

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder  
 32.60-2 GERMANY: Summary Reports (1945-1946)

Stuttgart

Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Metallurgical Research,  
 Seestrasse 75 and Wilendstrasse 15

This laboratory does fundamental research on metal problems  
 including corrosion.

Werner Koster, director  
 George Grobe  
 Albert Kochensdörfer

Cologne (Köln)

University of Cologne.  
 Considerable nuclear work done here before war

Kirschner  
 K. H. Lauterjung  
 H. Neuert

Danzig-Langfuhr

Technische Hochschule

Wilhelm Klemm, leader  
 K. Grimm  
 E. Voss

Heidelberg

Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Medical Research; Institute for Physics

Walter Bothe, director, leading nuclear experimenter in Germany  
 Group controls cyclotron

W. Gentner, worked with Joliot in Paris on cyclotron  
 P. Jensen, Institute for Physics  
 H. Meier-Leibnitz  
 Wolfgang Reizler  
 E. Fünfer

Lenard-Institute of University of Heidelberg (not likely to be  
 involved)

August Becker  
 Ilse Marie Schaper

Hamburg

University of Hamburg  
 Heavy water production problems seem centered here, with  
 some neutron physics as well.

P. Harteck, well known physical chemist, visited Rjukan  
 W. Groth  
 H. Jensen } Associates of Harteck  
 K. Knauer, Nuclear physicist  
 H. Suess  
 W. Schaffer

Figure D.849: Targets in Germany. October 1944 [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.60-2 Germany: Summary Reports (1945-1946)].

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.60-2 GERMANY: Summary Reports (1945-1946)

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

**SECRET**

P. O. BOX 1663  
SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

This document consists of 1 pages.  
No. 2 of 3 copies, series A

2 December 1944

MEMORANDUM TO DR. KARL A. COHEN:

Subject: Extension of Information.

I have, by now, been able to complete the information given us by the source which became available in October 1943. There are two points of interest:

1. The source is unfortunately not able to state explicitly what kind of diffusion was implied by Jensen in the conversations of 1942. It is the impression of the source, however, that half a dozen methods were being investigated, including membrane diffusion and thermal diffusion in both phases. Many other schemes were also involved. The picture which was conveyed at that time was not one of engineering development along a production line, but rather of an extensive research program intended to turn up any possible simple methods, even though they might require a long time in the laboratory stage. Whether sincere or not, our source's informants gave him the impression of working on a post-war effort.

Since that time, of course, as we ourselves have been lead to believe, there has been, no doubt, an enemy re-evaluation of the entire picture. It is fair to conclude that every known method is accessible to the enemy, at least in the laboratory stage.

2. Our source assures me that a heavy water chain was initiated in late 1942. He states further that Harteck and his co-workers not only were concerned about increasing the Rjukan production, but that also they made vague references to the existence of a large distillation plant inside Germany. The reliability of these impressions is, of course, not large.

The recently published statements of Hevesy and the article of the last issue of TIME are strongly indicative of general interest and understanding of the difficult problems of assembly. I propose the following rather speculative argument to which I would like your comments: The enemy has at present no very large production of 25, and a quite small one of 49. He is, therefore, interested in utilizing a minimum amount of material, and of doing that quickly. To this end he has begun to investigate the less straight-forward methods of assembly, simply because they promise results with a minimum of material. On this basis we may expect action from him at any time, even though it will not be in decisive amount. The complex assembly methods which are not necessary for 25 may still be of interest to him, even though we believe 25 his main production, simply because of the great shortening of his time schedule which they make possible.

cc - Major J. F. Smith ✓

**SECRET**

Phillip Morrison

Figure D.850: Philip Morrison to Karl Cohen. 2 December 1944. Subject: Extension of Information [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.60-2 Germany: Summary Reports (1945-1946)].



DECLASSIFIED

Authority 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder  
32.60-2 GERMANY: Summary Reports (1945-1946)

OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT  
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH COMMITTEE  
OF THE  
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

JAMES B. CONANT, Chairman  
RICHARD C. TOLMAN, Vice Chairman  
ROGER ADAMS  
CONWAY P. COE  
KARL T. COMPTON  
FRANK B. JEWETT  
CAPT. LYBRAND P. SMITH  
MAJ. GEN. CLARENCE C. WILLIAMS

~~TOP SECRET~~  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ADDRESS REPLY TO  
2101 CONSTITUTION AVENUE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 8, 1945

**SECRET** *Limited*

IRVIN STEWART, Executive Secretary

To: Major R. R. Furman  
From: W. A. Shurcliff and P. C. Fine  
Subject: Brief appraisal of (A) German TA Status, and  
(B) Alsos Strassburg Mission.

Explanation: This brief appraisal was requested by you on 5 Jan. 1945.

Part A Brief Appraisal of German TA Status

What We Know: On the basis of Preliminary study of Alsos material alone, we can state with at least moderate assurance that:

German nuclear physicists have been working on the theory of fission piles, as part of a program having high priority.  
"Large scale" experiments (probably on piles or pile segments) have been carried out near Berlin.  
In at least one (unspecified) phase of nuclear physics, technical problems have been mentioned as more pressing than the scientific questions. Germany considers nuclear physics to be very important; she has set up an agency reporting directly to Goering to work in this field; she has kept her best physicists at work in this field; she has released some scientifically-qualified men from the army to help out.  
On the other hand, in at least one university (Strassburg, in Alsace), the nuclear physics equipment has been mediocre and security has been poor.

What We Do Not Know: We know virtually nothing about:

German research on fission bombs and atomic poisons.  
Any methods Germany may have for producing enriched U, or 49, or 23.  
Any stores Germany may have of enriched U, or 49, or 23.  
The extent of German industry's activity in this field.  
Germany's familiarity with our program.  
(We guess that Germany has not placed her greatest emphasis on military applications; we guess that she has stressed development of power piles and that she lags behind us even here; we guess that she is by now convinced that USA is interested in military uses in this war.)

Part B Brief Appraisal of Alsos Strassburg Mission

The Alsos Strassburg Mission did an excellent job in promptly locating and seizing the principal quarters and remaining scientists, and in looking

through the remaining files and promptly forwarding to USA the more interesting items, - all despite great handicaps. The material thus obtained has been extremely interesting. It may be that in future cases of this kind the Germans will not leave so many documents around and it will then be necessary to obtain information to a large extent by questioning captured scientists and by examining laboratory equipment.

We understand that the Mission had inadequate quarters, inadequate office equipment, and no photostating equipment in their Paris office or in the field.

W. A. Shurcliff  
W. A. Shurcliff  
Technical Aide, NDRC

Paul C. Fine  
Paul C. Fine  
Technical Aide, NDRC

Figure D.851: W. A. Shurcliff and Paul C. Fine to Robert R. Furman. 8 January 1945. Subject: Brief appraisal of (A) German TA Status, and (B) Alsos Strassburg Mission [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.60-2 Germany: Summary Reports (1945-1946)].



DECLASSIFIED

Authority 717017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder  
32.60-2 GERMANY: Summary Reports (1945-1946)

SECRET

This document consists of 2 pages.

No. 2 of 3 copies, series A

P. O. Box 1663  
Santa Fe, New Mexico

January 10, 1945

Mr. Karl Cohen  
P. O. Box 41 - Station J  
New York 27, New York

Dear Karl,

I have delayed in answering your letter of December 14 partly to settle my own thoughts and partly to watch the events in Belgium. I am ready now to act on a premise very different from the one on which we based our planning this fall in Washington. If then we made the guess that the Germans might resist no longer than one or two months, now we should expect them to fight on their frontiers, east and west, at least into late summer. If Major Smith and the other responsible officers will accept this interpretation of the news, it is clear that a fresh start is needed for the whole work.

We have at present, a working organization in the theater; we have absolutely certain intelligence of the enemy interest and of his possession of raw materials; we have some results (which I do not know) from interrogation of enemy targets. I believe we should begin this year with the intention of going all out for positive intelligence. If we need new contacts with other agencies, if we need more personnel, if we need a re-evaluation of schedules and possibilities, let us get them. Certainly the burden of this work will fall on the people in the theater; I should like to see Furman, Goudsmit, and Smith make these plans together.

For my own part, I am most anxious to hear from the other side. By now, there should be a feeling in ALSOS of what the problem is like. Insofar as I am supposed to aid in evaluation of the enemy progress, I feel not very competent without conversation with our people overseas.

The direct preparation of counter-measures looks somewhat less important to me now than it did before I got to Y. There are two reasons: The construction of small-scale devices is capable of more variants than I had thought, which makes more costly and less reliable the possible counter-measures; more important, the damage done by a few devices is not so great as I had believed. Taken together, these imply that many schemes are simply not worth while. Two general measures, however, still appear to me to be of the highest importance, and are still feasible in a matter of months: These are (1) the preparation of an adequate medical and control organization, on a skeleton basis, directed against the radiological hazards of a device, and (2) the formulation of a policy, with its implementation worked out on paper, of what to do the day the Germans drop a gadget. They have already claimed the use of atomic bombs in the recent break-through, according to the newspapers here, and there has been no reaction. This may indicate that we need not worry about the matter, that routine censorship will handle it, but I am sure that a real bomb will have a bigger impact than those dropped simply by the DNB. At any rate, we should come to some decision, and there is not much time.

SECRET

Figure D.852: Philip Morrison to Karl Cohen and Francis J. Smith. 10 January 1945 [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.60-2 Germany: Summary Reports (1945-1946)].



DECLASSIFIED

Authority 717017


NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder  
32.60-2 GERMANY: Summary Reports (1945-1946)

Figure D.853: Philip Morrison to Karl Cohen and Francis J. Smith. 10 January 1945 [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.60-2 Germany: Summary Reports (1945-1946)].



**NARA RG 77, Entry  
UD-22A, Box 165, Folder  
ALSOS MATERIAL**

**TOP SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT

P. O. Box 2610  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

REFER TO FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF... PAGE(S)  
NO. 3 OF 2 COPIES, SERIES A

23 January 1945

Subject: Additional Personnel and Equipment for MID Scientific Mission.

To: Major General Clayton Bissell, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,  
U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

1. Up to the present I have, as you know, had two men attached on temporary duty to the Alsos Mission for the purpose of exploiting particular targets in the European Theater of Operations. When Strassbourg was captured there was discovered through the aid and cooperation of the Alsos much evidence that proved that Germany is making a real effort in the field in which I am interested. As a result many and widespread sites are now known, each of which demands thorough exploitation by specially qualified personnel.

2. The evidence gathered at Strassbourg also showed that among the many targets pertaining to our particular field there are two areas of especial importance. The first area comprises the city of Berlin and the surrounding country within a radius of fifty miles. The second area comprises the country around Bisingen-Hechingen in the Black Forest in southwest Germany. To exploit these two areas efficiently with the present staff of Alsos would be an impossible drain on its personnel and equipment. Accordingly it is recommended that there be added to the Alsos Mission a qualified group whose duties will be exclusively limited to those special targets which will affect this project. This group will, of course, be under the command and administration of the Alsos Mission for operations in the field.

3. Our experience with the work of Alsos has been very satisfactory. The personnel has gained invaluable experience in securing scientific intelligence data and it is felt that full advantage would be taken of Alsos' experience.

4. It will be necessary to increase table of organization and table of equipment of Alsos. It is therefore requested that a staff study similar to the one herewith attached be approved so that Alsos will be able to function properly.

L. R. GROVES,  
Major General, C. E.

Incl. (in dupl.)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NND 750112

By CR/SA NARS, Date 23 FEB 1976

**TOP SECRET**

Figure D.854: Leslie Groves to Clayton Bissell. 23 January 1945. Subject: Additional Personnel and Equipment for MID Scientific Mission [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 165, Folder ALSOS MATERIAL].



