

Forgotten Creators of the German Atomic Bomb

Dr. Todd H. Rider

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Bad Honnef

US-German WE Heraeus Seminar

The American and the German Atomic Bomb Projects and Their Legacies

**Der Welt Erbe gewänne
zu eigen,
wer aus dem Rheingold
schüfe den Ring,
der maß lose Macht
ihm verlieh’.**

**The whole world can be
possessed by one
who from the Rhinegold
forges the Ring,
which can bestow
immeasurable power.**


Richard Wagner, *Das Rheingold*, Scene I, Wellgunde (1854)

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Acknowledgments

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


Complete set of slides and more available at riderinstitute.org/revolutionary-innovation

Slides correspond to the 15 sections of *Forgotten Creators* Appendix D:

- 1. Conventional view of the wartime German nuclear program**
- 2. Origins and organization of the German nuclear program**
- 3. Sources of uranium and thorium**
- 4. Enrichment of uranium-235 (^{235}U)**
- 5. Breeding plutonium-239 (^{239}Pu) or uranium-233 (^{233}U) in fission reactors**
- 6. Breeding ^{239}Pu or ^{233}U in electronuclear systems**
- 7. Production of heavy water (D_2O) and other nuclear-related materials**
- 8. German fission bomb design (explosive yield ~ tens of kilotons)**
- 9. German hydrogen bomb design (explosive yield ~ megatons)**
- 10. October 1944 test explosion on the Baltic coast**
- 11. ~November 1944 test explosion in Poland**
- 12. March 1945 test explosions in Thuringia**
- 13. Wartime/postwar Axis belief in the reality of German nuclear weapons**
- 14. Wartime/postwar Allied belief in the reality of German nuclear weapons**
- 15. Conclusions and further work**

1. Conventional View of German Program: Alsos

At the end of the war, the U.S.-led Alsos Mission searching for nuclear work found an incomplete fission reactor at Haigerloch, some papers on basic nuclear physics, and apparently not much else, according to the public accounts.



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


At the end of the war, the U.S.-led Alsos Mission searching for nuclear work found an incomplete fission reactor at Haigerloch, some papers on basic nuclear physics, and apparently not much else, according to the public accounts.

Alsos failed to properly investigate numerous specific organizations, scientists, and locations that could have revealed a more advanced nuclear program.

If any more advanced nuclear work had in fact been discovered, that information would have been automatically classified at the time, and could remain classified or buried in archives and unreleased to this day.





Haigerloch



1. Conventional View of German Program: Farm Hall

10 scientists (Erich Bagge, Kurt Diebner, Walther Gerlach, Otto Hahn, Paul Harteck, Werner Heisenberg, Horst Korsching, Max von Laue, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, and Karl Wirtz) were kept under house arrest July 1945–January 1946 at Farm Hall, U.K., where their conversations were secretly recorded.



The transcripts record the scientists' surprise at news of the 6 August 1945 Hiroshima bombing and do not reveal significant apparent knowledge of nuclear weapons design and development.



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A huge number of relevant nuclear scientists were not at Farm Hall.

Those who were there suspected surveillance and presumably conducted their conversations accordingly.



The preserved transcripts document only a small fraction of the discussions that would have occurred among ten people and their British attendants during those six months.

The transcripts are English translations, which may not accurately reflect the original German conversations.

Oddly, both the original recordings and the original German transcripts just happen to have been completely lost.

1. Conventional View of German Program: Public Remarks

In their public interviews and writings in the years after the war, German nuclear scientists professed a lack of desire, plans, materials and/or political support to produce nuclear weapons for the Third Reich.





1. Conventional View of German Program: Public Remarks

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Only a small number of nuclear scientists went on the public record.

It was in their best personal interests to downplay the wartime German nuclear program, their knowledge of it, and their support for it.



1. Reconstructing the Wartime German Nuclear Program

The German nuclear program was coordinated by the Heer 1930s-1942 and SS 1942-1945, was highly compartmentalized, and was spread over:

- German-controlled Europe from Norway to Bulgaria, plus several nominally neutral countries (Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, Spain).
- Many government branches (Heer, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, SS, Reichspost, Organisation Todt, etc.).
- Many companies (I.G. Farben, AEG, Siemens, Degussa/Auer, Treibacher, etc.).
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The highly distributed, compartmentalized, and redundant organization of the program made it:

- Much more resistant to wartime Allied intelligence and bombing.
- Much more challenging for modern historians to reconstruct.

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Other difficulties for modern historians include:

- Germany destroyed/buried much at end of war.
- Many different organizations from different countries found and removed different pieces of the German program, and still keep much of it classified even 80 years later.
- Rediscovering the wartime program tarnishes the modern public images of all of the former Axis, Allied, and neutral countries that were involved.

2. Origins of the German Nuclear Program

**1920s: Georg Stetter, Fritz
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working on nuclear energy release**

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1934: Ida Tacke Noddack published
theoretical predictions of uranium
fission and plutonium production

Über das Element 93.

Von Dr.-Ing. IDA

NODDACK, Berlin.

(Eingeg. 10. September 1934.)

Vor etwa vier Monaten wurde in dieser Zeitschrift über die Lücken des Periodischen Systems berichtet¹⁾. Am Schluß der Arbeit wurde auf die Möglichkeit der Entdeckung von Transuranen (d. h. Elementen, die im System auf das Uran folgen) eingegangen.

Wenige Wochen später erschienen zuerst in der Tagespresse, dann auch in der Fachliteratur Nachrichten, daß es zwei Forschern, Prof. *Fermi* in Rom und Ingenieur *Koblic* in Joachimsthal, unabhängig voneinander gelungen sei, das Element mit der Ordnungszahl 93 zu entdecken.

Wir wollen uns zunächst mit den Angaben von *Fermi*²⁾ beschäftigen. *Fermi* hat die Frage untersucht, ob man die von *Curie* und *Joliot* entdeckte sogenannte induzierte Radioaktivität, die beim Beschießen von Atomkernen mit α -Strahlen entsteht, auch durch die Einwirkung von Neutronen hervorrufen kann.

Er brachte in ein Glasgefäß Beryllpulver und Radiumemanation. Die Emanation emittiert α -Strahlen, diese treffen auf die Atomkerne des Berylliums und lösen in ihnen Neutronen aus. Die Neutronen durchdringen

¹⁾ I. Noddack, diese Zschr. 47, 301 [1934].

²⁾ E. *Fermi*, Nature 133, 868 [1934].

die Wände des Glasgefäßes und können auf in der Nähe befindliche Stoffe einwirken. *Fermi* brachte eine Reihe von Elementen in elementarer Form oder als Verbindungen in die Nähe seiner Strahlenquelle, ließ die Neutronen einwirken und setzte dann die bestrahlten Stoffe vor einen Geiger-Zähler. Zahlreiche Elemente sandten nach Bestrahlung mit Neutronen eine Zeitlang β -Strahlen aus, wiesen also in der Tat induzierte Radioaktivität auf³⁾. Auf die Hypothesen, die *Fermi* zur Erklärung der zum Teil recht verwinkelten Erscheinungen aufstellte⁴⁾, soll hier nicht eingegangen werden, da uns nur ein Fall, die angebliche Entstehung des Elements 93, interessiert. Zum Studium der induzierten Radioaktivität des Urans brachte *Fermi* Uranylinitratlösung, die er von allen radioaktiven Zerfallsprodukten befreit hatte, in die Nähe seiner Neutronenquelle. Mit Hilfe des Geiger-Zählers konnte er zeigen, daß die Lösung durch die Bestrahlung radioaktiv geworden war und β -Strahlen aus-

³⁾ Natürlich wird nicht die Gesamtzahl der Atome des bestrahlten Stoffes radioaktiv, sondern nur eine unwägbar Menge, in diesem Fall einige hundert Atome.

⁴⁾ E. *Fermi*, Nature 133, 757 [1934].

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Noddack: Über das Element 93

[Angewandte Chemie
47. Jahre, 1934, Nr. 37]

sandte. Die Auswertung der Abklingungskurve ergab, daß nicht nur ein, sondern mindestens fünf radioaktive Elemente von verschiedenen Halbwertszeiten entstanden waren, wobei es bisher, wie *Fermi* betont, noch unsicher ist, ob diese Elemente nacheinander oder nebeneinander entstehen.

Es gelang nun *Fermi*, eins dieser neu entstandenen Radioelemente, und zwar eins mit der Halbwertszeit 13 min, auf chemischem Wege abzutrennen. Er verfuhr dabei so, daß er die bestrahlte stark salpetersaure Uranylinitratlösung mit etwas Manganoalz versetzte, zum Kochen erhitzte, und dann Natriumchlorat zugeb. In dem ausgeschiedenen Mangandioxyd war der größte Teil der β -Aktivität mit der Halbwertszeit von 13 min enthalten. *Fermi* versucht nun zu beweisen, daß das Radioelement, dem diese β -Aktivität zukommt, mit keinem bekannten Element in der Nähe des Urans isotop ist. Er setzt zu diesem Zweck zu der salpetersauren Lösung von bestrahltem Uranylinitrat nacheinander β -strahlende Isotope folgender Elemente: Protactinium (91), Thor (90), Actinium (89), Radium (88), Wismut (85) und Blei (82) und fällt dann Mangandioxyd mit Natriumchlorat. Alle die genannten β -strahlenden Elemente gehen nach *Fermi* nicht in den Niederschlag. Da das unbekannte Radioelement aber in die Manganfällung geht, und da es seinem Verhalten nach auch nicht mit Radon (86) und Ekacäsium (87) isotop sein kann, zieht *Fermi* den Schluß, daß es das unbekannte Element 93 (vielleicht auch 94 oder 95) sein könnte.

Diese Beweisführung ist nicht stichhaltig. Die Tatsache, daß *Fermi* nicht nur den bekannten unmittelbaren Nachbarn des Urans, das Protactinium, mit seinem neu entstandenen β -Strahler vergleicht, sondern mehrere Elemente bis herab zum Blei, beweist, daß er eine Reihe aufeinander folgender Abbauprozesse (unter Abgabe von Elektronen, Protonen und Heliumkernen) für möglich hält, die schließlich zur Bildung des Radioelements mit der Halbwertszeit 13 min führen. — Wenn er aber das tut, ist nicht einzusehen, warum er zwischen Uran (92) und Blei (82) das Element Polonium (84) nicht berücksichtigt, und warum er gerade beim Blei Halt macht; denn die alte Anschauung, daß die ununterbrochene Reihe radioaktiver Elemente beim Blei oder vielmehr beim

Polonium ausgeführter Versuch zeigte, daß dieses Element nahezu quantitativ in den MnO_2 -Niederschlag eingeht⁵⁾. Der Beweis, daß das neue Radioelement die Ordnungszahl 93 hat, ist also noch keineswegs glücklich, da *Fermi* ihn nur durch ein unvollkommen durchgeführtes Ausschlußverfahren versucht hat.

Man kann ebensogut annehmen, daß bei dieser neuartigen Kernzertrümmerung durch Neutronen erheblich andere „Kernreaktionen“ stattfinden, als man sie bisher bei der Einwirkung von Protonen- und α -Strahlen auf Atomkerne beobachtet hat. Bei den letztgenannten Bestrahlungen findet man nur Kernumwandlungen unter Abgabe von Elektronen, Protonen und Heliumkernen, wodurch sich bei schweren Elementen die Masse der bestrahlten Atomkerne nur wenig ändert, da nahe benachbarte Elemente entstehen. Es wäre denkbar, daß bei der Beschließung schwerer Kerne mit Neutronen diese Kerne in mehrere größere Bruchstücke zerfallen, die zwar Isotope bekannter Elemente, aber nicht Nachbarn der bestrahlten Elemente sind.

Auch der Befund, daß das neue Radioelement in saurer Lösung bei Fällung von Rheniumsulfid in diesen Niederschlag geht, spricht nicht für 93; denn erstens absorbiert das Rheniumsulfid gern andere Stoffe, und zweitens läßt die Voraussage der vermutlichen Eigenschaften von 93 es noch keineswegs sicher erscheinen, daß dieses Element ein säurebeständiges Sulfid bilden würde.

Weiterhin würde sich aus den Versuchen von *Fermi*, wenn seine Deutung richtig wäre, die von ihm nicht erwähnte Folgerung ergeben, daß aus dem β -strahlenden Element 93 das Element 94 entstehen müßte. Dieses Element sollte man verhältnismäßig leicht chemisch von 93 trennen können.

Man muß noch weitere Untersuchungen abwarten, ehe man behaupten darf, daß hier das Element 93 wirklich gefunden ist. *Fermi* selbst ist in dieser Hinsicht, wie bereits erwähnt wurde, vorsichtig, nur in einem Referat⁶⁾ über seine Versuche und in den Berichten der Tagespresse glaubt man schon des Resultates sicher zu sein.

Die zweite Angabe über die Auffindung des Elements 93 stammt von Odolen *Koblic*⁷⁾. Er teilte mit, daß er aus dem Waschwasser der gerösteten Pechblende von Joachimsthal reine Salze des Elements 93 in erheblicher Menge (die Pechblende sollte etwa 1% dieses

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¹⁾ I. Noddack, diese Zschr. 47, 301 [1934].

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die Wände des Glasgefäßes und können auf in der Nähe befindliche Stoffe einwirken. *Fermi* brachte eine Reihe von Elementen in elementarer Form oder als Verbindungen in die Nähe seiner Strahlenquelle, ließ die Neutronen einwirken und setzte dann die bestrahlten Stoffe vor einen Geiger-Zähler. Zahlreiche Elemente sandten nach Bestrahlung mit Neutronen eine Zeitlang β -Strahlen aus, wiesen also in der Tat induzierte Radioaktivität auf³⁾. Auf die Hypothese, die *Fermi* zur Erklärung der zum Teil recht verwickelten Erscheinungen aufstellt⁴⁾, soll hier nicht eingegangen werden, da uns nur ein Fall, die angebliche Entstehung des Elements 93, interessiert. Zum Studium der induzierten Radioaktivität des Urans brachte *Fermi* Uranylinitratlösung, die er von allen radioaktiven Zerfallsprodukten befreit hatte, in die Nähe seiner Neutronenquelle. Mit Hilfe des Geiger-Zählers konnte er zeigen, daß die Lösung durch die Bestrahlung radioaktiv geworden war und β -Strahlen aus-

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654 Noddack: Über das Element 93 [Angewandte Chemie 47. Jahre, 1934, Nr. 37]

sandte. Die Auswertung der Abklingungskurve ergab, daß nicht nur ein, sondern mindestens fünf radioaktive Elemente von verschiedenen Halbwertszeiten entstanden waren, wobei es bisher, wie *Fermi* betont, noch unsicher ist, ob diese Elemente nacheinander oder nebeneinander entstehen.

Es gelang nun *Fermi*, eins dieser neu entstandenen Radioelemente, und zwar eins mit der Halbwertszeit 13 min, auf chemischem Wege abzutrennen. Er verfuhr dabei so, daß er die bestrahlte stark salpetersaure Uranylinitratlösung mit etwas Manganoalz versetzte, zum Kochen erhitzte, und dann Natriumchlorat zugeb. In dem ausgeschiedenen Mangandioxyd war der größte Teil der β -Aktivität mit der Halbwertszeit von 13 min enthalten. *Fermi* versucht nun zu beweisen, daß das Radioelement, dem diese β -Aktivität zukommt, mit keinem bekannten Element in der Nähe des Urans isotop ist. Er setzt zu diesem Zweck zu der salpetersauren Lösung von bestrahltem Uranylinitrat nacheinander β -strahlende Isotope folgender Elemente: Protactinium (91), Thor (90), Actinium (89), Radium (88), Wismut (85) und Blei (82) und fällt dann Mangandioxyd mit Natriumchlorat. Alle die genannten β -strahlenden Elemente gehen nach *Fermi* nicht in den Niederschlag. Da das unbekannte Radioelement aber in die Manganfällung geht, und da es seinem Verhalten nach auch nicht mit Radon (86) und Ekacäsium (87) isotop sein kann, zieht *Fermi* den Schluß, daß es das unbekannte Element 93 (vielleicht auch 94 oder 95) sein könnte.

Diese Beweisführung ist nicht stichhaltig. Die Tatsache, daß *Fermi* nicht nur den bekannten unmittelbaren Nachbarn des Urans, das Protactinium, mit seinem neu entstandenen β -Strahler vergleicht, sondern mehrere Elemente bis herab zum Blei, beweist, daß er eine Reihe aufeinander folgender Abbauprozesse (unter Abgabe von Elektronen, Protonen und Heliumkernen) für möglich hält, die schließlich zur Bildung des Radioelements mit der Halbwertszeit 13 min führen. — Wenn er aber das tut, ist nicht einzusehen, warum er zwischen Uran (92) und Blei (82) das Element Polonium (84) nicht berücksichtigt, und warum er gerade beim Blei Halt macht; denn die alte Anschauung, daß die ununterbrochene Reihe radioaktiver Elemente beim Blei oder vielmehr beim

Polonium ausgeführter Versuch zeigte, daß dieses Element nahezu quantitativ in den MnO_2 -Niederschlag eingeht⁵⁾. Der Beweis, daß das neue Radioelement die Ordnungszahl 93 hat, ist also noch keineswegs glücklich, da *Fermi* ihn nur durch ein unvollkommen durchgeführtes Ausschlußverfahren versucht hat.

Man kann ebensogut annehmen, daß bei dieserartigen Kernzertrümmerung durch Neutronen erheblich andere „Kernreaktionen“ stattfinden, als man sie bisher bei der Einwirkung von Protonen- und α -Strahlen auf Atomkerne beobachtet hat. Bei den letztgenannten Bestrahlungen findet man nur Kernumwandlungen unter Abgabe von Elektronen, Protonen und Heliumkernen, wodurch sich bei schweren Elementen die Masse der bestrahlten Atomkerne nur wenig ändert, da nahe benachbarte Elemente entstehen. Es wäre denkbar, daß bei der Beschleßung schwerer Kerne mit Neutronen diese Kerne in mehrere größere Bruchstücke zerfallen, die zwar Isotope bekannter Elemente, aber nicht Nachbarn der bestrahlten Elemente sind.

Auch der Befund, daß das neue Radioelement in saurer Lösung bei Fällung von Rheniumsulfid in diesen Niederschlag geht, spricht nicht für 93; denn erstens absorbiert das Rheniumsulfid gern andere Stoffe, und zweitens läßt die Voraussage der vermutlichen Eigenschaften von 93 es noch keineswegs sicher erscheinen, daß dieses Element ein säurebeständiges Sulfid bilden würde.

Weiterhin würde sich aus den Versuchen von *Fermi*, wenn seine Deutung richtig wäre, die von ihm nicht erwähnte Folgerung ergeben, daß aus dem β -strahlenden Element 93 das Element 94 entstehen müßte. Dieses Element sollte man verhältnismäßig leicht chemisch von 93 trennen können.

Man muß noch weitere Untersuchungen abwarten, ehe man behaupten darf, daß hier das Element 93 wirklich gefunden ist. *Fermi* selbst ist in dieser Hinsicht, wie bereits erwähnt wurde, vorsichtig, nur in einem Referat⁶⁾ über seine Versuche und in den Berichten der Tagespresse glaubt man schon des Resultates sicher zu sein.

Die zweite Angabe über die Auffindung des Elements 93 stammt von Odolen *Koblic*⁷⁾. Er teilte mit, daß er aus dem Waschwasser der gerösteten Pechblende von Joachimsthal reine Salze des Elements 93 in erheblicher Menge (die Pechblende sollte etwa 1% dieses

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2. Origins of the German Nuclear Program

1920s: Georg Stetter, Fritz Houtermans, and others began working on nuclear energy release

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Über das Element 93.

Von Dr.-Ing. IDA

NODDACK, Berlin.

(Eingel. 10. September 1934.)

Vor etwa vier Monaten wurde in dieser Zeitschrift über die Lücken des Periodischen Systems berichtet¹⁾. Am Schluß der Arbeit wurde auf die Möglichkeit der Entdeckung von Transuranen (d. h. Elementen, die im System auf das Uran folgen) eingegangen.

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1934-1938: AEG, I.G. Farben, and Auergesellschaft patented high-voltage fusion neutron generators and tritium breeders

PATENT SPECIFICATION

Convention Date (Germany): Feb. 9, 1937.

508,233

Application Date (in United Kingdom): Feb. 7, 1938.

No. 3845/38.

Complete Specification Accepted: June 28, 1939.



COMPLETE SPECIFICATION

Method for Carrying out Nuclear Reactions

WE, DIESEL, AUSTRIAN PATENT OFFICE (AUSTRIAN PATENT OFFICE), of 16-19, Ballhausgasse, Berlin, O.T. (Germany), a German Company, do hereby declare the nature of this invention and in what manner the same is to be performed, to be particularly described and ascertained in and by the following statements:—

Artificial nuclear reactions are initiated by the bombardment of certain light elementary particles. With the use of charged particles of a particular energy of 10⁶ to 10⁷ volts are necessary for overcoming the Coulombic repulsion and, in order to ensure a sufficient yield for the penetration of the particles into the bombarded nucleus.

Such a repulsion does not exist for neutrons, so that neutrons of small speed can penetrate into nuclei and produce reactions, as experiments actually show. Unfortunately, there are no direct sources producing neutrons; they arise, for example, by the fission of heavy nuclei or by the bombardment of certain nuclei with fast particles of the heavy nuclei of hydrogen. As sources of neutrons of sufficiently high energy, only the latter are available, while the use of fast particles of heavy nuclei is necessary to be able to ensure for the production of neutrons a sufficient energy. With the remaining lighter nuclei methods for the production of elementary particles rich in energy have been used directly, or indirectly through the production of very energetic rays, for the production of neutrons and generally for the initiation of nuclear reactions, there exists to be used the braking action of the electron cloud of high vacuum. This method indeed produces definite results, but only at the expense of very heavy outlay in the matter of electro-technical apparatus for building up an increase in the current density of the accelerated particles, and also gives a greater electron yield from the neutron discharge. For this it is necessary that the neutron discharge (number of 10⁶ neutrons per cubic centimeter) be as great

UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE

1,551,9

METHOD OF PRODUCING NEUTRONS

HERBERT IRVING HALLMANN, formerly known as HERBERT SCHMANN, formerly of Berlin, Germany, and now of Berlin, Germany, do hereby declare the nature of this invention and in what manner the same is to be performed, to be particularly described and ascertained in and by the following statements:—

Application March 14, 1939 Serial No. 261,526 In Germany March 14, 1939

15 Claims. (Cl. 200-46)

The body impinged on by the ions is preferably made of a substance that strongly adsorbs the molecules containing heavy hydrogen and which is capable for the impinging ions. Chlorine and boron have been found useful for these reasons. It is especially desirable to employ substances in which the molecules containing heavy hydrogen is as thick a layer as possible. This can be accomplished for instance by using a substance that is permeable to the ions and the molecules containing heavy hydrogen. The molecules containing heavy hydrogen are adsorbed on the surface of the substance by the energy of the impinging ions. In this way the ions strike off the adsorbed substance is promoted. It is, therefore, advisable to cool the adsorbent body. This cooling has the advantage, moreover, that at low temperature the adsorbed heavy atoms move more easily. A variation of the temperature of only 10° C. for instance from 20° C. room temperature to 10° C. is sufficient for a considerable improvement. In many cases, it is advisable to use solid carbon dioxide or even liquid air for the cooling.

The adsorbed layer can be produced in the usual way, for instance by taking up heavy hydrogen of molecules containing heavy hydrogen from the surroundings, for instance from air, by bombarding the surface with heavy hydrogen ions. It is advisable to fix the surface intended for the adsorption of heavy hydrogen as far as possible from other adsorbed substances, such as ordinary hydrogen, for example, by heating in vacuum. Moreover, the gas hydrogen strikes off during the ion bombardment can be accumulated, for instance, by discharges of subsequent bombardment with ions containing heavy hydrogen. This bombardment can be accomplished, for instance, with advantage from a different direction, for example, from the back of the bombarding, for producing neutrons. The bombardment can be made in many ways as described, for example, by diffusion or by adsorption on the ions at an angle—preferably in a straight manner as possible.

The adsorbent layer containing hydrogen need not consist of pure hydrogen. It might under certain conditions be more advantageous if the adsorbent layer consists of gases or vapors containing hydrogen, for instance, ammonia or water. This is possible, for example, by using these substances are adsorbed especially strongly.

1936: Rausch von Traubenberg began using surrounding neutron reflectors




Fig. 3. Schema der Anordnung von Neutronenquelle und Detektor im Eisenhohlraum.

1934: Erich Schumann (shaped charge expert) hired Kurt Diebner (nuclear physicist) for army weapons program

2. Origins of the German Nuclear Program

Die Naturwissenschaften 27:11-15 (January 1939)

synthetischem Asbest¹, von künstlichem Glimmer², von künstlichem Kalksil und Montmorillonit³. Bei allen diesen Versuchen hat man zwar bisher nur sehr kleine Kristalle erhalten, deren Identifizierung nur mittelst Röntgenanalyse sicherzustellen werden konnte. Fruchtbar müssen. Interesse Technisch bei denen die einzelnen Eigenschaften der Verbindungen

Hahn and Strassmann

¹ K. H. SCHUBERT, Fortsch. d. Min. Krist. Petrographie 17, 69 (1937). — W. LÜTTGE, Fortsch. d. Min. Krist. Petrographie 18, 29 (1933); 15, 49 (1935). — Vgl. auch MACHATSCH, Naturwiss. 24, 742 (1939).
² W. NOTZ, Naturwiss. 20, 283 (1932).
³ W. NOTZ, Naturwiss. 20, 366 (1933).
⁴ W. NOTZ, Naturwiss. 23, 197 (1935); vgl. auch W. NOTZ, Ber. dtsch. keram. Ges. 19, H. 5 (1938).

Über den Nachweis und das Verhalten der bei der Bestrahlung des Urans mittels Neutronen entstehenden Erdalkalimetalle¹.

Von O. HAHN und F. STRASSMANN, Berlin-Dahlem.

In einer vor kurzem an dieser Stelle erschienenen vorläufigen Mitteilung² wurde angegeben, daß bei der Bestrahlung des Urans mittels Neutronen außer den von MEITNER, HAHN und STRASSMANN im einzelnen beschriebenen Trans-Uranen — den Elementen 93 bis 96 — noch eine ganze Anzahl anderer Umwandlungsprodukte entstehen, die ihre Bildung offensichtlich einem sukzessiven zweimaligen α -Strahlenerfall des vorübergehend entstandenen Urans 239 verdanken. Durch einen solchen Zerfall muß aus dem Element mit der Kernladung 92 ein solches mit der Kernladung 88 entstehen, also ein Radium. In der genannten Mitteilung wurden in einem noch als vorläufig bezeichneten Zerfallschema 3 derartiger isomerer Radiumisotope mit ungefähr geschätzten Halbwertszeiten und ihren Umwandlungsprodukten, nämlich drei isomeren Actiniumisotopen, angegeben, die ihrerseits offensichtlich in Thorisotope übergehen.

Zugleich wurde auf die zunächst unerwartete Beobachtung hingewiesen, daß diese unter α -Strahlenabspaltung über ein Thorium sich bildenden Radiumisotope nicht nur mit schnellen, sondern auch mit verlangsamtten Neutronen entstehen.

Der Schluß, daß es sich bei den Anfangsgliedern dieser drei neuen isomeren Reihen um Radiumisotope handelt, wurde darauf begründet, daß diese Substanzen sich mit Bariumsalzen abscheiden lassen und alle Reaktionen zeigen, die dem Element Barium eigen sind. Alle anderen bekannten Elemente, angefangen von den Trans-Uranen über das Uran, Protactinium, Thorium bis zum Actinium haben andere chemische Eigenschaften als das Barium und lassen sich leicht von ihm trennen. Dasselbe trifft zu für die Elemente unterhalb Radium, also etwa Wismut, Blei, Polonium, Ekaactinium. Es bleibt also, wenn man das Barium selbst außer Betracht läßt, nur das Radium übrig.

Im folgenden soll kurz die Abscheidung des Isotopengemisches und die Gewinnung der einzelnen

Prüfung des Glases vollkommen verloren haben, sowie ferner, daß die Beschichtung des Iostecristinus von Quarz und $AlPO_4$ zu technisch brauchbaren neuartigen Gläsern geführt hat.

Ich möchte schließen mit der Forderung, daß auch die mehr nennenswerten Kenntnisse der Kristallstruktur und Bindungsart der praktisch brauchbaren Stoffe vertieft werden müssen, um in planmäßiger Weise diejenigen chemischen Elemente zur Verbindungsbildung beizuziehen, die aus den allgemeinen Erkenntnissen über Bau, Größe und Bindungsvermögen der Atome in Betracht kommen und in Deutschland als Rohstoffe vorhanden sind.

Die einzelnen Eigenschaften der Verbindungen der Elemente 93 bis 96 sind noch nicht bekannt. Die Kenntnis der Kristallstruktur und Bindungsart der praktisch brauchbaren Stoffe vertieft werden müssen, um in planmäßiger Weise diejenigen chemischen Elemente zur Verbindungsbildung beizuziehen, die aus den allgemeinen Erkenntnissen über Bau, Größe und Bindungsvermögen der Atome in Betracht kommen und in Deutschland als Rohstoffe vorhanden sind.

Glieder beschrieben werden. Aus dem Aktivitätsverlauf der einzelnen Isotope ergibt sich ihre Halbwertszeit und lassen sich die daraus entstehenden Folgeprodukte ermitteln. Die letzteren werden in dieser Mitteilung aber im einzelnen noch nicht beschrieben, weil wegen der sehr komplexen Vorgänge — es handelt sich um mindestens 3, wahrscheinlich 4 Reihen mit je 3 Substanzen — die Halbwertszeiten aller Folgeprodukte bisher noch nicht erschöpfend festgestellt werden konnten.

Als Trägersubstanz für die „Radiumisotope“ diente naturgemäß immer das Barium. Am nächstliegenden war die Fällung des Bariums als Bariumauflauf, das neben dem Chromat schwerlösliche Bariumsalze. Nach früheren Erfahrungen und einigen Vorversuchen wurde aber von der Abscheidung der „Radiumisotope“ mit Bariumauflauf abgesehen; denn diese Niederschläge bilden neben geringen Mengen Uran nicht unbeträchtliche Mengen von Actinium- und Thoriumisotopen mit, also auch die mutmaßlichen Umwandlungsprodukte der Radiumisotope, und erlauben daher keine Reindarstellung der Ausgangsglieder. Statt der quantitativen, sehr oberflächennahen Sulfidfällung wurde daher das in starker Salzsäure sehr schwer lösliche Bariumchlorid als Fällungsmittel gewählt; eine Methode, die sich bestens bewährt hat.

Bei der energetisch nicht leicht zu verstehenden Bildung von Radiumisotopen aus Uran beim Beschießen mit langsamen Neutronen war eine besonders gründliche Bestimmung des chemischen Charakters der neu entstehenden künstlichen Radioelemente unerlässlich. Durch die Abtrennung einzelner analytischer Gruppen von Elementen aus der Lösung des bestrahlten Urans wurde außer der großen Gruppe der Transurane eine Aktivität stets bei den Erdalkalien (Trägersubstanz Ba), den seltenen Erden (Trägersubstanz La) und bei Elementen der vierten Gruppe des Periodischen Systems (Trägersubstanz Zr) gefunden. Eingehender untersucht wurden zunächst die Bariumfällungen, die offensichtlich die Anfangsglieder der beobachteten isomeren Reihen enthielten. Es soll gezeigt werden, daß Transurane, Uran, Protactinium, Thorium und Actinium

¹ Aus dem Kaiser Wilhelm-Institut für Chemie in Berlin-Dahlem. Eingegangen 22. Dezember 1938.
² O. HAHN u. F. STRASSMANN, Naturwiss. 26, 246 (1938).

2. Origins of the German Nuclear Program

Die Naturwissenschaften 27:11-15 (January 1939)

Hett l.
6. 1. 1939.

Hahn u. Strassmann: Über den Nachweis und das Verhalten der Erdalkalimetalle.

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Über den Nachweis und das Verhalten der bei der Bestrahlung des Urans mittels Neutronen entstehenden Erdalkalimetalle¹.

Von O. HAHN und F. STRASSMANN, Berlin-Dahlem.

In einer vor kurzem an dieser Stelle erschienenen vorläufigen Mitteilung² wurde angegeben, daß bei der Bestrahlung des Urans mittels Neutronen außer den von MEITNER, HAHN und STRASSMANN im einzelnen beschriebenen Trans-Uranen — den Elementen 93 bis 96 — noch eine ganze Anzahl anderer Umwandlungsprodukte entstehen, die ihre Bildung offensichtlich einem sukzessiven zweimaligen α -Strahlenerfall des vorübergehend entstandenen Urans 239 verdanken. Durch einen solchen Zerfall muß aus dem Element mit der Kernladung 92 ein solches mit der Kernladung 88 entstehen, also ein Radium. In der genannten Mitteilung wurden in einem noch als vorläufig bezeichneten Zerfallsschema 3 derartiger isomerer Radiumisotope mit ungefähr geschätzten Halbwertszeiten und ihren Umwandlungsprodukten, nämlich drei isomeren Actiniumisotopen, angegeben, die ihrerseits offensichtlich in Thorisotope übergehen.

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Im folgenden soll kurz die Abscheidung des Isotopengemisches und die Gewinnung der einzelnen

Spürigkeit des Glases vollkommen verloren haben, sowie ferner, daß die Beschichtung des Isotopstrahls von Quarz und AlPO_4 zu technisch brauchbaren neuartigen Gläsern geführt hat.

Ich möchte schließen mit der Forderung, daß auchbare n Kennt-zung des ungeschiet

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ÖSTERREICHISCHES PATENTAMT
PATENTSCHRIFT NR. 219170
Ausgegeben am 10. Jänner 1962

ALPENLÄNDISCHER ZENTRALVEREIN
ZUR FÖRDERUNG SCHÖPFERISCHEN SCHAFFENS
IN SALZBURG

Vorrichtung zur technischen Energiegewinnung mit Hilfe von
Kernspaltungsreaktionen

Angemeldet am 30. Juni 1958 (A. 4597/58); als Tag der Anmeldung gilt der
14. Juni 1959 (Tag der Hinterlegung beim Deutschen Reichspatentamt).
Beginn der Patentdauer: 15. Juni 1961.
Längste mögliche Dauer: 14. Juni 1971.
Als Erfinder wird genannt: Dr. Georg Stetter in Zell am See (Salzburg).

Die Erfindung bezieht sich auf eine Vorrichtung zur technischen Energiegewinnung mit Hilfe von Kernspaltungsreaktionen, wobei außer den eigentlichen Spaltsubstanzen (Brennstoff) neutronenstreuende Substanzen (Moderator) und gegebenenfalls neutronenabsorbierende Substanzen (Absorber) verwendet sind.

In derartigen Vorrichtungen (Spaltungsreaktoren) wird die Aufrechterhaltung der energieproduzierenden, mit Hilfe der bei der Kernspaltung entstehenden Spaltneutronen (Sekundärneutronen) als Kettenreaktion ablaufenden Kernspaltungen dadurch bewirkt, daß die schnellen Spaltneutronen in den neutronenstreuenden Substanzen (Moderator) auf langsame Geschwindigkeiten gebremst (moderiert) werden. Dieser Vorgang erhöht die Häufigkeit der Kernspaltungen und damit auch der Neutronenproduktion, da Kernspaltungen in überwiegendem Maße von langsamen Neutronen bewirkt werden. Die Neutronenbilanz wird gehoben, wodurch erhöhte Neutronenverluste, welche den Abbruch der Kettenreaktion zur Folge haben, kompensiert werden können.

Eine derartige Vorrichtung wurde von S. Flügge in der Zeitschrift Naturwissenschaften 27 [1939] im Heft 20/24 vom 9. 6. 1939, S. 405/410 beschrieben, wobei nach dem Vorschlag von S. Flügge die Spaltsubstanzen (Brennstoff) mit den neutronenstreuenden Substanzen (Moderator) homogen gemischt sind (homogener Spaltungsreaktor).