DECLASSIFIED Authority <u>NND 917017</u>	
<b>SECRET</b>	
<u>Locations of Plants &amp; Laboratories Engaged in Secret Work:</u>	
Bohnenland	Office of Censorship Report 7/21/43
Brandenburg	" " " " "
Dresden	MID Report 4/12/44 "War Production in Dresden Area" Message fr MA Turkey 2/25/44
Friedrichshafen	MID Report 4/27/44 "War Production in Friedrichshafen Area"
Griesheim	MID Rpt Supp #2 "Bacteriological & Chemical Warfare in Axis Europe"
Immenstadt	MID report 1/27/44 "Bacteriological & Chemical Warfare" MID report 4/27/44 "War Production in Friedrichshafen Area"
Kluftern	MID report 4/27/44 "War Production in Friedrichshafen Area"
Markdorf	" " " " " "
Meahrisch-Ostrau (Moravska-Ostrava)	OSS ltr - message fr Istanbul 5/4/44
Ober Raderach	MID Report 4/27/44 "War Production in Friedrichshafen Area" Letter fr Col. White (Calvert) 5/16/44
Rathenow	Office of Censorship report 7/21/44
Sackingen	MID Report 4/27/44 "War Production in Friedrichshafen Area" OSS ltr - message from Bern 4/18/44
Schrobenhausen	Letter from Col. Castles (Calvert) 5/19/44
Semmering	MID Report Supp. #2 "Bacteriological/Chemical Warfare in Axis Europe"
Tropau (Opava)	OSS ltr - message from Istanbul 5/5/44
Weimar	OSS Report S-2635/44 (Dora)
Voecklabruck	Memo from Lansdale 1 July 44 (ASF Int. Bulletin 10)

**SECRET** *probably prepared by Bureau in Jan 45* 32.60 IV

Figure D.855: Locations of Plants &amp; Laboratories Engaged in Secret Work. January 1945 [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.60-2 Germany: Summary Reports (1945-1946)].



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority AND 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder  
32.60-2 Germany: Summary Reports (1945-1946)

SECRET

This document consists of 1 pages.  
No. 3 of 3 copies, series A

P. O. Box 1663  
Santa Fe, New Mexico

29 January 1945

Major F. J. Smith  
P. O. Box 2610  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Major Smith:

It goes without saying that the report of the recent material which you sent me last week was much the most interesting document I have read for some time. I am quite eager to have a chance to look over the original material myself. It turns out that in the next two or three weeks the work here is such that I feel quite willing to come to Washington at your convenience. If you will let me know a week or so before you want me to leave for the East, I shall be there. I would appreciate it if Karl could arrange to be in Washington for at least a day or two while I am there; I think we will have a good many things to talk over at such a meeting.

My strongest impression from the material was, like yours, one of relief and optimism. The documents raise a good many questions, however, the most important one of which is - what about a bomb? There are references to this objective, but no sign of organization or technical work toward it. As a long shot, I will guess right now that there is such work but that the Strassbourg Group were not involved. This is the most important question I should like to try to settle by examining the documents. I hope there are available reports of interrogation of the targets.

I shall expect to hear from you soon setting a date for my coming East.

With best wishes.

Yours,

*P. Morrison*  
P. Morrison

cc - Karl Cohen

SECRET

Figure D.856: Philip Morrison to Francis J. Smith. 29 January 1945 [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.60-2 Germany: Summary Reports (1945-1946)].



DECLASSIFIED

Authority 717017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder  
32.60-2 GERMANY: Summary Reports (1945-1946)




Figure D.857: Philip Morrison to Francis J. Smith. 22 February 1945 [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.60-2 Germany: Summary Reports (1945-1946)].



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder  
202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.

Monthly Intelligence Summary

TOP SECRET

February 1945

4. Tailfingen

A paper discovered in the Strassburg investigation bore a letterhead indicating that the present address of KWI für Chemie is now located at Tailfingen approximately 20 miles S-SE of Hechingen. Air photos of Tailfingen have been obtained but revealed no evidence of such an institution. This of course does not preclude the possibility of the institute being there.

5. Oberndorf am Neckar.

A report was received stating that new weapons that had not yet been employed are being made at OBERNDORF am NECKAR. Significance was attached to this report because of the adjacency of Oberndorf to the Hechingen area. Air photos and Interpretation Reports covering this area reveal no new construction or that there were aircraft catchment wires strung across the Neckar at this locality as was first reported. No further action is being taken in regard to the area for the present.

6. REICHSPOST.

An A.D.I.K. Report states that the REICHSPOST RESEARCH GROUP formerly located in Berlin Tempelhof has been widely dispersed and that one large branch is now located at KLEIN-MACHNOW. A target dossier on Klein Machnow (near Berlin) is being prepared and will be included in our target list.

7. Saalfeld-Thuringia.

A report dated 19 April 1944 was received from OSS stating that a new weapon is being manufactured in an underground factory at SAALFELD-THURINGIA, Germany. The report added that experimental laboratories formerly in Berlin have been transferred to STRASBOURG and installed in a hospital there. The casings and tubings for the weapon were reported to be manufactured in the mechanical workshops in Bitschwiller (Haut-Rhin). Some significance is attached to this report because of the fact that a laboratory of interest to us has been discovered in a hospital in Strasbourg. Air coverage of the Saalfeld area has been obtained and is now being studied.

8. Tegernsee.

As a result of a report that a second Forschungstelle has been established at TEGERNSEE, aerial photos of the place were obtained. Nothing to indicate T A activity was observed in these photos, but the possibility of such activity at Tegernsee is not precluded by this.

-2-

TOP SECRET

Figure D.858: Monthly Intelligence Summary for February 1945 [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder 202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.].



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority AND GITHOLT

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder  
202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.

Monthly Intelligence Summary

TOP SECRET

February 1945

9. Heidelberg (I.G. Farben)

A P/W is reported to have stated that an elaborate "atom-smashing" apparatus is in operation at the I.G. Farben plant in Heidelberg. Major Furman has arranged for further interrogation of the P/W.

10. Leitmeritz.

An ungraded report indicated that the production of precision instruments for V-3 is being carried on by the Germans in the town of LEITMERITZ in Sudetenland. According to this report, a large volume of electric power is being directed to the factory. A power survey and aerial coverage of the area have been obtained and are being forwarded to General Groves' office for review.

11. LEHESTEN.

An OSS report states that possible manufacture of long range projectiles is being carried on in a semi-underground installation about 1.5 K.M. north of Lehesten in Germany. T A interest in the report arises from the fact that Siemens and Halske are said to be in charge of the plant, and a reference to the breaking down of water by electrolysis at this site. Aerial coverage has been requested.

III T A INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES

1. C.S.D.I.C.

P.W. Oberjäger Ahlbrecht was interrogated by a British Army officer. The discussion was directed to the manufacture and use of "heavy water" by the Germans. P.W. stated that there exists a Reich Research Council headed by Staatsrat ESSER (this is believed to be phonetic spelling and to probably refer to A. Esau.) P.W. is familiar with the heavy water plant at Norsk Hydro but says the Germans do not really need it as they have sufficient electrolysis in Germany. P.W. stated that he was told by a person in authority that the whole importance of heavy water had collapsed.

This information is not thought to have especial significance and the P.W. people do not believe the prisoner to have anymore information than this.

IV MATERIALS

1. Auergesellschaft.

Because of what is believed to be the improbability of our gaining possession of the X materials thought to be stored at Auergesellschaft,

-3-

TOP SECRET

Figure D.859: Monthly Intelligence Summary for February 1945 [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder 202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.].



**Gerard P. Kuiper to Frederick E. Terman. 13 March 1945.** [University of Arizona Libraries, Special Collections, Gerard P. Kuiper Papers, Box 57, Folder 15, ALSOS Mission (1), 1945, p. 61. <https://speccoll.library.arizona.edu/collections/gerard-p-kuiper-papers>]

[...] One is again surprised to see quotations from U.S. senators who think that the war will be over “within a few days”. It would be wiser to worry about the chance we still have of losing it if certain high explosives are developed in time. This possibility may, incidentally, be one reason why the Germans are not giving in. Few people here [in Alsos] expect an immediate collapse.

[By late 1944, Samuel Goudsmit seemed convinced that there was no German nuclear weapons program. This letter shows that even in mid-March 1945, shortly before the end of the war, Gerard Kuiper and other members of Alsos were still deeply concerned that there was indeed a German nuclear weapons program, and that it was on the verge of deploying a final product. What information had Kuiper or other members of Alsos discovered themselves or learned from others?]



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder  
202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.




Figure D.860: Monthly Intelligence Summary for April, May, June 1945 [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder 202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.].



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder  
202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.

**TOP SECRET**

Monthly Intelligence Summary For April, May, June, 1945 (Continued)

2. Scientific.

The 220th Anniversary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences was attended by a delegation from Czechoslovakia.

3. Material.

A survey of the mines at St. Joachimstahl was conducted by Captain DAVIS and Mr. GATTIKER. It was determined that the annual output of "X" oxide is approximately 15 tons with excellent prospects for continued yield at this rate for another ten years.

V FRENCH.

1. Political.

a. Arrangements were made with ATC, Paris, for our Paris office to receive a daily list of all French civilians booking passage at Paris, Lyons, Dijon and Marseille terminals of the North Africa and Middle East lines.

b. At the request of Major SMITH, a representative of this office met Dr. Bertrand L. GOLDSCHMIDT on his recent arrival in London. Dr. GOLDSCHMIDT was advised that the services of this office were at his disposal and was also given the address of our Paris office.

c. Pierre AUGER is working with the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique where he is concerned with reorganization of scientific teaching.

d. The French newspaper "Humanite" announced that the following persons were invited to attend the 220th Anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Academy of Science:

AUGE (believed to be AUGER); LEMOINE; MAURAIN; LANGEVIN; JOLIO CURIE; Emile BOREL; Elie CARTAN; August CHEVALIER; Josef PERES; Andre MASON; Eugene AUBEL; Rene AUDUBERT; Camille BLOCH; Maurice CAULLERY; Jaques CHAPELON; Maurice FRECHET; Pierre GRASSE; Jaque HADAMAR; Irene JOLIO CURIE; Jaques NICOLLE; Francis PERRIN; Jaques TREJOUEL; Henri LAUGIER; Charles LAURENT; Albert (?DEMOLON); Maurice LEMANCHE.

LANGEVIN will ill and did not attend. JOLIO and his wife did attend and from newspaper accounts it appears they took an active part.

- 4 -

**TOP SECRET**

Figure D.861: Monthly Intelligence Summary for April, May, June 1945 [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder 202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.].





NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder  
202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.




Figure D.862: Monthly Intelligence Summary for April, May, June 1945 [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder 202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.].



NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder  
202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.

Monthly Intelligence Summary  
for July and August 1945

*data later me  
referring to the 1st para  
to the summary was  
done.*

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

TOP SECRET

b. The French Press states that France now has a "Sixieme Bureau" which is in constant touch with French scientists. The French paper "SAMEDI SOIR" describes a machine used by the Sixth Bureau which keeps French scientists abreast of scientific developments in all subjects. The machine appears from its description to be an elaborate mechanical library.

2. Scientific.

a. A French newspaper stated that a Research Service has been organized by Jean PERRIN and Henri LANGIER and is now in the hands of JOLIOT-CURIE. This article bemoans the fact that very limited funds are at the disposal of this service and that the researchers are represented by a "poor team of scientists" whose labor is not honestly rewarded and whose status has not been clarified.

VI GERMAN

1. Intelligence.

a. During a conversation with Lise MEITNER in Sweden, one of the informants of this office was given a letter from MEITNER to be delivered to Prof. HAHN. MEITNER was under the impression that HAHN was at Tailfingen. In the letter MEITNER criticizes HAHN for his failure to oppose the Nazi regime.