Die Neutronenökonomie ist jedoch infolge starken Neutroneneinfanges durch die Spaltsubstanzen bei einer homogenen Mischung von Spaltsubstanzen und neutronenstreuenden Substanzen nicht gut, so daß eine Kettenreaktion nur unter erswerenden technischen Bedingungen in Gang gesetzt und aufrechterhalten werden kann.

Dieser Mangel wird durch die Erfindung dadurch behoben, daß die Spaltsubstanzen (Brennstoff) von den Neutronen streuenden Substanzen (Moderator) räumlich getrennt angeordnet sind (heterogener Spaltungsreaktor). Unter "räumlich getrennt" wird hier das Gegenteil einer homogenen Mischung verstanden, nämlich die "makroskopische" Eigenständigkeit der Bereiche der Spaltsubstanzen (Brennstoffbereiche) und der Bereiche der neutronenstreuenden Substanzen (Moderatorbereiche).

Dadurch, daß auf diese Weise die Spaltneutronen in von der Spaltsubstanz hinreichend entfernten Bereichen auf thermische Geschwindigkeit abgebremst werden, ergeben sie leichter den Einfangprozessen, welche bei bestimmten Maßen auftreten. Der durch die geometrischen Verhältnisse bedingte Neutronenverlust wird durch die geometrischen Verhältnisse des Reaktors so in besonderem Maße aufrechterhalten, daß die Kettenreaktion sich selbst erhält.

Vor dem Prioritätsdatum der Erfindung sind in einem Raum von der Spaltsubstanz getrennt angeordneten neutronenstreuenden Substanzen gebremst (vgl. Comptes Rendus 206, [1939], S. 898/900). Es ist jedoch vor dem Prioritätszeitpunkt der Erfindung nicht bekanntgeworden, eine derartige Anordnung auch zur Bremsung von in der Spaltsubstanz entstehenden Sekundärneutronen (Spaltneutronen) vorzusehen. Es

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Ich möchte schließen mit der Forderung, daß auch bei den nachfolgenden Versuchen eine möglichst genaue Kenntnis der Eigenschaften der untersuchten Elemente zur Verbindungsbildung beizubringen, die aus den allgemeinen Erkenntnissen über Bau, Größe und Bindungsvermögen der Atome in Betracht kommen und in Deutschland als Rohstoffe vorhanden sind.

Glieder beschrieben werden. Aus dem Aktivitätsverlauf der einzelnen Isotope ergibt sich ihre Halbwertszeit und lassen sich die daraus entstehenden Folgeprodukte ermitteln. Die letzteren werden in unsere Mitteilung aber im einzelnen noch nicht beschrieben, weil wegen der sehr komplexen Vorgänge — es handelt sich um mindestens 4 Reihen mit je 3 Substanzen — die Halbwertszeiten aller Folgeprodukte bisher noch nicht erschöpfend festgestellt werden konnten.

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ÖSTERREICHISCHES PATENTAMT PATENTSCHRIFT NR. 219170

Ausgegeben am 10. Januar 1962

Kl. 21.1g, 4/10

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S. K. Allison

- 6 -

December 20, 1945

2) At Berlin-Lichterfelde, in the private laboratory of the radio engineer, M. von Ardenne. At this laboratory some neutron work is being done, and at least one well-known neutron physicist (Houtermans) is employed.⁽²⁰⁾ It is interesting that an electronic research laboratory should extend into nuclear physics in war-time. Ardenne mentions that he was urged to do nuclear physics in 1939 by the Reichspostminister Ohnesorge.

3) A serviceable machine in Heidelberg, under Bothe.

(Can the presence and scale of secret work of these laboratories be determined?)

B. The principal laboratories which have published in this field are given after the text of the report with the names of the best-known workers, and with some statement of the nature of the work of each laboratory.

C. General personnel situation

The years 1940-1941 saw a dislocation of German nuclear physics similar to that in America. Heisenberg went from Leipzig to the K.W.I. at Berlin; men like Fock and Funke, early workers in the field, came from small universities to Berlin-Dahlem or Heidelberg. The British concluded⁽²¹⁾ that in Berlin-Dahlem was situated the main government team. This conclusion still seems sound. Much work was farmed out, as can be seen above, especially to Bothe's group, that the main secret work. that from late 1941 onwards involved a parallel German laboratory by Heisenberg's poison has been. have not meant against ant justified n bombe and/or

von Ardenne and Ohnesorge

A number of young German physicists have now published at all since their first 1939 work on fission. They may form the junior staff of the project. It is again true that mention of their presence has come largely from Hahn's group.

D. The University of Strasbourg

A possible opportunity to learn more is provided by the new Nazi university at Strasbourg, in Alsace. Apparently for purposes of propaganda, they have sent there in late 1942-early 1943 a rather strong faculty. Included are Heisenberg's closest co-worker at Berlin, K. F. v. Weizsäcker, Fleischmann, a well-known colleague of Bothe's, and Noddack, a man with experience in radio- and rare-element chemistry. These men will know a great deal. It is certainly true that Allied connections in Alsace are much better than those in Germany.

(Can this be employed to learn something about the German work through these men and their talk or activities?)

SECRET

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2. Origins of the German Nuclear Program

NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420, Box 6, Folder ALSOS—Reports and Operations

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Als Trägersubstanz für die „Radiumisotope“ diente naturgemäß immer das Barium. Am nächstliegenden war die Fällung des Bariums als Bariumsulfit, das neben dem Chromat schwerlösliche Bariumsalze. Nach früheren Erfahrungen und einigen Versuchen wurde aber von der Abscheidung der „Radiumisotope“ mit Bariumsulfit abgesehen, denn diese Niederschläge reisen neben geringen Mengen Uran nicht unbedeutliche Mengen von Actinium- und Thoriumisotopen mit, also auch die mutmaßlichen Umwandlungsprodukte dieser Radiumisotope, und erlauben daher keine Reindarstellung der Ausgangsglieder. Statt der quantitativen, sehr oberflächereichen Süßfällung wurde daher das in starker Salzsäure sehr schwer lösliche Bariumchlorid als Fällungsmittel gewählt; eine Methode, die sich bestens bewährt hat.

Bei der energetisch nicht leicht zu verstehenden Bildung von Radiumisotopen aus Uran beim Beschießen mit langsamen Neutronen war eine besondere gründliche Bestimmung des chemischen Charakters der neu entstehenden künstlichen Radioelemente unerlässlich. Durch die Abtrennung einzelner analytischer Gruppen von Elementen aus der Lösung des bestrahlten Urans wurde außer der großen Gruppe der Transurane eine Aktivität stets bei den Erdalkalien (Trägersubstanz Ba), den seltenen Erden (Trägersubstanz La) und bei Elementen der vierten Gruppe des Periodischen Systems (Trägersubstanz Zr) gefunden. Eingehender untersucht wurden zunächst die Bariumfällungen, die offensichtlich die Anfangsglieder der beobachteten isomeren Reihen enthalten. Es soll gezeigt werden, daß Transurane, Uran, Protactinium, Thorium und Actinium



ÖSTERREICHISCHES PATENTAMT
PATENTSCHRIFT NR. 219170

Ausgegeben am 10. Januar 1962

Kl. 21*i*, 4/10

ALPENLÄNDISCHER ZENTRALVEREIN
ZUR FÖRDERUNG SCHÖPFERISCHEN SCHAFFENS
IN SALZBURG

Vorrichtung zur technischen Energiegewinnung mit Hilfe von Kernspaltungsreaktionen

Angemeldet am 30. Juni 1958 (A. 4597/58); als Tag der Anmeldung gilt der 14. Juni 1959 (Tag der Hinterlegung beim Deutschen Reichpatentamt).
Beginn der Patentdauer: 15. Juni 1961.
Längste mögliche Dauer: 14. Juni 1971.
Als Erfinder wird genannt: Dr. Georg Stetter in Zell am See (Salzburg).

Die Erfindung bezieht sich auf eine Vorrichtung zur technischen Energiegewinnung mit Hilfe von Kernspaltungsreaktionen, wobei außer den eigentlichen Spaltsubstanzen (Brennstoff) neutronenstreuende Substanzen (Moderator) und gegebenenfalls neutronenabsorbierende Substanzen (Absorber) verwendet sind.

In derartigen Vorrichtungen (Spaltungsreaktoren) wird die Aufrechterhaltung der energieproduzierenden, mit Hilfe der bei der Kernspaltung entstehenden Spaltneutronen (Sekundärneutronen) als Kettenreaktion ablaufenden Kernspaltungen dadurch bewirkt, daß die schnellen Spaltneutronen in den neutronenstreuenden Substanzen (Moderator) auf langsame Geschwindigkeiten gebremst (moderiert) werden. Dieser Vorgang erhöht die Häufigkeit der Kernspaltungen und damit auch die Neutronenproduktion, da Kernspaltungen in überwiegendem Maße von langsamen Neutronen bewirkt werden. Die Neutronenbilanz wird gehoben, wodurch erhöhte Neutronenverluste, welche den Abbruch der Kettenreaktion zur Folge haben, kompensiert werden können.

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Die Neutronenökonomie ist jedoch infolge starken Neutroneneinfanges durch die Spaltsubstanzen bei einer homogenen Mischung von Spaltsubstanzen und neutronenstreuenden Substanzen nicht gut, so daß eine Kettenreaktion nur unter erschwerten technischen Bedingungen in Gang gesetzt und aufrechterhalten werden kann.

Dieser Mangel wird durch die Erfindung dadurch behoben, daß die Spaltsubstanzen (Brennstoff) von den Neutronen streuenden Substanzen (Moderator) räumlich getrennt angeordnet sind (heterogener Spaltungsreaktor). Unter „räumlich getrennt“ wird hier das Gegenteil einer homogenen Mischung verstanden, nämlich die „makroskopische“ Eigenständigkeit der Bereiche der Spaltsubstanzen (Brennstoffbereiche) und der Bereiche der neutronenstreuenden Substanzen (Moderatorbereiche).

Dadurch, daß auf diese Weise die Spaltneutronen in von der Spaltsubstanz hierarchisch eingefangenen Bereichen auf thermische Geschwindigkeit abgebremst werden, ergeben sie leichter den Einfangprozessen, welche bei bestimmter Substanz auftreten, eine in besonderem Maße aufrechterhaltung bedingende geometrische Form.

Georg Stetter

Vor dem Prioritätsdatum der Erfindung sind in der Technik Vorrichtungen bekannt, bei denen ein Reaktor-Präparat ausgetauscht werden kann, ohne den Reaktor zu stoppen. Diese Vorrichtungen sind jedoch nur zur Erzeugung von Wärme oder zur Erzeugung von elektrischer Energie geeignet. Es ist jedoch vor dem Prioritätszeitpunkt der Erfindung nicht bekanntgeworden, eine derartige Anordnung auch zur Erzeugung von elektrischer Energie zu verwenden. Es ist jedoch vor dem Prioritätszeitpunkt der Erfindung nicht bekanntgeworden, eine derartige Anordnung auch zur Erzeugung von elektrischer Energie zu verwenden. Es ist jedoch vor dem Prioritätszeitpunkt der Erfindung nicht bekanntgeworden, eine derartige Anordnung auch zur Erzeugung von elektrischer Energie zu verwenden.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ASD 4101-1

SECRET

2) At Berlin-Lichterfelde, in the private laboratory of the radio engineer, M. von Ardenne. At this laboratory some neutron work is being done, and at least one well-known neutron physicist (Houtermans) is employed. (20) It is interesting that an electronic research laboratory should extend into nuclear physics in war-time. Ardenne mentions that he was urged to do nuclear physics in 1939 by the Reichspostminister Ohnesorge.

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(Can the presence and scale of secret work of these laboratories be determined?)

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The years 1940-1941 saw a dislocation of German nuclear physics similar to that in America. Heisenberg went from Leipzig to the K.W.I. at Berlin; men like Fock and Panfer, early workers in the field, came from small universities to Berlin-Dahlem or Heidelberg. The British concluded (21) that in Berlin-Dahlem was situated the main government team. This conclusion still seems sound. Much work was farmed out, as can be seen above, especially to Bothe's group, who came to Darmstadt. The significance of this is not clear. It is not clear whether the work done at these laboratories is of a purely scientific nature, or whether it is of a more practical nature. It is not clear whether the work done at these laboratories is of a purely scientific nature, or whether it is of a more practical nature. It is not clear whether the work done at these laboratories is of a purely scientific nature, or whether it is of a more practical nature.

von Ardenne and Ohnesorge

A number of young German physicists have now published at all since their first 1939 work on fission. They may form the junior staff of the project. It is again true that mention of their presence has come largely from Hahn's group.

D. The University of Strasbourg

A possible opportunity to learn more is provided by the new Nazi university at Strasbourg, in Alsace. Apparently for purposes of propaganda, they have sent there in late 1942-early 1943 a rather strong faculty. Included are Heisenberg's closest co-worker at Berlin, K. F. v. Weizsäcker, Fleischmann, a well-known colleague of Bothe's, and Noddack, a man with experience in radio- and rare-element chemistry. These men will know a great deal. It is certainly true that Allied connections in Alsace are much better than those in Germany.

(Can this be employed to learn something about the German work through these men and their talk or activities?)

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SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ASD 4101-1

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
ALSOS MISSION
APO 887

25 May 1946

TO: Major R. R. Furman
FROM: Dr. S. A. Goudsmit

1. The Harteck file of correspondence with the RFR contains one very interesting document at the end. It is a proposal which was sent by Harteck and Groth to the War Ministry on 24 April 1939. In this letter, they write roughly:

"We take the liberty of calling to your attention the newest developments in nuclear physics which, in our opinion, will perhaps make it possible to produce an explosive which is many orders of magnitude more effective than the present one."

2. They then give a short popular account of the discovery of Hahn and the work of Joliot and mention that, in America and in England, great emphasis is placed on research in nuclear physics, whereas the same subject has been neglected in Germany.

3. They finish the letter with the following paragraph:
"It is obvious that, if the possibility of energy production outlined above can be realized, which certainly is within the realm of possibilities, that country which first makes use of it has an unsurpassable advantage over the others."

S. A. GOUDSMIT
Scientific Chief

NO DEPT. OF ENERGY CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION (NO ED/FRD/DSR-NRI)
COORDINATE 1
REF ID: A66484
AUTHORITY
BY R. H.
1/1/46

Harteck and Groth

SECRET

2. Origins of the German Nuclear Program

NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420, Box 6,
Folder ALSOS—Reports and Operations

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: 4802.32-1

synthetischem Asbest¹, von künstlichem Glimmer², von künstlichem Beryll³ und Monazit⁴. Bei allen diesen Versuchen hat man zwar bisher nur sehr kleine Kristalle erhalten, deren Identifizierung nur mittels Röntgenanalyse sicherzustellen werden konnte. Fruchtbar müssen. Interesse Techniker bei denen eine einheitliche Organisation eine Überwachung

¹ K. H. STRASSMANN, Fortsch. d. Min. Krist. Petrographie 17, 69 (1937). — W. LUTGE, Fortsch. d. Min. Krist. Petrographie 18, 29 (1933); 15, 40 (1935). — Vgl. auch MACHARD, Naturwiss., 24, 742 (1939).

² W. NOLL, Naturwiss., 20, 283 (1932).

³ W. NOLL, Naturwiss., 20, 366 (1933).

⁴ W. NOLL, Naturwiss., 23, 197 (1935). Vgl. auch W. NOLL, Ber. dtsch. keram. Ges. 19, H. 3 (1935).

Hahn und Strassmann

Über den Nachweis und das Verhalten der bei der Bestrahlung des Urans mittels Neutronen entstehenden Erdalkalimetalle¹.

Von O. HAHN und F. STRASSMANN, Berlin-Dahlem.

In einer vor kurzem an dieser Stelle erschienenen vorläufigen Mitteilung² wurde angegeben, daß bei der Bestrahlung des Urans mittels Neutronen außer den von MEITNER, HAHN und STRASSMANN im einzelnen beschriebenen Trans-Uranen — den Elementen 93 bis 96 — noch eine ganze Anzahl anderer Umwandlungsprodukte entstehen, die ihre Bildung offensichtlich einen sukzessiven zweimaligen α -Strahlenzerfall des vorübergehend entstandenen Urans 239 verdanken. Durch einen solchen Zerfall muß aus dem Element mit der Kernladung 92 ein solches mit der Kernladung 88 entstehen, also ein Radium. In der genannten Mitteilung wurden in einem noch als vorläufig beschriebenen Zerfallsschema 3 derartige isomere Radiumisotope mit ungefähr geschätzten Halbwertszeiten und ihren Umwandlungsprodukten, nämlich drei isomeren Actiniumisotopen, angegeben, die ihrerseits offensichtlich in Thorisotope übergehen.

Zugleich wurde auf die zunächst unerwartete Beobachtung hingewiesen, daß diese unter α -Strahlenabspaltung über ein Thorium sich bildenden Radiumisotope nicht nur mit schnellen, sondern auch mit verlangsamtsten Neutronen entstehen.

Der Schluß, daß es sich bei den Anfangsprodukten dieser drei neuen isomeren Reihen um Radiumisotope handelt, wurde darauf begründet, daß diese Substanzen sich mit Bariumsalzen abscheiden lassen und alle Reaktionen zeigen, die dem Element Barium eigen sind. Alle anderen bekannten Elemente, angefangen von den Trans-Uranen über das Uran, Protactinium, Thorium bis zum Actinium haben andere chemische Eigenschaften als das Thorium und lassen sich nicht von ihm trennen. Dasselbe trifft zu für die Elemente unterhalb Radium, also etwa Wismut, Röntgen, Polonium, Ekaactinium. Es bleibt also nur das Barium selbst außer Betracht läßt, nur das Radium übrig.

Im folgenden soll kurz die Abscheidung des Isotopengemisches und die Gewinnung der einzelnen

¹ Aus dem Kaiser Wilhelm-Institut für Chemie in Berlin-Dahlem, Eingegangen 22. Dezember 1938.
² O. HAHN u. F. STRASSMANN, Naturwiss. 26, 246 (1938).

SECRET

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S. A. GOUDMIT
Scientific Chief

SECRET

NO DIRT OF DIRTY CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION (NO DIRTY/DIRTY-NNI)
COORDINATE IN
BUREAU INDEX
AUTH: R. H.
DATE: 1/1/46

Harteck and Groth



ÖSTERREICHISCHES PATENTAMT
PATENTSCHRIFT NR. 219170

Ausgegeben am 10. Januar 1962

ALPENLÄNDISCHER ZENTRALVEREIN
ZUR FÖRDERUNG SCHÖPFERISCHEN SCHAFFENS
IN SALZBURG

Vorrichtung zur technischen Energiegewinnung mit Hilfe von Kernspaltungsreaktionen

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Dadurch, daß auf diese Weise die Spaltneutronen in von der Spaltsubstanz räumlich entferntem Bereich auf thermische Geschwindigkeit abgebremsen werden, ergeben sie leichter den Einflugsprozess, welche bei bestimmter Masse auftreten. Der 1 durch die geometrischen Verhältnisse des Reaktors bedingten Verlusten wird durch die geometrischen Verhältnisse des Reaktors

Bei der Erfindung ist es vorgesehen, die Spaltsubstanzen (Brennstoff) in einem Ra-Be-Präparat ausgegossen, in einem Raum von derselben Substanz getrennt angeordnet, neutronenstreuenden Substanzen gemischt (vgl. Comptes Rendus 208, [1939], S. 898/900). Es ist jedoch vor dem Prioritätszeitpunkt der Erfindung nicht bekannt gewesen, eine derartige Anordnung auch zur Bremsung von in der Spaltsubstanz entstehenden Sekundärneutronen (Spaltneutronen) vorzusehen. Es

Georg Stetter

SECRET

402 FIGURE: Kann der Energieinhalt der Atomkerne technisch nutzbar gemacht werden? Die Naturwissenschaften


Kann der Energieinhalt der Atomkerne technisch nutzbar gemacht werden?

Von S. Flüge, Berlin-Dahlem. UNCLASSIFIED

Zu Beginn dieses Jahres entdeckten HAHN und STRASSMANN, daß beim Beschicken von Uran mit schnelleren oder langsamen Neutronen Barium, Lanthan und andere Elemente mittels Atomgewichts entstehen. Die Entdeckung wurde sofort in vierzehn Forschern in vielen Ländern aufgegriffen, und eine intensive Arbeit auf diesem Gebiet haben sich vornehmlich verknüpfen und in mehr als 30 Veröffentlichungen schon zahlreiches quantitatives Material ergeben.

Im folgenden soll nur über ein Teilgebiet des ganzen, durch die HAHN-STRASSMANN'SCHE Entdeckung ausgelösten Fragenkomplexes berichtet werden. Nachdem die Frage nach der Zerspaltung von Urankernen sichergestellt war, wurde im Harteck Institut und wohl auch anderwärts die Frage aufgeworfen, ob bei einem so gewaltigen Eingriff nicht auch einige Neutronen aus dem zerbrochenen Kern "abgedampft" oder "abgespalten" werden könnten? Die Frage wurde auch alsbald in Angriff genommen, da sie zu einer sehr interessanten Konsequenz führte: Wenn jedes Neutron, das aufspaltend hervorritt, im Gefolge der Aufspaltung 2 oder 3 Neutronen frei macht, so muß es möglich sein, daß diese Neutronen ihrerseits wiederum Aufspaltungen anderer Urankerne herbeiführen und auf diese Weise ihre Zahl noch weiter vergrößert wird, so daß eine Kettenreaktion ohne Ende entstehen und zur Umsetzung des ganzen in dem bestrahlten Präparat vorhanden Urans führen kann.

Man konnte dazu sofort einige Überlegungen anstellen, noch die man Einzelheiten konnte: Die Hauptfrage ist natürlich, ob und wie viele Neutronen je Spaltungsprodukt in Freiheit gesetzt werden. Dann kommt alles auf die weitere Schicksal dieser Neutronen an. Sie werden elastische Stöße auslösen können, die im wesentlichen nur eine Richtung ändern; sie können unelastisch gestreut werden, so daß sie außer der Richtungsänderung noch Energie verlieren. Wenn sie elastisch streuen, sie können eingefangen werden in der bekannten Reaktion



die können endlich noch Einfangreaktionen oder Umwandlungen in andere Substanzen eintreten, die außer dem Uran anwesend sind, sofern man nicht reines Urannetzel bestrahlt, also z. B. am Sauerstoff von UO_2 . Es wird darauf ankommen, ob all diese Reaktionen, welche nur Neutronen wegnehmen, nicht zu großem Nachteil die Gesamtwirkungsquerschnitt haben, daß die beim Spaltungsprodukt erreichte Neutronenproduktion dadurch kompensiert wird oder nicht. Um zu erkennen, ob eine Kettenreaktion ablaufen kann, aus dem Kaiser Wilhelm-Institut für Chemie.

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Authority: 4802.32-1

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Siegfried Flüge

SECRET

SECRET

S. K. Allison - 6 -

December 20, 1943

2) At Berlin-Lichterfelde, in the private laboratory of the radio engineer, M. von Ardenne. At this laboratory some neutron work is being done, and at least one well-known neutron physicist (H. Ohnesorge) is employed. It is interesting that an electronic research laboratory should extend into nuclear physics in war-time. Ardenne mentions that he was urged to do nuclear physics in 1939 by the Reichspostminister Ohnesorge.

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The years 1940-1941 saw a dislocation of German nuclear physics similar to that in America. Heisenberg went from Leipzig to the K.W.I. at Berlin; men like Pleser and Pleser, early workers in the field, came from small universities to Berlin-Dahlem or Heidelberg. The British concluded that in Berlin-Dahlem was situated the main government team. This conclusion still seems sound. Much work was farmed out, as can be seen above, especially to Bothe's group, that the staff who came to the secret work, that from late 1940 onwards, a parallel group by Heisenberg's poison has been

von Ardenne and Ohnesorge

A number of young German physicists were also present at all since their first 1939 work on fission. They may form the junior staff of the project. It is again true that mention of their presence has come largely from Hahn's group.

D. The University of Strasbourg

A possible opportunity to learn more is provided by the new Nazi university at Strasbourg, in Alsace. Apparently for purposes of propaganda, they have sent there in late 1942-early 1943 a rather strong faculty. Included are Heisenberg's closest co-worker at Berlin, K. Z. V. Weizsäcker, a well-known colleague of Bothe's, and Noddack, a man with experience in radio- and rare-element chemistry. These men will know a great deal. It is certainly true that Allied connections in Alsace are much better than those in Germany.

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SECRET

Erich Schumann

qualitativen energetischen Verhältnisse erstreckt, vollständig dem stillen Zerfall von Sprengstoffmolekülen. Da die Kernenergien den chemischen Bindungsenergien, aus denen die Sprengstoffe ihre Leistungsfähigkeit schöpfen, um mindestens 6 Größenordnungen überlegen sind, würde durch die Kernreaktionen die Möglichkeit von Sprengstoffen unvorstellbar grosser Brisanz gegeben sein, wenn es gelingen würde, die Kernreaktion detonativ, d.h. durch Stoßwellen, auszulösen. Ganz abgesehen von der geschichtlich einschneidenden Bedeutung einer solchen Möglichkeit, einen Stoff von wirklich gigantischer Zerstörungskraft in menschliche Hände zu geben, würden wir damit die Materie unter thermodynamischen Bedingungen vorzuliegen haben, wie sie sonst nur an ganz wenigen Stellen des Universums vorkommen. Fraglos wäre der kernreaktionäre Sprengstoff physikalische Realität, wenn es gelänge, eine Stoßwelle genügender Intensität zu erzeugen, die einen Kernzeff einleiten könnte. Da jedoch selbst bei den schwereren, am wenigsten stabilen Atomen die Aktivierungsenergie noch nach Millionenvolt gemessen wird, besitzen wir keine Möglichkeit, eine solche intensive Stoßwelle zu erzeugen. Es fehlt bei den Kernreaktionen eben die Abstufung der Aktivierungsarbeiten, wie sie bei den Sprengstoffen von den Initial- bis zu

Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv Freiburg N822/17, Erich Schumann, 2 October 1940.
Unclassified draft article on explosives research for popular publication.

2. SS Coordination of the Nuclear Program

Ref No SAIC/FIR/15
27 Jul 45~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
*analyzed B*SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758**NOTES ON HIMMLER AND HIS STAFF
BY WILHELM FUEHRER, ADJ TO HIMMLER
Final Interrogation Report**4. PERSONALITIESa. HIMMLER's Field Hq

GROTHMANN SS-OSTUBAF (Lt Col) Adj to HIMMLER from 1941 to the last; supervised military matters of WAFFEN-SS. Born HAMBURG; 29 years old; blue eyes, 1,75 m tall.

c. Scientific Personalities

SCHUMANN, Prof	nuclear	Director, First Physics Institute, University of BERLIN, and of HEE-RESWAFFENAMT (Army Ord Dept).
GERTHSEN, Prof	nuclear	Director, Second Physics Institute University of BERLIN; atom research.
GEIGER, Prof	nuclear	Director, Physics Institute, TECHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE (Technical College), BERLIN; atom research.
GERLACH, Prof	nuclear	Physics Institute, University of MUNICH.
TOMASCHEK, Prof	nuclear	Physics Institute, TECHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE, MUNICH.
VON UND ZUR MUEHLEN, Prof		Geological Institute, TECHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE, MUNICH. Expert on Geology of Russia.
SCHMAUSS, Prof		Meteorological Institute, MUNICH.
VON FICKER, Prof		Meteorological Institute, VIENNA.
GUTHNICK, Prof		Observatory, BERLIN-BABELSBERG.
HECKMANN, Prof		Director, Observatory, HAMBURG-BERGEDORF.
KIRCHNER, Prof	nuclear	Director, Physics Institute, University of COLOGNE. Expert on atom physics.

2. SS Coordination of the Nuclear Program

Ref No SAIC/FIR/15
27 Jul 45

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

analysed B

SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER
APO 758

NOTES ON HIMMLER AND HIS STAFF
BY WILHELM FUEHRER, ADJ TO HIMMLER
Final Interrogation Report

4. PERSONALITIES

a. HIMMLER's Field Hq

GROTHMANN SS-OSTUBAF (Lt Col) Adj to HIMMLER from 1941 to the last; supervised military matters of WAFFEN-SS. Born HAMBURG; 29 years old; blue eyes, 1,75 m tall.

c. Scientific Personalities

SCHUMANN, Prof	nuclear	Director, First Physics Institute, University of BERLIN, and of HEE-RESWAFFENAMT (Army Ord Dept).
GERTHSEN, Prof	nuclear	Director, Second Physics Institute University of BERLIN; atom research.
GEIGER, Prof	nuclear	Director, Physics Institute, TECHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE (Technical College), BERLIN; atom research.
GERLACH, Prof	nuclear	Physics Institute, University of MUNICH.
TOMASCHEK, Prof	nuclear	Physics Institute, TECHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE, MUNICH.
VON UND ZUR MUEHLEN, Prof		Geological Institute, TECHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE, MUNICH. Expert on Geology of Russia.
SCHMAUSS, Prof		Meteorological Institute, MUNICH.
VON FICKER, Prof		Meteorological Institute, VIENNA.
GUTHNICK, Prof		Observatory, BERLIN-BABELSBERG.
HECKMANN, Prof		Director, Observatory, HAMBURG-BERGSDORF.
KIRCHNER, Prof	nuclear	Director, Physics Institute, University of COLOGNE. Expert on atom physics.

DER REICHSFÜHRER-
CHEF DES H-HAUPTAMTES

Ca/HIA/Be/Vo. VS-Tgb.Nr. 113/42 g.Kdos.

Von in der Antwort vorstehende Geschäftsverläufe und Beschlüsse ausgehen.

Berlin W 35, den
Littenstraße 40/49
Postfach 40

8. Sept. 1942

2 Ausfertigungen
Prüf.Nr. 1

Betr.: Reichspostminister Dr. Ohnesorge

An den

Reichsführer-~~H~~

und Chef der Deutschen Polizei,

Feld-Kommandostelle.

Reichsführer !

Reichspostminister Dr. Ohnesorge ist sehr aktiv und sehr beweglich aus seinem Urlaub zurückgekehrt. Drängt gewaltig, zum Führer zu kommen aus folgenden Gründen:

- Nach seinen Beobachtungen fasst im Augenblick Amerika die gesamten Professoren der Physik und der Chemie zusammen, um besondere Leistungen hervorzubringen. Er möchte hierüber kurz dem Führer Vortrag halten.
- Dr. Ohnesorge möchte sein nun ausprobiertes Gerät, aufgebaut auf einem Panzerjäger, dem Führer vorführen, um überhaupt die Möglichkeit zu erhalten, es für die Waffen-~~H~~ in genügender Menge herstellen lassen zu können. Die Konstrukteure würden selbst in das Führerhauptquartier fahren, das Gerät an einem vorhandenen Fahrzeug, bzw. Geschütz aufbauen, sodass es kurz dem Führer gezeigt werden könnte.
- Dr. Ohnesorge möchte dem Reichsführer-~~H~~ für seinen Kulturfonds einen Scheck über 5 Mill. Mark persönlich übergeben.

Ich wäre in besonderem Masse dankbar, wenn der Besuch von Dr. Ohnesorge im Führerhauptquartier bald ermöglicht werden könnte, jedenfalls vor dem Mitte September beginnenden Europäischen Kongress.

H-Gruppenführer

Ref No SAIC/FIR/15
27 Jul 45

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Bundesarchiv Lichterfelde, NS 19-2012

DER REICHSFÜHRER-
CHEF DES H-HAUPTAMTES

Ca/HIA/Be/Vo. VS-Tgb.Nr. 113/42 g.Kdos.

Berlin W 35, den
Littenstraße 40/49
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8. Sept. 1942

2 Ausfertigungen
Prüf.Nr. 1

Betr.: Reichspostminister Dr. Ohnesorge

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According to his [Ohnesorge's] observations, at the moment America is gathering all the professors of physics and chemistry to produce special achievements. He would like to give a short lecture about this to the Führer.

H-Gruppenführer

3. From 1938 to 1945, Germany Obtained Thousands of Tons of Uranium and Thorium Ores from Sites across Europe



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William Casey. 1988. *The Secret War Against Hitler*. p. 49.

When the British government learned that the Germans, on occupying Norway and Belgium, were increasing Norwegian heavy water production and had **seized 3500 tons of uranium from Union Minière in Belgium**, the Ministry of Supply was directed to study what would happen if an atom bomb was detonated in the center of a large British city.

[Nikolaus Riehl also reported the amount as 3500 tons instead of the usually given 1200 tons; see David Irving, 1967, *The Virus House*, pp. 65, 90–91.]

Vladimir Rychly, NARA RG 38, Entry 98C, Box 9, Folder TSC #2601-2700, 11 Feb. 1946.

The Germans put [uranium] mining on a high priority and only mining was done throughout the 6 years occupation. The ore was delivered by special planes to Germany and Austria.

Box 12, Folder TSC #3301-3400, 5 December 1946.

During the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Germans continued operations in this mine to the very last moment.

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000198124.pdf

Kowary area (the old **Schmiedeberg area exploited by the Germans**) where uranium was produced before the war...

Manhattan District History, Book I, Volume 14, Foreign Intelligence Supplement No. 1.

11 tons of uranium products, 1/2 ton of Schmiedeberg ore and a few drums of monazite sand were on hand... The shortage of radium in Germany made it worth while to **exploit the Schmiedeberg deposits**.

Peter Hayes. 2004. *From Cooperation to Complicity: Degussa in the Third Reich*. p. 235.

Radium-Bergbau GmbH of Berlin, which in 1941-43, further developed mines in Portugal...

H. S. Lowenhaupt. 5 December 1946. Russian Mining Operations in the German-Czech Border Region. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 163, Folder Czechoslovakia. Uranium is known to occur... in a number of silver-bismuth-cobalt veins 10 to 20 cm. in thickness cutting the slates within a 2 1/2 km. radius to the northwest, west, and southwest of **Johanngeorgenstadt**... [T]he strongest pitchblende vein is in the Vereinigt Mine. From 1870 to 1913, 12.2 tons U₃O₈ were produced with a maximum yield of 2.7 tons in 1905... **Schneeberg** mines are in a 10 km² mineralized area between Schneeberg and Neustadt to the south. Production in the thirty-seven year interval between 1870 and 1907 was 80 metric tons [U₃O₈]. Union Mines lists uranium at Schneeberg, Neustadt, Burckhardt Grauen, Rohna, and Pfannenstiel.

Jonathan E. Helmreich. 1986. *Gathering Rare Ores: The Diplomacy of Uranium Acquisition, 1943-1954*. p. 70.

The CDT [Combined Development Trust] did not know of the **valuable deposits in Saxony**, just north of the East German border with Czechoslovakia and the Joachimstal mines. **Discovered by the Germans in 1943**...

Report on Treibacher Chemical Works AG. 10 October 1945. CIOS Evaluation Report 343, AFHRA A1008 frames 0794-0797.

During the war they used Pitchblende from Joachimstahl in Czechoslovakia (where it was first discovered) and **from Erzgebirge**.

Schneeberg, Freiberg, Johanngeorgenstadt

Brussels (from Congo) **Thuringia** **Schmiedeberg** **Jachymov** **Pribram**

<http://taifasuri.ro/index.php/taifasuri/mozaic/17838-bomba-atmica-ruso-americana-hranita-din-uraniul-romanesc-nr748-sapt19-25-sept-2019>

And those **mines were in the Apuseni Mountains, in Biharia, at Stei-Baita**. It seems that the uranium deposits here were discovered by German aviators who, around 1938-1939, flying over the perimeter, noticed a drop in pressure and a bizarre development of the films, which led the Germans to carry out a geological survey of the area with modern equipment, so they installed 40 probes in the area... **The uranium that was obtained from those mines was... picked up by the SS service and shipped to laboratories in Germany. To facilitate transport on an industrial scale, the Germans built new sections of the Avram Iancu-Bulzești-Baia de Cris road and completed part of the Brad-Deva railway, a megastructure with viaducts and impeccable tunnels.**

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000198124.pdf

The most important uranium deposit in Bulgaria is located in the old lead mining area of Goten Peak, near the monastery of **Buhovo, northeast of Sofia**. In late 1945, the Soviets continued the former **German exploitation of this area**.

U.S. Embassy, Istanbul, 18 December 1943, AFHRA A1261 p. 27.


In the course of a violent argument with a Bulgarian officer, **an engineer of the Todt organization revealed in Sofia that the Germans now possess a new type of incendiary far surpassing anything yet used in warfare. The engineer intimated that London would suffer a fate worse than that of Berlin or Hamburg in the near future.**

Viseu & Guarda

Băița-Plai

Buhovo (Sofia)


3. At Least 20 Reported Sites of Uranium/Thorium Processing Facilities



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For more information, see *Forgotten Creators D.3*



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David Gattiker and George C. Davis. 16 May 1945. Report on visit to Joachimsthal. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 160, Folder APR 45--Dec. '45.

I and Davis entered Czechoslovakian target yesterday morning and spent three hours with Dr. Patzochke, German director of the mines. [...] These concentrates contain 60 per cent U_3O_8 and were sent to Germany and Austria for radium extraction, and were divided equally between Auer, Buchler at Brunswick, and Goldschmidt at Treibach in Austria.


G-157. I.G. Farben Leverkusen. 11 June 1942.

Kwasnik developed process whereby uranium oxide is carried through a rotating inclined nickel tube heated to $650^{\circ}C$ through which a stream of fluorine gas is passed. The UF_6 thus formed is frozen by CO_2 in containers. About 500 grams UF_6 thus produced per hour. The UF_6 to be frozen in large crystalline block to reduce amount of adsorption of other gases.

Robert E. Work. 18 September 1945. Preliminary Interrogation Report. Prof. Dr. Ulrich Hoffmann. AFHRA A5183 frame 0609.

PhD in chemistry from University of Berlin in 1926. Instructor at University of Berlin until 1936. Called to University of Rostock in 1936 where he became full professor in 1937. In April 1942 he was called to University of Vienna as Director of the Institute for Inorganic and Analytic Chemistry... Dr. Hoffmann's research in the field of air interest was only in the development of the atomic bomb. Claims to have improved method of obtaining FLUOR, which is necessary to obtain UF_6 , one of the basic ingredients of the atomic bomb.

Auer
Katowice



For more information, see *Forgotten Creators D.3*

Ueber den Einfluss der Zentrifugalkraft auf
chemische Systeme.

Von
G. Bredig.
(Mit 3 Figuren im Text.)

Einleitung.

Die Frage, ob durch den Einfluss äusserer Kräfte, wie z. B. durch die Gravitation, sich in einem ursprünglich homogenen Gemenge Konzentrationsverschiedenheiten in der Richtung dieser Kräfte ausbilden, ist bereits im Anfange dieses Jahrhunderts diskutiert worden. So stellte bereits Gay-Lussac¹⁾ in den Kellern der Pariser Sternwarte Versuche darüber an, ob eine Salzlösung in einer vertikalen 2 m langen Säule unter dem Einfluss der Schwerkraft am unteren Ende der Säule eine andere Konzentration annehme, als am oberen Ende. Er erhielt ein negatives Resultat, was nach den neueren Berechnungen von Gouy und Chaperon²⁾ auch verständlich wird, da diese Autoren thermodynamisch den Einfluss der Gravitation auf die Konzentration aus der Änderung der Dichte mit der Konzentration zu berechnen vermögen und denselben so klein finden, dass seine experimentelle Feststellung schwerlich ausführbar ist.

Die Theorie solcher Systeme ist bereits mehrfach, von J. W. Gibbs³⁾, Gouy und Chaperon⁴⁾, P. Duhem⁵⁾, van der Waals⁶⁾ und anderen gegeben worden.

Nun hat aber unlängst Herr Th. des Coudres in einer interessanten Abhandlung⁷⁾ beiläufig darauf hingewiesen, dass man die Betrachtungen über den Einfluss der Schwere auf die Konzentration der Lö-

¹⁾ Ann. chim. phys. 11, 306 (1819). — Vergl. auch Ostwald, Lehrbuch der allg. Chemie 2. Aufl. I, 700. — Bendant, Ann. chim. phys. 8, 15. — Bischof, Lehrbuch der ch. und ph. Geol. II, 1712. — Lieben, Lieb. Ann. 101, 77 (1857).

²⁾ Ann. chim. phys. (6) 12, 384 (1887).

³⁾ Thermodynam. Studien S. 171 ff. Deutsch von Ostwald.

⁴⁾ Siehe oben und Compt. rend. 105, 117.

⁵⁾ Journ. de phys. (2) 8, 391 (1888).

⁶⁾ Diese Zeitschr. 5, 157.

⁷⁾ Wied. Ann. 46, 296; 49, 284; Diese Zeitschr. 12, 143.

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⁶⁾ Diese Zeitschr. 5, 157.

⁷⁾ Wied. Ann. 46, 296; 49, 284; Diese Zeitschr. 12, 143.

PATENTSCHRIFT

Nr. 833 487
KLASSE 12a GRUPPE 30a
G 419 IV b 12c

Dr.-Ing. Helmut Hausen, München-Solln
ist als Erfinder genannt worden

Gesellschaft für Linde's Eismaschinen A. G.,
Höllriegelskreuth bei München

Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Zerlegung von Gas- und
Flüssigkeitsgemischen in Zentrifugen

Patentiert im Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 18. Juni 1939 an
Der Zeitraum vom 8. Mai 1943 bis einschließlich 7. Mai 1950 wird auf die Patentinhaber nicht angeschlossen

(Ges. v. 15.7.31)

Patentanmeldung bekanntgemacht am 26. Juli 1951

Patenterteilung bekanntgemacht am 7. Februar 1952

Es hat bisher nicht an Versuchen gefehlt, Gasgemische durch Zentrifugieren zu zerlegen. Ein heutzutage Ergebnis konnte jedoch mit diesen Verfahren nicht erzielt werden, weil die Trennwirkung der bekannten Zentrifugierverfahren verhältnismäßig gering ist. Auch theoretisch lässt sich nachweisen, dass die Zerlegungswirkung einer nach den bekannten Verfahren betriebenen Zentrifuge schon bei den höchsten heute möglichen Umfangsgeschwindigkeiten und bei Gemischen mit großen Unterschieden im Molekulargewicht nur sehr gering ist.

Nach der vorliegenden Erfindung lässt sich aber der an sich kleine, durch Zentrifugalkraftwirkung bedingte Trenneffekt durch eine größere Wirkung bringen, das man ihn durch Gegenstromführung der Gas- und Flüssigkeitsgemische verhältnismäßig stark erhöht. Gegenstrom ist z. B. bei der Rektifikation bekannt. Die nur geringe Zerlegungswirkung eines einzelnen Rektifikationslaufes wird dadurch vervielfacht, dass man eine große Zahl von solchen Böden übereinander anordnet und Flüssigkeit und Dampf im Gegenstrom fließen. Ebenso lässt sich grundsätzlich die Trennwirkung einer Zentrifuge dadurch ver-

PATENTSCHRIFT

Nr. 906 094
KLASSE 12a GRUPPE 30a
M 419 IV b 12c

Dr. Werner Kuhn, Basel (Schweiz) und Dr. Hans Martin, Kiel
sind als Erfinder genannt worden

Dr. Hans Martin, Kiel
Vorrichtung und Verfahren zur Trennung von Gasgemischen durch Anwendung von künstlich erzeugten Schwerfeldern

Patentiert im Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 12. Juli 1939 an
Der Zeitraum vom 8. Mai 1943 bis einschließlich 7. Mai 1950 wird auf die Patentinhaber nicht angeschlossen

(Ges. v. 15.7.31)

Patentanmeldung bekanntgemacht am 12. März 1951

Patenterteilung bekanntgemacht am 26. Januar 1954

Es ist bekannt, dass man eine teilweise Trennung von Gas- oder Dampfgemischen, welche sich aus verschiedenen Bestandteilen zusammensetzen, dadurch erreichen kann, dass man das Gasgemisch in einen Hohlkörper bringt und denselben mit hoher Umdrehungszahl um eine Achse rotieren lässt. Durch das bei der hohen Umdrehung auftretende Schwerfeld wird eine Anreicherung der schweren Bestandteile in den peripheren Teilen, eine verhältnismäßige Anreicherung der leichteren Bestandteile in den der Achse benachbarten Teilen des Hohlkörpers hervorgerufen. Es ist indessen bekannt, dass eine solche Trennung nur in recht geringem Ausmaße erfolgt und dass es nur dann merkliche Beträge annimmt, wenn das Molekulargewicht

der in dem Gemische vorliegenden Bestandteile große Unterschiede aufweist. Um auch bei kleinen Unterschieden im Molekulargewicht, wie sie z. B. bei Luft oder bei Isotopengemischen vorliegen, eine weitgehende Trennung herbeizuführen, ist es notwendig, die bei der Zentrifugation anfallenden Gasströme wiederholt zu zentrifugieren. Es ist dabei selbstredend, dass eine einzige eine Reihe von Zentrifugen vorsehen und diese durch Rohrleitungen, damit sie verbunden, dass die zweite Zentrifuge mit der in der ersten anfallenden schweren Fraktion gespeist wird, die dritte Zentrifuge mit der in der zweiten anfallenden noch schwereren Fraktion auf. Auf diese Weise können Fraktionen er-

Gas centrifuges were invented in Germany by 1895. By WWII, uranium gas centrifuges were produced in:


Kiel (2 groups)
Munich
Freiburg
Göttingen
Thuringia
Breslau/Wroclaw
Swiss factories (!)
+ more locations?

How many uranium gas centrifuges did Germany produce and use?

irp.fas.org/cia/product/zippe.pdf
In November 1946, [redacted] turned to centrifuge development... It must be noted that a centrifuge for isotope separation had been Steenbeck's idée fixe ever since he came to Sinop. Even before he came to Sinop, he seems to have suggested to the Soviet a centrifuge with extremely long rotors...


Werner Schwietzke. 1947. National Archives of Australia. Series MT105/8, ctrl 1/6/3094, code 934755.

Since the theoretical calculations of the stress distribution of the rotor rotating at high speed can only be carried out with a certain approximation, it was recommended that the precisely balanced rotor be subjected to a test run below the maximum rotational speed of 65,000 rpm, which was calculated as critical, and that any changes in the rotor be precisely determined by precision measurements after the run. After a considerable number of test series over several hours at 60,000 rpm a deformation of the rotor never could be detected, so that a constant operating speed of 56,000 rpm could be selected for the intended tests without danger. This ultracentrifuge, which requires little space and effort, has proven itself extraordinarily good in practice. [Forgotten Creators D.4.2]




Marshal Georgy Zhukov. 2 October 1945. Report to Joseph Stalin. Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Fund 93, Division 77 (45), List 4-11.

The main specialists in the field of isotope separation in Germany were Professor Harteck, Dr. Groth, who, together with the chief designer of the Anschütz company (Kiel, English zone), Dr. Beyerle, invented an ultracentrifuge built by the above company, as well as by the Hellige company (Breslau, USSR zone).



Deutsches Museum
FA 002/811
NARA RG 227, Microfilm M1392, Bush-Conant File
Relating to the Development of the Atomic Bomb



March 14, 1946

MEMORANDUM

TO: Major R. H. Purman
FROM: H. T. Wenzel

DECLASSIFIED
812018
N.H.C. BY SP-2 JGL/RS

This memorandum will put on record the information which I gave you orally yesterday.

Dr. H. C. Urey of Columbia University was approached through a Professor Perrin, who was then an exchange Professor in the Chemistry Department at Columbia University, on behalf of one Constantin Chilowsky. Chilowsky was desirous of selling an invention, the exact method never disclosed to us, for accomplishing the same purpose which the Manhattan District is seeking. Professor Urey indicated that he was not interested in the matter but passed the information on to the OSRD, and I was asked to interview Chilowsky by Dr. Conant to see what I could find out. I used my credentials as a member of the National Bureau of Standards and indicated to Chilowsky and Professor Perrin that I had no other government connection.

Chilowsky was a Swiss and refused to divulge even the approximate nature of his method but, inasmuch as I indicated that the government would be sympathetic to the idea until shown that something practical was involved, in order to "sell" me on the importance of the job, he indicated to me that the Germans were actively engaged on the same objective. In particular, he told me he had personally seen in a factory in Switzerland centrifuges which were being produced to be sent to Germany for the Germans' work on this field.

Chilowsky also told me that he had a moral and financial obligation to offer first credit to his invention to the British group of Halban. It seems that Halban and his group had some part in developing the invention in question. Halban is at present with the British team in Montreal, and it may be that Chilowsky's whereabouts can be traced through Halban if no other means of approach is available.

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An das	
Institut für Physikalische Chemie	
der Hanseischen Universität	
z.Hd. Herrn Dozent Dr. W. Groth,	
Jungferstr. 9,	
Hamburg 36.	
UNRE ZECHEN	UNRE ZECHEN
140	140
MEIN ZECHEN	MEIN ZECHEN
9.12.41.	9.12.41.
BEZUG	BEZUG
9.12.41.	9.12.41.

Herstellung einer Ultrazentrifuge, Oelkreislauf.

Für Ihr Schreiben vom 9.12.41 danken wir Ihnen bestens.
Die Firma Bosch G.m.b.H. teilt uns soeben mit, dass der in unserem Schema 05 21 02 - 1 / [Schem.1] bei 3) vorgesehene Einzylinder-Luftpressor nicht geliefert werden kann, dass aber Verdrichter der Type SV/DH 160 R 12 4 Wochen nach Auftragsingang erhältlich seien.

Wir haben unsere frühere Bestellung Nr. 82 11 vom 23.11.41 zurückgezogen und anstelle dessen 2 Stück Verdrichter der letztgenannten Type soeben mit der Bitte in Auftrag gegeben, die angegebene Lieferzeit von 4 Wochen einzuhalten. Gleichzeitig haben wir darauf hingewiesen, dass es sich dabei um ein Bauteil handelt, für dessen schnelle Lieferung Sie sich bereits an die Firma Bosch gewandt hatten.


Heil Hitler!
ANSCHÜTZ u. CO. G.m.b.H.
Entwicklungs-Abteilung

I.A.

[Signature]


4. ^{235}U Enrichment: Electromagnetic Separators/Calutrons

**Prototype calutron built and demonstrated
by 1941** by Manfred von Ardenne and ELIN
company [Russian archive/Rainer Karlsch].



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Samuel Goudsmit found 1942 reports on von Ardenne's calutrons. They are still withheld.

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HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
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APO 887

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NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 166, Folder 32.22-1
GERMANY—Research—TA—(1943—June 1946)

16 June 1945

SUBJECT: Baron von Ardenne's Isotope Separation


1. Among the Reichsforschungspapier papers, we have found the research report of the work which ~~von Ardenne~~ did for the Reichspost. The report is dated April 1942 and describes a magnetic isotope separator in detail. It was sent to the RFR by ~~Esau~~.

2. Attached is also an interesting commentary by von Ardenne himself. In this, he states that isotope separation is essential to decrease the amount of uranium necessary for the uranium machine. He claims that indications regarding developments, especially in the U.S.A., which aim at a decrease of the uranium quantity in the U-machine, have recently seeped through. Further down, he claims that the method invented by him is new and that, by keeping the development work very secret, an important advantage can be gained over the high level of experimental nuclear physics in the U.S.A.

S. A. Goudsmit
S. A. GOUDSMIT
Scientific Chief

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Heinz Ewald's March 1942 final report on calculations for the optimal performance of calutrons [Deutsches Museum G-139].

Punkte 7, so dass der Kreis k_{II} den Kreis c in T berührt. Die Radien der Kreise k und K seien p und r . Wenn wir für eine bestimmte Anordnung — gegeben seien die Radien r_1 und r_2 und die Winkeldivergenz α — das Ablenkungsvermögen angeben wollen, dann genügt es, das Verhältnis r_1/r_2 für die beiden Kreise k_{II} und K_{II} zu bestimmen. Dann aus der Beziehung

$$\rho = \frac{e \cdot m \cdot v \cdot H}{M \cdot U}$$

für den Krümmungsradius von Ionen der Voltenergie U im Magnetfeld H folgt für das Ablenkungsvermögen

$$\frac{H}{U} = \frac{1}{2} \frac{r_1}{r_2}$$

Wenn wir den Ursprung des Koordinatensystems in den Mittelpunkt K der ganzen Anordnung verlegen (Fig. 7), haben die drei Kreise k_{II} , K und c die Gleichungen (unter Vernachlässigung höherer Potenzen von α):

$$(x-p)^2 + (y-r_2-p)^2 = r^2$$

$$(x-(p+rp)) + (y-r_2-(p+rp))^2 = (p+rp)^2$$

$$x^2 + y^2 = r_2^2$$


Fig. 5. Zum Ablenkungsvermögen der Anordnung mit Innenionenquelle.

Fig. 6. Zum Ablenkungsvermögen der Anordnung mit Ausenionenquelle.


Fig. 7. Ableitung des Ablenkungsvermögens.

4. ²³⁵U Enrichment: Electromagnetic Separators/Calutrons


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


Manfred von Ardenne. 1990. *Die Erinnerungen*. 10th ed. Munich: Herbig, p. 159.


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
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


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
OSS. 9 June 1944. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.7003-1 GERMANY: US Wartime Positive Int. (July 42–June 44).

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


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
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


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


General Henry H. Arnold. 1949. *Global Mission*. New York: Harper. p. 491.


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
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


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
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
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
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


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How many calutrons did Germany produce and use during the war?

For more information, see *Forgotten Creators* D.4.3.

4. ²³⁵U Enrichment: Gaseous Diffusion

Gustav Hertz patented gaseous diffusion in 1923, worked throughout the war despite his Jewish ancestry, then helped the Soviet Union build gaseous diffusion enrichment plants.

March 11, 1924.

G. L. HERTZ

1,486,521 Klasse 12 d.

Ausgegeben am 25. Oktober 1927.

METHOD OF SEPARATING GASES FROM A MIXTURE THEREOF
Filed April 17, 1923




ÖSTERREICHISCHES PATENTAMT.
PATENTSCHRIFT N^o 107571.

N. V. PHILIPS' GLOEILAMPENFABRIEKEN IN EINDHOVEN.
Verfahren zur ununterbrochenen Trennung eines Gasgemisches.


Angemeldet am 27. Oktober 1925; Priorität der Anmeldung in den Niederlanden vom 21. August 1925 beansprucht.

Beginn der Patentdauer: 15. Mai 1927.

Als Erfinder wird genannt: Dr. Gustav Ludwig Hertz in Eindhoven.



Also
Erika
Cremer,
Erich
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
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
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Auergesellschaft patented improved diffusion enrichment methods in 1940 and worked throughout the war. Then Nikolaus Riehl and other Auer personnel helped the Soviets.

ÉTAT FRANÇAIS.

MINISTÈRE DE LA PRODUCTION INDUSTRIELLE ET DES COMMUNICATIONS.

SERVICE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INDUSTRIELLE.

BREVET D'INVENTION.

Gr. 14. — Cl. 6.

881.316

Procédé de séparation, par diffusion, de substances difficilement séparables.

Société d'ité: AUERGESSELLSCHAFT AKTIENGESellschaft résidant en Allemagne.

Demandé le 16 avril 1942, à 16^h 40^m, à Paris.

Délivré le 22 janvier 1943. — Publié le 21 avril 1943.

(Demande de brevet déposée en Allemagne le 21 septembre 1940. — Déclaration du déposant.)

On sait que les éléments chimiques ne sont pas à considérer comme des matières complètement uniformes, mais au contraire que la plupart des éléments se composent de plusieurs espèces d'atomes différentes, les espèces d'atomes appartenant à un élément se distinguant par leur poids atomique et non par leurs propriétés chimiques. On appelle isotopes les espèces d'atomes qui appartiennent au même élément, mais ont des poids atomiques différents. La séparation des isotopes les uns des autres pose un problème particulièrement difficile, parce qu'il n'y a pas de différences chimiques entre les isotopes à séparer et que, par suite, toutes les méthodes chimiques de séparation échouent. On a donc tenté de recourir à des méthodes physiques de séparation, dans lesquelles le poids atomique se manifeste de telle manière que l'on puisse compter la différenciation des atomes de poids différents. Mais parmi tous les essais entrepris dans ce sens, la très grande majorité ont manqué leur but, une des premières raisons de ces échecs étant due au fait que les différences de poids atomiques des corps isotopes sont pour la plupart très faibles. A maintes reprises, on a essayé de mettre à profit le fait qu'un atome plus léger doit posséder une vitesse de diffusion plus grande qu'un atome moins léger. On a donc fait diffuser à travers des membranes poreuses les espèces d'atomes étudiées en essayant de réaliser leur séparation par ce moyen. La majorité de ces essais n'ont toutefois pas réussi. Il a été trouvé, ces dernières années, un procédé par lequel on peut, dans de nombreux cas, exécuter une séparation d'isotopes avec une pleine réussite tout au moins pour des isotopes gazeux. Il s'agit du procédé par «thermo-diffusion» indiqué par Cheneb. Mais le procédé en question, aussi bien que tous les autres procédés qui produisent pour le moins une certaine ségrégation des isotopes, se limitent généralement à des corps gazeux. Un inconvénient plus grave encore des procédés indiqués jusqu'à présent réside dans la grande complexité, le prix élevé et le manque de robustesse des appareils qui nécessitent leur mise en œuvre. A cela s'ajoute la très grande dépense d'énergie nécessaire pour la séparation d'une certaine quantité de matière, dans tous ces procédés. Dans quelques cas particuliers, on réussit à séparer jusqu'à un certain degré des paires d'isotopes déterminées, sans fléchir le cadre d'un procédé de laboratoire, mais les

[881.316]


procédés employés jusqu'à présent n'ont aucune chance d'être appliqués à l'échelle industrielle.

La présente invention concerne un procédé de séparation d'isotopes, exempt de tous les inconvénients caractéristiques des méthodes employées jusqu'à ce jour et qui, pour la première fois, permet de réaliser une séparation d'isotopes sur le plan industriel. Comme il s'agit ici d'un nouveau procédé physico-chimique de séparation, il est également applicable à la ségrégation d'autres substances difficilement séparables telles que, par exemple, les paires d'éléments formant des mélanges azeotropiques. En outre, le procédé n'est pas applicable uniquement aux gaz, mais encore particulièrement à des substances en solution. C'est la précision qu'il convient d'apprécier l'importance particulière du nouveau procédé, car la séparation de substances dissoutes a une importance industrielle beaucoup plus grande que la séparation des seuls corps gazeux. En effet, les mélanges

notamment ne se trouvent pas en général normalement à l'état gazeux, tout au moins aux températures utilisables au laboratoire et en exploitation. La description qui va suivre, en regard du dessin annexé, donne à titre d'exemple non limitatif, fera bien comprendre comment l'invention peut être réalisée, les particularités qui ressortent tant du dessin que du texte faisant, bien entendu, partie de celle-ci. On décrit tout d'abord la forme de réalisation du procédé objet de l'invention qui est destinée à la séparation de substances à l'état dissous. La fig. 1 sert à expliquer le procédé. Un cylindre 1, par exemple en tôle, est rempli d'une masse poreuse 2, telle que du sable, de la terre d'infusaires ou une masse organique cohérente. La masse poreuse (telle que le sable) est noyée dans la solution des isotopes à séparer. A l'extrémité inférieure du cylindre, on évapore le solvant par la chaleur par ventilation ou par le vide, en pensant soit que l'évaporation soit suffisamment lente pour que le sol dissous ne risque pas de cristalliser. Par le haut, on verse du solvant frais goutte à goutte, en quantité égale à ce qui s'en évapore dans le bas. Il se passe alors le phénomène suivant: la solution se concentre au voisinage de la surface inférieure dans la mesure où le solvant est évaporé à l'extrémité inférieure. Il se produit, par suite, une baisse de concentration de bas en haut et la matière dissoute commence à se diffuser de bas en haut. On a donc affaire ici à deux courants de sens contraires, l'un de ces courants est constitué par l'écoulement du solvant à travers la masse en direction descendante, l'autre est un courant de diffusion, en sens contraire, de la matière dissoute. Les atomes ou les ions ou molécules en solution, diffèrent donc d'une manière ininterrompue de bas en haut, mais sans changer de place, car leur diffusion est continuellement compensée par le courant liquide s'écoulant à sa rencontre. (On pourrait illustrer les conditions régnant ici par l'exemple de l'écoulement dans la cage rotative; on sait que l'écoulement court continuellement sans changer de place, car la cage tourne en sens contraire). Grâce à la disposition adoptée, une diffusion ininterrompue et durable des isotopes s'établit de bas en haut et, par ce moyen, il se produit automatiquement une ségrégation, du fait que la partie basse de la solution s'enrichit peu à peu en isotope le plus lourd, la partie haute devenant plus riche en isotope le plus léger. Si l'on voulait entreprendre un fonctionnement de cette nature selon les méthodes usuelles de séparation, par exemple dans le genre de la cristallisation fractionnée, on serait conduit à employer des quantités de liquide exagérées et à surveiller et à préparer un très grand nombre de charges individuelles. Rien de tout cela n'est nécessaire pour le présent procédé. Tout le travail consiste à faire évaporer le solvant à l'extrémité inférieure de la colonne et à le faire retomber goutte à goutte à l'extrémité supérieure. Bien entendu, le dispositif doit comporter des appareils d'extraction, par exemple des tubulures d'aspiration qui permettent de prélever la solution de la colonne. Une telle colonne peut rester en service des mois, voire des années, sans nécessiter de frais importants en personnel de surveillance.

4. 235U Enrichment: Gaseous Diffusion


Gustav Hertz patented gaseous diffusion in 1923, worked throughout the war despite his Jewish ancestry, then helped the Soviet Union build gaseous diffusion enrichment plants.



Also
Erika
Cremer,
Erich
Bagge,
etc.


Soviets found Neustadt an der Orla factories that were uniquely skilled at producing nickel membrane filters for gaseous diffusion. What did those factories do during the war?

Forgotten
Creators
D.4.4,
D.4.6,
D.14



Princeton University Library, Moe Berg Papers (C1413),
Box 20, Folder 3--Loose Notes: Central Intelligence Agency.


Auergesellschaft patented improved diffusion enrichment methods in 1940 and worked throughout the war. Then Nikolaus Riehl and other Auer personnel helped the Soviets.



How many
gaseous diffusion
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produce and use
during the war?

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
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Also Erika Cremer, Erich Bagge, etc.


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Forgotten Creators D.4.4, D.4.6, D.14



Princeton University Library, Moe Berg Papers (C1413), Box 20, Folder 3--Loose Notes: Central Intelligence Agency.

The Manhattan Project believed the German gaseous diffusion program was ahead of them.



Samuel K. Allison to Leslie R. Groves, 27 January 1944. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 170, Folder 32.60-1 GERMANY: Summary Reports (1944)

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March 11, 1924.

G. L. HERTZ

1,486,521 Klasse 12 d.

Ausgegeben am 25. Oktober 1927.

METHOD OF SEPARATING GASES FROM A MIXTURE THEREOF
Filed April 17, 1923



ÖSTERREICHISCHES PATENTAMT. PATENTSCHRIFT NR 107571.

N. V. PHILIPS' GLOELAMPENFABRIEKEN IN EINDHOVEN.
Verfahren zur ununterbrochenen Trennung eines Gasgemisches.

Angemeldet am 27. Oktober 1923; Priorität der Anmeldung in den Niederlanden vom 21. August 1925

Bezugsfrist: Beginn der Patentdauer: 15. Mai 1927.

Als Erfinder wird genannt: Dr. Gustav Ludwig Hertz in Eindhoven.



Also
Erika
Cremer,
Erich
Bagge,
etc.

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Forgotten
Creators
D.4.4,
D.4.6,
D.14

The Mayflower
3. Industrial content unheard USSR
* most nickel wire mesh for use as a barrier backing for the gaseous diffusion plant by East German factories - also reports: such prod. in Moscow area
* the nickel wire for these screens, as well as looms for it, are also prod'd in East Germany
* apparently not NEUSTADT/ORLA EMIL DRESSER family gigante
* making looms of the quality req'd in prod. of fine nickel wire mesh
* former I. G. Farben plant: BITZERHEID = now Elektrochemisches Kombinat, " > large fraction of the calcium used in reduction of the U > metal for use in the pile
* also believed: equivalent > isotope sep.
program ok'd from satellites, used by East Germany

Princeton University Library, Moe Berg Papers (C1413), Box 20, Folder 3--Loose Notes: Central Intelligence Agency.

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ÉTAT FRANÇAIS.

MINISTÈRE DE LA PRODUCTION INDUSTRIELLE ET DES COMMUNICATIONS.

SERVICE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INDUSTRIELLE.

BREVET D'INVENTION.

Gr. 14. — Cl. 6.

881.316

Procédé de séparation, par diffusion, de substances difficilement séparables.

Société dite: AUERGESellschaft AKTIENGesellschaft résidant en Allemagne.

Demandé le 16 avril 1942, à 16^h 40^m, à Paris.

Delivré le 22 janvier 1943. — Publié le 21 avril 1943.

(Demande de brevet déposée en Allemagne le 21 septembre 1940. — Déclaration du déposant.)

On sait que les éléments chimiques ne sont pas à considérer comme des matières complètement uniformes, mais au contraire que la plupart des éléments se composent de plusieurs espèces d'atomes différentes, les espèces d'atomes appartenant à un élément se distinguant par leur poids atomique et non par leurs propriétés chimiques. On appelle isotopes les espèces d'atomes qui appartiennent au même élément, mais ont des poids atomiques différents. La séparation des isotopes les uns des autres pose un problème particulièrement difficile, parce qu'il n'y a pas de différences chimiques entre les isotopes à séparer et que, par suite, toutes les méthodes chimiques de séparation échouent. On a donc tenté de recourir à des méthodes physiques de séparation, dans lesquelles le poids atomique se manifeste de telle manière que l'on puisse compter la différenciation des atomes de poids différents. Mais parmi tous les essais entrepris dans ce sens, la plus grande nouveauté ont manqué leur but, une des premières raisons de ces échecs étant due au fait que les différences de poids atomiques des corps isotopes sont pour la plupart très faibles. A maintes reprises, on a essayé de profiter à profit le fait qu'un atome plus léger doit posséder une vitesse de diffusion plus grande qu'un atome moins léger. On a donc fait diffuser à travers des membranes poreuses les espèces d'atomes étudiées en essayant de réaliser leur séparation par ce moyen. La majorité de ces essais n'ont toutefois pas réussi. Il a été trouvé, ces dernières années, un procédé par lequel on peut, dans de nombreux cas, exécuter une séparation d'isotopes avec une pleine réussite tout au moins pour des isotopes gazeux. Il s'agit du procédé par thermo-diffusion indiqué par Chenebise. Mais le procédé en question, aussi bien que tous les autres procédés qui produisent pour le moins une certaine ségrégation des isotopes, se limitent généralement à des corps gazeux. Un inconvénient plus grave encore des procédés indiqués jusqu'à présent réside dans la grande complexité, le prix élevé et le manque de robustesse des appareils qui nécessitent leur mise en œuvre. A cela s'ajoute la très grande dépense d'énergie nécessaire pour la séparation d'une certaine quantité de matière, dans tous ces procédés. Dans quelques cas particuliers, on réussit à séparer jusqu'à un certain degré des paires d'isotopes déterminées, sans franchir le cadre d'un procédé de laboratoire, mais les

[881.316]

procédés employés jusqu'à présent n'ont aucune chance d'être appliqués à l'échelle industrielle. La présente invention concerne un procédé de séparation d'isotopes, exempt de tous les inconvénients caractéristiques des méthodes employées jusqu'à ce jour et qui, pour la première fois, permet de réaliser une séparation d'isotopes sur le plan industriel. Comme il s'agit ici d'un nouveau procédé physico-chimique de séparation, il est également applicable à la ségrégation d'autres substances difficilement séparables telles que, par exemple, les paires d'éléments formant des mélanges azeotropiques. En outre, le procédé n'est pas applicable uniquement aux gaz, mais encore particulièrement à des substances en solution. C'est la particularité qui le rend d'une importance industrielle beaucoup plus grande que la séparation des seuls corps gazeux. En effet, les mélanges 25 notamment ne se trouvent pas en général normalement à l'état gazeux, tout au moins aux températures utilisables au laboratoire et en exploitation. La description qui va suivre, en regard du dessin annexé, donne à titre d'exemple non limitatif, fera bien comprendre comment l'invention peut être réalisée, les particularités qui ressortent du dessin de ce texte faisant, bien entendu, partie de celle-ci. On décrit tout d'abord la forme de réalisation du procédé objet de l'invention qui est destinée à la séparation de substances à l'état dissoutes. La fig. 1 sert à expliquer le procédé. Un cylindre 1, par exemple en tôle, est rempli d'une masse poreuse 2, telle que du sable, de la terre d'infusaires ou une masse amorphe cohérente. La masse poreuse (telle que le sable) est noyée dans la solution des isotopes à séparer. A l'extrémité inférieure du cylindre, on évapore le solvant par le chauffage par ventilation ou par le vide, en maintenant soit que l'évaporation soit suffisamment lente pour que le sol dissout ne risque pas de cristalliser. Par le haut, on verse du solvant frais goutte à goutte, en quantité égale à ce qui s'est évaporé dans le bas. Il se passe alors le phénomène suivant: la solution se concentre au voisinage de la surface inférieure dans la mesure même où le solvant est évaporé à l'extrémité inférieure. Il se produit, par suite, une baisse de concentration de bas en haut et la matière dissoute commence à se diffuser de bas en haut. On a donc affaire ici à deux courants de sens contraires, l'un de ces courants est constitué par l'écoulement du solvant à travers la masse en direction descendante, l'autre est un courant de diffusion, en sens contraire, de la matière dissoute. Les atomes ou les ions en molécules en solution, diffèrent donc d'une manière ininterrompue de bas en haut, mais sans changer de place, car leur diffusion est continuellement compensée par le courant liquide s'écoulant à sa rencontre. (On pourrait illustrer les conditions régnant ici par l'exemple de l'écoulement d'un liquide visqueux dans un tube, où la diffusion est continuellement compensée par le courant liquide s'écoulant à sa rencontre. (On pourrait illustrer les conditions régnant ici par l'exemple de l'écoulement d'un liquide visqueux dans un tube, où la diffusion est continuellement compensée par le courant liquide s'écoulant à sa rencontre. (On pourrait illustrer les conditions régnant ici par l'exemple de l'écoulement d'un liquide visqueux dans un tube, où la diffusion est continuellement compensée par le courant liquide s'écoulant à sa rencontre.)

The Manhattan Project believed the German gaseous diffusion program was ahead of them. In September 1946, Leslie Groves sent Percival C. Keith, chief designer of Oak Ridge K-25, on a high-risk, two-week, Top Secret trip to Czechoslovakia. Was it to inspect/sabotage a former German enrichment plant?