Major RITTNER has asked that this letter not be delivered because he fears it would have such a psychological effect on HAHN as to create a difficult problem in connection with detaining him. The letter has not been delivered.

b. American authorities are reported to have seized the 700 room German Patent Office in Berlin and found "almost all" the patent records intact. These patents are now being catalogued and as soon as the cataloguing is complete a representative of this office will conduct a search for TA patents.

c. Dr. GOUDSMIT submitted a report dated 10 August in which he stated that the use of the atomic bomb has resulted in renewed confidence of the German people in HITLER as they now think he was not lying when he promised them some terrible weapon which would end the war. GOUDSMIT also states that he considers it unfortunate that HAHN and STRASSMAN were not named as the discoverers of uranium splitting, because since the whole scientific world knows that they are the discoverers, he fears that the omission might be misconstrued as having some sinister purpose.

d. The Guests have now been installed in a house in England where they are under constant technical supervision. Copies of the reports have been studied here and forwarded to Washington. The following conclusions have been drawn from a study of these reports:

- 4 -

TOP SECRET

Figure D.863: Monthly Intelligence Summary for July and August 1945 [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder 202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.].



Monthly Intelligence Summary  
for July and August 1945

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder  
202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

TOP SECRET

VIII SWEDEN

1. Intelligence.

a. An agreement was concluded between the foreign ministers of Sweden and Belgium providing for an exchange of goods under which Sweden will supply wood pulp, ball bearings, timber and iron ore in return for industrial diamonds, steel goods, coke and non-ferrous ores. This agreement was reported in Daily Digest of World Broadcasts.

b. The 220th Anniversary of the Russian Academy of Science was attended by five Swedish scientists headed by Professor SVEDBERG. According to monitored broadcasts, the Swedes were much impressed both by the accomplishments of Soviet science and by the fact that the Russians were so frank and open in exhibiting their discoveries to scientists of other countries.

2. Publicity.

Swedish newspapers carrying publicity about the atom bomb were forwarded to Washington.

IX CENSORSHIP.

a. The wives of H. SHEARD and D. J. LITTLER, who were working at "Y" at the time, signed the notice of censorship of incoming and outgoing mail at that establishment on 9 July 1945.

b. The Paris edition of "STARS AND STRIPES" for 1 July 1945 contained an article headlined "Nazi Progress In Atomic Field Veiled by U.S." Investigation revealed that this censorship violation resulted from negligence on the part of a censor. The body of the article contained only slight and insignificant reference to atomic weapons. The censor was admonished by Col. MERRICK, his superior officer.

c. At the request of Col. CONSODINE this office has subscribed to the following British scientific publications:

"Proceedings Of The Royal Society"  
"Proceedings Of The Physical Society"  
"Nature"  
"Proceedings Of The Cambridge Philosophical Society"  
"Transactions Of The Farraday Society"  
"Philosophical Magazine"

These magazines are being hastily scanned in the London Office upon receipt and then forwarded to Washington.

d. On 6 August 1945, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in Japan. Two days previous to this the London Office was advised that the bomb would be used in the next few days. Captain DAVIS was immediately dispatched to the continent in order to control undesirable publicity from ALSOS and also to carry instructions to Pierre

- 6 -

TOP SECRET

Figure D.864: Monthly Intelligence Summary for July and August 1945 [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder 202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.].



**NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420, Boxes 1-9**

Figure D.865: Many Alsos-related documents from Samuel Goudsmit's files remain classified [NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420].



<p>RG: <u>200</u></p> <p>ENTRY: <u>GOVERNMENT PAPERS</u></p> <p>BOX: <u>1</u></p>	<p>TAB #: <u>4</u></p> <p><u>1</u> / <u>24</u> / <u>S</u></p> <p>COPIES/ PPS./CLASS.</p>
---	--

**ACCESS RESTRICTED**

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation FROM: PACIFIC MISSION RELATED  
MEMO W/RT

Date 17 OCT 1944

From APRMS

To HAM

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

**WITHDRAWAL NOTICE**

<p>NND <u>988079</u></p> <p>Authority _____</p>	<p><u>6 OCT 1992</u></p> <p>Date _____</p>
<p>Withdrawn by <u>RCH</u></p>	

<p>RG: <u>200</u></p> <p>ENTRY: <u>Governments Papers</u></p> <p>BOX: <u>3</u></p>	<p>TAB #: <u>(104)</u></p> <p><u>1</u> / <u>13</u> / <u>S</u></p> <p>COPIES/ PPS./CLASS.</p>
--	--

**ACCESS RESTRICTED**

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation (UNTITLED)  
ENTIRE FOLDER

Date 00/00/44

From \_\_\_\_\_

To \_\_\_\_\_

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information


  

**WITHDRAWAL NOTICE**

<p>NND <u>933079</u></p> <p>Authority _____</p>	<p><u>06 October 1993</u></p> <p>Date _____</p>
<p>Withdrawn by <u>JST</u></p>	



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)

**NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420, Boxes 1-9**

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NN0933079

<p>RG: 200  ENTRY: GUDSMIT Papers  BOX: 3</p> <p style="text-align: center;">TAB #: 112  1 / 27 / C  COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:  File Designation <u>Netherlands Intelligence (First Off-Security Ch. 4)</u>  <u>- ENTIRE FOLDER -</u></p> <p>Date <u>00/00/1945</u>  From _____  To _____</p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information  <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p style="text-align: right;">NND 933079  Authority _____  Date <u>06 October 1993</u>  Withdrawn by <u>[Signature]</u></p>	<p>RG: 200  ENTRY: Gudsmit  BOX: 6</p> <p style="text-align: center;">TAB #: 7  1 / 4 / 9  COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:  File Designation <u>PASH Mission Related</u>  <u>W/ memo w/ att</u></p> <p>Date <u>4/3/45</u>  From <u>Kemble</u>  To <u>Anton</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information  <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p style="text-align: right;">NND 933079  Authority _____  Date <u>10/6/93</u>  Withdrawn by <u>4</u></p>
--	---

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
NA FORM 14000 (5-92)

Figure D.866: Many Alsos-related documents from Samuel Goudsmit's files remain classified [NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420].



<p>RG: 200 ENTRY: Goudsmit Papers BOX: 3</p> <p>TAB #: (109) 1 / 4 / 5 COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>ALSO (Historian Inventory Control)</u> <u>LTR. 4/2 Index</u></p> <p>Date <u>27 April 1945</u> From <u>WOODG</u> To <u>BURCHARD</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>Authority <u>NND 933079</u> Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fst</u></p>	<p>RG: 200 ENTRY: Goudsmit Papers BOX: 3</p> <p>TAB #: (106) 1 / 2 / 5 COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>ALSO (Historian Inventory Control)</u> <u>Memo 4/attach</u></p> <p>Date <u>18 July 1945</u> From <u>Goudsmit</u> To <u>Eckman</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>Authority <u>NND 933079</u> Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fst</u></p>
--	---

## NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420, Boxes 1-6

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 933079

<p>RG: 200 ENTRY: Goudsmit Papers BOX: 3</p> <p>TAB #: (107) 1 / 3 / 5 COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>ALSO (Historian Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 6)</u> <u>Memo</u></p> <p>Date <u>07 August 1945</u> From <u>Goudsmit</u> To <u>Subject: Dissemination of Energy Scientific</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>Authority <u>NND 933079</u> Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fst</u></p>	<p>RG: 200 ENTRY: Goudsmit Papers BOX: 3</p> <p>TAB #: (105) 1 / 3 / 5 COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>ALSO (Historian Inventory Control)</u> <u>Memo</u></p> <p>Date <u>10 August 1945</u> From <u>Goudsmit</u> To <u>LMH</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>Authority <u>NND 933079</u> Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fst</u></p>
--	---

Figure D.867: Many Alsos-related documents from Samuel Goudsmit's files remain classified [NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420].



<p>RG: 200 ENTRY: Goudsmit Papers BOX: 3</p> <p>TAB #: 99 COPIES/ PPS. /CLASS. 1 / 3 / 5</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation: <u>Histories Office Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 4</u> <u>LTR</u></p> <p>Date: <u>03 September 1945</u> From: <u>Goudsmit</u> To: <u>Eckman</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>Authority: <u>NND 933079</u> Date: <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by: <u>fgt</u></p>	<p>RG: 200 ENTRY: Goudsmit Papers BOX: 3</p> <p>TAB #: 100 COPIES/ PPS. /CLASS. 1 / 3 / 5</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation: <u>Histories Office Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 4</u> <u>Briefing Paper w/attach</u></p> <p>Date: <u>03 September 1945</u> From: <u>Smyth</u> To: <u>No Subj: Removal to Review of Perimeter</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>Authority: <u>NND 933079</u> Date: <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by: <u>fgt</u></p>
--	---

## NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420, Boxes 1-6

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: NND 933079

<p>RG: 200 ENTRY: Goudsmit Papers BOX: 3</p> <p>TAB #: 110 COPIES/ PPS. /CLASS. 1 / 1 / 5</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation: <u>ALSO5 (Histories Office Inventory Control)</u> <u>Memo</u></p> <p>Date: <u>03 September 1945</u> From: <u>Goudsmit</u> To: <u>Eckman</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>Authority: <u>NND 933079</u> Date: <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by: <u>fgt</u></p>	<p>RG: 200 ENTRY: Goudsmit Papers BOX: 3</p> <p>TAB #: 111 COPIES/ PPS. /CLASS. 1 / 7 / 5</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation: <u>ALSO5 (Histories Office Inventory Control)</u> <u>Memo w/attach</u></p> <p>Date: <u>10 September 1945</u> From: <u>Goudsmit</u> To: <u>Eckman</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>Authority: <u>NND 933079</u> Date: <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by: <u>fgt</u></p>
---	--

Figure D.868: Many Alsos-related documents from Samuel Goudsmit's files remain classified [NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420].



<p>RG: 200 ENTRY: Goudsmit Papers BOX: 3</p> <p>TAB #: 93 COPIES/ PPS. /CLASS. 1/1/1C</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>HISTORIAN'S OFFICE Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 4</u> <u>LTR</u></p> <p>Date <u>08 January 1947</u> From <u>Henderson</u> To <u>Goudsmit</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>Authority <u>NND 933079</u> Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fgt</u></p> <p>NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)</p>	<p>RG: 200 ENTRY: Goudsmit Papers BOX: 3</p> <p>TAB #: 94 COPIES/ PPS. /CLASS. 1/1/1C</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>HISTORIAN'S OFFICE Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 4</u> <u>LTR</u></p> <p>Date <u>19 May 1947</u> From <u>Goudsmit</u> To <u>Henderson</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>Authority <u>NND 933079</u> Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fgt</u></p> <p>NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)</p>
--	--

## NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420, Boxes 1-9

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 933079

<p>RG: 200 ENTRY: Goudsmit Papers BOX: 3</p> <p>TAB #: 95 COPIES/ PPS. /CLASS. 1/1/1C</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>HISTORIAN'S OFFICE Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 4</u> <u>LTR</u></p> <p>Date <u>08 May 1947</u> From <u>Henderson</u> To <u>Goudsmit</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>Authority <u>NND 933079</u> Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fgt</u></p> <p>NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)</p>	<p>RG: 200 ENTRY: Goudsmit Papers BOX: 3</p> <p>TAB #: 96 COPIES/ PPS. /CLASS. 1/1/1C</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>HISTORIAN'S OFFICE Inventory Control Box 4 Folder 4</u> <u>LTR</u></p> <p>Date <u>10 June 1947</u> From <u>Henderson</u> To <u>Goudsmit</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>Authority <u>NND 933079</u> Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fgt</u></p> <p>NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)</p>
--	---

Figure D.869: Many Alsos-related documents from Samuel Goudsmit's files remain classified [NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420].



RG: 200 ENTRY: <u>Goudsmit Papers</u> BOX: 3	TAB #: <u>(92)</u> COPIES/ PPS. /CLASS. <u>1 1 7 1 5</u>	RG: 200 ENTRY: <u>Goudsmit</u> BOX: 6	TAB #: 5 COPIES/ PPS. /CLASS. <u>1 1 1 1 u/c</u>
ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>HISTORIAN'S OFFICE INVENTORY CONTROL Box 4 Folder 4</u> <u>LTR w/ Encl</u> Date <u>23 April 1946</u> From <u>Goudsmit</u> To <u>SWIDDER</u>		ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>Joint Research &amp; Development Board</u> <u>Ltr</u> Date <u>4/2/47</u> From <u>Goudsmit</u> To <u>Bush</u>	
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	
Authority <u>NND 933079</u> Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fst</u>		Authority <u>NND 933079</u> Date <u>10/6/93</u> Withdrawn by <u>4</u>	
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)		NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)	

## NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420, Boxes 1-9

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 933079

RG: 200 ENTRY: <u>Goudsmit Papers</u> BOX: 3	TAB #: <u>(97)</u> COPIES/ PPS. /CLASS. <u>1 1 2 1 C</u>	RG: 200 ENTRY: <u>Goudsmit Papers</u> BOX: 3	TAB #: <u>(103)</u> COPIES/ PPS. /CLASS. <u>1 1 2 1 C</u>
ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>HISTORIAN'S OFFICE INVENTORY CONTROL Box 4 Folder 4</u> <u>LTR</u> Date <u>10 November 1948</u> From <u>Goudsmit</u> To <u>Handerson</u>		ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: File Designation <u>HISTORIAN'S OFFICE INVENTORY CONTROL Box 4 Folder 4</u> <u>LTR</u> Date <u>07 April 1967</u> From <u>Goudsmit</u> To <u>Lima Laine</u>	
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information		In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	
Authority <u>NND 933079</u> Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fst</u>		Authority <u>NND 933079</u> Date <u>06 October 1993</u> Withdrawn by <u>fst</u>	
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)		NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)	

Figure D.870: Many Alsos-related documents from Samuel Goudsmit's files remain classified [NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420].



<p>RG 165 Entry-Goudsmit Box 2</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(9) 1/15/R</p> <p style="text-align: center;">ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>From: CIA MISCELLANEOUS</u> <u>Washington</u></p> <p>Date <u>1947</u></p> <p>From <u>Entire Folder</u></p> <p>To _____</p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 901101</u> <u>3/7/91</u> Authority Date</p> <p style="text-align: center;">WITHDRAWAL NOTICE</p>	<p>RG 165 Entry-Goudsmit Box 2</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(12) 1/18/21</p> <p style="text-align: center;">ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>CIA</u></p> <p>Date <u>1950</u></p> <p>From <u>Entire Folder</u></p> <p>To _____</p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 901101</u> <u>3/7/91</u> Authority Date</p> <p style="text-align: center;">WITHDRAWAL NOTICE</p>
--	--

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

## NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420, Boxes 1-9

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 933079

<p>RG: 200 ENTRY: Goudsmit Papers BOX: 5</p> <p style="text-align: center;">TAB #: <u>113</u> <u>1, 92, 1, C</u> COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>C.I.A. (Historical Inventory Control)</u> <u>Box 4 Folder 10</u></p> <p>Date <u>1954</u></p> <p>From _____</p> <p>To _____</p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 933079</u> <u>06 October 1993</u> Authority Date</p> <p>Withdrawn by <u>[Signature]</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">WITHDRAWAL NOTICE</p>	<p>RG: 200 ENTRY: Goudsmit Papers BOX: 3</p> <p style="text-align: center;">TAB #: <u>27</u> <u>1 / 9 / S</u> COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Folder #2 Secret Documents Nuclear Aircraft...</u> <u>Entire Folder</u></p> <p>Date <u>1955</u></p> <p>From _____</p> <p>To _____</p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 933079</u> <u>5 October 93</u> Authority Date</p> <p>Withdrawn by <u>[Signature]</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">WITHDRAWAL NOTICE</p>
---	--

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (5-92)

Figure D.871: Many Alsos-related documents from Samuel Goudsmit's files remain classified [NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420].



RG: 200  
ENTRY: Eudamit  
BOX: 5

TAB #: 4  
COPIES/ PPS. /CLASS.  
1 1 2 - 1 uc

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation E.R. Eckman - (Krauch, etc.)  
etc w/ att  
Date 1/18/51  
From Eudamit  
To Eckman

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

Authority NWD 933079  
Date 10/6/93  
Withdrawn by 44

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE  
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE  
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE  
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE  
WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

file:  
ch, etc)  
access to  
on. The  
ains:  
tion  
ation

G. R. Eckman  
(Krauch, etc.)

NA FORM 14000 (5-92) 921 1000 (5-92)

**NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420, Boxes 1-9**

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NN0933079

RG: <u>200</u> ENTRY: <u>Gardsmir</u> BOX: <u>5</u>	TAB #: <u>8</u> <u>1171C</u> COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.	TAB #: <u>22</u> <u>1171C</u> COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.
---	---	--

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation	<u>BPTS. (O'Carner)</u>
Date	<u>15 May 1963</u>
From	<u>Gardsmir</u>
To	

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

Authority	<u>10-7-93</u>	<u>10-7-93</u>
	Date	Date
	Withdrawn by <u>PTK</u>	Withdrawn by <u>PTK</u>

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Figure D.872: Many Alsos-related documents from Samuel Goudsmit's files remain classified [NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420].



**OSS. TOP SECRET—CONTROL Number 67. Subject: Experts on Atomic Fission. Late 1945 (?). [NARA RG 226, Entry A1-215, Box 6, Folder WN26150–26164]**

1. The following list includes the names, approximate locations, field of interest, and relative importance of the scientists now living in Germany who are outstanding for their theoretical knowledge of atomic fission.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>	<u>FIELD</u>	<u>RATING</u>
BAGGE	Goettingen	Nuclear physics	B
BERKEI, Fritz	Berlin	Nuclear physics	B–C
*BONHOEFFER, K. F.	Leipzig	Phys-chemistry; heavy water	A
*BORN, Dr. H. J.	Berlin-Karlshorst	Bio-physics	B
BOTHE, Prof. Walter	Heidelberg	Nuclear physics	A
BRILL, Prof. Dr. R.	Darmstadt	Inorganic chemistry	A
BRUNA, Dr. Otto	Tailfingen	Nuclear physics	B–C
CLUSIUS, Klaus	Munich	Nuclear physics	A
CZULIUS, Werner	Berlin (?)	Nuclear physics	B–C
DAENZER, Dr. H.	Heidelberg (?)	Nuclear physics	A–B
DIEBNER, Dr. K.	Br. Zone	Nuclear physics	C
DIECKEL	Munich	Nuclear physics	B
DOPEL, R.	Leipzig (?)	Nuclear physics	B
DROSTE, Dr. G. von	Berlin-Dahlem	Nuclear physics	B
ERBACHER, Prof. Otto	Tailfingen (?) (May be in Berlin-Dahlem)	Nuclear physics	B
EWALD, Dr. Heinz	Tailfingen (?)	Mass spectroscopy	B
FLAMMERSFELD, Dr. Arnold	Berlin-Dahlem	Theoretical physics	B
FUCHTBAUER, Prof. Dr.	Beboldehausen (Formerly Bonn)	Spectroscopy	B
FLÜGGE, Siegfried	Goettingen (?)	Nuclear physics	A–B
GENTNER, Dr. Wolfgang	Heidelberg	Nuclear physics	B
GERLACH, W.	Bonn	Nuclear physics	B
GERTHSEN, Prof.	Berlin	Nuclear physics	A–B
GOTTE, Dr. Hans	Tailfingen (?)	Nuclear physics	B
GRASSMAN, E.	Berlin (?)	Nuclear physics	C
GROTH, Dr. Will	Hamburg	Physical chemistry	B
HAHN, Prof. Dr. Otto	Goettingen	Nuclear physics	A
HARTECK, P.	Hamburg	Nuclear physics	A
HAXEL, O.	Berlin (?)	Nuclear physics	B
HILSCH, Dr. R.	Erlangen	Experimental physics	B
HEISENBERG, Werner	Goettingen	Nuclear physics	A
*HILGERS, Dr.	Berlin-Oberschoeneweide	Nuclear physics	C



HINTERBERGER, Dr. Heinrich	(?—is Austrian)	Mass spectroscopy	B
HOCKER, Karl Heinz	Hechingen	Nuclear physics	C
HOFFMAN, Prof.	Leipzig	Physics	B
HOUTERMANS, Fritz G.	Goettingen	Physics	B
JENSEN, Dr. J.	Hannover	Theoretical physics	B
JORDAN, Pasqual	Berlin	Theoretical physics	A
JUILFS, Dr.	Berlin	Theoretical physics	B–C
KIRCHNER, Dr.	Garmisch	Nuclear physics	B
KLEMM, Dr. Alfred	Tailfingen (?)	Nuclear physics	B
KLUGE, Dr.	Berlin (?)	High frequency cables (AEG)	C
KOCHENDORFER, Dr. Albert	Stuttgart	Physics	B
KOPPERMANN, H.	Goettingen	Nuclear physics	A
KOSSEL, Prof. W.	?	Physics	A
LAUE, Max von	Goettingen	Nuclear physics	A
LINDNER, Dr. Roland	Tailfingen (?)	Nuclear physics	C
MATTAUCH, Dr. Joseph	Tailfingen	Nuclear physics	A
MECKE, Prof. Dr. F.	Freiburg	Theoretical physics (Spectroscopy)	B
MOLIERE, G.	Heckingen	Theoretical physics (Cosmic Rays)	B
PHILIPP, Kurt	?	Physics Geiger-Mueller counters	B
POHL, Dr. R. W.	Goettingen	Physics	A
POSE, H.	Leipzig (?) Heckingen (?)	Nuclear physics	B
RAMSAUER, Prof. Dr. K. W.	Berlin (?)	Physics	A–B
REGENER, E.	Weissenantal (Ravensburg)	Cosmic radiation; physics of ionosphere	A
REHBEIN, F.	Stadtilm, Thur.	Nuclear physics	B–C
RIEZLER, Prof. Dr. W.	Garmisch	Nuclear physics	B
RUCHARDT, E.	Munden	Nuclear physics	B–C
SAUERWEIN, Kurt	Tailfingen	Theoretical physics	B
SCHMIDT, Dr. Theo	Greifswald (N. of Berlin)	Theoretical physics	B
SEELMANN-EGGEBERT, Dr. Walter	Tailfingen	Nuclear chemistry	B
STRASSMANN, Dr. Fritz	Goettingen	Nuclear physics	A
*STEIMEL, Dr.	Berlin (?)	Electronic tubes	B
WALDMANN, Dr. Ludwig	Tailfingen	Theoretical physics	A
WEIZSAECKER, Carl Fred. von	Goettingen	Nuclear physics	B
WIRTZ, Karl	Goettingen	Nuclear physics	B
*ZIMMER, Dr.	Berlin-Karlshorst	Bio-physics	B



(Asterisks denote men who have been invited to work in Russia but have declined.)

2. Any of these men becomes an important intelligence target whenever it appears that his services have been sought by any other nation. Any attempts to recruit these scientists should be reported in detail; especially the name and German address of the man, exactly what he is being recruited for, where he would go, and all inducements offered. This information should be forwarded by the quickest means possible.

3. The following is a list of German scientists known to be working in the USSR at the invitation of the Russians.

ARDENNE, Baron Manfred von: Germany's foremost builder of cyclotrons. Taken to Russia June 1945; now reported in Taupse on Black Sea. Rating: A.

HERTZ, Prof. G.: Partially Jewish; non-Nazi. Went to Russia in June 1945 with 25 assistants. Rating: A.

MIE, Dr.: Nazi; physicist. Arrived Moscow July 1945. Rating: C.

RIEHL, Prof. N.: Non-Nazi; Director of Research for the Auergesellschaft AG Oranienburg, Berlin. Radio chemist. Went to Russia June 1945. Rating: A.

STEENBECK, Dr.: Nazi; atomic physicist and rheotron expert. Arrested by Russians and sent to Moscow in September 1945. Rating: A.