Metallurgical Laboratory
P.O. BOX 3707
CHICAGO 90, ILLINOIS
January 27, 1944
RUTHERFORD 4000
MURKIN-KA-444
The document consists of 1 figures
No. 1 of 6 copies, Series A
Major Gen. L. R. Groves
P.O. Box 2610
Washington, D.C.
Dear Gen. Groves:
Major Purman has told us that in connection with the work we are doing for him we should cover possible enemy activities in every phase of our project, that is, the X-10, Y-12, and K-25 processes.
We have dismissed as too improbable to require investigation the possibility that the enemy may be engaged in the Y-12 process on a scale of military importance. We believe, however, that due to the fact that the enemy was considerably in advance of us in certain work of the K-25 type before the war, there is a high probability that if he is doing anything of military interest in our field, he is operating along this line.
In order to suggest to Major Purman appropriate leads for investigation, we would like to request that Dr. Karl Cohen of the Columbia group be authorized to visit us and discuss various methods of accomplishing our result by K-25 processes. Dr. Cohen in his work for Dr. Urey has had wide experience in investigating several kinds of such processes, some of which have been developed by the enemy.
Would it be possible for you to authorize such a visit in the near future?
Yours sincerely,
Samuel K. Allison
Samuel K. Allison
44
CC Compton
Worthington
Vernon

Samuel K. Allison to Leslie R. Groves, 27 January 1944.
NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 170, Folder 32.60-1
GERMANY: Summary Reports (1944)
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND-111617
Leslie Groves to U.S. Military Attaché London, 10 Sept. 1946.
Top Secret cable WAR 99912. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 160, Folder 205.4 Cables Outgoing, Top Secret.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED. HANDLE AS TOP SECRET CIPHER. PER PARAS 531 and 60a. AR 380-5
Major Gen. L. R. Groves' Office
Room 4266 78333 Major John G. Mattine
10 September 1946
MILITARY ATTACHE London England
Number: WAR 99912
Loss Personal for Dean from Shuler signed Groves
Mr P. C. Keith will be in Czechoslovakia from approximately 15 September to 25 September. The name of the Military Attache at Prague, Colonel Francis P. Keonig, has been given to Keith. It is important that Keonig be notified of visit of Keith into Czechoslovakia so that Keonig may extend to him every courtesy possible should the occasion arise.
Wire Keonig immediately in Prague-Top Secret-priority as follows on high priority to the command of U. S. Industrial Corporation, will be in Czechoslovakia on September 15th and may contact you personally. Important that every courtesy possible be shown him if occasion arises.
End
ORIGINATOR : Gen Groves
GA-OUT-99912 (Sep 46) DTG 101959Z ee

How many
gaseous diffusion
cells did Germany
produce and use
during the war?

4. ^{235}U Enrichment: Many Sites, Mostly Underground

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OSS Report No. FF-83. 21 October 1944. Atom Smashing Secret Weapon. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.7003-2.

1. The Germans have completed a weapon which is founded on the principle of the disintegration of matter (Atomzertruemmerung). Experiments have been performed which have proved conclusive... 2... The radius of action is supposed to be about three kilometers... 3. Different conversations which have taken place with industrial leaders in charge of concentration of production of German war material give the impression that Germany has unlimited confidence in the use of this weapon, which is to bring them certain victory. 4. Herr Schneider, one of the directors of the German factories called Deutsche Waffen u. Munitions-fabrik (a combine representing some fifteen factories and 250,000 workers) declared with a smile: "... Our important factories where the assembly is carried out are all subterranean. An immense quantity of accessories is made in small lots everywhere throughout the country, so that bombing cannot interrupt the production."

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MacFarland Istanbul to Shepardson OSS. 4 May 1944. Cable IN-9026. NARA RG 226, Entry AI-134, Box 219, Folder IN AZUSA Nov. '43 Sept. '45. ["Azusa" = OSS code word for nuclear.]

We have been informed by Azusa-Dahlia that the component of a new explosive is being produced by the I.G. Farben factory in the vicinity of Tropau (called Opava by the Czechs). This factory has 30,000 employees. In the vicinity of Maehrisch-Ostrau (called Moravska-Ostrava by the Czechs) there is an identical factory.

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F. A. Duwell. 5th Army POW Cage (Air), Target Notes A/16. 7 November 1944. AFHRA folder 512.619C-15A 1943-1945; AFHRA A5417 frames 966-967.

7. Other Underground Factories P/W claims that a number of underground factories are located between LANDSBERG and SCHONGAU on the west side of the RR line and main highway in a heavily wooded area... He had his information from members of Organization TODT, who had helped with construction there. 8. Electric Power Stations, LANDSBERG-SCHONGAU Along the river LECH between LANDSBERG and SCHONGAU four electric power stations are located... 9. Dynamite A. G. Kaufering at Landsberg This plant was begun in 1939-40 and at that time curious civilians were informed that they need not be concerned as the project was of little importance. However, this did not quiet the suspicions that something highly secret was being performed, suspicions that are still rife today. In May 1943 there was a sudden increase in activity after which time the place was put under heavy guard. The entire complex is set in the woods and is heavily camouflaged. An extensive network of roads was built into and through the woods. P/W knew that about 30 large tanks were partially buried near the factory, painted green on top, and covered over with trees and shrubs. He also knew that "Press Luft" (Compressed Air) was being prepared here for use in the factory and that some sort of munitions were being manufactured.

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Philip Morrison to Francis J. Smith. 17 February 1945. Subject: Evaluation of Air Photos. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.7003-3 GERMANY: US Wartime Positive Int. (Nov. 44-June 45).

Dubnica (Czechoslovakia)—This plant has been carefully studied by the Crossbow Committee in interpretation report #U17. It is an excellent factory for making anything. More specifically, the underground facilities, which include quite sizeable steam installations, would make possible the location of a plant of LTD [enrichment], or similar style in fractional scale, at this site. The absence of visible handling facilities for large equipment, etc., is not conclusive, but it is a bit strange if this is really a normal factory for producing ordnance.

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Cable IN 1788 from Caserta, Italy to OSS Director. #27074. AZUSA. 154 and Dix from 148. 19 January 1945. NARA RG 226, Entry A1-134, Box 219, Folder IN AZUSA Nov. '43 Sept. '45.

Octopus cables 18 January that partisans report experiments being conducted on atomic bombs at Sopron, Hungary and west of Vienna. We are asking that further inquiries be made discreetly. Meanwhile cable me whether you have had other indications on these localities. Ask Major Furman if Major Ham is still his representative in this Theater.

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7. Other Underground Factories P/W claims that a number of underground factories are located between LANDSBERG and SCHONGAU on the west side of the RR line and main highway in a heavily wooded area... He had his information from members of Organization TODT, who had helped with construction there. 8. Electric Power Stations, LANDSBERG-SCHONGAU Along the river LECH between LANDSBERG and SCHONGAU four electric power stations are located... 9. Dynamite A. G. Kaufering at Landsberg This plant was begun in 1939-40 and at that time curious civilians were informed that they need not be concerned as the project was of little importance. However, this did not quiet the suspicions that something highly secret was being performed, suspicions that are still rife today. In May 1943 there was a sudden increase in activity after which time the place was put under heavy guard. The entire complex is set in the woods and is heavily camouflaged. An extensive network of roads was built into and through the woods. P/W knew that about 30 large tanks were partially buried near the factory, painted green on top, and covered over with trees and shrubs. He also knew that "Press Luft" (Compressed Air) was being prepared here for use in the factory and that some sort of munitions were being manufactured.

Philip Morrison to Francis J. Smith. 17 February 1945. Subject: Evaluation of Air Photos. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.7003-3 GERMANY: US Wartime Positive Int. (Nov. 44-June 45).

Dubnica (Czechoslovakia)—This plant has been carefully studied by the Crossbow Committee in interpretation report #U17. It is an excellent factory for making anything. More specifically, the underground facilities, which include quite sizeable steam installations, would make possible the location of a plant of LTD [enrichment], or similar style in fractional scale, at this site. The absence of visible handling facilities for large equipment, etc., is not conclusive, but it is a bit strange if this is really a normal factory for producing ordnance.

R. V. Shepherd. BIOS 313. Report on Visit to Czechoslovakia by Armament Design Department. p. 11.

Dubnica—An underground factory built before the war by Skoda. It was taken over by the Germans and operated by them. It was completely destroyed by the Germans when the Russians advanced into Slovakia.

Henry Picker. 2009. *Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier*. 2nd ed. pp. 42, 493.

And how much more death, war damage, refugees, and destruction would have been the result if Hitler's opponents had not won—as Churchill said—"five minutes before midnight" and thus thwarted Hitler's new end-run defense in the spring of 1945. For with the A-9 "interglobal rockets" developed in Peenemünde, which also reached their targets in the USA, and with the small-pumpkin-sized "uranium bombs" (with their full destructive energy in a 3-km radius), which according to Schaub's information had been developed to ready prototypes at the Reichspost's research office in Lichterfelde, if Hitler had been able to make these weapons actually deployed, the suffering, the cruelty, the harshness, the extension, and the duration of World War II would certainly have been multiplied... According to Schaub, the "terrible weapons" meant above all the "uranium bomb" with the size of a small pumpkin which was to be produced in an underground SS plant in the southern Harz region (with a production capacity of 30,000 workers). The plant was relocated to the USSR by the Red Army in 1945 after Germany's unconditional surrender.

PW INTELLIGENCE SECTION, HQ MAAF. 22 December 1944. AFHRA A6091 frame 1419.

SECRET WEAPONS, REDL ZIPF (A): At REDL ZIPF between VÖCKLAMARKT and VÖCKLABRUCK, experiments are being made in connection with the atomic bomb.

Report of Interrogation PW RAAB. 11 October 1944. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.7003-2 GERMANY: US Wartime Positive Int. (July-Oct. 44).

Redl Zipf plant. The product of the firm is known to the workers only as "liquid gas" and, based on PW's knowledge of the raw materials delivered to the plant, it would appear to be some kind of explosive... This firm, in turn, was importing large quantities of thorium from Hungary and elsewhere in the Balkans... The equipment inside the plant consists of circa 200 boilers of unusual construction in that they are completely lined with some argillaceous material and covered over on the outside with some white metal, name of which is unknown to PW, but it is supposed to be a non-magnetic substance. These boilers are situated in different compartments and are connected by a system of pipes and conduits running between the sections and through the concrete walls... The gas, or liquid, prepared was stored in large high-pressure cylinders about 3 1/2 to 4 meters in height and 1 1/2 to 2 meters in diameter. PW believes they were constructed of more than usual strength steel. They too, as well as all connections and valves, were lined with an earthenware type coating. The product, when ready for shipment, was sent to an already established munitions factory in Stadl Paura... It is noteworthy that the workers in the plant complained of loss of appetite... Peasants in the vicinity were required to make regular delivery of whole milk for the workers.

Cable IN 1788 from Caserta, Italy to OSS Director. #27074. AZUSA. 154 and Dix from 148. 19 January 1945. NARA RG 226, Entry A1-134, Box 219, Folder IN AZUSA Nov. '43 Sept. '45.

Octopus cables 18 January that partisans report experiments being conducted on atomic bombs at Sopron, Hungary and west of Vienna. We are asking that further inquiries be made discreetly. Meanwhile cable me whether you have had other indications on these localities. Ask Major Furman if Major Ham is still his representative in this Theater.

Frederick Loofbourow. 19 Sept. and 28 Oct. 1943. NARA RG 226, Entry 125, Box 6, Folder 78.

Our sources claim that there are large explosives factories in Hiltersheim, Magdeburg district. These factories are said to have been moved here from Ludwigshafen. They are located in underground, bomb-proof facilities. A special substance is produced here which is said to have an enormous explosive effect. In Ludwigshafen, this explosive was used on an experimental basis to blow up severely damaged houses and entire neighborhoods. With one kilogram, everything within a radius of approximately four kilometers should be literally razed away, or disintegrated to dust and ashes. We are told that this explosive will soon be used for other purposes. We are also informed that there are aircraft factories in Silesia (unfortunately we are not given exact details of the location) which cannot be entered without a pass. A son of a shipman we know works there. The employees are not allowed to leave the factories. They eat and sleep in specially equipped rooms. The factories are also located underground and are protected against air raids. It is suspected that something like a "secret weapon" is also being produced here...

Dr. Berg tells me that his friends know from countless sources that several factories and hundreds of workers have been transported from the Wiesental near Bâle to northern Germany. The workers' letters home are mailed from a great variety of towns—but all these towns are on the periphery of the Lüneburger Heide. The story he hears is that they are all working in vast underground factories putting out a new explosive in aerial bombs. He has even heard that the container of the explosive is spherical. A very large number of runways are being built in that region with calculated slowness and care to prevent detection from the air—and these are to accommodate the planes that will eventually come to load up with the new bombs for an attack on England. While I am gone he will assemble the details of this story for me—what kind of factories were removed—what kind of training the workers had had—names of any chemicals they may have worked with. He heard some part of the explosive was previously manufactured in the Wiesental before the whole business was concentrated in Lüneburger Heide. The concentration took place about 9 months ago.

[See *Forgotten Creators* D.4.6, D.8 for many more.]

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Book I, Volume
12, Part 2,
Appendix C-7.*

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1 November 1944	77,700,000	187,760	320,080.80
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United States Strategic Bombing Survey. 1947. *German Electric Utilities Industry Report.* p. 4.

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Other documents indicate that German enrichment was more efficient than Oak Ridge (centrifuges) and German bombs were more efficient than Little Boy (implosion), so Germany needed much less power than Oak Ridge.

5. Reported Fission Reactors

Dahlem →
Haigerloch



5. Reported Fission Reactors

● **Königsberg**

● **Hamburg**

→ **Dahlem**
→ **Haigerloch**

● **Lichterfelde**

● **Gottow**
→ **Stadttilm**

● **Leverkusen**

● **Leipzig**


● **Thuringia**
underground

● **Krizek/**
Bodenbach

● **Unter-**
raderach

● **Gusen**

Forgotten Creators D.5



H. K. Calvert. 29 January 1945. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.7003-3 GERMANY: US Wartime Positive Int. (Nov. 44–June 45). [I. G. Farben was producing uranium hexafluoride, heavy water, graphite, aluminum, calcium, etc.]

At the LEVERKUSEN I G Farben Works, PW learned through an uncle, who is a director, that a special department has been installed in concrete structures like pillboxes, to which access is gained only through special passes, even high-ranking officers being refused admission under a special order issued 18 Nov by factory police. There is heavy A.A. defence of all calibers, and the general belief is that experiments are being made with special weapons of some kind.

Richard P. Fischer. June 1945. Report on German Supplies of Uranium-Bearing Raw Materials. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 163, Folder Australia.

About 50 to 60 tons of strongly radioactive "tarnsand" was delivered to the German Army... More likely the "tarnsand" was prepared from material in which the radioactivity has been artificially induced.

F.A.C. Wardenburg and J.A. Lane. 5 April 1945. Interrogation of Dr. Kohl, Works Manager of Degussa Plant No. 2, Frankfurt. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 166, Folder 32.22-1.

Metallic uranium was mixed with coal dust (carbon?) and with Tragacanth gum as a binding material and pressed into blocks, approximately 50% by weight of coal and uranium. The blocks were approximately 5 cm x 5 cm x 6 cm. About five tons as metallic uranium in total were delivered in this form.

S. McClintic 6 Jan 1945. AFHRA A5734 p. 1092 At UNTERRADERACH, near FRIEDRICHSHAFEN, there is a large semi-underground factory which was constructed early last winter where strange experiments were taking place. Heavy clouds of smoke filled the sky in the day and at night a red glow. The experiments caused the earth to shake. These experiments are with atoms and when the experiments proved successful the plant went into operation. Workmen were not allowed to leave the factory.

Gerhard Dessauer to Leo Szilard. 6 July 1942. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.7003-1 GERMANY: US Wartime Positive Int. (July 42–June 44).

I learned that the chain reaction of the uranium isotope is now successful. It is not explosive, but there is now the prospect of technical utilization.

MED Foreign Intelligence. 3 April 1944. Activities from 13 March to 31 March 1944. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 170, Folder 32.60-1.

Mr. [John Hitchcock] Chapin reported successful detection experiments and requested aircraft study.

F. J. Smith. 30 July 1945. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 163, Folder Australia.

Mr. Parks, a geologist for the Engineers who has recently returned to the States, was interviewed and he stated that there was sizeable pile of material that originally came from the Belgian-Congo now at Hamburg. The material was being used by the KWI and even though we don't know his interpretation of a sizeable pile, we believe it would be worthwhile looking into.

Wolfgang G. Schwanitz. *H-Soz-u-Kult, H-Net Reviews*. Feb. 2009.

After 1945 the Grand Mufti said that the enemy espionage by "Jewish, English and American intelligence services" caused "the greatest damage." They were able to discover the locations of "atomic reactors" in East Prussia.

RAF Bomber Command Campaign Diary. webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20070706054833/http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/aug44.html

29/30 August 1944 189 Lancasters of No 5 Group carried out one of the most successful No 5 Group attacks of the war on Königsberg at extreme range. Only 480 tons of bombs could be carried because of the range of the target but severe damage was caused around the 4 separate aiming points selected.

Joint Intelligence Committee. Exploitation of German Scientists and Technicians. 5 January 1946. J.I.C. 317/10. Appendix C. [NARA RG 218, Entry UD-1, Box 475, Folder CCS 471.9... (5-1-45)... Sec. 3.

Practically the entire staff of the German "URANMOTOR" Project at KRIZEK in Czechoslovakia under Prof. HUETTIG is working for the U.S.S.R.

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Folder Focke, Franz.

There was once a report of an atomic pile operated by Russians at Bodenbach, CSR...

Edward M. Pickett to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USFET. 4 March 1946. Additional Supply of Uranium Oxide. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 169, Folder 32.32. Germ. Ind. TA.

Additional quantities of Uranium Oxide have been located in the amount of approximately five and one-half tons at Bad Tölz and Munich... Dr. Fritz REHBEIN stated during investigation that the Uranium Oxide is very active and can be extremely injurious to personnel not qualified in its handling.

E. P. Dean to W. R. Shuler. 1 April 1946. Shipment of Uranium Compounds. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 169, Folder 32.32. Germ. Ind. TA.

G-2 moved very slowly and we had to prod them on three successive occasions... On the other hand, G-2 moved extremely quickly re the five tons of uranium oxide recently discovered at Bad Tölz.

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● Hamburg

→ Dahlem
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● Lichterfelde

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Forgotten Creators D.5


5. Kurt Diebner and Colleagues, Gottow Fission Experiments, 1941 [Courtesy of Günter Nagel]



5. Sites of Known or Suspected Reactors: Gusen, Austria

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


16 April 1945 U.S. aerial surveillance photo
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sealed before U.S. forces arrive




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
©Sammlung Jakob

2 Atom-Meiler
= 2 atomic piles

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5. Sites of Known or Suspected Reactors: Gusen, Austria

15 March 1945 U.S. aerial surveillance photo
of underground reactor complex (?)
under construction or operational




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2 Atom-Meiler


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


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
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


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Walter Chmielewski, son of Gusen commandant, 2016:
There was the precise talk of a total (of about) **30–40 kilometers of tunnels** which have been created and partly in fact on two levels. This came through in talks with SS people and there is now **nuclear research being carried out there**. Under high pressure there is research, which could still save the nation, so to speak; **the atomic bomb could be constructed**, so that the initiative can be recovered again, yes. This was clearly stated in conversations in Gusen, that this research is already taking place. [\[Forgotten Creators D.5\]](#)

6. Breeding ^{239}Pu or ^{233}U in Electronuclear Systems

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It was attempted to produce plutonium without having a reactor. [...] In the summer of 1944, when the uranium program had already been developed properly, decisive measures were taken, because there was evidence that plutonium could be produced, albeit with difficulty and in very small quantities. It was Himmler who commissioned us to use our technical capabilities to build the first machines for it. The construction drawings for it were not from our [SS] people. [...] In addition, the Reichspost had its own very secret research facility nearby, but I do not know anything about it. The equipment for the plutonium matter was manufactured by Austrian companies and in the [Czech] Protectorate. This was so because Austrian scientists had better contacts to their own companies, which did excellent work by the way. The operation of the facility was supposed to be organized such that we [SS] provided the facility and also the construction of the underground rooms. The technicians there should operate them for us and Ohnesorge's people would provide the technical supervision. [...] After the war I heard that we had material for one or two plutonium bombs.

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PRAGUE, Aug. 23---(AP)---A shattering American air raid, Czech sabotage and an accident frustrated German experiments in Czechoslovakia seeking to develop an atomic bomb, newspaper accounts said here today. A German engineer named [W.] Isenbeck worked with the problem of releasing atomic energy in a radio plant at Vysocany, the accounts said. A blast and fire at the plant in 1943 followed by an American raid [25 March 1945] halted work soon after the plant resumed operations. Some mysterious apparatus was dispatched to the Imperial Research Institute in Berlin, but Czech workers believed they managed to damage the delicate mechanism before it was shipped, the stories said.

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Georgy Flerov. 1983 interview. www.gornictwo.walbrzych.pl/news-91-Tajemnice_kopalni_Walbrzycha.php

Nobody knows everything, because the Germans destroyed a lot of documents and experimental materials, and the Allies, the Americans, took a lot. [...] I was in Waldenburg, but just before I came back from Germany to Moscow. [...] Stalin and Kurchatov sent me there. There were reports that the Germans were conducting atomic tests. I went there as a representative of the Ministry of Light Machines. It turned out on the spot that the Germans were more advanced in the tests than one could have imagined. [...] I found out that in Dresden the "Service" [NKVD] had captured a German scientist, a physicist, who told me about secret experiments in Waldenburg, so I took him with me and we went there, but he knew too little. [...] You see, the Germans had a lot of research groups. My German worked in an institute in Dresden that belonged to the Postal Ministry. He was in Waldenburg only one time to install equipment, because that institute belonged to the SS. [...] He was there only once. The car that carried him from the railway station drove around the city for a long time until the German had forgotten the way. Then they drove into the mine and drove him underground. He sat there for two days, worked, ate, and slept underground. When he finished, the car drove him around the city again, before he reached the station. And that is why the German could not find anything with me. [...] He said that when he was there for the first time he was also afraid. He said that SS people were guarding everywhere; he described them as "sharp." He said they had strange emblems on their uniforms that he had never seen before. [...] He said that with his colleagues he had installed a cyclotron there, but it turned out that it was the second one, because one was already there. They installed the second one. He told us that the mine had been specially adapted. There were trolleys, tables, all the necessary equipment, and at the entrances there were locks and guards. He could not enter because he did not have a special pass.


For more information, see *Forgotten Creators* D.6 and D.15.3

Reported Heavy Water Production

Norsk Hydro
Vemork



7. At Least 27 Reported Heavy Water Production Sites



7. At Least 27 Reported Heavy Water Production Sites

C. Chamberlain. Reveal Allied Capture of Nazi Atom Factory. *Chicago Daily Tribune*. 9 Aug. 1945.

The largest heavy water plant in Germany, where Nazi scientists were working feverishly to perfect an atomic bomb, was captured almost intact by the allies three months ago in a heavily wooded section four miles from Kiel. Cobwebs of plastic pipes connected eight huge vats holding thousands of gallons of plain water for processing into heavy water. I stumbled onto the factory two weeks after it was taken over by American and British technicians. Altho they gave me freedom to roam around the grounds, I was called on the carpet the next day for entering without authority from high officials and was required to pledge not to reveal what I had seen until it was released.

OSS London. 5 December 1944. T-2805-a. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.7003-3.

GERMANY: ATOMIC PHYSICS Heavy Water Experimental Station. Heavy water experiments are being carried out at the Dräger Werke, Lübeck, which is reported to be the largest gas factory in Germany.

<https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81-01028r000100080011-0>

The dismantling of the Leuna Plant in Merseburg, Thuringia, Germany (Soviet Zone), was initiated in March 1946... 3. The following large installations were dismantled:... (j) The heavy water installation operating at atmospheric pressure was dismantled and possibly placed in a building near the Agricultural Exhibition Grounds in Moscow. (k) The heavy water installation operating at 700 atmospheres was taken to the Karpov Institute where it was being installed when we left in July 1948.

Interrogation of PW MAYER. 14 July 1944. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.7003-2.

PW is an educated man in his late thirties, a physical chemist by profession[...] PW believes that D2O (Heavy Hydrogen) is manufactured principally at GRIESHEIM ELEKTRON in fairly large quantities for distribution to research and scientific establishments.

B.K. Hough to L. Groves. 9 December 1943. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 166, Folder 32.22-1.

Dr. E. P. Wigner of Chicago mentioned to Dr. Urey that he has had reports of heavy water plants now in production in Germany.

Norsk Hydro Ljunga
Vemork Säheim -verk

Notodden

Karl Cohen to F. Smith. 23 February 1945. Subject: Status of Enemy Separation Projects. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 166, Folder 32.22-1.

Heavy Water Production... Factories: Rjukan (now dismantled) Müggenberg, I. G. Farben

Kiel Dräger
Lübeck
Berlin
Müggenberg
Halle
Leuna (2)
Bitterfeld
Breslau
Lehesten
Griesheim
Linde
Schmiedeberg
Frankfurt
Munich
Pardubice
Brixlegg
Weer
B9 Quarz
Merano
Rheinfelden
Weissenstein

Ferdinand Cap. 23 November 1950 report.

At the invitation of Colonel Colonel GOUSSOT, Innsbruck, I had the opportunity to visit Mr. Werd's [wartime] heavy water extraction test facility in Weer near Wattens in Tyrol on 21 November 1950.

See *Forgotten Creators*

D.7 for many more.

Cotrone

Stig Edfast. Sveriges Radio. 10 July 2015. <https://www.sverigesradio.se/artikel/6209697>

Ulf Sundholm has written books about the history of Ljungaverk and he now wants to open a museum. "They produced heavy water here in the factory during the war. It is a story that many older people have known about, but it has not been talked about," says author Ulf Sundholm. For six years he has been researching information and putting together a puzzle and can now show that heavy water from Fosfatbolaget in Ljungaverk was transported to Germany in containers during the Second World War... "The containers with heavy water went from Ljungaverk by train. They were transferred in Gällö to German transport trains."

Siegfried Knappe. 1992. *Soldat: Reflections of a German Soldier 1936-1949*. Orion. pp. 265-268.

Hitler had declared Breslau a fortress city, which meant that it was to be defended to the last man, even if it was surrounded and totally isolated... A factory for making heavy water for atomic experiments had been abandoned east of Breslau, and we had to plan and conduct a counterattack to destroy it and keep its secrets from falling into the hands of the Russians.

U.S. Embassy, Warsaw. 12 Aug. 1947. MIS-390731. Subject: Plants producing heavy water. NARA RG 319, Entry 85A, Box 2534, Folder 390731-390740.

It is believed that no plants designed specially for the production of heavy water exist in Poland [in 1947]. It is reliably reported that the Germans built one such plant near OSWIECIM (Auschwitz) but that it was destroyed or moved out by the SOVIETS in 1945.

R. W. Kirkman. 28 January 1944. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.7003-1.

According to Major Furman, the substance of the conversation referred to was to the effect that Degussa was producing heavy water at two plants located at Rheinfelden and Weissenstein on the Drau River, Austria.

7. At Least 27 Reported Heavy Water Production Sites



The map shows the following production sites marked with red dots and labeled in red text:

- Norsk Hydro
- Vemork
- Såheim
- Notodden
- Ljunga
- verk
- Kiel
- Dräger
- Lübeck
- Berlin
- Müggenberg
- Piesteritz
- Halle
- Bitterfeld
- Leuna (2)
- Breslau
- Auschwitz
- Lehesten
- Griesheim
- Linde
- Schmiedeberg
- Frankfurt
- Munich
- Pardubice
- Brixlegg
- B9
- Quarz
- Weer
- Rheinfelden
- Merano
- Weissenstein

How many production sites were operational during the war?

How much heavy water was produced?

Where was it used?

Why are the reports still classified?

See *Forgotten Creators*

D.7 for many more.

Cotrone

7. At Least 27 Reported Heavy Water Production Sites

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11/11/01	SD	DECLASSIFIED	
11/11/01	SD	DECLASSIFIED	

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Copies: 001
Pages: 0002

Box: 00051

ACCESS RESTRICTED

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Folder Title: 926139
Document Date: 06/13/1946
Document Ser#: _____

Description: MEMO FR: S. M. SKINNER TO: CHIEF SCIENTIFIC BRANCH, WAR DEPT

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Withdrawn: 09/11/2001 by: RUTHEMEYER

FOIA RETRIEVAL #: 20017045 00051 00003

Norsk Hydro Ljunga
Vemork Såheim -verk

Notodden

Kiel Dräger
Lübeck

Berlin
Müggenberg Piesteritz
Halle Bitterfeld
Leuna (2) Breslau Auschwitz
Lehesten
Griesheim Linde Schmiedeberg
Frankfurt Munich Pardubice
Brixlegg B9 Quarz
Weer Rheinfelden
Merano Weissenstein

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NARA RG 319,
Entry AI-84E, Box 124

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

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Where was it used?

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See *Forgotten Creators*

D.7 for many more. Cotrone

7. Production of Other Potentially Nuclear-Related Materials

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Material	Non-nuclear applications	Nuclear applications	Wartime production
Deuterium/ heavy water	Isotope labeling of molecules	Producing tritium, neutrons, fusion; neutron moderator for reactor	At least 27 reported production plants
Lithium	Glass, ceramics, metals	Producing tritium, neutrons, fusion	Hundreds of tons
Beryllium	Metal alloys	Neutron production/reflection	Tons
Boron	Glass, ceramics, metals	Neutron absorber	Large quantities
Graphite	Rocket rudders, electrodes	Neutron moderator for reactor	Tens of thousands of tons
Fluorine	Industrial production	U hexafluoride for enrichment	Thousands of tons
Aluminum	Metal structures, packaging	Reactor fuel cladding, bomb casings	Thousands of tons
Calcium	Metal alloys	Th/U/Pu purification	Thousands of tons
Nickel	Batteries, alloys	Resists corrosion by U hexafluoride	Thousands of tons
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Some sites were producing multiple nuclear-related materials. I.G. Farben's Bitterfeld facility was producing heavy water, graphite, aluminum, and calcium, and perhaps other relevant materials.

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After the war, many of these same German plants continued to produce these same materials for the U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons programs.

Archival documents in *Forgotten Creators* D.7, D.14

7. Disposal of Radioactive Waste at the End of the War

Hasso Ziegler. Die “Konzertsäle” von Asse sind strahlensicher: Endlagerung radioaktiver Abfallprodukte in 500-Meter tiefen Abbaukammern. *Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29 July 1974:

Extensive preparatory work is still going on for the highly radioactive waste, which will accumulate at the earliest from 1976 onwards in West Germany and be stored in Asse (mainly the residues from reprocessed fission products, for example reactor fuel rods). It is thought to sink them—vitrified beforehand—in special chambers (drill holes) to a depth of fifteen hundred meters.

Asked about the occasional bad news that appears every now and then regarding the supposedly dangerous storage of radioactive waste, Alwin Urff, mining engineer and deputy technical plant manager in Asse, only shook his head: “Here in the mine nothing can happen anyway. When we began storage in 1967, our company first sank radioactive waste from the last war, that uranium waste which arose in the preparation of the German atomic bomb. Specifically we had to get that out of concrete bunkers near Munich, where it had been deposited at the time, because back then one did not know where the devil one should leave the stuff...”

8. German Fission Pit Masses

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Erich Schumann, Kurt Diebner, et al. February 1942 [1941 data].
Energiegewinnung aus Uran: Ergebnisse der vom Heereswaffenamt
veranlassten Forschungsarbeiten zur Nutzbarmachung von
Atomkernenergien. AMPG, I. Abteilung, Rep. 34, Nr. 105.

From U_{238} a substance ("element 94") is formed by the absorption of
neutrons, which must be even easier to fission than U_{235} . Since this substance
is chemically different from uranium, it must be possible to separate it easily
from the uranium of a previously operating machine [used reactor fuel]. But
today we know neither the amount in which it is produced nor its properties
precisely enough for a completely safe prediction. Since there are some free
neutrons in each substance, it would be enough to spatially combine a
sufficient amount (probably about 10--100 kg) to ignite the explosive.

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Our sources claim that there are large explosives factories in Hiltersheim, Magdeburg district. These factories are said to have been moved here from Ludwigshafen. They are located in underground, bomb-proof facilities. A special substance is produced here which is said to have an enormous explosive effect. [...] With one kilogram, everything within a radius of approximately four kilometers should be literally razed away, or disintegrated to dust and ashes.

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Erich Rundnagel, in: Gerhardt Remdt and Gunter Wermusch. 2006. *Rätsel Jonastal*. 2nd ed. Meiningen: Heinrich Jung. pp. 125-126.

I was mainly involved with Dr. Rehbein and engineer Rackwitz, with whom I came into a kind of relationship of trust. [...] Then he told me that something was being developed here that had a greater explosive power than anything I could imagine as an old pioneer. Rehbein just smiled and said the whole bomb was only a few decimeters tall, but **weighs about eight kilograms.** When I asked him if I could see the thing, he waved it off: "That could cost us both our heads."

Critical Masses and Radii for Different Fission Fuels and Conditions

Conditions	Uranium-233	Uranium-235	Neptunium-237	Plutonium-239
No reflector No compression No fusion	14.2 kg 5.676 cm	45.9 kg 8.37 cm	25.92 kg 6.736 cm	16.7 kg 6.346 cm
Reflector No compression No fusion	3.55 kg 3.58 cm	11.5 kg 5.27 cm	6.48 kg 4.24 cm	4.18 kg 4.00 cm
No reflector Compression No fusion	1.58 kg 2.73 cm (before compression)	5.10 kg 4.02 cm (before compression)	2.88 kg 3.24 cm (before compression)	1.86 kg 3.05 cm (before compression)
Reflector Compression No fusion	0.394 kg 1.72 cm (before compression)	1.28 kg 2.53 cm (before compression)	0.720 kg 2.04 cm (before compression)	0.464 kg 1.92 cm (before compression)
Reflector Compression Fusion neutrons	<0.394 kg <1.72 cm (before compression)	<1.28 kg <2.53 cm (before compression)	<0.720 kg <2.04 cm (before compression)	<0.464 kg <1.92 cm (before compression)

Based on critical masses and spherical radii with no reflector, no compression, and no fusion [Bruce Cameron Reed, 2011, *The Physics of the Manhattan Project*, 2nd ed., Berlin: Springer, p. 46].

Reflector/tamper reduces critical mass by a factor of 4 [Robert Serber, 1992, *The Los Alamos Primer*, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 31].

Shock compression reduces critical mass by a factor of 9 [Carey Sublette, 2019, *The Nuclear Weapon Archive*, Section 2.1.4, nuclearweaponarchive.org].

Coupled fusion and fission reactions further improve performance [Friedwardt Winterberg, 2010, *The Release of Thermonuclear Energy by Inertial Confinement*, Singapore: World Scientific, pp. 36, 206-208].

8. Fission Bomb, Mass ~ 300 kg, Yield < 1 kT, Tested 1944-45?

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Erich Schumann and Walter Trinks. DE977825.

Zu der Patentschrift 977 825
Kl. 12g Gr. 201
Internat. Kl. B 01j
Blatt III

Fig. 11






Fig. 12



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


T. J. Betts and R. P. Linstead. 15 Sept. 1945. AFHRA A5186 pp. 904-1026.

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

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Werner Grothmann. 2002. pp. 9, 18.

What I know is the actual preparation for the prototype production of the two fully constructed atomic bomb types for uranium and plutonium... I was not allowed to know anything about it, so I can only say that there were two standard types for use against cities and two more of a different size, which were supposed to be **tactical and contain smaller charges.** I learned only after the war that one of the two smaller ones would have had a charge equivalent, that is a comparable explosive material quantity, of I believe 130 tons. This was supposed to be used against railway tunnels, port facilities and military installations. The point was that the small weapons required only very little material, which overcame first of all the shortage [of fission fuel]... **I know that the smaller was about the size of the SC 250, but the weight was higher.**

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NARA RG 165, Entry NM84-187, Box 137, Folder BW 55

Small prolate warhead with two-point ignition, similar to (but less powerful than) postwar U.S. designs such as W45.

For more information, see *Forgotten Creators* D.8, D.15.

8. Fission Bomb Design: 23 March 1945 Letter from General Ivan Ilyichev (Head of GRU) to Joseph Stalin

КАРТАЛЬНЫЙ КОМИССАРИАТ
ОБЩЕГО СОЮЗА ССР

ГЛАВНОЕ
АЗЕДИКАТЕЛЬНОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ
КРАСНОЙ АРМИИ

3 марта 1945

М. 357

г. Москва

В. № 1

НАЧАЛЬНИКУ ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОГО ШТАБА
КРАСНОЙ АРМИИ

ГЕНЕРАЛУ АРМИИ тов. АНТОНОВУ

Докладываю:

Наш достоверный источник из Германии сообщает:

"Немцы в последнее время произвели два взрыва бомбы большой мощности в Тюрингии. Взрывы проводились в лесной местности в обстановке строжайшей секретности. От центра взрыва деревья повалены на расстоянии 500-600 метров. Уничтожены специально построенные для опытов укрепления и сооружения. Находящиеся в центре взрыва военнослужащие погибли, причем зачастую от них не осталось следов. Военнопленные, находящиеся за центром взрыва, имеют ожоги лица и тела, сила которых зависит от расстояния от центра взрыва. Испытания проводились в максимальном глухом районе. На объектах копирования режим секретности максимальный. Взрывы и взрывы разрешены только по особому удостоверению. Команды ЗС оценили рай и испытания, затрагивали качающего приближающегося к этому району человека. Бомба предположительно снаряжена ураном 235 массой около двух тонн. Бомба была привезена в место взрыва на специально оборудованной платформе. Вместе с ней были доставлены некоторые из жидким кислородом. При бомбе постоянно находилось 20 человек охраны с собаками. Взрыв бомбы сопровождался образованием взрывной волны большой мощности, развитием высокой температуры. Кроме этого образовался мощный радиационный эффект. Бомба представляет из себя шар диаметром 130 см.

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Бомба состоит из:

1. Высококачественной разрывной трубки, изготовленной от специальных генераторов
2. Шара, состоящего из металлического урана
3. Замедлителя
4. Защитного футляра
5. Вспышечного вещества
6. Детонаторного устройства
7. Оболочки из стали

Все части бомбы вставляются друг в друга.

Инициатор или запал бомбы.

Состоит из специальной трубки, которая имеет быстрое нейтрона. Ее питают специальные генераторы, создающие в трубке высокое напряжение. В результате быстрые нейтроны атакуют материал.

Активный материал бомбы.

Активным материалом бомбы является уран. Он представляет из себя шар, внутри которого через отверстие вставляется инициатор. Отверстие после этого закрывается пробкой, сделанной из урана 235.

Защитный футляр.

Шар из урана закрывается защитным футляром из алюминия, покрытого слоем кадмия. Футляр не задерживает тепловое нейтрона, но задерживает тепловое нейтрона урана 235, которые могут вызвать преждевременную детонацию.

Вспышечное вещество.

После слоя кадмия помещается взрывчатое вещество, состоящее из пористого тринитротолуола.

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пропитанного жидким кислородом.

Тринитротолуол состоит из брусков, специально подобранной формы. Внутренняя поверхность брусков имеет сферический диаметр, совпадающий с наружной сферической поверхностью шара. К каждому из брусков подвешен один детонатор с двумя электродными лапками.

Оболочка.

Тринитротолуол покрыт защитной оболочкой из легкого алюминиевого сплава. Сверху на эту оболочку крепится инициаторное устройство.

Наружная оболочка.

Сверху подытного устройства устанавливается наружная оболочка из бронированной стали.

Обтекатель.

На бронированную оболочку может устанавливаться обтекатель легкого сплава, для последующей установки бомбы на ракетном двигателе типа "V-2".

Сборка бомбы.

Шар, состоящий из металлического урана, помещается внутри защитного футляра, состоящего из алюминия, покрытого слоем кадмия, так чтобы отверстие в шаре совпадало с отверстием в футляре. Через это отверстие вставляется инициатор. После чего отверстие закрывается пробкой из урана. После этого алюминиевый шар, покрытый кадмием, закрывается пробкой, на которую сверху вкладывается последний брусок тринитротолуола. Дальше в отверстие в защитной оболочке закрывается тринитротолуол, закрывается жидкий кислород. После чего бомба готова к работе.

Самая бомба.

Развал бомбы осуществляется за счет несовершенной разрывной трубки. Она создает поток нейтронов, атакующий активный материал. В процессе воздействия на уран потока нейтронов из него выделяется элемент 93, который вызывает возникновение цепной реакции. Далее, по мере развития цепной реакции, происходит взрывчатое вещество, которое происходит направленный к центру шара. Взрыв наружного слоя тринитротолуола вызывает с жидким кислородом. Это позволяет наружному урану 235 иметь критическую массу. Прямой удар перед взрывом, урановый шар облучается нейтронами с энергией не более 6 миллионов электронвольт, что многократно повышает его взрывную силу.

Заключение.

Несомненно, немцами произведено создание бомбы большой разрушительной силы. В случае успешного окончания и производства подобной бомбы в достаточном количестве они будут обладать оружием, способным замедлить наше наступление.

НАЧАЛЬНИК ИЛ.РАЗВЕДУПРАВЛЕНИЯ
КРАСНОЙ АРМИИ
ГЕНЕРАЛ-ЛЕЙТЕНАНТ

Отпеч. 4 экз.
Экз. № 1 - т. Сталину
- " - 2 - т. Молотову
- " - 3 - т. Антонову
- " - 4 - в дело
161.

Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Fund 93, Division 81 (45), List 37.
Found in 2003 by Rainer Karlsch.

The letter appears to be genuine. It is part of a paper trail of earlier and later documents, some of which were already published.

8. Fission Bomb Design: Ilyichev to Stalin, 23 March 1945

Our trustworthy source from Germany reports:

The Germans have in recent times carried out two large-capacity bomb explosions in Thuringia. The explosions took place in a forest area, under conditions of strictest secrecy. Trees fell at a distance of 500–600 meters from the center of the explosion. Buildings and fortifications specially constructed for the tests have been destroyed.

Prisoners of war who were near the epicenter of the explosion died, often without leaving a trace. Prisoners of war who were in the area beyond the center of the explosion have burns on their face and body, the strength of which depends on their position in relation to the epicenter of the explosion. The tests were carried out in a remote deserted area. The regime of secrecy at the test site was at maximum level. Entrance and exit from the territory are by special pass only. SS soldiers have surrounded the area of tests and interrogated any person approaching the area.

The bomb, supposedly filled with uranium 235 and weighing approximately two tons, was brought to the test site on a specially constructed truck. Dewars of liquid oxygen were delivered together with it. The bomb was permanently guarded by 20 guards with dogs. The bomb explosion was accompanied by a large explosive wave and high temperature. In addition, a massive radioactive effect was observed. The bomb is a sphere with a diameter of 130 cm.

The bomb consists of:

1. High-voltage discharge tube, which is charged by special generators
2. A sphere made of metal uranium 235
3. A delay mechanism [tamper]
4. Protective casing
5. Explosive substance
6. Detonating mechanism
7. Steel casing

All parts of the bomb fit inside each other.

8. Fission Bomb Design: Ilyichev to Stalin, 23 March 1945

Initiator or bomb fuse.

Consists of a special tube, which creates fast neutrons. It is charged by special generators, which create high voltage inside the tube. As a result, fast neutrons attack active material.

Active bomb material.

Active bomb material is uranium 235. It represents a sphere with an opening into which an initiator is inserted. Once this is done, the opening is sealed by a cork made of uranium 235.

Protective casing.

The uranium sphere is encased in a protective aluminum casing, which is covered by a layer of cadmium. This significantly impedes thermal neutrons emanating from uranium 235, which can cause premature detonation.

Explosive matter.

After the layer of cadmium it is placed inside explosives that consist of porous TNT saturated with liquid oxygen; TNT is made

up of bars of a specially chosen shape. The inner surface of the bars has a spherical curvature, which is the same as that of the external surface of the cadmium layer. Each of the bars is supplied with one detonator or two electrical fuses.

Casing.

TNT is covered by a protective layer made of a light aluminum alloy. A blasting mechanism is attached on top of this casing.

Exterior casing.

An exterior casing of armored steel is installed above the blasting mechanism.

Fairing.

A fairing made of a light alloy can be installed on top of the armored casing **for future installation on a rocket of the V-type.**

Bomb assembly.

The sphere, which consists of metal uranium, is placed inside a protective casing, which consists of aluminum, covered in a layer of cadmium, so that the opening in the

8. Fission Bomb Design: Ilyichev to Stalin, 23 March 1945

sphere coinciding with the opening is sealed off by a uranium cork. After this the aluminum sphere, covered in cadmium, is sealed off by a cork, on top of which the last bar of TNT is placed. Next, liquid oxygen is pumped through the opening inside a protective casing, which covers the TNT. After this the bomb is ready for deployment.

Bomb ignition.

The bomb ignition is carried out with the help of a high-voltage discharge tube. It forms a flow of neutrons, which attack the active material. When the flow of neutrons impacts upon uranium, element 93 fissions, which speeds up the creation of a chain reaction. Next, the detonating mechanism detonates the explosive matter, after which

a shock from the explosion of the external layer of TNT mixed with liquid oxygen takes place, which is directed toward the center. This allows the uranium to reach a critical mass.

Ahead of this, before the explosion, the uranium sphere is irradiated with gamma-rays, the energy of which does not exceed 6 million electron volts, which many times increases its explosive qualities.


CONCLUSION.

Without doubt, the Germans are carrying out tests of a bomb of high destructive force. In the event of their successful conclusion and production of such bombs in sufficient quantities, they will have weapons capable of slowing down our advance.

Marshal Georgy Zhukov. 2 October 1945. Report to Joseph Stalin. Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Fund 93, Division 77 (45), List 4-11. Based on the collected materials, it can be concluded that the German scientists in the field of theoretical and practical research and application of atomic energy have achieved good results up to the creation of the atomic bomb.

8. Fission Bomb, Mass 2000 kg, Yield 10s of kT, Tested 1944-45


8. Fission Bomb, Mass 2000 kg, Yield 10s of kT, Tested 1944-45



Gadget/Fat Man diagram from Carey Sublette
nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Gadget2_sm.png

Component	Gadget/Fat Man
Neutron initiator	~ 7 g beryllium/polonium-210 "urchin" 1.25 cm radius
Pit	6.2 kg ²³⁹ Pu 4.6 cm radius
Tamper/reflector	108 kg natural U 11.1 cm radius
Neutron absorber	Boron-10 plastic 3.2 mm thick
Pusher	130 kg aluminum 23.5 cm radius
Explosive	Composition B and baratol 2500 kg, segmented ~ 70 cm radius
Explosive case	~ 180 kg aluminum 72.5 cm radius
Ballistic case	Steel 4.5 mm thick 75 cm radius
Overall radius	75 cm
Total mass	3000 kg (bomb only) 4670 kg (with shell and fins)
Delivery system	Boeing B-29 heavy bomber
Explosive yield	20 kilotons

8. Fission Bomb, Mass 2000 kg, Yield 10s of kT, Tested 1944-45




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Sources:

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 Werner Grothmann, 2002. Jonastalverein Archive, Arnstadt. pp. 9, 18.
 Gottfried Guderley. 1942. *Luftfahrtforschung*, 19:302.
 Caperton Horsley. 1945. CIOS XXVIII-31. Investigation of the X-Ray Industry in Germany.
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 Ordnance Technical Intelligence. Aug. 1945. NARA RG 498, Microfilm MP63-9_0137, frames 623-626.
 Erwin Respondek. 6 November 1945. NARA RG 226, Entry A1-210, Box 447, Folder WN 16162-16171.
 Erich Rundnagel, in Remdt and Wermusch. 2006. *Rätsel Jonastal*. 2nd ed. Heinrich Jung. pp. 125-126.
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 Germans Are Still Striving to Perfect New V Weapons. *New York Times*. 22 October 1944, p. E5.
 V-3? *Time*, 27 November 1944, p. 88.

Component	Gadget/Fat Man	Thuringian Device
Neutron initiator	~ 7 g beryllium/polonium-210 "urchin" 1.25 cm radius	Deuterium + lithium with high voltage ~ 1.25 cm radius and/or external 6 MeV betatron
Pit	6.2 kg ²³⁹ Pu 4.6 cm radius	For test: ~1 kg inner layer of ²³⁵ U with ~ 5–10 kg natural or low-enriched U outer layer For deployment: ~ 5–10 kg ²³⁵ U ~ 5 cm radius
Tamper/reflector	108 kg natural U 11.1 cm radius	~ 100 kg natural U ~ 11 cm radius
Neutron absorber	Boron-10 plastic 3.2 mm thick	~ 1.3 kg cadmium ~ 1 mm thick
Pusher	130 kg aluminum 23.5 cm radius	~ 130 kg aluminum ~ 23 cm radius
Explosive	Composition B and baraton 2500 kg, segmented ~ 70 cm radius	TNT, RDX, and liquid oxygen ~ 1400 kg, segmented ~ 63 cm radius
Explosive case	~ 180 kg aluminum 72.5 cm radius	~ 140 kg aluminum ~ 64 cm radius
Ballistic case	Steel 4.5 mm thick 75 cm radius	~ 190 kg steel ~ 4.5 mm thick 65 cm radius
Overall radius	75 cm	~ 65 cm
Total mass	3000 kg (bomb only) 4670 kg (with shell and fins)	~ 2000 kg
Delivery system	Boeing B-29 heavy bomber	A-4, A-9, or A-9/A-10 ballistic missile
Explosive yield	20 kilotons	For test: < 1 kiloton For deployment: ~ 5–100 kilotons

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Explosive yield	20 kilotons	For test: < 1 kiloton For deployment: ~ 5–100 kilotons

A number of sources reported at least four successful test explosions from October 1944 to March 1945.

Test explosions were likely kept as small as possible by using just enough fuel to briefly achieve criticality, both to conserve weapons-grade fuel and to minimize the mess made in German territory.

With enough fuel, fielded versions could have had larger explosive yields than the first U.S. fission bombs.

For more information, see *Forgotten Creators* D.8 and D.15.

8. Some Manufacturers of Suitable Bomb Components

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D+Li fusion neutron initiator: C.H.F. Müller (Hamburg) and other suppliers

CIOs XXVIII-31

Prof. Bierman of A.E.G., in Berlin, was reported to be working on the design of a 20 megavolt betatron.

During the past two years, C. H. F. Müller has constructed and delivered five "neutron generators". Three of these were rated at 1.5 megavolts, one at 1.2 megavolts, and one at .9 megavolts. They have on order, but have not yet completed, one additional neutron generator rated at .9 megavolts and another rated at 2.4 megavolts. These "neutron generators", or "neutron accelerators", accelerate ionized heavy hydrogen against a beryllium or a lithium target. The neutron output at .9 megavolts when using a beryllium target was estimated to be equivalent to the neutron output of 2 kilograms of radium plus beryllium; when using a lithium target, 3 kilograms; when using a beryllium target at 1.5 megavolts, 13 kilograms; when using a lithium target, 8 kilograms.

The Phillips "cascade" circuit was used for these neutron generators. Although the electrical output of these generators could be as high as 5 ma., the ion source limited this equipment to 0.8 ma. for continuous operation, regardless of voltage.

At 0.8 ma. the ripple was about 1%, at 5 ma., about 5%.

8. Some Manufacturers of Suitable Bomb Components

D+Li fusion neutron initiator: C.H.F. Müller (Hamburg) and other suppliers

Betatron ($e^- \rightarrow \gamma \rightarrow n$) initiator: Siemens-Reiniger (Erlangen) and other suppliers

C. H. F. Müller A.-G., working in cooperation with, and under the direction of, the M. V. Research Association (M. V. Forschungs-Verein), at Wrist, completed the construction of a 15 megavolt betatron about the first of this year. This betatron operates on 50 cycles. The average current of the high voltage electron beam is approximately .03 microamperes. The output of gamma radiation was reported to be approximately equivalent to one kilogram of radium. This betatron is now installed at Wrist.

In December, 1944, the M. V. Research Association completed the calculations and layouts of a 200 megavolt betatron, to operate on 50 cycles. It was estimated that the average electron beam current of this betatron would be in the order of one milliamperes. The total weight was expected to be approximately 30 tons. This betatron was to be constructed by Brown Boveri and Cie A.-G. in Heidelberg. It is understood that Brown Boveri completed detailed construction drawings of this betatron about the first of March of this year.

Dr. W. Müller, of C. H. F. Müller, recently constructed a very small 2 megavolt betatron which weighed less than 100 pounds. This betatron operated on 50 cycles and had a sealed off tube but the output was only sufficient to increase a Geiger counter to about three times its normal rate.

Two betatrons had recently been constructed and were being tested at the Siemens-Reiniger plant in Erlangen. The first of these betatrons to be completed operates on 500 cycles and provides an electron acceleration of 6 megavolts. The second, most recently constructed, betatron operates on 50 cycles and provides an electron acceleration of 7 megavolts. Plans were being made at this plant to construct a 50 cycle, 15 megavolt betatron. Siemens reported that their particular interest in betatron development was in order to provide a means for experimental work with electron beam cancer therapy.

CIOs XXVIII-31

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8. Some Manufacturers of Suitable Bomb Components

D+Li fusion neutron initiator:	C.H.F. Müller (Hamburg) and other suppliers
Betatron ($e^- \rightarrow \gamma \rightarrow n$) initiator:	Siemens-Reiniger (Erlangen) and other suppliers
Uranium-235 fission pit:	SS-controlled enrichment sites (discussed earlier)

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CIOs XXVIII-31

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The Phillips "cascade" circuit was used for these neutron generators. Although the electrical output of these generators could be as high as 5 ma., the ion source limited this equipment to 0.8 ma. for continuous operation, regardless of voltage.

At 0.8 ma. the ripple was about 1%, at 5 ma., about 5%.

8. Some Manufacturers of Suitable Bomb Components

D+Li fusion neutron initiator:	C.H.F. Müller (Hamburg) and other suppliers
Betatron ($e^- \rightarrow \gamma \rightarrow n$) initiator:	Siemens-Reiniger (Erlangen) and other suppliers
Uranium-235 fission pit:	SS-controlled enrichment sites (discussed earlier)
Unenriched uranium tamper:	Auer/Degussa (Oranienburg and other locations)

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CIOS XXVIII-31

BIOS 1615

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The testing of the plated coating for thickness, porosity, corrosion resistance etc., was apparently seldom done and the platers seemed to be little concerned about these points. Testing of solutions was equally haphazard. pH was rarely controlled except by litmus and pH papers; comparators were

B. CADMIUM		KAMPSCHULTE.	
I. Firm:			
Solution:	4.2 g/litre	Cadmium Cyanide	
	42.5 g/litre	Sodium Cyanide	
	5.0 g/litre	Sodium Chloride	
	5.0 g/litre	Turkey Red Oil	
Operating Conditions			
Temperature:		25 - 30°C.	
Current Density:		10 amps/dm ²	
Voltage:		Not given	
II. Firm:		BLASBERG.	
Solution:	50 - 120 g/litre	Sodium Cadmium Cyanide	
	20 - 60 g/litre	Sodium Cyanide	
	10 - 30 g/litre	Sodium Hydroxide	
Nickel Salts as bright addition agents.			
Operating Conditions			
Temperature:		20 - 35°C.	
Current Density:		0.5 - 1.2 amps/dm ²	
Voltage:		Not given	
Time:		10 - 60 minutes	
pH:		12 - 13.5	

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CIOB XXVIII-31

BIOS 1615

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
B. CADMIUM		KAMPSCHULTE.	
I. Firm:			
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		5.0 g/litre	Turkey Red Oil
Operating Conditions			
Temperature:		25 - 30°C.	
Current Density:		10 amps/dm ²	
Voltage:		Not given	
II. Firm:		BLASBERG.	
Solution:		50 - 120 g/litre	Sodium Cadmium Cyanide
		20 - 60 g/litre	Sodium Cyanide
		10 - 30 g/litre	Sodium Hydroxide
		Nickel Salts as bright addition agents.	
Operating Conditions			
Temperature:		20 - 35°C.	
Current Density:		0.5 - 1.2 amps/dm ²	
Voltage:		Not given	
Time:		10 - 60 minutes	
pH:		12 - 13.5	

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Erich Schumann and Gerd Hinrichs. 1943. HEC 2590. Imperial War Museum Duxford.



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
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Solution:	4.2 g/litre Cadmium Cyanide 42.5 g/litre Sodium Cyanide 5.0 g/litre Sodium Chloride 5.0 g/litre Turkey Red Oil
Operating Conditions	
Temperature:	25 - 30°C.
Current Density:	10 amps/dm ²
Voltage:	Not given
II. Firm:	BLASBERG.
Solution:	50 - 120 g/litre Sodium Cadmium Cyanide 20 - 60 g/litre Sodium Cyanide 10 - 30 g/litre Sodium Hydroxide
Nickel Salts as bright addition agents.	
Operating Conditions	
Temperature:	20 - 35°C.
Current Density:	0.5 - 1.2 amps/dm ²
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Current Density:	10 amps/dm ²
Voltage:	Not given
II. Firm:	BLASBERG.
Solution:	50 - 120 g/litre Sodium Cadmium Cyanide 20 - 60 g/litre Sodium Cyanide 10 - 30 g/litre Sodium Hydroxide
Nickel Salts as bright addition agents.	
Operating Conditions	
Temperature:	20 - 35°C.
Current Density:	0.5 - 1.2 amps/dm ²
Voltage:	Not given
Time:	10 - 60 minutes
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Imperial War Museum Duxford.

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
Cadmium-electroplated aluminum: Kampschulte, Blasberg, Wilhelm Meyer, etc.

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Liquid oxygen: V-2 rocket program (Friedrichshafen, etc.)



C. H. F. Müller A.-G., working in cooperation with, and under the direction of, the M. V. Research Association (M. V. Forschungs-Verein), at Wrist, completed the construction of a 15 megavolt betatron about the first of this year. This betatron operates on 50 cycles. The average current of the high voltage electron beam is approximately .03 microamperes. The output of gamma radiation was reported to be approximately equivalent to one kilogram of radium. This betatron is now installed at Wrist.

In December, 1944, the M. V. Research Association completed the calculations and layouts of a 200 megavolt betatron, to operate on 50 cycles. It was estimated that the average electron beam current of this betatron would be in the order of one milliamperes. The total weight was expected to be approximately 30 tons. This betatron was to be constructed by Brown Boveri and Cie A.-G. in Heidelberg. It is understood that Brown Boveri completed detailed construction drawings of this betatron about the first of March of this year.

Dr. W. Müller, of C. H. F. Müller, recently constructed a very small 2 megavolt betatron which weighed less than 100 pounds. This betatron operated on 50 cycles and had a sealed off tube but the output was only sufficient to increase a Geiger counter to about three times its normal rate.

Two betatrons had recently been constructed and were being tested at the Siemens-Reiniger plant in Erlangen. The first of these betatrons to be completed operates on 500 cycles and provides an electron acceleration of 6 megavolts. The second, most recently constructed, betatron operates on 50 cycles and provides an electron acceleration of 7 megavolts. Plans were being made at this plant to construct a 30 cycle, 15 megavolt betatron. Siemens reported that their particular interest in betatron development was in order to provide a means for experimental work with electron beam cancer therapy.

Prof. Bierman of A.E.G., in Berlin, was reported to be working on the design of a 20 megavolt betatron.

During the past two years, C. H. F. Müller has constructed and delivered five "neutron generators". Three of these were rated at 1.5 megavolts, one at 1.2 megavolts, and one at .9 megavolts. They have on order, but have not yet completed,

one additional neutron generator rated at .9 megavolts and another rated at 2.4 megavolts. These "neutron generators", or "neutron accelerators", accelerate ionized heavy hydrogen against a beryllium or a lithium target. The neutron output at .9 megavolts when using a beryllium target was estimated to be equivalent to the neutron output of 2 kilograms of radium plus beryllium; when using a lithium target, 3 kilograms; when using a beryllium target at 1.5 megavolts, 13 kilograms; when using a lithium target, 8 kilograms.

The Phillips "cascade" circuit was used for these neutron generators. Although the electrical output of these generators could be as high as 5 ma., the ion source limited this equipment to 0.8 ma. for continuous operation, regardless of voltage.

At 0.8 ma. the ripple was about 1%, at 5 ma., about 5%.

CIOS XXVIII-31

BIOS 1615

(A) Plating on Aluminium and its Alloys

Although aluminium is widely used in Germany, no actual samples of nickel plus chromium plated aluminium were seen. Samples of lead plated battery lugs were encountered at Robert Bosch, Stuttgart and direct chromium plated aluminium at Blasberg's, Solingen. Numerous references are made to the plating of aluminium and its alloys, however, and the most popular treatment for plating on this metal appears to be a primary application of a zincate dip followed by either a copper or brass deposit and then final plating.

(B) Testing of Plated Coatings, etc.

The testing of the plated coating for thickness, porosity, corrosion resistance etc., was apparently seldom done and the platers seemed to be little concerned about these points. Testing of solutions was equally haphazard. pH was rarely controlled except by litmus and pH papers; comparators were

B. CADMIUM	
I. Firm:	KAMPSCHULTE.
Solution:	4.2 g/litre Cadmium Cyanide 42.5 g/litre Sodium Cyanide 5.0 g/litre Sodium Chloride 5.0 g/litre Turkey Red Oil
Operating Conditions	
Temperature:	25 - 30°C.
Current Density:	10 amps/dm ²
Voltage:	Not given
II. Firm:	BLASBERG.
Solution:	50 - 120 g/litre Sodium Cadmium Cyanide 20 - 60 g/litre Sodium Cyanide 10 - 30 g/litre Sodium Hydroxide
Nickel Salts as bright addition agents.	
Operating Conditions	
Temperature:	20 - 35°C.
Current Density:	0.5 - 1.2 amps/dm ²
Voltage:	Not given
Time:	10 - 60 minutes
pH:	12 - 13.5

9. Over 30 Sources: **LiD H-Bomb with Fission Primary, Radiation Implosion, Total Mass 6000 kg, ~1.6 Megaton Yield, Expected Test 1945-46**

Werner Grothmann, 2002: “**The hydrogen bomb. That was also worked on...** Himmler once mentioned in a small circle that the first prototype of this could come at the earliest between **June and October 1946...** **It must have looked like a swollen bomb...** By the way, what the physicists told Himmler in their private lecture on the **hydrogen bomb** had really electrified him, because he heard that **the explosive effect would be a hundred times greater** than that of the **uranium bomb.**”

Wolfgang Ferrant, 1945: “**Our purpose was to produce, within an extensive reaction area which contains a very large number of atoms capable of reacting, a temperature or an almost entirely uncoordinated heat motion, such as prevails on the stars. At the same time, the density of the reacting material should be as great as possible. Under these circumstances atomic reactions will occur... Lithium D hydride is well suited as the choice of substance...** Our method, therefore, results directly in the creation of a source of neutrons of greatest intensity... If the purpose is to obtain energy alone, the neutrons formed will be utilized in **splitting the uranium atom**; and in that manner extraordinary amounts of energy will be liberated, as a first product, by way of the neutrons. The **lithium-D-hydride, recipient**, therefore, will be surrounded by a coat of **uranium**. Quite possibly a special advantage could be obtained by adding a quantity of **uranium D** compound to the “large particles” and to the recipient mass; because in this manner a considerable amount of energy will be given off by **uranium** fragments located within the reaction area, and this state of affairs might possibly result in further increases of temperature within the reaction area. ... **There will result an explosion of the entire LiD mass, since the external reaction zone is capable of enlarging itself on the strength of its own energy production.**”

Hans Thirring, 1946: “**In a ‘super atom bomb’ it would be possible to use on the order of tons of lithium hydride** compared to **kilograms of plutonium** [for fission], in such a way as to **produce an effect several thousand times as large as before. God have mercy on the country** over which a **six-ton bomb of lithium hydride is made to explode!** If the idea is realizable at all, the former **uranium bomb or plutonium bomb** would only play the role of a sparkplug in such a super atom bomb.”

Heiko Petermann, discussion notes with Alfred Klemm, 5 March 2004: “**Main focus of the work was the production of Li6 by separation of Li7. This was achieved very well in the electrolytic process. From 1942-43. Klemm pointed out that he was probably the first to achieve the separation by means of electrolysis... He also confirmed that the tritium problem (disintegration of Li6 into tritium) was already discussed before 1945.**”

Immigration of Austrian Scientists to Soviet Zone, ca. 1949: “**SCHINTLMEISTER, Dr Josef Peter... During war, succeeded in isolating Transuranen to Transuranen 104...** In September 1948 he reportedly contacted JOLIOT CURIE on problem of **extracting plutonium**. Censorship intercept indicates subject is **currently interested in lithium hydride bombs, originally begun with STETTER.**”

U.S. Army CIC, 29 September 1953: “**Karl Lintner... was Dr. Georg STETTER’s assistant in the Second Physical Institute during World War II, when STETTER was working on the splitting of the lithium nucleus...** All of STETTER's research material and notes fell into the hands of the Soviets in 1945...”

Assistant Chief of Staff, US Army G-2, 6 April 1954: “**During the war, the nuclear physicists of the Second Institute of Physics in Vienna engaged in a research project of releasing high amounts of energy through nuclear reactions of the lithium hydride crystal *Li H*.** The research was carried out mainly by Dr. Karl LINTNER under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Georg K. F. STETTER.”

Air Intelligence Report, 15 June 1946: “**Heavy Hydrogen Bomb.** In Germany a letter was picked up by the American censors. It had been written by a German desirous of exchanging information for an opportunity to go to the United States. The writer professed knowledge of ‘heavy water’ research in Germany and of an **‘even more deadly weapon than the atomic bomb’.**”

For complete quotes and sources, please see *Forgotten Creators* D.9 and D.14.

9. Over 30 Sources: **LiD H-Bomb with Fission Primary, Radiation Implosion, Total Mass 6000 kg, ~1.6 Megaton Yield, Expected Test 1945-46**

Edmund Tilley, 13 July 1946: “KÄSTNER told Lt. GUTMANN of a **new radio-active bomb, weighing six tons. This bomb has no fins and is lowered by parachute... In July 1944 a small group of the Forschungsstaffel was sent to Northern Finland [to map a test site]...**”

Eugen Sänger and Irene Bredt, 1944: “As an example of area attack with single propulsion and full turn, we use the **attack on New York** at a range of 6500 km. For $c=4000$ m/sec, the **bomb load is 6 tons**, and the detailed attack runs as follows...”

New York Times, 4 December 1946: “Wernher von Braun... revealed today that **before the war ended the Nazis were building** a 100-ton rocket to strike at the United States... He said it would have carried a **‘pay-load’ of six tons** and would have traveled thousands of miles to strike the United States.”

Hermann Zumppe, 7 November, 1946: “...the maximum weight allowable for the motor, fuels, and shell was 20 tons, leaving **6 tons for the warhead.**”

Allen Dulles, 14 March 1944: “Length 15 to 17 meters, weight of explosive 4 to **6 tons**. Rocket consists of over 1000 parts...”

Gordon Gaskill, March 1945: “The leading V-2 authority for the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe [Donald Putt]... has calculated for me approximately what kind of rocket might **hit New York**. Leaving Germany, it would weigh 63 tons, mostly fuel. Its **war head would be 7 tons** of high explosive.”

Charles Chamberlain, 9 February 1946: “**Another atom scientist in the British occupation zone of Germany---Prof. Paul Harteck of the Kaiser Wilhelm institute of physics in Berlin---said that the light rays thrown out during the enormous explosion of an atomic bomb added greatly to the destructive force... This frees an amount of light which is beyond the visible spectrum. Only a few people know that the reflection of beams of light on solid bodies also exerts a mechanical pressure. This pressure is so small where our normal light is concerned that it is not noticed. The amount of light freed by an atomic bomb is so great it destroys walls.**”

Rodolfo Graziani, 1948: “Everybody can say what they want about the matter of secret weapons; but **the fact is that secret weapons in Germany were there: they were there in the most absolute way...** There was the V-1 and there was the V-2, but it went all the way up to the V-10 which **destroyed within a ten-kilometer radius every element of life.**”

Pittsburgh Press, 7 August 1945: “**21ST ARMY GROUP HEADQUARTERS, Germany, Aug. 7 (UP)...** The bomb, it was calculated, **would wipe out everything within a radius of six miles.** A famous German research scientist [Wilhelm Groth, in] charge of the experiments was flown immediately to Britain at the time. He estimated his work **would have been completed by October [1945].**”

Daily Mail, 30 October 1944: “Immense concrete works on top of a hill in Artois, near Saint Omer, were intended as a launching place for flying bombs, which, the Germans boasted, **would wreck New York... German engineers told local French people that when the vast machinery was installed and ready to fire, the district would have to be evacuated for six miles around.**”

Goffredo Coppola, 16 February 1945: “**The Germans have found the means to disintegrate the atom... The disintegration occurs in successive cycles and covers vast areas of tens of kilometers. In the laboratories work is at full capacity.**”

For complete quotes and sources, please see *Forgotten Creators* D.9 and D.14.

10. Reported October 1944 Test Explosion on Baltic Coast

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Luigi Romersa. May-June 1955. Le armi segrete di Hitler. *Civiltà delle Macchine*.

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Summary of 5 October 2004 interview with Elisabeth Mestlin. Rainer Karlsch and Heiko Petermann 2007. *Für und Wider "Hitlers Bombe"*. Münster: Waxmann. p. 163.

She remembered the extraordinary event because of credible circumstances. After the bombardment of Stralsund on 6 October 1944, Ms. Mestlin went to see her children in Vitte on the island of Hiddensee. On the island of Hiddensee on 12 October 1944, she heard a violent explosion and saw a large cloud of dust on the southern tip of the Bug peninsula.

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Werner Grothmann. 2002 interview. Jonastalverein Archive, Arnstadt. pp. 13, 31.

When, in October 1944, it was clear that the theory of the atomic bomb was in principle correct, various circles had, of course, also been thinking about what should be done to end the war as quickly as possible... It is known to me that there were four atomic tests. The first still in 1943 in the autumn in the North Sea, which failed. Then two in 1944 in the autumn and the late autumn. One of them on the ground, that is on a small stand, the later one in the atmosphere on a parachute... Where the tests were I would like to not say now, because otherwise the population would be unnecessarily upset.

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Wilhelm Wulff. 1973. *Zodiac and Swastika*. Coward McCann & Geoghegan. pp. 160-161.

[Himmler] went on to talk about a quite different missile, one of incredible power. Cities like New York and London, he said, could be wiped off the face of the earth with the help of this new weapon... What he had told me was basically true, for work was already being done on the German atom bomb at the time. Franz Göring also told me that the new missiles had been tested. According to him, a large town was especially built near Auschwitz concentration camp and some 20,000 Jews, mostly women and children, were sent to live in it. A single missile was then fired into the settlement. In the ensuing explosion, which developed a heat output of 6,000° C at its center, the whole town and the entire population were burned to cinders in a flash.

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Joseph Borkin. 1978. *The Crime and Punishment of I. G. Farben*. Free Press. p. 127.
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11. Reported ~November 1944 Test Explosion in Poland

Robert Jackson to Albert Speer. 21 June 1946. avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/06-21-46.asp
And certain experiments were also conducted and certain researches conducted in atomic energy, were they not?... Now, I have certain information, which was placed in my hands, of an experiment which was carried out near Auschwitz and I would like to ask you if you heard about it or knew about it. The purpose of the experiment was to find a quick and complete way of destroying people without the delay and trouble of shooting and gassing and burning, as it had been carried out, and this is the experiment, as I am advised. A village, a small village was provisionally erected, with temporary structures, and in it approximately 20,000 Jews were put. By means of this newly invented weapon of destruction, these 20,000 people were eradicated almost instantaneously, and in such a way that there was no trace left of them; that it developed, the explosive developed, temperatures of from 400[0] to 500[0] centigrade and destroyed them without leaving any trace at all. Do you know about that experiment?

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Kriminalrat Obersturmfuehrer Goering... said that a village had been built near Auschwitz for experimental purposes. They wanted to "try out" the new weapon. For the purpose, twenty thousand Jewish men, women, and children had been brought to live in this village. A single shell had been fired on the settlement. It had caused six thousand degrees of heat, and the whole village—houses, human beings, and animals included—was burnt to ashes. Obviously, as I see it now in retrospect, the Germans had nearly completed their atomic bomb and were almost ready to use it on the enemy when the encirclement of Berlin was complete.