THIESEN, Prof. P. A.: Former Director Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for physical chemistry. Taken to Russia in October 1945 with two assistants and VON ARDENNE. Rating: B.

VOLMER, Prof. M.: Non-Nazi; physical chemist. In Russia with HERTZ. Rating: A.

4. The activities of these men are of the greatest interest, as are those of any other men who may be added to the list. If any of these men returns to Germany information as to his whereabouts should be forwarded at once.

5. The names and activities of engineers and other technical experts possibly connected with atomic research also become of great intelligence interest when such men are known to be working for other nations or to have been successfully recruited or even approached by another nation. Full details are required.



[This is the final version of a list that was created and distributed by the Alsos Mission. There was a similar but separate list for Austrians such as those Georg Stetter's group—see the following pages. If the U.S. government truly believed that these scientists knew and accomplished so little during the war, why were they so concerned about what these scientists might tell or do for other countries that wanted to develop nuclear weapons?

In some respects this list shows a remarkably detailed knowledge of wartime German nuclear work, including many relatively obscure scientists. In other respects this list reveals areas of ignorance about the wartime German nuclear program. It underestimates the importance of some people. For example, it assigns the lowest value (C) to Diebner, who appears to have been instrumental in running the nuclear program, and gives a B to Jensen, who went on to win a Nobel Prize for his nuclear work. It also omits a number of important people.]



Todos M. Odarenko. FIAT 63. *Activities of the Second Institute of Physics of the University of Vienna*. [The original German version of this report is G-345.]

[See document photos on pp. 4832–4833.]

### 1.0 Introduction.

The material presented here on the activities of the Second Physics Institute of Vienna University was obtained from Prof. Stetter, as the result of my visit to Thumersbach and to Zell-am-See between October 10 and 13, 1945. The primary purpose of the visit was to establish the contribution of the Institute to the atomic work on the so-called “Uran-Motor” project, and to determine the work of the Institute on radiation absorption materials. Two days were used for interviews with Prof. Stetter and his associates, at the end of which a series of reports were obtained, the English translation of which is attached herewith, as Appendix I.

Although some of these reports, and additional documents, were removed from the Institute earlier by Prof. Smyth of the Alsos Mission, the reports obtained were translated and are released herewith as a matter of record. The original German reports were turned over to the Naval Intelligence Division, Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

### 2.0 General Observations on the Institute and its Work.

#### 2.1 The Institute.

The Institute, with its present component parts, was the largest and the most important research organization in Austria. Before the war, it was involved primarily in the so-called pure research. During the war, it became engaged in certain special problems, of which the Uran-Motor project was one. In addition, the problems relating to the radar field, high frequency development work on testing equipment and the radiation absorption materials, received a certain amount of attention. A very brief review of these activities is undertaken below. A series of the reports prepared by the members of the Institute is attached for a more searching study.

#### 2.2 Work in Nuclear Physics.

Not having been intimately connected with the work on atomic energy release, I am not in a position to fully evaluate the importance of the Institute’s work in this field. The significance of the work of the Institute, from the point of view of the potential utilization of its research, was very sketchily discussed in my reports on “Atomic Bomb Research in the Russian Zone of Czechoslovakia”, dated October 26, 1945, and on “Problems of Displaced Scientists Now Residing in the American Zone of Austria”, dated October 26, 1945.



Contrary to the statements, attributed by the U.S. newspapers to the various U.S. atomic experts, that it “would take the Germans some 100 years to solve the problem of atomic disintegration on an explosive basis” (for the manufacture of bombs), the opinion of the members of the Institute themselves was that, given a supply of radium and uranium, and permitting their return to Vienna, where certain of their materials and equipments are stored, they would be able to “complete their work” in some 3 to 6 months. Some small scale experiments were claimed to be performed successfully by the Institute before the end of the war in Europe.

That these claims of the Institute are not to be disregarded too readily would follow from the fact that Prof. Smyth spent considerable time with the Institute, revisited them several times, and thought it necessary to insist on the most stringent type of control over the scientific activities of the group, as well as on close individual observations. Perhaps equally significant are the indications of the substantial interest of the Russians in several members of the Institute.

Incidentally, the following list of materials was obtained from Prof. Stetter, as held in Vienna by Prof. E. Haschek of the Vienna University: a mass-spectrograph, amplifiers, oscillographs, an X-ray equipment, various testing devices for work on nuclear physics, 200 kg. of Wolfram, some Beryllium, Heavy water, 500 kg. of Lead, a small quantity of Uranium, (most of the Uranium had been removed by the Russians from the laboratories of the University).

As a result of the forced idleness, the group has occupied itself with the problems of Uranium split-up on a considerably more concentrated basis than they were able to do in Vienna. They also managed to attract the attention to this problem of other members of the scientific body in the region around Zell-am-See. I am inclined to think that, given an opportunity, such as their return to Vienna, and some sort of inducement, the Institute would concentrate on this problem to the exclusion of other activities, with a good chance of success.

### 2.3 Radiation Absorption Material.

This problem, and the contribution of the group to it, was discussed in a separate report on “Radar Camouflage-Radiation Absorption Material”.

[Georg Stetter and his fellow Austrian researchers were heavily involved in both the wartime fission and fusion programs (pp. 3390–3393, 4368–4383, 4830–4846, 5038).

The information from Odarenko was forwarded directly to Leslie Groves—see pp. 4840–4841.

“Prof. Smyth” was Charles P. Smyth, a Princeton chemistry professor and member of the Alsos Mission. He should not be confused with his brother Henry DeWolf Smyth, a Manhattan Project physicist who wrote the August 1945 “Smyth Report” that gave public information about the U.S. atomic bomb program.

As a result of the reports of Odarenko and Smyth, the Austrian nuclear scientists were closely monitored and controlled for years by U.S. intelligence and military agencies. For example, Georg Stetter was kept under virtual house arrest by U.S. agents in Austria from 1945 until the 1950s, nearly destroying his career (pp. 4842–4846).]



1.0 Introduction.

The material presented here on the activities of the Second Physics Institute of Vienna University was obtained from Prof. Stetter, as the result of my visit to Thumersbach and to Zell-am-See between October 10 and 13, 1945. The primary purpose of the visit was to establish the contribution of the Institute to the atomic work on the so-called "Uran-Motor" project, and to determine the work of the Institute on radiation absorption materials. Two days were used for interviews with Prof. Stetter and his associates, at the end of which a series of reports were obtained, the English translation of which is attached herewith, as Appendix I.

Although some of these reports, and additional documents, were removed from the Institute earlier by Prof. Smyth of the Alsos Mission, the reports obtained were translated and are released herewith as a matter of record. The original German reports were turned over to the Naval Intelligence Division, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

2.0 General Observations on the Institute and its Work.2.1 The Institute.

The Institute, with its present component parts, was the largest and the most important research organization in Austria. Before the war, it was involved primarily in the so-called pure research. During the war, it became engaged in certain special problems, of which the Uran-Motor project was one. In addition, the problems relating to the radar field, high frequency development work on testing equipment and the radiation absorption materials, received a certain amount of attention. A very brief review of these activities is undertaken below. A series of the reports prepared by the members of the Institute is attached for a more searching study.

2.2 Work in Nuclear Physics.

Not having been intimately connected with the work on atomic energy release, I am not in a position to fully evaluate the importance of the Institute's work in this field. The significance of the work of the Institute, from the point of view of the potential utilization of its research, was very sketchily discussed in my reports on "Atomic Bomb Research in the Russian Zone of Czechoslovakia", dated October 26, 1945, and on "Problems of Displaced Scientists Now Residing in the American Zone of Austria", dated October 26, 1945.

Contrary to the statements, attributed by the U. S. newspapers to the various U. S. atomic experts, that it "would take

Figure D.873: Longtime Bell Telephone physicist Todos M. Odarenko interviewed Georg Stetter and some of his group members soon after the war and wrote, "Contrary to the statements [by Goudsmit...] that it 'would take the Germans some 100 years to solve the problem of atomic disintegration on an explosive basis' [...] the opinion of the members of the Institute themselves was that [...] they would be able to 'complete their work' in some 3 to 6 months." [FIAT 63]



the Germans some 100 years to solve the problem of atomic disintegration on an explosive basis" (for the manufacture of bombs), the opinion of the members of the Institute themselves was that, given a supply of radium and uranium, and permitting their return to Vienna, where certain of their materials and equipments are stored, they would be able to "complete their work" in some 3 to 6 months. Some small scale experiments were claimed to be performed successfully by the Institute before the end of the war in Europe.

That these claims of the Institute are not to be disregarded too readily would follow from the fact that Prof. Smyth spent considerable time with the Institute, revisited them several times, and thought it necessary to insist on the most stringent type of control over the scientific activities of the group, as well as on close individual observations. Perhaps equally significant are the indications of the substantial interest of the Russians in several members of the Institute.

Incidentally, the following list of materials was obtained from Prof. Stetter, as held in Vienna by Prof. E. Haschek\* of the Vienna University: a mass-spectograph, amplifiers, oscillographs, an X-ray equipment, various testing devices for work on nuclear physics, 200 kg. of Wolfram, some Beryllium, Heavy water, 500 kg. of Lead, a small quantity of Uranium, (most of the Uranium had been removed by the Russians from the laboratories of the University).

As the result of the forced idleness, the group has occupied itself with the problems of Uranium split-up on a considerably more concentrated basis than they were able to do in Vienna. They also managed to attract the attention to this problem of other members of the scientific body in the region around Zell-am-See. I am inclined to think that, given an opportunity, such as their return to Vienna, and some sort of inducement, the Institute would concentrate on this problem to the exclusion of other activities, with a good chance of success.

### 2.3 Radiation Absorption Material.

This problem, and the contribution of the group to it, was discussed in a separate report on "Radar Camouflage-Radiation Absorption Material".

### 2.4 Radar and Radio Frequency Work.

Figure D.874: Longtime Bell Telephone physicist Todos M. Odarenko interviewed Georg Stetter and some of his group members soon after the war and wrote, "Contrary to the statements [by Goudsmit...] that it 'would take the Germans some 100 years to solve the problem of atomic disintegration on an explosive basis' [...] the opinion of the members of the Institute themselves was that [...] they would be able to 'complete their work' in some 3 to 6 months." [FIAT 63]



**Todos M. Odarenko. 26 October 1945. Problem of Displaced Scientists Now Residing in the American Zone of Austria. [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 167, Folder 32.12-2 GERMANY: Personnel (Jan 45–Dec 45)]**

1. This memorandum is prepared for Col. R. M. Osborne, Chief of FIAT, and Dr. H. P. Robertson, Chief of Scientific and Technological Branch of FIAT, upon their request to point out certain problems arising out of the presence of a very large group of displaced German and Austrian scientists, now residing in and around Zell-am-See, south of Salzburg, Austria. [...]

3. The total number of scientists is not known to the undersigned. It was variously estimated for him by the officers of G-2 and OSS in Salzburg as being between 150 to 250 individuals. They come from the high institutions of learning originally located in Berlin, Innsbruck, Graz, Wien, Dresden, etc. A complete list of the evacuated organizations might be in the hands of OSS, Salzburg, or in the hands of Education, Religion, Muniment and Fine Art Office of the military government of Salzburg. [...]

6. Among these evacuees there is a very large group of capable scientists who worked in the field of nuclear physics and chemistry and who have been carrying this work with such facilities as they have been able to assemble. **There are two (or possibly more) institutes which were directly involved before the end of the war in a secret German project called "Uranmotor" whose purpose was to split u-ran atoms in order to obtain a powerful source of intra-atomic energy. It is apparent that the end result of this work is a method of obtaining an explosive release of atomic energy, or atomic bomb.** The two groups definitely identified with the Uranmotor project are Kaiser Wilhelm Institute and Institut für Neutronenforschung. Professor Stetter, Professor Mattauch, Professor Thirring, Dr. Schintlmeister, Dr. Jentschke, Dr. Ortner, Dr. Ing. F. Focke are some of the names reported to the undersigned to have been directly involved in the project and capable of completing it as soon as the opportunity will present itself.