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[Himmler] went on to talk about a quite different missile, one of incredible power. Cities like New York and London, he said, could be wiped off the face of the earth with the help of this new weapon... What he had told me was basically true, for work was already being done on the German atom bomb at the time. Franz Goering also told me that the new missiles had been tested. According to him, a large town was especially built near Auschwitz concentration camp and some 20,000 Jews, mostly women and children, were sent to live in it. A single missile was then fired into the settlement. In the ensuing explosion, which developed a heat output of 6,000° C at its center, the whole town and the entire population were burned to cinders in a flash.

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Well, it is so: It is known to me that there were four atomic tests. The first still in 1943 in the autumn in the North Sea, which failed. Then two in 1944 in the autumn and the late autumn. One of them on the ground, that is on a small stand, the later one in the atmosphere on a parachute. That one in winter 1944 in the air was highly explosive and the charge [fuel] was also larger. That could have been in November. The last test was then again with a small charge in March 1945. Where the tests were I would like to not say now, because otherwise the population would be unnecessarily upset.

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Information has been given this Embassy by a capable young engineer working in the zinc industry, that one of the best if not the only material for atomic bomb containers is cadmium. According to the informant the cadmium output of Poland in 1945 amounted to 49.15 tons, and in January of 1946 to 10.9 tons. In 1945 there was exported to Russia the total Polish cadmium output. End ACTION: General Groves

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R. W. Shaw to L. E. Seeman. 5 December 1946. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.60-2 Germany: Summary Reports (1945-1946).

[Otto] Hahn said that a rumour which went the rounds in Germany about six months before the capitulation was equally untrue. According to this rumour, atom bomb tests had been carried out in Poland during the last year of the war which were supposed to have had an effect similar to the first atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima though on a considerably smaller scale.
[For more information see *Forgotten Creators* D.11.]

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The material is extremely interesting. It contains a description of the construction of a German atomic bomb, which is intended to be transported by a carrier rocket of the type "V." ... All of these design details are very credible and agree overall with those according to us that underlie the project of an atomic bomb. It should be noted that I am not totally convinced on the basis of the reviewed material that the Germans have actually made experiments with an atomic bomb. The level of destruction of a nuclear bomb would be greater than stated, and spread over several kilometers and not just a few hundred meters. The events mentioned in the documents may be preparatory tests with nuclear weapon designs, but conducted without U235 explosive. It would be desirable to obtain additional information about the course of the experiments, in order to get a more precise location and to obtain a sample of the uranium 235.

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Summary of interrogation of Robert Döpel. 1946. GARF, courtesy of Rainer Karlsch & Matthias Uhl. Some information related to materials of Prof. Döpel about extremely powerful atomic bombs and an atomic heat source for energy-generating machines.... It is noted that the problem of a uranium bomb has been developed to the point of testing on a [military] base.

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Oscar W. Koch with Robert G. Hays. 1999. *G-2: Intelligence for Patton*. Schiffer. pp. 115–118.

The Third Army intelligence staff would never forget one particular prisoner captured sometime earlier who had told us a convincing story. His unit had been working on a new and unusual weapon, the PW told interrogators. Then, he said, while he was temporarily away from his post, there had been a terrific explosion. Everything at the site was a shambles and trees in a wide area of the surrounding forest had been laid low. No aircraft had been near and the blast—the most forceful he ever had witnessed—could not possibly have resulted from a bomb. To add even more intrigue, the soldier was unable to say just what kind of weapon he had been working on. It was so secret that the individuals in his unit never knew the complete story. He knew only enough to be able to carry on his own duties. The prisoner knew precisely where he was at the time of the blast. He readily pinpointed the exact location on a map. His story aroused great interest in the intelligence section. The Germans had already launched V-1 and V-2 rockets, and Hitler had promised a "secret weapon" which would one day make its appearance and bring the Allies to their knees.

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The material is extremely interesting. It contains a description of the construction of a German atomic bomb, which is intended to be transported by a carrier rocket of the type "V." ... All of these design details are very credible and agree overall with those according to us that underlie the project of an atomic bomb. It should be noted that I am not totally convinced on the basis of the reviewed material that the Germans have actually made experiments with an atomic bomb. The level of destruction of a nuclear bomb would be greater than stated, and spread over several kilometers and not just a few hundred meters. The events mentioned in the documents may be preparatory tests with nuclear weapon designs, but conducted without U235 explosive. It would be desirable to obtain additional information about the course of the experiments, in order to get a more precise location and to obtain a sample of the uranium 235.

Summary of interrogation of Robert Döpel. 1946. GARF, courtesy of Rainer Karlsch & Matthias Uhl. Some information related to materials of Prof. Döpel about extremely powerful atomic bombs and an atomic heat source for energy-generating machines.... It is noted that the problem of a uranium bomb has been developed to the point of testing on a [military] base.

Georgiy Flerov to Igor Kurchatov. Ca 21 May 1945. In L. D. Riabev. 2002. *Atomnii Projekt SSR 1938-1945*. Vol. 1, Part 2. Moscow, pp. 310-311.

Today or tomorrow we are going to fly in the direction that you know. I am taking with me Dubovsky's [Geiger] instrument, but its sensitivity is probably too low. If we determine on site that there are objects of interest for examination and sensitivity of the instrument is the issue, I'll send you a cable. You will have to assign Stoljarenko or Davidenko (if he gets back by then) to this work. Instruct them to assemble the instrument in the lightweight option: powered from the mains by 220 volts... Along with the instrument, let them pack the tables for finding the appropriate half lives...

Georgiy Flerov to Igor Kurchatov. 29 May 1945. In L. D. Riabev. 2002. *Atomnii Projekt SSR 1938-1945*. Vol. 1, Part 2. Moscow, pp. 312-315.

Possibly, you can send somebody from the staff to help me. I think that as a result of such search we will be able to find what we need—a person who happened to be there nearby, as there were a lot of escapees wandering through forests at the time. If successful, we will get objective confirmation of the fact, tantamount to as if we personally had been at that site. This must be done right here and right now, because afterwards all people crossing the border are dispersed through camps in Germany and then are transferred to the Soviet Union, and then even such an enthusiast as myself would question our ability to catch the right people... The second direction is connected to what I wrote you in the previous letter. In order to determine finally what was really tested there, we shall of course look after artificial, not natural radioactivity. Unfortunately, a lot of time has passed since, but I think that with [our instruments] we will be able to attain the required sensitivity.

Georgiy Zhukov to Joseph Stalin. 2 October 1945. In L. D. Riabev. 2002. *Atomnii Projekt SSR 1938-1945*. Vol. II, Part 6. Moscow, pp. 60-64.

Based on the collected materials, it can be concluded that the German scientists in the field of theoretical and practical research and application of atomic energy have achieved good results up to the creation of the atomic bomb.

G-2 Periodic Report No. 177. 7 April 1945. NARA RG 407, Entry NM3-427, Box 12342, Folder 604-2.1. PW was told by an ordnance man stationed at OHRDRUF that from here a new secret wpn will shortly rise (wird steigen). It is believed that the entire area should be very thoroughly examined for new material.

Oscar W. Koch with Robert G. Hays. 1999. *G-2: Intelligence for Patton*. Schiffer, pp. 115-118.

The Third Army intelligence staff would never forget one particular prisoner captured sometime earlier who had told us a convincing story. His unit had been working on a new and unusual weapon, the PW told interrogators. Then, he said, while he was temporarily away from his post, there had been a terrific explosion. Everything at the site was a shambles and trees in a wide area of the surrounding forest had been laid low. No aircraft had been near and the blast—the most forceful he ever had witnessed—could not possibly have resulted from a bomb. To add even more intrigue, the soldier was unable to say just what kind of weapon he had been working on. It was so secret that the individuals in his unit never knew the complete story. He knew only enough to be able to carry on his own duties. The prisoner knew precisely where he was at the time of the blast. He readily pinpointed the exact location on a map. His story aroused great interest in the intelligence section. The Germans had already launched V-1 and V-2 rockets, and Hitler had promised a "secret weapon" which would one day make its appearance and bring the Allies to their knees.

Werner Grothmann. 2002 interview. Jonastalverein Archive, Arnstadt.

[p. 31:] It is known to me that there were four atomic tests... The last test was then again with a small charge [fuel] in March 1945. [p. 17:] But I would like to say something about the background, why Himmler did not come to Thuringia for the atomic bomb test on the fourth of March. [p. 40:] This test was to provide proof that the ignition system worked stably and to serve as preparation for a corresponding attack that was supposed to be flown with a rocket... You see, that went so far that the stand for our atom test in Thuringia was manufactured by a metalworking shop in Thuringia. I know it because when meeting there, Diebner explained, in response to someone's question about whether our people had built it, it was from a metalworking shop from the area. They would not have known what it was meant for. The test was carried out directly there, even though that was in an inhabited area, because due to the course of the war we did not have a lot of choice and, of course, because time was also critical. So we just stayed where the necessary material was produced and stored. In addition, our people and those of Diebner's other group had their laboratories and the development department. And here close by, too, the mass production of uranium bombs had been planned. In addition, at the beginning of January, the ignition [system] production or at least the development of an ignition system intended for the uranium bomb was likewise supposed to be relocated here, according to my memory... Diebner allegedly assured that the explosive effect would be quite small for the small amount [of fuel] that the test would require. Unfortunately his prediction was not confirmed. What happened there was horrible. In addition, there were other consequences in the surrounding area, of which I only heard, that doctors, who were under contract with us, had to be deployed there. [p. 13:] After the third attempt, which was the one from March in Thuringia, Hitler was informed... It was like this: when the test in Thuringia succeeded, according to my understanding, workers from a camp died accidentally. [For more information see *Forgotten Creators* D.12.]


12
August
1944

12. Reported March 1945 Test in Thuringia




21
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1945

12. Reported March 1945 Test in Thuringia




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
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
For more information, see: *Forgotten Creators* D.15;
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
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


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~1.1–2.0 Gy for the first 24 hours
(causing radiation sickness
but not short-term lethality)




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
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Prompt radiation at the test site and the radioactive fallout at the test site and in nearby towns within 24 hours fit Ilyichev's description that a "massive radioactive effect was observed"

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After 80 years, the radioactivity of the fallout would have dropped to $\sim 2 \times 10^{-9}$ of its radioactivity 1 hour after the explosion [Glasstone and Dolan, *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons*, 1977, p. 393], or $\sim 2.6\text{--}4.6 \times 10^{-6}$ Gy/yr averaged over the region and $\sim 7\text{--}14 \times 10^{-5}$ Gy/year right at the test site.

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For more information, see *Forgotten Creators* D.15.

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Erwin Giesing. 1944-1945. Diary. Institut für Zeitgeschichte, p. 176, 13-15 February 1945: Hitler... said, "...I'm going to commit my V-weapons soon, and then the war will be brought to a glorious end. The problem of atom splitting has been solved a long time ago, and it has been so far developed that we can make use of this energy for weapons. These people are going to see something. This is the weapon of the future, and with it Germany's future is secured too. Providence has already shown me this last and victorious road, and I know that the final turn of fortune is about to come... Our V-weapon will decide the war in no time at all."

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Erwin Giesing. 1944-1945. Diary. Institut für Zeitgeschichte, p. 176, 13-15 February 1945: Hitler... said, "...I'm going to commit my V-weapons soon, and then the war will be brought to a glorious end. The problem of atom splitting has been solved a long time ago, and it has been so far developed that we can make use of this energy for weapons. These people are going to see something. This is the weapon of the future, and with it Germany's future is secured too. Providence has already shown me this last and victorious road, and I know that the final turn of fortune is about to come... Our V-weapon will decide the war in no time at all."

Monthly Intelligence Summary. March 1945. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder 202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.: "Hitler once said: 'May God forgive me for the last ten minutes of the war!'" [\[FC D.5, D.13\]](#)

13. Hitler Strongly Supported Nuclear Weapons Development

Reichswerke Hermann Göring, Linz, 4 April 1943

Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz 50042721, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek



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Adolf Hitler. 19 September 1939 in Danzig: "Let them make no mistake here, however. The moment could come very suddenly in which we could use a weapon with which we cannot be attacked. I hope then they do not suddenly begin to think of humaneness and of the impossibility of waging war against women and children."

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Leslie Groves's Foreign Intelligence Unit files. 14 September 1944. Special Interrogation Report 2. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.7003-2 GERMANY: US Wartime Positive Int. (July-Oct. 44): "Linz's Hermann Goering Works, which were in production, were pretty well bombed out."

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25. Prof. Dr. NIELS [Walter Nielsch?], now said to be in the United States, was, according to [censored,] concerned with chemical and atomic problems at TUCHELER HEIDE and **produced a number of atomic bombs, weighing from 1 to 5 kilograms.** NIELS should be traced and questioned in detail.

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Werner Grothmann. 2002 interview. Jonastalverein Archive. pp. 31–32.

It is known to me that **there were four atomic tests.** The first still in 1943 in the autumn in the North Sea, which failed. Then two in 1944 in the autumn and the late autumn. One of them on the ground, that is on a small stand, the later one in the atmosphere on a parachute. That one in winter 1944 in the air was highly explosive and the charge [fuel] was also larger. That could have been in November. The last test was then again with a small charge in March 1945. [...] I can definitely declare that I was told of **six atomic bombs that came from three different research installations.** All were prototypes. In addition, there were some very small devices that were intended for laboratory experiments.

13. Multiple Sources: Why Germany Did Not Use Its Nuclear Weapons

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From time to time since the present war began there have been reports that one or more of the Axis powers were seriously contemplating use of poisonous or noxious gases or other inhumane devices of warfare. [...] I feel obliged now to warn the Axis armies and the Axis peoples, in Europe and in Asia, that the terrible consequences of any use of these inhumane methods on their part will be brought down swiftly and surely upon their own heads. Any use of gas by any Axis power, therefore, will immediately be followed by the fullest possible retaliation upon munition centers, seaports, and other military objectives throughout the whole extent of the territory of such Axis country.

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On December 2, 1943, a most regrettable and disturbing incident took place at the port of Bari. [...] One of the ships was loaded with a quantity of mustard gas, which we were always forced to carry with us because of uncertainty of German intentions in the use of this weapon. [...] We manufactured and carried this material only for reprisal purposes in case of surprise action on the part of the enemy.

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Winston S. Churchill to General Hastings Ismay. 6 July 1944.

I WANT you to think very seriously over this question of poison gas. I would not use it unless it could be shown either that (a) it was life or death for us, or (b) that it would shorten the war by a year. [...] I want a cold-blooded calculation made as to how it would pay us to use poison gas, by which I mean principally mustard. [...] If the bombardment of London really became a serious nuisance and great rockets with far-reaching and devastating effect fell on many centres of Government and labour, I should be prepared to do anything that would hit the enemy in a murderous place. [...] We could drench the cities of the Ruhr and many other cities in Germany in such a way that most of the population would be requiring constant medical attention. [...] I quite agree it may be several weeks or even months before I shall ask you to drench Germany with poison gas, and if we do it, let us do it 100%.

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If we were now to use such a weapon on Hitler's order, for example to employ it on London, a completely new situation would arise, but not in our favor. [...] Important parts of the political and military leadership will fall, but many other levels that have been relocated outside will be preserved. [...] Besides, the British are also on our territory. And the most important argument: with us, no one really believed that they would then withdraw. Quite the contrary! We could picture their reactions to our population. The other side, which must also be considered, is the Americans. [...] At the meetings I attended, or about which I learned in hints, no one was so crazy to use a weapon which could no longer help us, but would only make things even much worse. [...] What would have happened after the use of our atomic bomb? [...] Everything would be much worse.

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C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.) S.R.G.G. 1118. Information received: 10 Jan 1945. AFHRA A5415 frames 284-285. [Secret recording of German generals Heinrich Kittel and Wilhelm von Thoma as prisoners of war in U.K.]

KITTEL: (Re atom bomb). It's a perfectly horrible thing. [...]

THOMA: Then he would have used it long ago.

KITTEL: No; he isn't using it, because the others have promised to retaliate with chemical warfare.

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13. Multiple Sources: Why Germany Did Not Use Its Nuclear Weapons

Franklin D. Roosevelt. 8 June 1943. Statement Warning the Axis.

From time to time since the present war began there have been reports that one or more of the Axis powers were seriously contemplating use of poisonous or noxious gases or other inhumane devices of warfare. [...] I feel obliged now to warn the Axis armies and the Axis peoples, in Europe and in Asia, that the terrible consequences of any use of these inhumane methods on their part will be brought down swiftly and surely upon their own heads. Any use of gas by any Axis power, therefore, will immediately be followed by the fullest possible retaliation upon munition centers, seaports, and other military objectives throughout the whole extent of the territory of such Axis country.

Dwight D. Eisenhower. 1948. *Crusade in Europe*. New York: Doubleday. Ch. 12.

On December 2, 1943, a most regrettable and disturbing incident took place at the port of Bari. [...] One of the ships was loaded with a quantity of mustard gas, which we were always forced to carry with us because of uncertainty of German intentions in the use of this weapon. [...] We manufactured and carried this material only for reprisal purposes in case of surprise action on the part of the enemy.

Winston S. Churchill to General Hastings Ismay. 6 July 1944.

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Allen Dulles. 1 April 1945. Cable IN 9061 from Bern, Switzerland to Office of Strategic Services. NARA RG 226, Entry UD-90, Box 6, Folder 64 SUNRISE.

In his conversation with Kesselring, latter said to Wolff our situation is desperate, nobody dares tell truth to Fuehrer who surrounded by small group of advisers who still believe in a last specific secret weapon which they call "Verzweiflung" weapon [Verzweiflungswaffe: desperation weapon]. Kesselring believed this weapon can prolong war but not decide it, but might cause terrible blood bath on both sides. Kesselring said if Fuehrer gave him order to use weapon he would surrender his command.

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Rochus Misch. 2014. *Hitler's Last Witness: The Memoirs of Hitler's Bodyguard*. Barnsley: Frontline Books. p. 60.

The Western Allies had threatened that, if Germany used the atom bomb, they would assemble 15,000 aircraft in North Africa and use them to drench all of Germany with poison gas. [FC A.4, D.13]

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
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32.60-2 Germany: Summary Reports (1945-1946)

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TOP SECRET		THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 15 PAGE(S)	
NO 1 OF 2 COPIES, SERIES A...		THIRD DRAFT	
ENEMY PRODUCTION OF ATOMIC BOMBS - SUMMARY			
12/11/44			
1. Intelligence indicates that the enemy is working in the project field. It is likely that he has undertaken one or several of the various processes for the production of bombs on a small scale and to have organized an installation equivalent to our project on final utilization. (TAB A).			
2. The various methods for the production of U-233, U-235 and Pu-239 have been considered in the light of scientific development, basic materials, and industrial effort required. (TAB B). The liquid thermal diffusion process for production of U-235 on a moderate scale and the pile process using heavy water for the production of Pu-239 on a small scale appear to be the most likely possibilities; the production of U-233 on a useful scale appears to be unlikely. Activities inferred from the intelligence and other reports indicate that these processes could have come into operation during 1943. (TAB C).			
3. On the basis of the above analysis it is possible for the enemy to have at least one device in his hands now, but it is improbable for him to have more than three.			
ACCESS RESTRICTED			
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:			
File Designation	32-60-2 Germany: Summary 1945-46		
Date	Tab A		
From	1944		
To	---		
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:			
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14. Allied Belief in German Nuclear Weapons—Where Are the Reports?

Major Robert Furman. 22 May 1945. NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder 202.2

LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Disc.

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Royal Army Ordnance Corps. October 1946. *R.A.O.C. Gazette* 28:5:150.

Many interesting discoveries were made by Ordnance representatives *en route*. D.D.O.S. of 8 Corps found a factory engaged in production work for the **German atomic bomb**. The ammunition for Germany's largest gun was also located. Two of these massive guns had been captured by the Russians, but this was the first time their ammunition had been seen. At Belsen, the Ordnance service found itself faced with an unprecedented task.

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U.S. News. 17 August 1945, pp. 20-23.

The Germans had planned to use the atomic bomb in the warhead of a V-type winged torpedo such as they fired upon England across the Channel. With such a bomb, they might have devastated England.

U.S. Office of War Information. 25 August 1945. NARA RG 208, Entry 198, Box 1042.

Germany's inner war secrets ranged from experiments with the atomic bomb, anti-radar devices, and piloted rocket missiles that they expected to cross the Atlantic in 17 minutes, to butter made from coal, the Office of War Information reported today.

General George C. Marshall. 1 September 1945. Final Report to the Secretary of War.

Victory in this global war depended on the successful execution of OVERLORD. That must not fail... These conclusions seemed inescapable: France must be invaded in 1944, to shorten the war by facilitating the advance westward of the Soviet forces. At the same time **German technological advances such as in the development of atomic explosives made it imperative that we attack before these terrible weapons could be turned against us.**

General T. J. Betts and Sir R. P. Linstead. 15 Sept. 1945. AFHRA A5186, pp. 904-1026.

Certain items have been omitted because of security considerations... Of particular significance were the statements, made by German experts in the rocket and controlled missile field, that much of the priority accorded their work by the German High Command was in anticipation of the use of atomic explosives. **These authorities stated that KWI had repeatedly assured Hitler that an atomic explosive would be available for use within a comparatively short time.** During the last months of work by the Peenemünde staff, V-weapons were designed with much smaller war-heads. Quite possibly this trend was in anticipation of the **successful development of a German atomic explosive.**

Sir Roy Fedden. German Plans to Revolutionise Air Warfare. *Daily Telegraph & Morning Post.* 1 October 1945, p. 4.

There is some reason to believe that **Hitler had been promised atomic explosives by October of this year...** Immense developments were under way with robot rocket weapons, some of which had already started in production. They were simple and cheap to make, and with atomic explosives even a few such devices could have placed air warfare on a new nightmare plane of impersonal long-distance annihilation...

U.S. Department of Commerce. 1946. The Chemical Problem in Germany. p. 8. NARA RG 40, Entry UD-75, Box 3, Folder Press Releases.

Spectacular accomplishments in uranium,... nuclear physics and many other fields, have been uncovered in the investigation of the chemicals field alone.

Colonel George Bryant Woods. 1946. *The Aircraft Manufacturing Industry: Present and Future Prospects.* New York: White, Weld & Co. p. 32.

Germany's Plans for the "A-9" with Atomic Bomb... In captured scientific German documents there are diagrams of the city of New York showing anticipated areas of destruction to be expected after perfection of such a weapon to carry an atomic war head, and **it is well known that the Germans originally had hoped to have their atomic bomb developments completed by the end of 1944.**

AAF Review. July 1946. German Rocketeers: German Rockets and Guided Missiles Almost Won the War for the Nazis. [Based heavily on information from **Col. Donald Putt.**]

It is now also fairly generally known that the atomic bomb race was close—again, closer than we care to think about. And paralleling the Nazis' research on atomic explosives was their accelerated development of the V-2 program. Linking these two projects together makes credible another theory which is current among Allied guided missile groups: namely, that it was the intention of Nazi technicians to put some sort of atomic device in the warhead of the V-2... **But it is still a matter of scientific conjecture just how many weeks—or days—it might have taken Germany to be ready with her atomic devices for the V-2s.**


Royal Army Ordnance Corps. October 1946. *R.A.O.C. Gazette* 28:5:150.

Many interesting discoveries were made by Ordnance representatives *en route*. D.D.O.S. of 8 Corps found a factory engaged in production work for the **German atomic bomb.** The ammunition for Germany's largest gun was also located. Two of these massive guns had been captured by the Russians, but this was the first time their ammunition had been seen. At Belsen, the Ordnance service found itself faced with an unprecedented task.


Science Service. Reveal Nazis Planned Rocket to Blast N.Y. at 6000 MPH. *Indianapolis Times.* 2 August 1947, p. 4.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 2—The Germans planned a bomb to cross the Atlantic and blast New York. It was a rocket to be started on its long journey by another rocket which detached itself when its job was done. This was revealed today by **Brig. Gen. William L. Richardson** of the U.S. Army Air Forces. Gen. Richardson, **chief of the A.A.F. Guided Missiles and Air Defense Division,** spoke as a guest of Watson Davis, director of Science Service, on "Adventures in Science," heard over the Columbia network... **There is evidence to believe, he stated, that the Germans intended to utilize an atomic warhead which would have made this weapon extremely deadly.** [See *Forgotten Creators* D.14]

14. Where Are the Archival Documents for Postwar Inspections and Interrogations at Reported Nuclear Facilities?



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Montgomery at Lüneburger Heide




Eisenhower at Ohrdruf



Patton at Pilsen



U.S. troops at Gusen



14. International Shipments—Where Are the Reports???

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NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.60-2

GERMANY: Summary Reports (1945-1946),
Summary of Information June and July [1944]

The Japanese have announced that they too have discovered the effects of fission and have also said that Germany was working on the project. The interchange of technical information between Japan and Germany is being accomplished by means of submarine, surface ships, the Siberian railway and by air.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 917017

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Operation LUSTY. Jan 1946.

AFHRA folder 570.650A V.1 6 June 1944--1 Feb 1946, IRIS 241258

A casual remark made by a technical engineer, who stated that he had recently been offered a position in Japan, led to his being thoroughly interrogated for significant technical information. As an aside, and what he probably considered a relatively unimportant incident, he stated that less than a month ago, about the middle of April, ten submarines heavily loaded with the latest German equipment relative to aerial warfare, were dispatched from Kiel to Japan. When Lt Col. O'Brien was thus informed he immediately advised the Directorate of Intelligence, USAFE, who in turn notified the Japanese Intelligence Section of SHAEF. A cable was then dispatched to all commands in every theater of war. All vessels in ports and at sea were notified, and one of the biggest searches ever undertaken during the war for submarines was initiated. What route they had taken, whether they had gone alone or together, no one knew. But so extensive was the search and so carefully was it executed by warships of all Allied nations, that by the end of June, six of these ten submarines had been captured intact, some a relatively short distance away from their bases, others perilously close to Japan.

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For more information, see *Forgotten Creators* D.14.

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NARA Boston RG 181. 1st Naval District. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. Formerly Security Classified General Correspondence 1944--1945. Box 26. Folder U-Boats, Surrender of.

SECRET
262151 (P)

27 MAY

FROM: CNO
TO: NYPORT
INFO: COMONE
SUBJECT: MINE TUBES, UNLOADING OF

INTERROGATION LT PFAFF SECOND WATCH OFFICER U-234 DISCLOSES HE WAS IN CHARGE OF CARGO AND PERSONALLY SUPERVISED LOADING ALL MINE TUBES.

PFAFF PREPARED MANIFEST LIST AND KNOWS KIND DOCUMENTS AND CARGO IN EACH TUBE.

PFAFF STATES LONG CONTAINERS SHOULD BE UNPACKED IN HORIZONTAL POSITION AND SHORT CONTAINERS IN VERTICAL POSITION.

URANIUM OXIDE LOADED IN GOLD LINED CYLINDERS AND AS LONG AS CYLINDERS NOT OPENED CAN BE HANDLED LIKE CRUDE TNT.

THESE CONTAINERS SHOULD NOT BE OPENED AS SUBSTANCE WILL BECOME SENSITIVE AND DANGEROUS.

PFAFF IS AVAILABLE AND WILLING TO AID UNLOADING IF RNEEDT DESIRES. ADVISE.

DISTRIBUTION
COMDT
C/S
DUTY OFF
ACO (A)
DIO
D ORD OFF

CTM

14. Personnel: Hans Kammler



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SS General Hans Kammler was in charge of the nuclear weapons program by the end of the war.



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In the last years [of the war], the central management of the development and production of the most secret weapons and devices was in the hands of **SS General Professor Kammler** and his working group. These were the most secret weapons, devices, and processes, some of which were actually used, but some of which were not used [in the war], namely in the field of **atom smashing, the transformation of elements, the atomic bomb and atomic energy**, and also rocket weapons, the latest propulsion systems for aircraft, remote control, etc.... Kammler succeeded in centralizing the development work in his field. He was the representative of the Ministry of Armaments, the Army Ordnance Office, the Air Force, and the SS at the same time.

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HQ CIC, USFET, Region Munich IV, 25 April 1946. Subject: Wilhelm Voss. NARA RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 133, Folder Voss, Friedrich Wilhelm.

Subject states that the two men that were responsible for research on the most secret weapons at Skoda were **SS Gruppenfuehrer Prof. KAMMLER** and his deputy SS Oberfuehrer PURUCKER. On the 10 May 1945 VOSS and PURUCKER were in Schimelitz, fleeing in the direction of the American troops. PURUCKER was driving a large civilian car which contained many of the plans on the **atom bomb**. This car plus material fell into the hands of the Russians...

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Obergruppenführer Professor Kammler, one of the directors of the S.S. Hauptamt, was said to have great influence on Himmler and more influence on Hitler than Speer himself; and he was kept informed on all questions concerning armaments... One of the functions of the S.S. was to control the work of politically unreliable scientists who were kept in concentration camps... **Trials on some kind of atomic bomb were made at or near the camp.**

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Werner Grothmann. 2002. Jonastalverein Archive. p. 18.

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Declassified per Executive Order 12958, Section 3.5
NND Project Number: NND 785009 By: NND Date: 1978

Ebensee and about \$ 2,400,000 were authorized for payment to creditors. Payment, however, was stopped and this accounts for the large balance. Had this sum been paid the balance would have been 1,100,000. On the other hand some additional 3,000,000 was forwarded to this account by the Reichsbank in München but the sum was not credited to the account because it was stopped by the Military authorities before it left München.

Shortly after the occupation, Hans Kammler appeared before the CIC in Gmünden and made a detailed statement on the operations and activities of the Baustelle Ebensee, as well as on the account, and his own authority and authority of Karl Englehardt. None of the present American Officers at the CIC, Gmünden, is familiar with his statement but it should be in the files there. Mr. Morrison of the CIC, Gmünden was requested by the team to send a copy of this statement to Mr. Loehr.

CONCLUSIONS :

1. Sammelkonto was established by the Financial Division of the Military Government on 31 July 1945. ←
2. Sammelkonto received monies belonging to the German Wehrmacht and its affiliated organizations.
3. The details of the account show that some of the funds could not be classified as direct Wehrmacht funds without a more thorough investigation. There could be other funds which were erroneously classified as Wehrmacht funds.

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
Office of Asst. Chief of Staff A-2
Exploitation Division, Operations Section
A-2
30 May, 1945
MEMORANDUM: Summary of Activities, Operations Section, Exploitation Division.
TO : Colonel Sheldon.
To date the intelligence exploitation of the German Air Force and of German technical facilities has yielded a vast amount of material and documents. Briefly to evaluate at this time the worth of such material and documents is made difficult due to the fact that the emphasis has necessarily been upon the speed of collection rather than upon concise evaluation. However enough progress has already been made to indicate that a practically half of the category "one" items assigned for evacuation by Wright Field have been secured. Much of the material for the longer term research into all aspects of the German Air Force as required by "Air Staff Post Hostilities Intelligence Requirements" prepared by IC/IS, Intelligence, HQ, AAF, is presently being gathered.
There follows a brief outline of recapitulation of the accomplishments to date divided into technical and non-technical exploitation.

GERMAN NON-TECHNICAL PERSONNEL
47. The following is a list of key German Air Force non-technical personnel presently being held for interrogation.
Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering Commander in Chief of Luftwaffe.
Generalfeldmarschall Erhard Milch Secretary of State for Air and Inspector General of the GfV-Director General of Equipment.
General der Flieger Keller Chief of General Staff of Luftwaffe.
Dr. Albert Speer Minister for Armaments and War Production.
General Martini Director General of GAF Signals.
General von Criegern General Quartermaster of Luftwaffe.

Generaloberst Weise Specially detailed officer for defense against enemy long-range arms.
SS-Obergruppenführer Kammler Inspector of all units of the Luftwaffe working with rocket-propelled arms.

CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
Office of Asst. Chief of Staff A-2
AFG 633
AAF Station 179
2 November 1945
SUBJECT: German Underground Installations.
TO: Major ERNEST ENGLANDER, A.C., Headquarters USAF, AFG 633.
1. I have been instructed by the AG of S A-2, Headquarters Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., to furnish detailed information from many aspects on enemy underground installations, technique, etc.
2. In view of recent scientific developments, it is considered of the utmost importance for future planning and of the highest priority that we obtain all the benefit of the experience of German industry regarding the use of such facilities.
3. To implement the required study, you are directed to make the necessary arrangements to personally interrogate Speer, Kammler and Bauer and report your findings to me as soon as possible. ←
GORDON C. McDONALD,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Asst. Chief of Staff A-2.
By hand to Maj. Englander
3 Nov 45
2 NOV 1945

SS General Hans Kammler was in charge of the nuclear weapons program by the end of the war.

He was interrogated by the U.S. for at least 6 months after the war. The information he provided was sufficiently valuable to shield him from all prosecution. Where are the reports on his wartime work and postwar life?

Wilhelm Voss. April 1946. NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Folder XE065651.

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[See *Forgotten Creators* D.14]

Loyd K. Pepple. 30 May 1945. AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46.

Louis D. Caplane and William G. Magee. NARA RG 260, DN1929, Roll 0126, pp. 26 ff.

George C. McDonald. 2 November 1945. AFHRA folder 570.6501A 1945-46.

14. Personnel: Siegfried Flügge

- Published detailed calculations of fission reactors and fission bombs in June 1939.



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- Published detailed calculations of fission reactors and fission bombs in June 1939.
- Appears to have been the top physicist of the German nuclear weapons program, working for the Reichspost, Heereswaffenamt, University of Berlin, Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes, Reichsforschungsrat, University of Königsberg (reported to have fission reactors), and Gusen SS facility.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AND 07017

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 202,
Folder XE196681 Siegfried Fluegge

The following information was received by phone from L&S Office Marburg, Wednesday, 17 Sept 47, thru Mrs. Steinbacher:

Flügge, Siegfried, Dr.

Date of birth: 16 March 1912
Place of Birth: Dresden, Saxony, Germany
Present address: Marburg/Lahn, Wilhelm Rösser Str. 33 A
Present employment: as professor at University of Marburg (ordentlicher Professor)
Special Field: Nuclear Physics (Struktur der Materie)
Background information:
from 1918 - 1921: attended elementary school, Dresden
" 1921 - 1929: " high school (Gymnasium) in Dresden
" 1929 - 1930: attended Technical High School, Dresden.
" 1930 - 1933: at University in Göttingen
" 1933: Doctor of Physics at University of Göttingen.
" 1933 - 1935: worked at University of Frankfurt as Scientific Assistant.
" 1935 - 1937: lectured at University of Leipzig to Berlin
" 1937 - 1942: worked in chemical department of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute in Berlin, Dahlem.
" 1942 - 1944: assistant at the Institute of Scientific Research of the Reichspost, Berlin
" 1940 - 1944: lectured at the University of Berlin
" 1944: appointed professor (ausserordentlicher) at the University of Königsberg.
After the surrender, he went to Göttingen, where he was employed as Professor for History of Physical Science from 1945 - 1947.

He was not called to Military Service during the War, because he worked as a Scientist of Physics for the "Heereswaffenamt", Berlin, and was later exempted of any Army Service by the Reichsforschungsrat in Berlin.



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- Appears to have been the top physicist of the German nuclear weapons program, working for the Reichspost, Heereswaffenamt, University of Berlin, Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes, Reichsforschungsrat, University of Königsberg (reported to have fission reactors), and Gusen SS facility.
- Was brought to work in the U.S. after the war at the specific request of Edward Teller to “be of marked assistance in carrying out” a “physics... program... of interest and importance to the national security.”

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 007017

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 202,
Folder XE196681 Siegfried Fluegge

The following information was received by phone from L&S Office Marburg, Wednesday,
17 Sept 47, thru Mrs. Steinbacher:

Flügge, Siegfried, Dr.

Date of Birth: 16 March 1912
Place of Birth: Dresden, Saxony, Germany
Present address: Marburg/Lahn, Wilhelm Rösser Str. 33 A
Present employment: as professor at University of Marburg
(ordentlicher Professor)
Special Field: Nuclear Physics (Struktur der Materie)
Background information: from 1918 - 1921: attended elementary school, Dresden
" 1921 - 1929: " high school (Gymnasium)
in Dresden
" 1929 - 1930: attended Technical High School,
Dresden.
" 1930 - 1933: at University in Göttingen
I 1933 Doctor of Physics at University of
Göttingen.
" 1933 - 1935: worked at University of Frankfurt as
Scientific Assistant.
" 1935 - 1937: lectured at University of Leipzig
1937 to Berlin
" 1937 - 1942: worked in chemical department of the
Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute in Berlin,
Dahlem.
" 1942 - 1944: assistant at the Institute of Scientific
Research of the Reichspost, Berlin
" 1940 - 1944: lectured at the University of Berlin
" 1944 appointed professor (ausserordentlicher)
at the University of Königsberg.
After the surrender, he went to Göttingen, where he was
employed as Professor for History of Physical Science
from 1945 - 1947.

He was not called to Military Service during the War, be-
cause he worked as a Scientist of Physics for the "Heeres-
waffenamt", Berlin, and was later exempted of any Army
Service by the Reichsforschungsrat in Berlin.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 013039

NARA RG 330, Entry A1-1B,
Box 43, Folder Flügge, Siegfried

EXOS:ONR:NA21:UL:kem

Serial No. 14654

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of Naval Research
Washington 25, D.C.

July 18, 1947

From: Chief of Naval Research
To: Chief of Naval Intelligence
Subj: Foreign Scientists, Request for assistance
on.

1. Professor Edward Teller, Physics Department, University of Chicago, is supervising under contract to this Office a research program on various phases of research in physics of the solid state. This program is of interest and importance to the national security. Professor Teller is very desirous to obtain the services of the German physicist, Dr. Siegfried Flügge, who can be of marked assistance in carrying out the aforementioned program.

2. Professor Teller has requested the Office of Technical Services, Department of Commerce, to obtain Dr. Flügge from Germany. It is requested that the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency be informed of the Navy's interest in this case, and asked to provide such assistance as is possible to Professor Teller in aiding Dr. Flügge to come to this country.

/s/ C.M. Bolster
Capt., USN
Acting Chief of Naval Research

cc: Mr. Robert Frye, OTS, Dept. of Commerce
Professor Edward Teller, Physics Dept.
University of Chicago



14. Personnel: Siegfried Flügge

For more information,
see *Forgotten Creators D.14*

- Published detailed calculations of fission reactors and fission bombs in June 1939.
- Appears to have been the top physicist of the German nuclear weapons program, working for the Reichspost, Heereswaffenamt, University of Berlin, Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes, Reichsforschungsrat, University of Königsberg (reported to have fission reactors), and Gusen SS facility.
- Was brought to work in the U.S. after the war at the specific request of Edward Teller to “be of marked assistance in carrying out” a “physics... program... of interest and importance to the national security.”
- Was placed on the Top Secret JIOA K “hot list” when not in the U.S. and constantly monitored/detained for at least a decade after the war, on the direct orders of CIC Colonel George R. Eckman, formerly of Alsos.

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 202,
Folder XE196681 Siegfried Fluegge

Where are the reports on Flügge’s interrogations and on his postwar work?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NND 013039*

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FLÜGGE, Siegfried, Dr.

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Place of Birth: Dresden, Saxony, Germany

Present address: Marburg/Lahn, Wilhelm Rösser Str. 33 A

Present employment: as professor at University of Marburg (ordentlicher Professor)

Special Field: Nuclear Physics (Struktur der Materie)

Background information:

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- " 1921 - 1929: " high school (Gymnasium) in Dresden
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- " 1930 - 1933: at University in Göttingen
- " 1933: Doctor of Physics at University of Göttingen.
- " 1933 - 1935: worked at University of Frankfurt as Scientific Assistant.
- " 1935 - 1937: lectured at University of Leipzig to Berlin
- " 1937 - 1942: worked in chemical department of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute in Berlin, Dahlem.
- " 1942 - 1944: assistant at the Institute of Scientific Research of the Reichspost, Berlin
- " 1940 - 1944: lectured at the University of Berlin
- " 1944: appointed professor (ausserordentlicher) at the University of Königsberg.

After the surrender, he went to Göttingen, where he was employed as Professor for History of Physical Science from 1945 - 1947.

He was not called to Military Service during the War, because he worked as a Scientist of Physics for the "Heereswaffenamt", Berlin, and was later exempted of any Army Service by the Reichsforschungsrat in Berlin.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NND 013039*

NARA RG 330, Entry A1-1B,
Box 43, Folder Flügge, Siegfried

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Authority *NND 013039*

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 202,
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EXOS:ONR:NA21:UL:kem
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From: Chief of Naval Research
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1. Professor Edward Teller, Physics Department, University of Chicago, is supervising under contract to this Office a research program on various phases of research in physics of the solid state. This program is of interest and importance to the national security. Professor Teller is very desirous to obtain the services of the German physicist, Dr. Siegfried Flügge, who can be of marked assistance in carrying out the aforementioned program.

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/s/ C.M. Bolster
Capt., USN
Acting Chief of Naval Research

cc: Mr. Robert Frye, OTS, Dept. of Commerce
Professor Edward Teller, Physics Dept.
University of Chicago

FLÜGGE, Siegfried Wilhelm (Dr.)

25 April 1952

Res: MARBURG, Wilhelm Rösserstrasse 33a

Priority 1, (JIOA Personality on the "K" List)

REF: D-137899 "Secret ltr dtd 31 Jan 52 file X-272
SUB: Custodial Detention
CS

FLÜGGE, S. (Professor)

4 Nov 54

Employed by subject. Now in MARBURG.



Ref: D-264237 BfV Report dtd 26 Aug 53 File: BR53-11-91
Sub: German Academy of Sciences of BERLIN F-3
Re: Nuclear Physics Institute

CS GERNAND

14. Personnel: Others

Where Are the Reports/Interrogations?

14. Personnel: Others

Where Are the Reports/Interrogations?

**Dozens of experts with knowledge of the
German nuclear program (including H-bombs)
were brought to the U.S./U.K. after WWII**

NARA RG 330, Entry A1-1B, Boxes 1-186.
JIOA Foreign Scientist Case Files.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 5010.107-39

14. Personnel: Others

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Dozens of experts with knowledge of the German nuclear program (including H-bombs) were brought to the U.S./U.K. after WWII

Karl-Friedrich Bonhoeffer	Gottfried Guderley	Walter Nielsch (?)
Wernher von Braun	Paul Harteck	Edgar Petersen
Rudolf Brill	Otto Haxel	Heinz Schlicke
Adolf Busemann	Richard Herzog	Erich Schumann
Walter Dornberger	Johannes Hans Jensen	Otto Schwede
Rudolf Edse	Willibald Jentschke	Edmung Sorg
Krafft Ehrlicke	Ulrich Jetter	Kurt Starke
Wilhelm Eitel	Georg Joos	Wolfgang Steurer
Gerhard Falck	Hartmut Kallmann	Ernst Stuhlinger
Karl Fiebinger	Hans Kammler	Hans Suess
Wolfgang Finkelburg	Gerald Klein	Herbert Wagner
Rudolf Fleischmann	Stanley Kronenberg	Wilhelm Westphal
Siegfried Flügge	Heinz Maier-Leibnitz	Friedwardt Winterberg
Walter Glaser	Werner Maurer	Karl Wirtz
Wilhelm Groth	Hugo Neuert	Gernot Zippe

FORMULARY, Adolf
Address: Staatseisenbahn Str. 180
City: Frankfurt-am-Main
Place of Birth: Luedbeck, Germany
Date of Birth: 20 April 1901
Nationality: German

NAME
PHOTOGRAPH HERE
(OPTIONAL)

NAME: FIEBINGER, Karl
Address: Engelmannstr. 16
City: Salzburg/Austria
Place of Birth: Vienna
Date of Birth: 20 January 1913
Nationality: Austrian

NAME
PHOTOGRAPH HERE
(OPTIONAL)

BASIC PERSONNEL RECORD
(Alien Enemy or Prisoner of War)

(Interment serial number)
GIDELE, Karl Gottfried
(Name of intern)
Male (Sex)

Height 6 ft. 0 in.
Weight 168
Eyes Gray
Skin Ruddy
Hair Dark Brown
Age 36
Distinguishing marks or characteristics:
Operation scar on right upper thigh.

NAME
PHOTOGRAPH HERE
(OPTIONAL)

NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

APPLICANT

Name of contributor: Police Department City: Troy State: New York
(State whether Police Department, Sheriff's Office, or other official designation)

Applicant for: Visiting Research Professor of
(Field of interest)
Physical Chemistry

Name of company: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Date: June 30, 1951
Address: 1501 Tibbitts Avenue, Troy, N. Y.
Birthplace: Vienna, Austria Citizenship: Austrian-German
Age: 48 Date of birth: July 30, 1902
Height: 6 ft. 3 in. Weight: 230
Hair: Dark Eyes: Grey
Complexion: Ruddy Build: Large

NAME
PHOTOGRAPH HERE
(OPTIONAL)

BASIC PERSONNEL RECORD
(Alien Enemy or Prisoner of War)

(Interment serial number)
STUHLINGER, Ernst
(Name of intern)
Male (Sex)

Height 5 ft. 10 in.
Weight 151 lbs.
Eyes blue gray
Skin medium
Hair dark brown
Age 32
Distinguishing marks or characteristics:
none

NAME
PHOTOGRAPH HERE
(OPTIONAL)

14. Personnel: Others

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Karl Fiebinger	Hans Kammler	Hans Suess
Wolfgang Finkelburg	Gerald Klein	Herbert Wagner
Rudolf Fleischmann	Stanley Kronenberg	Wilhelm Westphal
Siegfried Flügge	Heinz Maier-Leibnitz	Friedwardt Winterberg
Walter Glaser	Werner Maurer	Karl Wirtz
Wilhelm Groth	Hugo Neuert	Gernot Zippe

Countless others were interrogated in Europe, or taken to France, the Soviet Union, or other countries

The image displays four pages of personnel records from the National Defense Program, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Page 1: BASIC PERSONNEL RECORD (Alien Enemy or Prisoner of War)
 (Interment serial number) _____
 GUDERLEY, Karl Gottfried
 (Name of internment) _____
 Male (Sex)
 Height 6 ft. 0 in.
 Weight 168
 Eyes Gray
 Skin Ruddy
 Hair Dark Brown
 Age 36
 Distinguishing marks or characteristics: Operation scar on right upper thigh.
 Photos: 15 4

Page 2: NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM
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 WASHINGTON, D. C.
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 (State whether Police Department, Sheriff's Office, or other official designation)
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 Birthplace: Vienna, Austria Citizenship: Austrian-German
 Age 48 Date of birth: July 30, 1902
 Height: 6 ft. 3 1/2 in. Weight: 220
 Hair: Dark Eyes: Grey
 Complexion: Ruddy Build: Large
 Photos: 15 4

Page 3: BASIC PERSONNEL RECORD (Alien Enemy or Prisoner of War)
 (Interment serial number) _____
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 Skin medium
 Hair dark brown
 Age 32
 Distinguishing marks or characteristics: none
 Photos: A 23

Page 4: BASIC PERSONNEL RECORD (Alien Enemy or Prisoner of War)
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 Male (Sex)
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 Photos: A 23

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Countless others were interrogated in Europe, or taken to France, the Soviet Union, or other countries

Walter Trink. 1945. NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Folder XE098301 Trink, Walter. TO THE AMERICAN COMMAND OF THE INTERNMENT CAMP? CIC-STAFF... I am a Physicist and have been employed with the OKH until the end of the war in the research dept. of the office for arms [Heereswaffenamt] as referee for the physics of explosions and blasting... **At the end of the war I was occupied with experiments for producing extreme high pressures and temperatures, extreme velocities (up to 15 km/sec) and heavy swingings of the air [shock waves].** The practical use of these researches comprises: 1st for the war: the defense against V-weapons super- and atomic bombs by destroying them before they reach their target and **the initiation of atomic bombs.**

BASIC PERSONNEL RECORD (Alien Enemy or Prisoner of War)		NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON, D. C.	
<p>Name: GUIDELER, Karl Gottfried Address: St. 180, Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany City: Frankfurt-am-Main Place of Birth: Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany Date of Birth: 20 April 1901 Nationality: German</p> <p>Height: 6 ft. 0 in. Weight: 168 Eyes: Gray Skin: Ruddy Hair: Dark Brown Age: 36 Distinguishing marks or characteristics: Operation scar on right upper thigh.</p>		<p>APPLICANT Name of contributor: Police Department City: Troy State: New York (State whether Police Department, Sheriff's Office, or other official designation) Applicant for: Visiting Research Professor of Physical Chemistry Name of company: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Date: June 30, 1951 Address: 1501 Tibbitts Avenue, Troy, N. Y. Birthplace: Vienna, Austria Citizenship: Austrian-German Age: 49 Date of birth: July 30, 1902 Height: 6 ft. 3 1/2 in. Weight: 230 Hair: Dark Eyes: Gray Complexion: Ruddy Build: Large</p>	
<p>Name: STUHLINGER, Ernst Address: St. 180, Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany City: Frankfurt-am-Main Place of Birth: Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany Date of Birth: 6 September 1911 Nationality: Austrian</p> <p>Height: 5 ft. 10 1/2 in. Weight: 151 lbs. Eyes: blue gray Skin: medium Hair: dark brown Age: 32 Distinguishing marks or characteristics: none</p>		<p>APPLICANT Name of contributor: Police Department City: Troy State: New York (State whether Police Department, Sheriff's Office, or other official designation) Applicant for: Visiting Research Professor of Physical Chemistry Name of company: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Date: June 30, 1951 Address: 1501 Tibbitts Avenue, Troy, N. Y. Birthplace: Vienna, Austria Citizenship: Austrian-German Age: 49 Date of birth: July 30, 1902 Height: 6 ft. 3 1/2 in. Weight: 230 Hair: Dark Eyes: Gray Complexion: Ruddy Build: Large</p>	

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Walter Trink. 1945. NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Folder XE098301 Trink, Walter. TO THE AMERICAN COMMAND OF THE INTERNMENT CAMP? CIC-STAFF... I am a Physicist and have been employed with the OKH until the end of the war in the research dept. of the office for arms [Heereswaffenamt] as referee for the physics of explosions and blasting... **At the end of the war I was occupied with experiments for producing extreme high pressures and temperatures, extreme velocities (up to 15 km/sec) and heavy swingings of the air [shock waves].** The practical use of these researches comprises: 1st for the war: the defense against V-weapons super- and atomic bombs by destroying them before they reach their target and **the initiation of atomic bombs.**

Charles A. Crowley to W. F. Heimlich. 31 August 1945. Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe (Main). AFHRA C5094 frames 0957-0958.

Gerald Klein (Dr.), Dipl.-Eng., Manager of LGW. Address: Berlin-Dahlem, Hohe Ähren 10b. Specialty: Electrical flying control, V-2 control. A very efficient electrical engineer. Developed V-2 control devices. Worked at Peenemünde and later became **group director of atomic devices in RLM [Reichsluftfahrtministerium].** At present being used by the British. Evacuated by "T" Force.

BASIC PERSONNEL RECORD (Alien Enemy or Prisoner of War)		NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON, D. C.	
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Ernst Stuhlinger
Hans Suess
Herbert Wagner
Wilhelm Westphal
Friedwardt Winterberg
Karl Wirtz
Gernot Zippe

Form 100-10 (1-1-40)
BASIC PERSONNEL RECORD
(Alien Enemy or Prisoner of War)

Name: **GUDERLEY, Karl**
Address: **St. 180, Franzensberg, Innsbruck, Germany**
City: **Innsbruck**
Place of Birth: **20 April 1901**
Date of Birth: **20 April 1901**
Nationality: **German**

Height: **6** ft. **0** in.
Weight: **168**
Eyes: **Gray**
Skin: **Ruddy**
Hair: **Dark Brown**
Age: **36**
Distinguishing marks or characteristics: **Operation scar on right upper thigh.**

Form 100-10 (1-1-40)
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Date of Birth: **20 April 1901**
Nationality: **German**

Height: **5** ft. **10** in.
Weight: **151** lbs.
Eyes: **blue gray**
Skin: **medium**
Hair: **dark brown**
Age: **32**
Distinguishing marks or characteristics: **none**

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Robert E. Work. 18 September 1945. Preliminary Interrogation Report. Prof. Dr. Ulrich Hoffmann. AFHRA A5183 frame 0609. PhD in chemistry from University of Berlin in 1926. Instructor at University of Berlin until 1936. Called to University of Rostock in 1936 where he became full professor in 1937. In April 1942 he was called to University of Vienna as Director of the Institute for Inorganic and Analytic Chemistry... Dr. Hoffmann's research in the field of air interest was only in the **development of the atomic bomb. Claims to have improved method of obtaining FLUOR, which is necessary to obtain UF6, one of the basic ingredients of the atomic bomb.**

14. Personnel: Others

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Stanley Kronenberg
Heinz Maier-Leibnitz
Werner Maurer
Hugo Neuert

Walter Nielsch (?)
Edgar Petersen
Heinz Schlicke
Erich Schumann
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Herbert Wagner
Wilhelm Westphal
Friedwardt Winterberg
Karl Wirtz
Gernot Zippe

Form 100-10 (1-1-44)
BASIC PERSONNEL RECORD
(Alien Enemy or Prisoner of War)

NAME: GUDERLEY, Karl Gottfried
Address: Saarbrücken, Str. 180
City: Saarbrücken
Place of Birth: Saarbrücken, Germany
Date of Birth: 20 April 1901
Nationality: German

Height: 6 ft. 0 in.
Weight: 166
Eyes: Gray
Skin: Ruddy
Hair: Dark Brown
Age: 36
Distinguishing marks or characteristics: Operation scar on right upper thigh.

Form 100-10 (1-1-44)
BASIC PERSONNEL RECORD
(Alien Enemy or Prisoner of War)

NAME: STUHLINGER, Ernst
Address: 1501 Tibbitts Avenue, Troy, N. Y.
City: Troy, New York
Place of Birth: Vienna, Austria
Date of Birth: 25 January 1913
Nationality: Austrian

Height: 5 ft. 10 in.
Weight: 151 lbs.
Eyes: Blue Gray
Skin: Medium
Hair: Dark Brown
Age: 32
Distinguishing marks or characteristics: none

Countless others were interrogated in Europe, or taken to France, the Soviet Union, or other countries

Walter Trink. 1945. NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Folder XE098301 Trink, Walter. TO THE AMERICAN COMMAND OF THE INTERNMENT CAMP? CIC-STAFF... I am a Physicist and have been employed with the OKH until the end of the war in the research dept. of the office for arms [Heereswaffenamt] as referee for the physics of explosions and blasting... **At the end of the war I was occupied with experiments for producing extreme high pressures and temperatures, extreme velocities (up to 15 km/sec) and heavy swingings of the air [shock waves].** The practical use of these researches comprises: 1st for the war: the defense against V-weapons super- and atomic bombs by destroying them before they reach their target and **the initiation of atomic bombs.**

Charles A. Crowley to W. F. Heimlich. 31 August 1945. Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe (Main). AFHRA C5094 frames 0957-0958. Gerald Klein (Dr.), Dipl.-Eng., Manager of LGW. Address: Berlin-Dahlem, Hohe Ähren 10b. Specialty: Electrical flying control, V-2 control. A very efficient electrical engineer. Developed V-2 control devices. Worked at Peenemünde and later became **group director of atomic devices in RLM [Reichsluftfahrtministerium].** At present being used by the British. Evacuated by "T" Force.

Robert E. Work. 18 September 1945. Preliminary Interrogation Report. Prof. Dr. Ulrich Hoffmann. AFHRA A5183 frame 0609. PhD in chemistry from University of Berlin in 1926. Instructor at University of Berlin until 1936. Called to University of Rostock in 1936 where he became full professor in 1937. In April 1942 he was called to University of Vienna as Director of the Institute for Inorganic and Analytic Chemistry... Dr. Hoffmann's research in the field of air interest was only in the **development of the atomic bomb. Claims to have improved method of obtaining FLUOR, which is necessary to obtain UF6, one of the basic ingredients of the atomic bomb.**

Todos M. Odarenko. 1945. FIAT 63. Activities of the Second Institute of Physics of the University of Vienna.

Contrary to the statements, attributed by the U.S. newspapers to the various U.S. atomic experts, that it "would take the Germans some 100 years to solve the problem of atomic disintegration on an explosive basis" (for the manufacture of bombs), the opinion of the members of the Institute themselves was that, given a supply of radium and uranium, and permitting their return to Vienna, where certain of their materials and equipments are stored, they would be able to "complete their work" in some 3 to 6 months... That these claims of the Institute are not to be disregarded too readily would follow from the fact that Prof. Smyth spent considerable time with the Institute, revisited them several times, and thought it necessary to insist on the most stringent type of control over the scientific activities of the group, as well as on close individual observations.

14. Personnel: Others

Where Are the Reports/Interrogations?

Dozens of experts with knowledge of the German nuclear program (including H-bombs) were brought to the U.S./U.K. after WWII

Karl-Friedrich Bonhoeffer
Wernher von Braun
Rudolf Brill
Adolf Busemann
Walter Dornberger
Rudolf Edse
Krafft Ehrlicke
Wilhelm Eitel
Gerhard Falck
Karl Fiebinger
Wolfgang Finkelburg
Rudolf Fleischmann
Siegfried Flügge
Walter Glaser
Wilhelm Groth

Gottfried Guderley
Paul Harteck
Otto Haxel
Richard Herzog
Johannes Hans Jensen
Willibald Jentschke
Ulrich Jetter
Georg Joos
Hartmut Kallmann
Hans Kammler
Gerald Klein
Stanley Kronenberg
Heinz Maier-Leibnitz
Werner Maurer
Hugo Neuert

Walter Nielsch (?)
Edgar Petersen
Heinz Schlicke
Erich Schumann
Otto Schwede
Edmung Sorg
Kurt Starke
Wolfgang Steurer
Ernst Stuhlinger
Hans Suess
Herbert Wagner
Wilhelm Westphal
Friedwardt Winterberg
Karl Wirtz
Gernot Zippe

Form 1: BASIC PERSONNEL RECORD (Alien Enemy or Prisoner of War) for Karl Gottfried Guderley, Karl. Includes photo, height 6 ft 0 in, weight 166, eyes gray, skin ruddy, hair dark brown, age 36, distinguishing marks: operation scar on right upper thigh.

Form 2: NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D. C. Applicant: Ernst Stuhlinger. Includes photo, height 5 ft 10 1/2 in, weight 141 lbs, eyes blue gray, skin medium, hair dark brown, age 32, distinguishing marks: none.

Form 3: BASIC PERSONNEL RECORD (Alien Enemy or Prisoner of War) for Ernst Stuhlinger. Includes photo, height 5 ft 10 1/2 in, weight 141 lbs, eyes blue gray, skin medium, hair dark brown, age 32, distinguishing marks: none.

Countless others were interrogated in Europe, or taken to France, the Soviet Union, or other countries

Walter Trink. 1945. NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Folder XE098301 Trink, Walter. TO THE AMERICAN COMMAND OF THE INTERNMENT CAMP? CIC-STAFF... I am a Physicist and have been employed with the OKH until the end of the war in the research dept. of the office for arms [Heereswaffenamt] as referee for the physics of explosions and blasting... **At the end of the war I was occupied with experiments for producing extreme high pressures and temperatures, extreme velocities (up to 15 km/sec) and heavy swingings of the air [shock waves].** The practical use of these researches comprises: 1st for the war: the defense against V-weapons super- and atomic bombs by destroying them before they reach their target and **the initiation of atomic bombs.**

Charles A. Crowley to W. F. Heimlich. 31 August 1945. Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe (Main). AFHRA C5094 frames 0957-0958. Gerald Klein (Dr.), Dipl.-Eng., Manager of LGW. Address: Berlin-Dahlem, Hohe Ähren 10b. Specialty: Electrical flying control, V-2 control. A very efficient electrical engineer. Developed V-2 control devices. Worked at Peenemünde and later became **group director of atomic devices in RLM [Reichsluftfahrtministerium].** At present being used by the British. Evacuated by "T" Force.

Robert E. Work. 18 September 1945. Preliminary Interrogation Report. Prof. Dr. Ulrich Hoffmann. AFHRA A5183 frame 0609. PhD in chemistry from University of Berlin in 1926. Instructor at University of Berlin until 1936. Called to University of Rostock in 1936 where he became full professor in 1937. In April 1942 he was called to University of Vienna as Director of the Institute for Inorganic and Analytic Chemistry... Dr. Hoffmann's research in the field of air interest was only in the **development of the atomic bomb. Claims to have improved method of obtaining FLUOR, which is necessary to obtain UF6, one of the basic ingredients of the atomic bomb.**

Todos M. Odarenko. 1945. FIAT 63. Activities of the Second Institute of Physics of the University of Vienna.

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Memo to P. M. Wilson. Atom-Bomb Specialist. 4 April 1946. TNA FO 1031/112. Karl Heinz BOSECK, former Ustuf in the Waffen SS, alleges that **he is an Atom-Bomb expert.** He is now interned in No. 2 CIC, SANDBOSTEL and his P.O.W. No. is 204526. [Boseck studied under Erich Schumann, worked at Oranienburg SS facility near Auer.]

14. Why Are So Many Archival Files on the German Nuclear Program Still Classified, or Missing Entirely?

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 166	② 1/2/5 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 166	⑧ 1/10/7 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 167	⑮ 1/9/5 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 167	⑩ 1/2/5 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 167
<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32-22-1 Germany</u></p> <p>Date <u>8-23-44</u></p> <p>From <u>FURMAN</u></p> <p>To <u>SMITH</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority 4-2-91 Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32-22-1 Germany</u></p> <p>Date <u>12-1-44</u></p> <p>From <u>DONOVAN</u></p> <p>To <u>GROVES</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority 4-2-91 Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32-12-2 Germany: Personnel (Jan 45-Dec 45)</u></p> <p>Date <u>12-6-44</u></p> <p>From <u>CSDFC</u></p> <p>To <u>-</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority 4-3-91 cc Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32-12-2 Germany: Personnel (Jan 45-Dec 45)</u></p> <p>Date <u>7-6-45</u></p> <p>From <u>PERKIN</u></p> <p>To <u>-</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority 4-3-91 cc Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32-22-1 Germany</u></p> <p>Date <u>8-23-44</u></p> <p>From <u>FURMAN</u></p> <p>To <u>SMITH</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority 4-2-91 Date</p>

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 166

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 167

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 166	⑥A 1/3/5 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 166	⑥ 1/1/5 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 167	⑭ 1/2/7 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 167	⑩ 1/2/5 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 167
<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32-22-1 Germany</u></p> <p>Date <u>3-12-45</u></p> <p>From <u>CALVERT</u></p> <p>To <u>SPEER</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority 4-2-91 Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32-22-1 Germany</u></p> <p>Date <u>9-19-45</u></p> <p>From <u>DIX</u></p> <p>To <u>SMITH</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority 4-2-91 Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32-12-2 Germany: Personnel (Jan 45-Dec 45)</u></p> <p>Date <u>9-24-45</u></p> <p>From <u>CHADWICK</u></p> <p>To <u>GROVES</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority 4-3-91 cc Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32-12-2 Germany: Personnel (Jan 45-Dec 45)</u></p> <p>Date <u>11-5-45</u></p> <p>From <u>HOLT</u></p> <p>To <u>-</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority 4-3-91 cc Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32-22-1 Germany</u></p> <p>Date <u>3-12-45</u></p> <p>From <u>CALVERT</u></p> <p>To <u>SPEER</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority 4-2-91 Date</p>

14. Why Are So Many Archival Files on the German Nuclear Program Still Classified, or Missing Entirely?

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 160	19 1/2/T RG 77 Entry 22 Box 160	18 1/1/T RG 77 Entry 22 Box 160	6D 1/1/T RG 77 Entry 22 Box 160	6C 1/1/T RG 77 Entry 22 Box 160
ACCESS RESTRICTED				
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:				
File Designation <u>Apr 45 - Dec 45</u>				
Date <u>MSG 65971</u>				
From <u>10-11-45</u>				
To <u>War Dept.</u>				
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:				
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information				
<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information				
NND 917017 Authority 4-4-91 Date AR				
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)				

DECLASSIFIED Authority NA 917017 NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 160

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 160	9A 1/1/T RG 77 Entry 22 Box 160	9 1/2/T RG 77 Entry 22 Box 160	6A 1/3/T RG 77 Entry 22 Box 160	4 1/1/T RG 77 Entry 22 Box 160
ACCESS RESTRICTED				
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:				
File Designation <u>205.2 Cables Incoming Top Secret</u>				
Date <u>MSG 70232</u>				
From <u>1-25-46</u>				
To <u>USMA</u>				
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:				
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information				
<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information				
NND 917017 Authority 4-4-91 Date AR				
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)				

<div>RG 77 Entry 22 Box 160</div> <div>2A 1/1/7</div> <div>RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164</div>	<div>ACCESS RESTRICTED</div> <div>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</div> <div><div>File Designation205.2 Cables Incoming Top Secret MSG 7/1/54 Date10-18-46 FromUSMA London ToWar Dept.</div><div>WITHDRAWAL NOTICE</div><div>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</div><div><div>AuthorityNND 917017 Date4-4-91</div><div>RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164</div></div></div>	<div>ACCESS RESTRICTED</div> <div>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</div> <div><div>File DesignationAustralia Memo Willett Date5-19-44 FromCastles ToRussett</div><div>WITHDRAWAL NOTICE</div><div>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</div><div><div>AuthorityNND 917017 Date4-4-91</div><div>RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164</div></div></div>	<div>ACCESS RESTRICTED</div> <div>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</div> <div><div>File DesignationCzechoslovakia Rpt Date5-15-45 From— To—</div><div>WITHDRAWAL NOTICE</div><div>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</div><div><div>AuthorityNND 917017 Date4-4-91</div><div>RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164</div></div></div>	<div>ACCESS RESTRICTED</div> <div>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</div> <div><div>File DesignationCzechoslovakia Memo Date2-4-46 FromShuler ToGroves</div><div>WITHDRAWAL NOTICE</div><div>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</div><div><div>AuthorityNND 917017 Date4-4-91</div><div>RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164</div></div></div>
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<div>DECLASSIFIED Authority <i>NND 917017</i></div> <div><i>RG 77</i> <i>Entry 22</i> <i>Box 164</i></div> <div><i>25</i> <i>118/17</i></div> <div><i>RG 77</i> <i>Entry 22</i> <i>Box 164</i></div> <div><i>25</i> <i>115/25</i></div> <div><i>RG 77</i> <i>Entry 22</i> <i>Box 164</i></div> <div><i>27</i> <i>113/17</i></div> <div><i>RG 77</i> <i>Entry 22</i> <i>Box 164</i></div> <div><i>28</i> <i>113/25</i></div> <div><i>RG 77</i> <i>Entry 22</i> <i>Box 164</i></div> <div><i>28</i> <i>113/25</i></div>		<div>DECLASSIFIED Authority <i>NND 917017</i></div> <div><i>RG 77</i> <i>Entry 22</i> <i>Box 164</i></div> <div><i>25</i> <i>118/17</i></div> <div><i>RG 77</i> <i>Entry 22</i> <i>Box 164</i></div> <div><i>25</i> <i>115/25</i></div> <div><i>RG 77</i> <i>Entry 22</i> <i>Box 164</i></div> <div><i>27</i> <i>113/17</i></div> <div><i>RG 77</i> <i>Entry 22</i> <i>Box 164</i></div> <div><i>28</i> <i>113/25</i></div> <div><i>RG 77</i> <i>Entry 22</i> <i>Box 164</i></div> <div><i>28</i> <i>113/25</i></div>	
<div>ACCESS RESTRICTED</div> <div>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</div> <div><div>File Designation <i>Australia</i></div><div><i>Memo w/ Ltr</i></div><div>Date <i>5-15-46</i></div><div>From <i>Johansen</i></div><div>To <i>Shuler</i></div></div> <div><div>IN THE REVIEW OF THIS FILE THIS ITEM WAS REMOVED BECAUSE ACCESS TO IT IS RESTRICTED. RESTRICTIONS ON RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ARE STATED IN GENERAL AND SPECIFIC RECORD GROUP RESTRICTION STATEMENTS WHICH ARE AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION. THE ITEM IDENTIFIED ABOVE HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN BECAUSE IT CONTAINS:</div><div><div><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</div><div><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</div></div><div><i>NND 917017</i> Authority</div><div><i>4-4-91cc</i> Date</div></div>		<div>ACCESS RESTRICTED</div> <div>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</div> <div><div>File Designation <i>Australia</i></div><div><i>Ltr w/ Encl</i></div><div>Date <i>12-5-46</i></div><div>From <i>Pederson</i></div><div>To <i>Pewler</i></div></div> <div><div>IN THE REVIEW OF THIS FILE THIS ITEM WAS REMOVED BECAUSE ACCESS TO IT IS RESTRICTED. RESTRICTIONS ON RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ARE STATED IN GENERAL AND SPECIFIC RECORD GROUP RESTRICTION STATEMENTS WHICH ARE AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION. THE ITEM IDENTIFIED ABOVE HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN BECAUSE IT CONTAINS:</div><div><div><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</div><div><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</div></div><div><i>NND 917017</i> Authority</div><div><i>4-4-91cc</i> Date</div></div>	
<div>ACCESS RESTRICTED</div> <div>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</div> <div><div>File Designation <i>Czechoslovakia</i></div><div><i>Memo</i></div><div>Date <i>2-11-46</i></div><div>From <i>Dean</i></div><div>To <i>Shuler</i></div></div> <div><div>IN THE REVIEW OF THIS FILE THIS ITEM WAS REMOVED BECAUSE ACCESS TO IT IS RESTRICTED. RESTRICTIONS ON RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ARE STATED IN GENERAL AND SPECIFIC RECORD GROUP RESTRICTION STATEMENTS WHICH ARE AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION. THE ITEM IDENTIFIED ABOVE HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN BECAUSE IT CONTAINS:</div><div><div><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</div><div><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</div></div><div><i>NND 917017</i> Authority</div><div><i>4-4-91cc</i> Date</div></div>		<div>ACCESS RESTRICTED</div> <div>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</div> <div><div>File Designation <i>Czechoslovakia</i></div><div><i>Ltr w/ Encl</i></div><div>Date <i>2-12-46</i></div><div>From <i>Dean</i></div><div>To <i>Shuler</i></div></div> <div><div>IN THE REVIEW OF THIS FILE THIS ITEM WAS REMOVED BECAUSE ACCESS TO IT IS RESTRICTED. RESTRICTIONS ON RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ARE STATED IN GENERAL AND SPECIFIC RECORD GROUP RESTRICTION STATEMENTS WHICH ARE AVAILABLE FOR EXAMINATION. THE ITEM IDENTIFIED ABOVE HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN BECAUSE IT CONTAINS:</div><div><div><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</div><div><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</div></div><div><i>NND 917017</i> Authority</div><div><i>4-4-91cc</i> Date</div></div>	

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 164

14. Why Are So Many Archival Files on the German Nuclear Program Still Classified, or Missing Entirely?

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164
<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Czechoslovakia</u></p> <p>Date <u>2-28-46</u></p> <p>From <u>Cuthbert</u></p> <p>To <u>Shuler</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority <u>4-4-91 cc</u> Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Czechoslovakia</u></p> <p>Date <u>Feb 1946</u></p> <p>From</p> <p>To</p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority <u>4-4-91 cc</u> Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Czechoslovakia</u></p> <p>Date <u>10-8-46</u></p> <p>From <u>Languth</u></p> <p>To <u>Free</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority <u>4-</u> Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Czechoslovakia</u></p> <p>Date <u>11-4-46</u></p> <p>From <u>Dodkins</u></p> <p>To <u>Cuthbert</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority <u>4-4-91 cc</u> Date</p>