7. The undersigned spent a day with one of these groups, namely Professor Stetter and his men. He was assured that the work on the project reached the state before the end of the war when small scale experiments were completed and were quite satisfactory. The present status is that if given an opportunity to return to Vienna, where certain equipment and raw materials were left (and are still intact in the hands of Professor E. Haschek, Poltzman Gasse S, Wien IX) and given a supply of u-ran, **the project could be completed in three to six months with the available personnel and equipment.**

8. **Professor Smyth of the Alsos Mission visited the region and Professor Stetter's group three times (last on August 14, 1945) and spent considerable time with them. It is reasonable to assume that he is fully cognizant of the significance of the experience and qualification of the group, since his recommendation to OSS in Salzburg was to keep the group under a "constant and strict survey". [...]**



10. It must be also kept in mind that because of the decision of the United States not to share the secrets of atomic explosion with other nations, there is an ever increasing desire on the part of certain nations to arrive at the solution of the atomic disintegration problem by an independent method. The undersigned has some information indicating that USSR has a large scale research organization with the best of German scientists working on the problem and expect the solution shortly. They are also reputed to be anxious to get certain of the men now in Austria to join their organization. Thus, it would appear that a careful consideration must be given promptly to the disposition and utilization of the scientific personnel in Austria. It has been repeatedly stated to the undersigned by the occupational officers in Austria that the final decision on the disposition of the displaced scientists in Austria must come from the highest quarters in USFET, and that if the decision does not come soon enough it might come too late. [...]

[See document photos on pp. 4836–4839.]

Georg Stetter and his fellow Austrian researchers were heavily involved in both the wartime fission and fusion programs (pp. 3390–3393, 4368–4383, 4830–4846, 5038).

The information from Odarenko was forwarded directly to Leslie Groves—see pp. 4840–4841.

“Prof. Smyth” was Charles P. Smyth, a Princeton chemistry professor and member of the Alsos Mission. He should not be confused with his brother Henry DeWolf Smyth, a Manhattan Project physicist who wrote the August 1945 “Smyth Report” that gave public information about the U.S. atomic bomb program.

As a result of the reports of Odarenko and Smyth, the Austrian nuclear scientists were closely monitored and controlled for years by U.S. intelligence and military agencies. For example, Georg Stetter was kept under virtual house arrest by U.S. agents in Austria from 1945 until the 1950s, nearly destroying his career (pp. 4842–4846).]



DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NND 917017

*we have copy H.S.L.*

CONFIDENTIAL October 26, 1945

PROBLEM OF DISPLACED SCIENTISTS  
NOW RESIDING IN THE AMERICAN ZONE OF AUSTRIA

1. This memorandum is prepared for Col. R. M. Osborne, Chief of FIAT, and Dr. H. P. Robertson, Chief of Scientific and Technological Branch of FIAT, upon their request to point out certain problems arising out of the presence of a very large group of displaced German and Austrian scientists, now residing in and around Zell-am-See, south of Salzburg, Austria.
  
2. These scientists were assembled in the American occupied zone of Austria by the process of evacuation of whole laboratories or small groups of scientists by the various G-2 and OSS Branches, and sometimes by the officers of the military units in the area, from the zones now occupied by USSR, Great Britain and France. The undersigned understands that in certain cases the evacuation from the neighboring zones was carried hurriedly and without necessary authorization, and that it is possible that even now a complete list of the scientists so transferred to the American Zone might not be fully complete.
  
3. The total number of the scientists is not known to the undersigned. It was variously estimated for him by the officers of G-2 and OSS in Salzburg as being between 150 to 250 individuals. They come from the high institutions of learning originally located in Berlin, Innsbruck, Graz, Wien, Dresden, etc. A complete list of the evacuated organizations might be in the hands of OSS, Salzburg, or in the hands of Education, Religion, Muniment and Fine Art Office of the military government in Salzburg.
  
4. Since these men were removed to their present locations primarily for a subsequent scientific and technological exploitation and are controlled by military intelligence groups, no direction has been established for their scientific activities. For this reason these have been scheduled and carried on in a somewhat arbitrary manner by the individual displaced groups. At this moment there is a rather free exchange between the groups of their problems, of their methods of attacking the problems and of the communal use of such equipment as has been salvaged during the evacuation or built by the evacuees subsequently.

Figure D.875: Todos M. Odarenko. 26 October 1945. Problem of Displaced Scientists Now Residing in the American Zone of Austria. [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 167, Folder 32.12-2 GERMANY: Personnel (Jan 45-Dec 45)]



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 167, Folder  
32.12-2 GERMANY: Personnel (Jan 45-Dec 45)

2

5. Most of these scientists are fundamentally quite harmless individuals, anxious to carry on their research activities and to obtain some means of the public recognition of their work through publications or through correspondence. All are anxious to return to their homes or to attach themselves to some functioning research institution. Some of them were members of the Nazi party.

6. Among these evacuees there is a very large group of capable scientists who worked in the field of nuclear physics and chemistry and who have been carrying this work with such facilities as they have been able to assemble. There are two (or possibly more) institutes which were directly involved before the end of the war in a secret German project called "Uranmotor" whose purpose was to split uran atoms in order to obtain a powerful source of intra-atomic energy. It is apparent that the end result of this work is a method of obtaining an explosive release of atomic energy, or atomic bomb. The two groups definitely identified with the Uranmotor project are Kaiser Wilhelm Institute and Institut fur Neutronenforschung. Professor Stetter, Professor Matauch, Professor Thiering, Dr. Schindelmeister, Dr. Jentschke, Dr. Ortner, Dr. Ing F. Focke are some of the names reported to the undersigned to have been directly involved in the project and considered capable of completing it as soon as the opportunity will present itself.

7. The undersigned spent a day with one of these groups, namely Professor Stetter and his men. He was assured that the work on the project reached the state before the end of the war when small scale experiments were completed and were quite satisfactory. The present status is that if given an opportunity to return to Vienna, where certain equipment and raw materials were left (and are still intact in the hands of Professor E. Haschek, Poltzman Gasse 5, Wien IX) and given a supply of uran, the project could be completed in three to six months with the available personnel and equipment.

8. Professor Smythe of Alsos Mission visited the region and Professor Stetter's group three times (last on August 14, 1945) and spent considerable time with them. It is reasonable to assume that he is fully cognizant of the significance of the experience and qualification of the group, since his recommendation to OSS in Salzburg was to keep the group under a "constant and strict survey".

9. Until recently the occupational authorities in Austria kept a reasonably close supervision of the movements of the members of scientific organizations in Austria.

Figure D.876: Todos M. Odarenko. 26 October 1945. Problem of Displaced Scientists Now Residing in the American Zone of Austria. [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 167, Folder 32.12-2 GERMANY: Personnel (Jan 45-Dec 45)]



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

3

A certain Captain Hudson, OSS, had an office in Thumersbach, near Zell-am-See for the purpose. Recently he has left for the United States, leaving nobody familiar with the background of the displaced scientists to carry on his job. In general, due to discharge of high-point officers, G-2, and its branches OSS and CIC, are shrinking to the point where they are not in position to handle such additional duties as those imposed by the displaced scientific personnel in Austria. An officer in charge of OSS in Salzburg told the undersigned that OSS must, and will, transfer the responsibility for the displaced scientists in Austria to some other organization, perhaps some branch of the military government. It is reasonable to expect the military government personnel to treat these scientists as any other group of displaced individuals, since scientific knowledge and training in nuclear field cannot be requested nor expected of them. Thus the scientists involved in Uranmotor project might find themselves soon in position favorable for the completion of the project.

10. It must be also kept in mind that because of the decision of the United States not to share the secrets of atomic explosion with other nations, there is an ever increasing desire on the part of certain nations to arrive at the solution of the atomic disintegration problem by an independent method. The undersigned has some information indicating that USSR has a large scale research organization with the best of German scientists working on the problem and expect the solution shortly. They are also reputed to be anxious to get certain of the men now in Austria and Germany to join their organization. Thus, it would appear that a careful consideration must be given promptly to the disposition and utilization of the scientific personnel in Austria. It has been repeatedly stated to the undersigned by the occupational officers in Austria that the final decision on the disposition of the displaced scientists in Austria must come from the highest quarters in USFET, and that if the decision does not come soon enough it might come too late.

11. It should also be realized that the present trend of German scientists in Germany to leak into the Russian Zone and into USSR will be repeated in Austria, and on a much more systematic scale, with the projected easing up of travel and communication restrictions in Austria following the recognition of Austrian government by the Four Powers. This trend is due to the offer on part of the Russian government to German scientists and engineers of excellent living conditions, of unbelievably high salaries, of well equipped laboratories and of the opportunity of

Figure D.877: Todos M. Odarenko. 26 October 1945. Problem of Displaced Scientists Now Residing in the American Zone of Austria. [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 167, Folder 32.12-2 GERMANY: Personnel (Jan 45-Dec 45)]



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

**NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 167, Folder  
32.12-2 GERMANY: Personnel (Jan 45-Dec 45)**

4

carrying on their research and development work. Of these the last offer is perhaps the strongest desire and need of the displaced scientists. The present policy of the United States occupational authorities is the exact opposite to that of USSR in all respects, and is a great deal weaker than the working arrangements now in operation in the remaining two zones.

12. In the light of the above it is recommended that the problem of disposition of the displaced scientists in Austria, and particularly of those involved in the Uranmotor project, be considered promptly at a sufficiently high level of the occupational authorities in the ETO, that a definite policy be formulated which recognizes fully the existing conditions, trends, commitments and declarations, that a specific directive be issued forthwith with reference to a special method of handling of the Uranmotor experts and that a permanent body be established for carrying out both the fundamental policy and the specific directives. It seems clear that such a body must consist, or at least include, scientists capable of properly evaluating the present and potential significance of the activities of the displaced scientists in terms of their contribution to war potentials and to the industrial and scientific reconstruction of Austria.

*T. M. Odarenko*  
T. M. Odarenko

Figure D.878: Todos M. Odarenko. 26 October 1945. Problem of Displaced Scientists Now Residing in the American Zone of Austria. [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 167, Folder 32.12-2 GERMANY: Personnel (Jan 45-Dec 45)]



DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NND 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 174,  
 Folder 10.10. Austria Personnel

TOP SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 2 PAGE(S)  
 NO. 1 OF 2 COPIES, SERIES a

26 November 1945

Subject: Problem of Displaced Scientists in American Zone of Austria.

MEMORANDUM to Major General L. R. Groves

1. A recent report from JIOA "concerning certain problems arising out of the presence of a very large group of displaced German and Austrian scientists" in the American zone of Austria is substantially as follows:

a. These scientists were evacuated - in some cases with whole laboratories - to the American Zone in Austria by various G-2 and OSS branches and sometimes by the military units in the area from zones now occupied by Russia, Great Britain, and France. The list may not be complete because it is understood transfer often took place without authorization and hastily; but it is variously estimated that they number about 150-250. They are said to have come from "high institutions of learning" in Berlin, Dresden, Granz, Innsbruck, Vienna, etc. It is possible a complete list of them is in the hands of OSS, Salzburg or at the Education, Religion, Monument & Fine Arts office of the Military Government in Salzburg.

b. Their scientific activities are without direction: work is done in a rather arbitrary manner; there is free exchange of information concerning problems, methods of experimenting, and "communal use of such equipment" as was salvaged during the evacuation or as was built by the evacuees since.

c. Most of them are harmless; anxious to carry on their research and to obtain recognition of it through publication or correspondence and desirous of returning home and becoming members of "functioning research" institutions again. Some were Nazis.

d. Among them there is a very large group of capable nuclear physicists and chemists who have been working with make-shift equipment. Profs. STETTER, MATTAUCH, THIERING, Drs. SCHINDELMEISTER, JENTSCHKE, ORTNER, and E. FOCKE are names of some of them reported to have been connected with German research on a "Uranium Motor" project before war's end conducted by Kaiser Wilhelm Institute and the Institute for Neutron Research. They are reported capable of completing the work as soon as the opportunity arises. STETTER and his group assured ODARENKO that German research had progressed to where small-scale experiments were completed and satisfactory. If they could return to Vienna - where certain equipment and raw materials were left (and still intact in hands of Prof. E. HASCHKE,

TOP SECRET
cc - filed Austria

Figure D.879: W. R. Shuler to Leslie R. Groves. 26 November 1945. Subject: Problem of Displaced Scientists in American Zone of Austria [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 174, Folder 10.10. Austria Personnel].



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 91017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 174,  
Folder 10.10. Austria Personnel

**TOP SECRET**

Subject: Problem of Displaced Scientists in American Zone of Austria.

Poltzman Gasse 5, Vienna IX) - and given a supply of uranium, they could complete their work in three to six months with available personnel and equipment.

e. Prof. SMYTHE of Alsos Mission evidently is fully aware of their qualifications because he recommended to OSS that they be kept under "constant and strict survey."

f. Discharge of high-point officers of G-2, OSS and CIC makes it impossible for those remaining to take on the added duties connected with these displaced scientists. OSS in Salzburg has said responsibility for them will be transferred to some other organization - perhaps the Military Government - in which case it is to be supposed they will be treated as any other group of DP's. Consequently, these scientists may soon find themselves in a position favorable for completing their work.

g. The Russians are reported to be anxious to get certain men now in Austria and Germany to work for them. It seems therefore that PROMPT AND CAREFUL ATTENTION MUST BE GIVEN TO THESE PERSONS. Occupation authorities have said repeatedly that final disposition of them must come from USFET and that if a decision isn't made soon, it will perhaps be too late.

h. It is feared "that the present trend of German scientists in Germany to leak into the Russian zone and into USSR" will also occur in Austria but more systematically because of alleviation of travel and communication difficulties. This trend is attributable to the exceedingly alluring offers of the Russians. On the other hand, the present policy of OUR occupation authorities is the exact opposite of Russia's in all respects and a great deal weaker than the set-up in the other two zones.

2. A copy of the original report is being forwarded to Lt. Col. H. K. Calvert.

SHULER

*File Note: Letter may be  
Section mentioned in Skinner's Ltr  
(AA-259) of 18 Dec. 45. "summiting Nazi  
may have belonged to Sicherheitsdienst"  
[50 Security Service] R  
Jan 46*

**TOP SECRET**

Figure D.880: W. R. Shuler to Leslie R. Groves. 26 November 1945. Subject: Problem of Displaced Scientists in American Zone of Austria [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 174, Folder 10.10. Austria Personnel].



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority AND 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 174,  
Folder 10.10. Austria Personnel

<p>THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF ... PAGE(S) NO ... OF ... COPIES, SERIES ...</p>	
<p><b>TOP SECRET</b>      CONFIDENTIAL</p>	
<p>CROSS REFERENCE SHEET</p>	
<p>MAIN SUBJECT: INCOMING TOP SECRET CABLE</p>	<p>CLASSIFICATION NUMBER: 205.2</p>
<p>TO: WAR DEPARTMENT FOR WDGID</p>	<p>DATE OF COMMUNICATION: 23 November 1946</p>
<p>FROM: CG USFET Frankfurt Germany</p>	
<p>BRIEF SUMMARY:  See below</p>	
<p>CROSS REFERENCE NUMBERS:  10.10</p>	
<p>Following cable received from United States Forces Austria:</p> <p>"Subjects are Professors <u>George Stetter</u> and <u>Willibald Jentschke</u>, noted Austrian nuclear physicists presently in our custody at Zell Am See, Austria. Both names appear on the United State Forces European Theater 90 name denial list. During October Doctor Garin alias engineer Samsanov, a Russian civilian, visited the wife of Doctor Jentschke on several occasions in her Vienna home. He stated that he was aware of the fact that her husband was under contract to the United States but felt that he would reconsider and accept employment in Moscow. Although Garin's offers were very generous, Mrs. Jentschke declined them.</p> <p>"Garin implied during the conversations that the Moscow Research Institute was somewhat disappointed in the work Schintlmeister was doing. (Schintlmeister was an assistant to Stetter and Jentschke and is presently in Moscow). To substantiate this it is the opinion of several noted professors at the University of Vienna that Schintlmeister, although an outstanding nuclear physicist is not capable of progressive research in atomic energy without collaboration of Jentschke and Stetter with whom he has always been teamed. We believe that the Russians will vigorously attempt to secure the services of Stetter and Jentschke and although they are outspoken anti-Communistic, they obviously have a natural and exceptionally keen scientist's desire to continue their work and will eventually accept an attractive Russian offer. We</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CONFIDENTIAL</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>TOP SECRET</b></p> <p style="text-align: right;">10/10</p> <p style="text-align: right;">CARDERD</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;">- 2 -</p> <p>also fear the possibility of their being contracted in our (Lipped Russian) agents and kidnapped as was Schintlmeister.</p> <p>"It is therefore, urged that special consideration be given this case and that subjects be removed from the American Zone in Austria to prevent their falling into Russian hands."</p> <p>Stetter and Jentschke and families are being moved to Landshut without delay. Recommend they be shipped to the United States under project PAPERCLIP for denial purposes. Your approval requested soonest.</p>	

Figure D.881: Georg Stetter was kept under virtual house arrest by U.S. agents from 1945 until the 1950s [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 174, Folder 10.10. Austria Personnel].



WAR DEPARTMENT MEMO ROUTING SLIP			
1. NAME OR TITLE <i>Col. Free</i>	INITIALS <i>RF</i>	DATE <i>10/3</i>	CIRCULATE
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION			CONCURRENCE
2. <i>Col. Seaman</i>	<i>Kp</i>	<i>4/10/45</i>	FILE
3.			INFORMATION
4.			NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN
			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE
REMARKS <i>Discussion with Hagood on attached subject of Stetter and Jentschke revealed the following:</i> <i>a. legal procedure of "farming" out foreign scientists on Paperclip has yet to be ironed out - an ans are may be expected after a Conference Wed., 4 Dec.</i> <i>b. When "an" above has been ironed out, a War Department Agency will have to be found to sponsor the men.</i> <i>c. 4th organization will have to be located who will hire them.</i> <i>(even)</i>			
FROM NAME OR TITLE		DATE	
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION		TELEPHONE	

WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 1946 895 16-48467-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

*and unless until these things are carried out nothing can be done to move Stetter and Jentschke from their present locality under project Paperclip. Hagood will keep this section informed.*

WAR DEPARTMENT MEMO ROUTING SLIP			
1. NAME OR TITLE <i>Maj. Mattina</i>	INITIALS	DATE	CIRCULATE
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION			CONCURRENCE
2.			FILE
3.			INFORMATION
4.			NECESSARY ACTION
			NOTE AND RETURN
			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE
REMARKS <i>Maj. Mattina talked to Hagood 11/16. H. said ID has not decided on action yet, is looking for a military sponsor for two men concerned.</i> <i>For follow-up.</i>			

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 174,  
Folder 10.10. Austria Personnel

ARMY SERVICE FORCES MEMO ROUTING SLIP			
THE FOLLOWING IN THE ORDER INDICATED		INITIALS	CHECK ACTION
1. NAME, ORGANIZATION, BUILDING		DATE	CONCURRENCE
Hank		<i>HST</i>	SIGNATURE
2. Earl		<i>SM</i>	NOTE AND RETURN
3. Col. Free		<i>R</i>	NOTE AND FORWARD
		<i>RF</i>	COMPLETE ACTION
			CIRCULATE
			INFORMATION
			FILE
Both Stetter and Jentschke are rated "B" on our denial list which makes them rather important, since the "A" category is quite small.  I think every effort ought to be made to keep them from falling into the Russian laboratories.  Attached are the sheets from the Russian Summary which give the history of Sch., Jent., Stetter, and Gerin.  CIC <i>Jentschke worked on cross sections of fission energies and masses of fission products and neutron absorption cross sections of uranium. Note his work on energy of fission products better than MED work up to end of war.</i> <i>Stetter worked with Jentschke and also on fission with fast neutrons (the bomb problem). These are both good men and must not go to the Russians. Let's bring them over here &amp; finance them in Germany.</i> FROM: (Name, organization, building) <i>Hank</i> DATE TEL.			
AGASF FORM 1 OCT 1945 895 16-46173-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE			
REMARKS Stetter and Jentschke have excellent reputations. During the war they worked on: a. cross sections of uranium to neutrons particularly at high energies (the bomb problem) b. absorption cross sections of uranium toward neutrons c. energy and masses of fission products of uranium and ionium (Note this work is better than any corresponding MED work through the end of the war on this particular subject).  These men are definitely worth keeping out of Russian hands, and I think every effort should be made to do so, even to bringing them to this country.  Hank			
4. <i>Col. Free</i>			SEE ME
			SIGNATURE
REMARKS Granted that it is essential to keep them away from the Russians, the first question that comes to my mind is:  1) how is it that the Russians have such easy access to them?  This leads to question No. 2:  2) Landshut is in Bavaria but not such a heck of a distance from Zell-am-See. Would these yodlers be any safer THERE than they are.  3) If we don't want them in the USA (which is another matter), why don't we play safe and send them as far west in our zone as possible - or perhaps into the British Zone if that seems better and if John Bull, Esq. doesn't object.			
FROM NAME OR TITLE Ryan		DATE 25 Nov	
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION		TELEPHONE	

Figure D.882: "Stetter and Jentschke... During the war they worked on a. cross sections of uranium to neutrons particularly at high energies (the bomb problem)... c. energy and masses of fission products of uranium and ionium [thorium] (Note this work is better than any corresponding MED [Manhattan Engineering District] work through the end of the war on this particular subject." [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 174, Folder 10.10. Austria Personnel].



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority WDD007017

**NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 749,  
Folder 23 Nov 95 Georg Stetter XA001081**

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
JUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS  
Salzburg Detachment  
UNITED STATES FORCES AUSTRIA  
APO 541

MBH:lb  
Zell am See Section  
Date: 9 April 1946

Subject: Members of the Physics Institute II of  
the Vienna University (Zweites Physikalisches Institut)

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

Reference is made to letter, dated 21 January 1946, from Hq. Rainbow University, 42nd Infantry Division, Subject: "Civilian Scientist Groups in Kreis Zell am See", and to MOIC, Land Salzburg Detachment, CIC, Zell am See Section, dated 9 April 1946, Subject: "SCHINTLMBEISTER Josef, Dr., Scientist".

The Institute, together with a large part of its scientific equipment, had been moved from Vienna, IX, Boltzmannngasse 5, to Thumersbach, Bezirk Zell am See, in March 1945, according to Professor Dr. Georg STETTER, head of the Institute in Vienna, who was in charge also in Thumersbach.

Reports obtained from him, giving brief personal data on the members of the Institute and containing detailed information on the research work completed and contemplated by Subject Institute as well as a list of the members of the Institute and their present location, are attached to the original and file copies of this report.

On 7 January 1946 the scientific equipment was shipped back to Vienna on instructions from Major SELKE, USFA Education Officer, according to Dr. BIBERSCHICK Walter, member of the Institute.

Dr. STETTER stated that the attached reports had been submitted to IOSS, G-2, USFA, last year. As yet no word had been received from the American authorities on further research assignments.

*Meir Ben-Horin*  
MEIR BEN-HORIN  
Special Agent, CIC

Approved: *Gerald J. Weber*  
Gerald J. Weber  
SAIC CIC  
Land Salzburg Detachment

DISTRIBUTION:  
4 - A.C. of S., G-2 (CI), USFA  
1 - A.C. of S., G-2, 42d Inf.Div.  
1 - C.O., 430th CIC Det., Vienna  
1 - SCI/A  
1 - File

**DOWNGRADED**  
Auth CO, 430th CIC Det  
SOURCE: *[Signature]* 23 Jul 51  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

EVALUATION:

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Figure D.883: Georg Stetter was kept under virtual house arrest by U.S. agents from 1945 until the 1950s [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 749, Folder 23 Nov 95 Georg Stetter XA001081].