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164
<p>DECLASSIFIED Authority <u>NND 917017</u></p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Czechoslovakia</u></p> <p>Date <u>Sept 1946</u></p> <p>From <u>Languth</u></p> <p>To <u>Free</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority <u>4-4-91 cc</u> Date</p>	<p>DECLASSIFIED Authority <u>NND 917017</u></p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Czechoslovakia</u></p> <p>Date <u>Sept 46</u></p> <p>From</p> <p>To</p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority <u>4-4-91 cc</u> Date</p>	<p>DECLASSIFIED Authority <u>NND 917017</u></p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Czechoslovakia</u></p> <p>Date <u>11-12-46</u></p> <p>From <u>Campbell</u></p> <p>To <u>Seaman</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority <u>4-4-91 cc</u> Date</p>	<p>DECLASSIFIED Authority <u>NND 917017</u></p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Czechoslovakia</u></p> <p>Date <u>11-13-46</u></p> <p>From <u>Seaman</u></p> <p>To <u>Cuthbert</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority <u>4-4-91 cc</u> Date</p>

14. Why Are So Many Archival Files on the German Nuclear Program Still Classified, or Missing Entirely?

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164	② 1/3/77 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164	① 1/2/77 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 165	⑨ 1/3/75 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 165	③ 1/3/75
<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>France</u></p> <p>Date <u>3-3-46</u></p> <p>From <u>Dean</u></p> <p>To <u>Swicker</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-4-91</u> Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>France</u></p> <p>Date <u>4-15-46</u></p> <p>From <u>Source</u></p> <p>To <u>Groues</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-4-91</u> Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Alamo w/att.</u></p> <p>Date <u>1-8-45</u></p> <p>From <u>Calvert</u></p> <p>To <u>Furman</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-2-91</u> Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Alsos Material</u></p> <p>Date <u>MSR 7/19/1</u></p> <p>From <u>11-5-46</u></p> <p>To <u>USMA, London</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-2-91</u> Date</p>	

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Boxes 164 & 165

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 165

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 165	⑪ 1/3/75 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 165	⑬ 1/2/75 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 165	⑩ 1/1/75 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 165	④ 1/9/75
<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Partial Folder</u></p> <p>Date <u>1944</u></p> <p>From <u>-</u></p> <p>To <u>-</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-2-91</u> Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Alamo w/att.</u></p> <p>Date <u>4-24-44</u></p> <p>From <u>Tarver</u></p> <p>To <u>-</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-2-91</u> Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Rpt. A-44346</u></p> <p>Date <u>11-7-46</u></p> <p>From <u>Subj: Enemy Secret Weapons</u></p> <p>To <u>-</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-2-91</u> Date</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Alsos Material</u></p> <p>Date <u>Rpt. R-5542-46</u></p> <p>From <u>12-19-46</u></p> <p>To <u>MA, London</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-2-91</u> Date</p>	

14. Why Are So Many Archival Files on the German Nuclear Program Still Classified, or Missing Entirely?

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 167	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 168	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 168	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 168
<p>③ 1/3/T</p>	<p>② 1/3/T</p>	<p>② 1/3/T</p>	<p>② 1/10/T</p>
ACCESS RESTRICTED	ACCESS RESTRICTED	ACCESS RESTRICTED	ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:	The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:	The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:	The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
File Designation <u>202.3-2 London Office: Combined Open Sec Group</u>	File Designation <u>202.3-2 London Office: Combined Open Sec Group</u>	File Designation <u>202.3-1 London Office: Combined Intel Rpts</u>	File Designation <u>202.3-1 London Office: Combined Intel Rpts</u>
Date <u>1-3-46</u>	Date <u>1-4-46</u>	Date <u>11-6-45</u>	Date <u>11-8-45</u>
From <u>Mikes</u>	From <u>-</u>	From <u>Calvert</u>	From <u>Calvert</u>
To <u>Groves</u>	To <u>-</u>	To <u>Britt</u>	To <u>Britt</u>
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:	In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:	In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:	In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information
<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information
<u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-3-91 cc</u> Date	<u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-3-91 cc</u> Date	<u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-4-91</u> Date	<u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-4-91</u> Date

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 167	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 168	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 168	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 168
① 1/1/T	① 1/1/T	② 1/3/T	② 1/2/T
ACCESS RESTRICTED	ACCESS RESTRICTED	ACCESS RESTRICTED	ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:	The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:	The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:	The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
File Designation <u>202.3-2 London Office: Combined Open Sec Group</u>	File Designation <u>202.3-2 London Office: Combined Open Sec Group</u>	File Designation <u>202.3-1 London Office: Combined Intel Rpts</u>	File Designation <u>202.3-1 London Office: Combined Intel Rpts</u>
Date <u>2-2-46</u>	Date <u>10-22-47</u>	Date <u>2-14-46</u>	Date <u>2-14-46</u>
From <u>Mikes</u>	From <u>Langguth</u>	From <u>Welsh</u>	From <u>Welsh</u>
To <u>Groves</u>	To <u>GattiKer</u>	To <u>GattiKer</u>	To <u>GattiKer</u>
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:	In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:	In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:	In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information
<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information
<u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-3-91 cc</u> Date	<u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-3-91 cc</u> Date	<u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-4-91</u> Date	<u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-4-91</u> Date

14. Why Are So Many Archival Files on the German Nuclear Program Still Classified, or Missing Entirely?

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 168	22 1/4/77 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 168	21 1/4/77 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 171	20 1/4/77 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 171	38 1/5/77 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 171
ACCESS RESTRICTED	ACCESS RESTRICTED	ACCESS RESTRICTED	ACCESS RESTRICTED	ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>202.3-1 London Office: Combined Intel Rpts.</u> Date <u>Memo</u> From <u>3-13-46</u> To <u>Guthrie</u> In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information NND 917017 Authority 4-4-91 Date	The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>202.3-1 London Office: Combined Intel Rpts.</u> Date <u>Memo</u> From <u>3-22-46</u> To <u>London Office of Joint TA Intel Sec.</u> In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information NND 917017 Authority 4-4-91 Date	The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>32.7003-1 Germ-US Liaison July 42-June 44</u> Date <u>Partial Folder</u> From <u>June 1944</u> To <u>—</u> In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information NND 917017 Authority 4-8-91 Date	The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>32.602-2 Germany: Summary 1945-46</u> Date <u>Summary</u> From <u>7-31-44</u> To <u>—</u> In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information NND 917017 Authority 4-8-91 Date	WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Boxes 168 & 169

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 168	22 1/3/77 RG 77 Entry 22 Box 169
ACCESS RESTRICTED	ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>Report</u> Date <u>10/20/45</u> From <u>—</u> To <u>—</u> In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information NND 917017 Authority 4/5/91 Date	The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>Partial Folder</u> Date <u>1945</u> From <u>—</u> To <u>—</u> In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information NND 917017 Authority 4/5/91 Date

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 171
ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>32.7003-2 Germ-US Liaison July-Oct 44</u> Date <u>10-11-44</u> From <u>D.R.</u> To <u>Evman</u> In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information NND 917017 Authority 4-8-91 Date

14. Why Are So Many Archival Files on the German Nuclear Program Still Classified, or Missing Entirely?

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 171	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 171	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 174	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 174
<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32-7003-3-Germ-US wartime Nov 41-June 45</u></p> <p>Date <u>11-20-44</u></p> <p>From <u>OSS Bern</u></p> <p>To <u>—</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority Date 4-8-91 cc</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32-60-2-Germ-Nazi Summary 1945-46</u></p> <p>Date <u>1944</u></p> <p>From <u>—</u></p> <p>To <u>—</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority Date 4-8-91 cc</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>10-70 Austria Misc</u></p> <p>Date <u>29 October 1945</u></p> <p>From <u>Brit</u></p> <p>To <u>Graves</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority Date 4/6/91 cc 52A</p>	<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>10-70 Austria Personnel</u></p> <p>Date <u>13 June 1946</u></p> <p>From <u>Shuman</u></p> <p>To <u>Free</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority Date 4/6/91 cc 45</p>

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 171	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 174	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 175
<p>DECLASSIFIED Authority <u>NND 917017</u></p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32-7003-3-Germ-US wartime Nov 41-June 45</u></p> <p>Date <u>April 1945</u></p> <p>From <u>—</u></p> <p>To <u>—</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority Date 4-8-91 cc</p>	<p>DECLASSIFIED Authority <u>NND 917017</u></p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>10-70 Austria Personnel</u></p> <p>Date <u>27 June 1946</u></p> <p>From <u>—</u></p> <p>To <u>—</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority Date 4/6/91 cc 44</p>	<p>DECLASSIFIED Authority <u>NND 917017</u></p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Letter</u></p> <p>Date <u>08/08/46</u></p> <p>From <u>Howe</u></p> <p>To <u>Schwartz</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority Date 4/6/91 cc 44</p>

14. Why Are So Many Archival Files on the German Nuclear Program Still Classified, or Missing Entirely?

RG: 200	TAB #: 108	RG: 200	TAB #: 5	RG: 200	TAB #: 4	RG: 200	TAB #: 104
ENTRY: Goudens Papers	COPIES/ PPS./CLASS. 1/2/1 C	ENTRY: Goudens Papers	COPIES/ PPS./CLASS. 1/1/4/1 S	ENTRY: Goudens Papers	COPIES/ PPS./CLASS. 1/1/24/1 S	ENTRY: Goudens Papers	COPIES/ PPS./CLASS. 1/1/13/1 S
BOX: 3		BOX: 1		BOX: 1		BOX: 3	
ACCESS RESTRICTED		ACCESS RESTRICTED		ACCESS RESTRICTED		ACCESS RESTRICTED	
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:		The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:		The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:		The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:	
File Designation: <u>ALSO (Historical Inventory Control)</u>		File Designation: <u>FROM: PASH MISSION RELATED</u>		File Designation: <u>FROM: PASH MISSION RELATED</u>		File Designation: <u>(UNTITLED)</u>	
Date: <u>24 June 1944</u>		Date: <u>17 June 1944</u>		Date: <u>17 Oct 1944</u>		Date: <u>00/00/44</u>	
From: <u>Sagan G.</u>		From: <u>SECRET</u>		From: <u>ARRAS</u>		From: <u></u>	
To: <u>Waterman</u>		To: <u>OIC</u>		To: <u>HAM</u>		To: <u></u>	
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:		In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:		In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:		In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information	
<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	
NND 933079		NND 933079		NND 933079		NND 933079	
Authority		Authority		Authority		Authority	
Date: <u>06 October 1993</u>		Date: <u>6 OCT 1993</u>		Date: <u>6 OCT 1993</u>		Date: <u>06 October 1993</u>	
Withdrawn by: <u>JS</u>		Withdrawn by: <u>JS</u>		Withdrawn by: <u>JS</u>		Withdrawn by: <u>JS</u>	

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NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420, Boxes 1-9

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Authority: NND 933079

RG: 200	TAB #: 6	RG: 200	TAB #: 6	RG: 200	TAB #: 112	RG: 200	TAB #: 7
ENTRY: Goudens Papers	COPIES/ PPS./CLASS. 1/1/10/1 S	ENTRY: Goudens Papers	COPIES/ PPS./CLASS. 1/1/1/1 S	ENTRY: Goudens Papers	COPIES/ PPS./CLASS. 1/1/27/1 C	ENTRY: Goudens Papers	COPIES/ PPS./CLASS. 1/1/4/1 S
BOX: 1		BOX: 6		BOX: 3		BOX: 6	
ACCESS RESTRICTED		ACCESS RESTRICTED		ACCESS RESTRICTED		ACCESS RESTRICTED	
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:		The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:		The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:		The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:	
File Designation: <u>FROM: PASH MISSION RELATED</u>		File Designation: <u>PASH Mission Related</u>		File Designation: <u>Non-Excluded Intelligence (had 4 folders)</u>		File Designation: <u>PASH Mission Related</u>	
Date: <u>22 June 1944</u>		Date: <u>06/06/44</u>		Date: <u>00/00/1945</u>		Date: <u>4/3/45</u>	
From: <u>H.M.</u>		From: <u>Fisher</u>		From: <u></u>		From: <u>Kemble</u>	
To: <u>CHIEF, M.C.</u>		To: <u>Calley</u>		To: <u></u>		To: <u>Winton</u>	
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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information	
<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	
NND 933079		NND 933079		NND 933079		NND 933079	
Authority		Authority		Authority		Authority	
Date: <u>6 OCT 1993</u>		Date: <u>0/4/93</u>		Date: <u>06 October 1993</u>		Date: <u>10/4/93</u>	
Withdrawn by: <u>JS</u>		Withdrawn by: <u>JS</u>		Withdrawn by: <u>JS</u>		Withdrawn by: <u>JS</u>	

14. Why Are So Many Archival Files on the German Nuclear Program Still Classified, or Missing Entirely?

RG: 200	TAB #: (109)	RG: 200	TAB #: (106)	RG: 200	TAB #: (99)	RG: 200	TAB #: (100)
ENTRY: <i>Goebbels Papers</i>	1 / 3 / 5 COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.	ENTRY: <i>Goebbels Papers</i>	1 / 2 / 5 COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.	ENTRY: <i>Goebbels Papers</i>	1 / 3 / 5 COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.	ENTRY: <i>Goebbels Papers</i>	1 / 3 / 5 COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.
BOX: 3		BOX: 3		BOX: 3		BOX: 3	
ACCESS RESTRICTED		ACCESS RESTRICTED		ACCESS RESTRICTED		ACCESS RESTRICTED	
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:		The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:		The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:		The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:	
File Designation <i>ALSO5 (Historian's Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 6)</i>		File Designation <i>ALSO5 (Historian's Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 6)</i>		File Designation <i>ALSO5 (Historian's Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 4)</i>		File Designation <i>ALSO5 (Historian's Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 4)</i>	
Date <i>27 April 1945</i>		Date <i>18 July 1945</i>		Date <i>03 September 1945</i>		Date <i>03 September 1945</i>	
From <i>Goebbels</i>		From <i>Goebbels</i>		From <i>Goebbels</i>		From <i>Goebbels</i>	
To <i>BURMAN</i>		To <i>Eckman</i>		To <i>Eckman</i>		To <i>Eckman</i>	
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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information	
<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	
NND 933079 Authority		NND 933079 Authority		NND 933079 Authority		NND 933079 Authority	
Date <i>06 October 1993</i>		Date <i>06 October 1993</i>		Date <i>06 October 1993</i>		Date <i>06 October 1993</i>	
Withdrawn by <i>fgt</i>		Withdrawn by <i>fgt</i>		Withdrawn by <i>fgt</i>		Withdrawn by <i>fgt</i>	

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Authority *NND 933079*

RG: 200	TAB #: (107)	RG: 200	TAB #: (105)	RG: 200	TAB #: (110)	RG: 200	TAB #: (111)
ENTRY: <i>Goebbels Papers</i>	1 / 3 / 5 COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.	ENTRY: <i>Goebbels Papers</i>	1 / 3 / 5 COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.	ENTRY: <i>Goebbels Papers</i>	1 / 3 / 5 COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.	ENTRY: <i>Goebbels Papers</i>	1 / 3 / 5 COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.
BOX: 3		BOX: 3		BOX: 3		BOX: 3	
ACCESS RESTRICTED		ACCESS RESTRICTED		ACCESS RESTRICTED		ACCESS RESTRICTED	
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:		The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:		The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:		The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:	
File Designation <i>ALSO5 (Historian's Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 6)</i>		File Designation <i>ALSO5 (Historian's Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 6)</i>		File Designation <i>ALSO5 (Historian's Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 6)</i>		File Designation <i>ALSO5 (Historian's Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 6)</i>	
Date <i>09 August 1945</i>		Date <i>10 August 1945</i>		Date <i>03 September 1945</i>		Date <i>10 September 1945</i>	
From <i>Goebbels</i>		From <i>Goebbels</i>		From <i>Goebbels</i>		From <i>Goebbels</i>	
To <i>HAAS</i>		To <i>HAAS</i>		To <i>Eckman</i>		To <i>Eckman</i>	
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:		In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:		In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:		In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information	
<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	
NND 933079 Authority		NND 933079 Authority		NND 933079 Authority		NND 933079 Authority	
Date <i>06 October 1993</i>		Date <i>06 October 1993</i>		Date <i>06 October 1993</i>		Date <i>06 October 1993</i>	
Withdrawn by <i>fgt</i>		Withdrawn by <i>fgt</i>		Withdrawn by <i>fgt</i>		Withdrawn by <i>fgt</i>	

14. Why Are So Many Archival Files on the German Nuclear Program Still Classified, or Missing Entirely?

RG: 200 ENTRY: <u>Goudsmit Papers</u> BOX: 3	TAB #: <u>(93)</u> 1/1/1/C COPIES/PPS./CLASS.	RG: 200 ENTRY: <u>Goudsmit Papers</u> BOX: 3	TAB #: <u>(94)</u> 1/1/1/C COPIES/PPS./CLASS.	RG: 200 ENTRY: <u>Goudsmit Papers</u> BOX: 3	TAB #: <u>(92)</u> 1/1/7/1/C COPIES/PPS./CLASS.	RG: 200 ENTRY: <u>Goudsmit</u> BOX: 6	TAB #: 5 1/1/1/1/C COPIES/PPS./CLASS.
ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>HISTORIAN'S OFFICE Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 4 LTR</u> Date <u>08 January 1947</u> From <u>Henderson</u> To <u>Goudsmit</u> In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>HISTORIAN'S OFFICE Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 4 LTR</u> Date <u>19 May 1947</u> From <u>Goudsmit</u> To <u>Henderson</u> In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>HISTORIAN'S OFFICE Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 4 LTR</u> Date <u>23 April 1946</u> From <u>Goudsmit</u> To <u>SNIDGE</u> In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>Joint Research & Development Board LTR</u> Date <u>4/2/47</u> From <u>Goudsmit</u> To <u>Bush</u> In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	
NND 933079 Authority Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fst</u>		NND 933079 Authority Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fst</u>		NND 933079 Authority Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fst</u>		NND 933079 Authority Date <u>10/6/93</u> Withdrawn by <u>4</u>	
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)		NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)		NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)		NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)	

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RG: 200 ENTRY: <u>Goudsmit Papers</u> BOX: 3	TAB #: <u>(95)</u> 1/1/1/C COPIES/PPS./CLASS.	RG: 200 ENTRY: <u>Goudsmit Papers</u> BOX: 3	TAB #: <u>(96)</u> 1/1/1/C COPIES/PPS./CLASS.	RG: 200 ENTRY: <u>Goudsmit Papers</u> BOX: 3	TAB #: <u>(97)</u> 1/1/2/1/C COPIES/PPS./CLASS.	RG: 200 ENTRY: <u>Goudsmit Papers</u> BOX: 3	TAB #: <u>(103)</u> 1/1/2/1/C COPIES/PPS./CLASS.
ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>HISTORIAN'S OFFICE Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 4 LTR</u> Date <u>02 May 1947</u> From <u>Henderson</u> To <u>Goudsmit</u> In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>HISTORIAN'S OFFICE Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 4 LTR</u> Date <u>10 June 1947</u> From <u>Henderson</u> To <u>Goudsmit</u> In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>HISTORIAN'S OFFICE Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 4 LTR</u> Date <u>10 November 1948</u> From <u>Goudsmit</u> To <u>Henderson</u> In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>HISTORIAN'S OFFICE Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 4 LTR</u> Date <u>07 April 1947</u> From <u>Goudsmit</u> To <u>Lima-Larson</u> In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	
NND 933079 Authority Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fst</u>		NND 933079 Authority Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fst</u>		NND 933079 Authority Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fst</u>		NND 933079 Authority Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fst</u>	
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)		NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)		NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)		NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)	

**15. Some Well-Informed People
Who Concluded That the German
Nuclear Weapons Program Was
Not Small and Primitive**

United States

President Franklin D. Roosevelt
Vice President Henry A. Wallace
Senator Harry F. Byrd
Senator Elbert D. Thomas
Justice Robert H. Jackson
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover
Secretary Henry H. Fowler
Ambassador John Gunther Dean
General Henry H. Arnold
General Thomas J. Betts
General Omar N. Bradley
General George Bryan Conrad
General Dwight D. Eisenhower
General Leslie R. Groves
General John L. Magruder
General George C. Marshall
General George S. Patton
General Donald L. Putt
General George C. McDonald
General William L. Richardson
General Carl A. Spaatz
Commander Herbert Agar
Colonel Howard W. Dix
Colonel George R. Eckman
Colonel John A. Keck
Colonel John A. O'Mara
Colonel Loyd K. Pepple
General Leslie E. Simon
Colonel Lowell P. Weicker
Colonel George Bryant Woods
Major Horace K. Calvert
Major Alexander de Seversky
Major Robert R. Furman
Captain George C. Davis
Jack H. Alberti
Moe Berg

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United States (cont'd)

William Casey
Allen Dulles
Frederick R. Loofbourow
Whitney Shepardson
Dr. Samuel K. Allison
Dr. Edward L. Bowles (MIT)
Dr. Karl P. Cohen
Dr. Enrico Fermi
Dr. Richard P. Fischer
Dr. Samuel A. Goudsmit
Caperton B. Horsley
Dr. Gerard P. Kuiper
Dr. Philip Morrison
Dr. Lothar W. Nordheim
Dr. Todos M. Odarenko
Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer
Dr. Charles P. Smyth
Dr. Leo Szilard
Dr. Edward Teller
Dr. Alvin M. Weinberg
Dr. Eugene P. Wigner
Fritz Lang
Associated Press reporters
Life reporters
Los Angeles Times reporters
Newsweek reporters
New York Times reporters
Time reporters
Washington Post reporters

United States

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Dr. Enrico Fermi
Dr. Richard P. Fischer
Dr. Samuel A. Goudsmit
Caperton B. Horsley
Dr. Gerard P. Kuiper
Dr. Philip Morrison
Dr. Lothar W. Nordheim
Dr. Todos M. Odarenko
Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer
Dr. Charles P. Smyth
Dr. Leo Szilard
Dr. Edward Teller
Dr. Alvin M. Weinberg
Dr. Eugene P. Wigner
Fritz Lang
Associated Press reporters
Life reporters
Los Angeles Times reporters
Newsweek reporters
New York Times reporters
Time reporters
Washington Post reporters

Axis

Adolf Hitler
Hermann Göring
Heinrich Himmler
Wilhelm Ohnesorge
Benito Mussolini
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem
Erwin Bartmann
Helmut J. Fischer
Werner Grothmann
Julius Schaub
Werner Wächter
Manfred von Ardenne
Dr. Wernher von Braun
Dr. Kurt Diebner
Dr. Robert Döpel
Dr. Rudolf Edse
Dr. Siegfried Flügge
Dr. Wilhelm Groth
Dr. Otto Hahn
Dr. Fritz Houtermans
Dr. Johannes Hans Jensen
Dr. Fritz Rehbein
Dr. Erich Schumann
Dr. Hermann Staudinger
Dr. Georg Stetter
Heinz Stölzel
Dr. Walter Trinks
Dr. Wilhelm Voss
General Walter Dornberger
General Gerhard Franz
General Hans Kammler
General Heinrich Kittel
Erwin Respondek
Hans Ulrich Rudel
Adolf Schneider
Alwin Urff

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If you found thousands of pages of evidence from knowledgeable sources that some modern country suddenly started doing all of those things, would you conclude that that country clearly had no significant nuclear weapons program, or would you decide that all of that evidence raises real concerns and warrants a more detailed investigation?

15. Further Work

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- Search for relevant documents in archives and personal collections around the world, and lobby to have all files declassified and released.**

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



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To do that, we must first:

- Search for relevant documents in archives and personal collections around the world, and lobby to have all files declassified and released.**
- Conduct industrial archaeology digs (carefully!) and laboratory analyses at all sites suspected to have been involved in the wartime German nuclear program.**

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Slide presentations:

Forgotten Creators of the German Atomic Bomb

Forgotten Creators of the German H-Bomb

Forgotten Creators of the German Nuclear Triad
[delivery methods]

Forgotten Creators of German Microelectronics

Forgotten Creators of German Biotechnology

Lessons from the Forgotten Creators

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Some Reviewers' Comments on *Forgotten Creators*

"Todd H. Rider's *Forgotten Creators* is an encyclopedic consideration of Germany's central place in the advancement of science and technology between 1800 and 1945. Drawing upon a wide range of sources, Rider has summarized that effort in a survey that will impress the reader just as much for the breadth of German intellectual achievement as for the influence that achievement has had upon the modern world."

George W. Cully, retired Director, Office of History at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

"Todd H. Rider's *Forgotten Creators* is a monumental treatise about and an exciting intellectual journey through the contributions of scientists and technologists in Germany and other Central European countries and German-speaking areas to universal progress. It is thoroughly researched, meticulously documented, and presented in an easy-to-perceive way. The pre-war and pre-Nazi German system of science support has lessons that would be difficult to emulate but worthy to ponder about even today. The long-range tragic consequences in science caused by National Socialism are well demonstrated as are the benefits in the West and in the East from the exodus of Jewish scientists before and the importation of others from Germany following World War II. The book is a virtually bottomless well for mining reliable information in the history of science and technology. The 'forgotten creators' are no longer forgotten. Todd is to be congratulated for his accomplishment and thanked for sharing it so generously with the international community."

István Hargittai, Professor Emeritus of Chemistry, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, author of *Buried Glory*, *Candid Science*, *Drive and Curiosity*, *Great Minds*, *Judging Edward Teller*, *Martians of Science*, and *The Road to Stockholm*

"The book *Forgotten Creators* is a really impressive book, as Todd H. Rider tries to mention all relevant German-speaking scientists and engineers and their scientific fields up to 1945 in this mammoth project. In this form, nobody has dared to do this before. The author deserves my full respect for this. I am pleased that we were able to support him in his research."

Thomas Köhler, Peenemünde Historical-Technical Museum historian and head of the archive

"*Forgotten Creators* is an examination of mid-twentieth-century German science and technology, studying the question of how this era came to be so productive. Using extensive reproduction of original materials and source accounts, the author is not only able to provide an overview of what is known about wartime activities, but is also able to indicate avenues for future historical research. The careful and comprehensive referencing permits the materials presented to be used in academic studies. A notable feature of this work is the fluid format provided by online publication, allowing revisions and new materials to be added. An especially important emphasis of the book is what can be learned from both the German-speaking scientists and the World War II era in general that could improve scientific productivity and creativity now."

Thomas Kunkle, Los Alamos National Laboratory, retired

"With his work, based on very comprehensive, thoroughly researched sources, Todd Rider has presented an astonishing study of the history of German science, especially in the first half of the twentieth century, which also reveals many connections that have been unjustly forgotten or little noticed. This also applies to numerous persons whose achievements are hardly known."

Günter Nagel, author of *Wissenschaft für den Krieg*, *Himmlers Waffenforscher*, *Atomversuche in Deutschland*, and *Das geheime deutsche Uranprojekt 1939-1945*

"A very valuable part of the book is devoted to the development of nuclear weapons in Germany during WWII, 1939-1945. While the histories of both the US/British Manhattan Project and the Soviet atomic project have been to a large extent declassified, little is actually known about the German work. Rider has done historians a favor by marshalling all of the evidence he could find in US, German, and Russian archives regarding the German atomic project. The inescapable conclusion is that the Germans were much farther advanced in nuclear weapons development than is generally thought."

Lee Pondrom, Professor Emeritus of Physics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, author of *The Soviet Atomic Project: How the Soviet Union Obtained the Atomic Bomb*

"*Forgotten Creators* by Todd Rider is an extraordinary work of detailed research and new insights into the technological advances contributed by German-speaking scientists. His lengthy and in-depth study of history often overlooked or not even seen in more cursory reviews is a refreshing read. His attempt to create the fullest account possible has resulted in a fine reference book that also serves to introduce new research for the reader. Rider's contention, right up front in the Executive Summary—that inventions and discoveries had their highest concentration of revolutionary innovations from scientists and engineers from the German-speaking central European research world in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—demands the reader's attention. He then fills an enormous amount of over 4,000 pages with supporting details. Amazing subject matter and new revolutionary insights dug up through meticulous research make *Forgotten Creators* a 'must read' for serious historians and curious researchers alike."

D. Ray Smith, Oak Ridge National Lab Historian, retired

"This truly voluminous study provides an in-depth overview of techno-scientific achievements and innovations which originated from the German-speaking world. It is a rich and fascinating history of the transnational circulation of knowledge over a period of no less than two centuries."

Helmuth Trischler, Head of Research, Deutsches Museum, Munich

"A most important and deserving book. Todd Rider's research on the German rocket and nuclear programs in World War II is especially impressive because of the number and depth of the sources cited and the meticulousness of their evaluation. Really pioneering work has been done here!"

Matthias Uhl, Deutsches Historisches Institut, Moscow, author of *Stalins V-2: Der Technologietransfer der deutschen Fernlenkwaffentechnik* and *Die Organisation des Terrors: Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1943-1945*

"Todd Rider has produced a meticulously researched and cogently argued *tour de force* on the men and the circumstances that drove the modern German Renaissance in science and technology. Brought out of the long shadow of the Third Reich, the story of this Golden Age of human enquiry is convincingly shown to have as much relevance to our present times as it did then. A remarkable achievement."

Stephen Walton, Senior Curator, U.K. Imperial War Museum

Dr. Todd H. Rider

thor@riderinstitute.org

Fundamental Limitations on Plasma Fusion Systems Not in Thermodynamic Equilibrium

by
Todd Harrison Rider

S.M., Nuclear Engineering, MIT, 1994
S.M., Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, MIT, 1991
S.B., Electrical Engineering, MIT, 1991

Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

June 1995

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May 19, 1995

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Lawrence M. Lidsky
Professor of Nuclear Engineering
Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by _____
Frederic R. Morgenthaler
Chairman, Department Committee on Graduate Students

Fundamental limitations on plasma fusion systems not in thermodynamic equilibrium

Todd H. Rider
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science,
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

Received 5 June 1996; accepted 6 January 1997

Abstract: Fusion-Frank calculations are used to accurately determine the minimum power that must be supplied to maintain a plasma out of thermodynamic equilibrium device. For virtually all possible types of fusion reactions in which the major particle species are significantly non-Maxwellian or are at radically different temperatures, this minimum recirculating power is substantially larger than the fusion power. Barring the discovery of methods for recycling the power at exceedingly high efficiencies, grossly non-equilibrium plasmas will not be able to produce net power. © 1997 American Institute of Physics. [S1070-6648/97/01013-5]

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most important challenges in modern physics is to identify the best approach to clean and efficient fusion power generation. Advanced concepts such as "Weber," "B," and "T" would produce considerably less non-Maxwellian and/or at radically different temperatures, this minimum recirculating power is substantially larger than the fusion power. Barring the discovery of methods for recycling the power at exceedingly high efficiencies, grossly non-equilibrium plasmas will not be able to produce net power. © 1997 American Institute of Physics. [S1070-6648/97/01013-5]

systems, fusion products, or other sources. This system operates at a lower limit on the electron temperature and ionization fraction, in agreement with the usual goal of finding an optimum based on the performance of the fusion system.

However, it is experimentally assumed that the entire fusion reaction output power can be utilized. Current ion efficiency limitations are ignored, and power losses are directly compared with the gross fusion power P_{gross} .

In energy confinement strategies, fusion, fusion and beam-heating radiation with each other, the density, spatial density profile, and plasma volume do not matter, since all of these phenomena are involved effects and thus are proportional to $\int n^2 dV$ (neglecting the weak density dependence of the Coulomb logarithm L), in which n is the particle density as a function of position.

The energy of the plasma which has values of $\int n^2 dV$ large enough to be of interest are approximately isentropic. Otherwise they would be subject to counterstreaming, Weibel, and other instabilities.

Although instabilities can prove to be a serious concern even in essentially nonrelativistic plasmas, they will be generally ignored here.

Since the energy ranges of interest, the functional dependence of the fusion reactivity (σ_{fusion}) on the mean energy $\langle E \rangle$ is approximately $\sigma_{\text{fusion}} \propto \langle E \rangle^{-1/2}$ (for the low velocity distributions) shape of the distribution is isotropic and the ion species have the same mean energy, as shown explicitly in Ref. 5. The functional dependence of the beam-heating reactivity on the mean energy $\langle E \rangle$ is approximately independent of the electron velocity distribution shape in the energy range of interest.

As demonstrated in Ref. 5, systems which violate the

Fundamental Constraints on Large-Scale Antimatter Rocket Propulsion

Todd H. Rider
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

Recent advances could potentially be used to accelerate interstellar space probes to velocities in excess of 10% of light speed, similar to those in the vicinity of stellar outflows. These quantities of antimatter could be produced in a feasible fashion. A number of different proposed methods for large-scale antimatter production are analyzed, and fundamental limits on the production of antimatter are derived. The implications for antimatter rocket propulsion are discussed.

Nomenclature	
Δ	= rate of loss of mass to proton mass
Δ	= lifetime of virtual particle-particle pair
Δ	= magnetic strength
Δ	= speed of light
Δ	= initial energy
Δ	= least energy
Δ	= annihilation energy efficiency
Δ	= electron
Δ	= fraction of synchrotron radiation that is field
Δ	= antimatter production rate
Δ	= Plank's constant $h/2\pi$
Δ	= least beam intensity
Δ	= antimatter production rate
Δ	= least spacecraft mass
Δ	= initial spacecraft mass
Δ	= total antimatter + matter propellant mass
Δ	= mass of electron
Δ	= mass of proton or antiproton
Δ	= electric density
Δ	= density of free ion
Δ	= density of neutral gas
Δ	= plasma pressure
Δ	= fraction of neutral gas neutralized
Δ	= power converted into antimatter
Δ	= acceleration radiation power
Δ	= proton
Δ	= radius of least target pellet
Δ	= electric field
Δ	= time interval between laser shots
Δ	= electron temperature
Δ	= ion temperature
Δ	= reaction volume producing antineutrinos
Δ	= volume entering synchrotron radiation
Δ	= beam velocity
Δ	= mass of ion used to proton charge
Δ	= mass of plasma pressure to magnetic field
Δ	= percent

PARTIALS of the new challenges in spacecraft propulsion is the question of how to develop much smaller systems with a level of mass that is the human biological system. By using matter-antimatter reactions to propel the vehicle to decrease the flexibility of antimatter, the mass of the vehicle is reduced. This paper will analyze and evaluate a number of different antimatter rocket propulsion systems. This paper will analyze and evaluate a number of different antimatter rocket propulsion systems. This paper will analyze and evaluate a number of different antimatter rocket propulsion systems.

For rocket propulsion applications, it is desirable not only to create positive thrust, but also to create a positive thrust. For rocket propulsion applications, it is desirable not only to create positive thrust, but also to create a positive thrust.

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A B Cell-Based Sensor for Rapid Identification of Pathogens

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James D. Margi,† Richard M. Haffner,†
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We report the use of a genetically engineered yeast for a pathogen identification system. This sensor can B lymphocytes that have been engineered to emit light within seconds of exposure to the specific antigen, and specificity. The pathogen identification technology could provide for medical diagnosis, biosecurity defense, and water quality monitoring, and other applications.

The diagnosis of infectious disease can be a difficult task for the clinician. The use of a genetically engineered yeast for a pathogen identification system. This sensor can B lymphocytes that have been engineered to emit light within seconds of exposure to the specific antigen, and specificity. The pathogen identification technology could provide for medical diagnosis, biosecurity defense, and water quality monitoring, and other applications.

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Broad-Spectrum Antiviral Therapeutics

Todd H. Rider,† Christine E. Zook, Tara L. Boettcher, Scott T. Wick, Jennifer S. Parnacek, Benjamin D. Zeman

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Abstract: We have developed a new broad-spectrum antiviral approach. Broad-Spectrum Antiviral Therapeutics (BSAT) is a new class of antiviral drugs that are active against a wide range of viruses, including HIV, hepatitis B, and hepatitis C. BSAT is a new class of antiviral drugs that are active against a wide range of viruses, including HIV, hepatitis B, and hepatitis C.

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