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NND 007017*

**NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 749,  
Folder 23 Nov 95 Georg Stetter XA001081**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS  
(430th CIC Detachment)  
LAND SALZBURG SECTION  
U.S. ARMY

CIC Salzburg  
Ref. No. S-2315

Zell am See Subsection  
16 July 1948

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SUBJECT: STETTER Prof. Dr. Georg (20th Bi-Weekly Report) ,  
FROM : CIC, Land Salzburg Section, Zell am See Subsection  
TO : Chief, CIC, Land Salzburg Section

1. Subject is currently residing at the Park Hotel, Thumersbach, Bezirk Zell am See, with his wife. His daughter is attending school in Innsbruck, French Zone, Austria.

2. Recently Subject started to write a book on Nuclear Physics (Kernphysik), however, he is having difficulties as he does not have access to a library.

3. Subject's work on the device to remove dust from the air in coal mines is currently at a standstill as he does not have money to build a final model. A copy of the report Subject sent to the Salzburg Land-Government concerning his tests is attached to this report as Appendix "A".

4. Except for the fact that his rheumatism is apparently getting worse, even under treatment in Salzburg, Subject appears to be in a cheerful state of mind.

*Charles W Foss*  
CHARLES W FOSS  
Special Agent, CIC



Classification Cancelled or Changed to *Confidential* by  
Authority of *Originator*, by *H. F. Minchin*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Figure D.884: Georg Stetter was kept under virtual house arrest by U.S. agents from 1945 until the 1950s [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 749, Folder 23 Nov 95 Georg Stetter XA001081].



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority WDD007017

**NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 749,  
Folder 23 Nov 95 Georg Stetter XA001081**

CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION	
AGENT REPORT (SR 380-320-10)	
1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT <b>STETTER, Dr. Georg, Patent Concerning Production of Atomic Energy (TIM 700), Technical Intelligence, Vienna</b>	2. DATE SUBMITTED <b>9 November 1953 mh</b> 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER <b>HO 01081 V-36742</b>
4. REPORT OF FINDINGS <p>On 26 October 1953, Informant 1063 submitted the following information to this Office:</p> <p>On 22 October 1953, Informant interviewed Prof. Dr. Georg STETTER at the First Physical Institute of the University of Vienna, concerning STETTER's atomic energy patents. STETTER stated that he owned no patents concerning atomic energy and that he did not contemplate applying for any. STETTER further stated that he had worked with nuclear physics during World War II, but that his notes and papers were seized by the Soviets in 1945 and that he had not worked with nuclear physics since 1945. STETTER is currently employed as head of the First Physical Institute of the University of Vienna and experimenting with dust particles. (C-3)</p> <p>On 29 October 1953, the files of this Region were examined, concerning Georg STETTER and revealed the following information:</p> <p>A/R V-34833, STETTER, Dr. Georg, dated 20 March 1953, reveals that STETTER accepted a position at the University of Vienna as head of the First Physical Institute. (C-3)</p> <p>A/R V-33629, dated 23 January 1953, Subject: "STETTER, Georg", reveals that STETTER was flown to Vienna on 26 October 1952 for the purpose of arranging employment at the University of Vienna. (B-3)</p> <p>STETTER is listed in numerous files of the Region as a prominent Austrian scientist and a former member of the NSDAP who was removed from his position as head of the Second Physics Institute at the University of Vienna because of NSDAP membership. STETTER is also listed on the Austrian Objective List of the JIOA. (C-3)</p>	
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED, EXCEPT FOR 200.10	
5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT <b>ROBERT A. SNEDEKER, S/A CIC 430th CIC Region "C" (Vienna)</b>	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT <i>Robert A. Snedeker</i>

DA FORM 341 1 APR 52 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED. SECURITY INFORMATION AGI (I) 12-52-200M-30093

Figure D.885: Georg Stetter was kept under virtual house arrest by U.S. agents from 1945 until the 1950s [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 749, Folder 23 Nov 95 Georg Stetter XA001081].



**William A. Consodine and A. E. Britt. August 1945. Notes to Aid in the Discussion with Dr. Vannevar Bush Concerning the Captured German Scientists. [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder 202.2 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Disc.]**

[...]

### III. REASON FOR DETENTION

#### A. Security

In view of our impending operations, security was the initial and remains the paramount reason for their detention. Any publicity on TA, either foreign or domestic, at this critical period would be detrimental to overall security. This action is in alignment with the treatment accorded to other important German scientists who are being held for interrogation.

#### B. Fear of their falling into French hands

We have long been afraid of these scientists falling into the hands of the French inasmuch as they represent enough combined talent to carry on work of utmost importance. France's very great interest in these men and their work has been evidenced on more than one occasion. [...]

#### C. Fear of their falling into Russian hands

At the time of their capture Anglo-American authorities were negotiating with Russian authorities for the permission for intelligence teams to enter each other's zone. The possibility of such an agreement left detention of the scientists the only means to prevent full interrogation by the Russians.

Russia's interest in soliciting the goodwill and services of German scientists has been clearly indicated. [...]

[See document photos on p. 4848.]



**TOP SECRET**

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 4...PAGES  
NO. 1... OF 4... COPIES, SERIES A

Notes to Aid in the Discussion with Dr. Vannevar Bush  
Concerning the Captured German Scientists

*WAC*

*July 1945*

**I. PERSONNEL**

A. The following German nuclear physicists are at present being secretly detained in a house on the outskirts of London:

Prof. Max von Laue  
Prof. Otto Hahn  
Prof. Werner Heisenberg  
Prof. Walther Gerlach  
Dr. Paul Harteck  
Prof. C. F. von Weizsacker  
Dr. Karl Wirtz  
Dr. Kurt Diebner  
Dr. Erich Bagge  
Dr. Horst Korsching

B. The Scientists were secured around 1 May of this year during the Hechingen operations.

**II. ITINERARY SINCE CAPTURE**

A. Since their capture they have been moved as follows:

1. Hechingen to Rheims, 1 May 1945  
(They were furnished ample quarters here and in the same house in which von Papen had been detained)
2. Rheims to Versailles, 7 May 1945  
(Their billet here was considered unsatisfactory as complete segregation was impossible from other captured German scientists)
3. Versailles to Le Vesinet (suburb of Paris), 11 May 1945  
(The scientists were pleased with this location. They occupied themselves by working in their rooms, or exercising.)
4. Le Vesinet to Huy, Belgium, 4 June 1945  
(Here they were located in a large chateau)
5. Huy to London, 3 July 1945 (Travel performed by air)  
(They were moved here for reasons of security. It was felt that tighter security from outside influences could be maintained in England than Belgium. These living quarters are more than ample, they are isolated, have better rationing than POWs, and their present location affords us the opportunity of monitoring their conversations which should aid in making the decision regarding their final disposition.)

**TOP SECRET**

Monitored conversations of von Weizsacker and Heisenberg have indicated their leanings toward Russia.

**IV. TREATMENT OF THE SCIENTISTS SINCE THEIR CAPTURE**

A. The handling of the scientists since their capture has been solely by TA personnel, under the policies set forth by this office in accordance with the directives for handling POWs as established in the Theater. Their accommodations have been more than ample as indicated by providing four German POWs who act as orderlies. The scientists are furnished reading material in the form of newspapers, technical journals, and novels. Free access to the grounds of the estate is permitted. Their families have been notified that they are safe, however, from a security standpoint, free exchange of mail has not yet been permitted. In general the difficulty of communication and transportation has been the curtailment factor. At Diebner's request we moved his family, along with some of his furnishings, outside of the territory to be occupied by the Russians; this incident took considerable work and time.

**V. MORALE AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES**

A. The group has settled down well at their new location outside London but are becoming more and more restive. The question of their families is causing them the greatest concern. Most of the monitored conversations indicate they are pleased with the treatment they are receiving, but are completely mystified about their future.

**VI. CHARACTER SKETCHES OF CAPTURED SCIENTISTS**

**von Laue**  
A shy mild mannered man. He cannot understand the reason for his detention. He has been extremely friendly and is very well disposed to England and America.

**Hahn**  
A man of the world. He has been the most helpful of the professors and his sense of humour and common sense has saved the day on many occasions. He is definitely friendly disposed to England and America.

**Heisenberg**  
He has been very friendly and helpful and is, it is believed, genuinely anxious to cooperate with British and American scientists although he has spoken of going over to the Russians.

**Gerlach**  
Has a very cheerful disposition and is easy to handle. He appears to be genuinely co-operative.

**Harteck**  
A pleasing personality and has never caused any trouble. His one wish is to get on with his work. As he is a bachelor, he is less worried than the others about the conditions in Germany.

**TOP SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 97017

**TOP SECRET**

**III. REASON FOR DETENTION**

**A. Security**

In view of our impending operations, security was the initial and remains the paramount reason for their detention. Any publicity on TA, either foreign or domestic, at this critical period would be detrimental to overall security. This action is in alignment with the treatment accorded to other important German scientists who are being held for interrogation.

**B. Fear of their falling into French hands**

We have long been afraid of these scientists falling into the hands of the French inasmuch as they represent enough combined talent to carry on work of utmost importance. France's very great interest in these men and their work has been evidenced on more than one occasion. The main incidents proving this are:

1. Joliot dispatching a French scientific party to the Hechingen area, which is still occupied by French troops.
2. After their capture Joliot inquired from an Alsos scientist the whereabouts of Heisenberg and his party, at which time he made the statement that he would like to find them in order that they might be put to work for France.
3. There is a possibility that should Joliot have gained control of the scientists prior to his recent trip to Moscow, they might have been used as a bargaining power with Russia.

**C. Fear of their falling into Russian hands**

At the time of their capture Anglo-American authorities were negotiating with Russian authorities for the permission for intelligence teams to enter each other's zone. The possibility of such an agreement left detention of the scientists the only means to prevent full interrogation by the Russians.

Russia's interest in soliciting the goodwill and services of German scientists has been clearly indicated. Professor Sauerbach, the former German Minister of Health, who was captured by the Russians, has made repeated broadcasts from Berlin relating the kind treatment the USSR has bestowed upon the German technical classes. The only interpretation that can be made is that they are trying to entice men of this caliber into their zone. In another incident, Dr. Hasche a member of the American intelligence team TIG, ran into a nuclear physicist laboratory near Munich staffed by some twenty-four scientists of whom half were from Vienna. These individuals were taken into custody by the American Army but most of them elected to go to Berlin into Russian custody as it was their impression that the Russians were going out of their way to attract German scientists of this type.

**TOP SECRET**

**Diebner**  
Outwardly very friendly but has an unpleasant personality and is not to be trusted. He is disliked by all the others except Bagge.

**von Weizsacker**  
A diplomat. He has always been very friendly and co-operative and it is believed he is genuinely prepared to work with England and America but he is a good German.

**Wirtz**  
An egoist. Very friendly on the surface but cannot be trusted. If doubt whether he will co-operate unless it is made worth his while.

**Bagge**  
A serious and very hardworking young man. He is completely German and is unlikely to co-operate. His friendship with Diebner lays him open to suspicion.

**Korsching**  
A complete enigma. He appears to be morose and surly. He very rarely opens his mouth. He has, however, become more human since his arrival in England.

**VII. POST-WAR DISPOSITION OF CAPTURED SCIENTISTS**

A. After impending operations are completed we will have several alternatives open to us, none of which can wisely be decided at this time. These alternatives appear to be:

1. Release them from custody and permit them to return to Germany. This would inevitably result in their working either for the Russians or the French. Both are desirous of their services and such action would materially enhance their efforts.
2. Move them and their families to America for employment on the American job with the ultimate aim of their becoming citizens. In monitored conversations some of them have indicated they would like to establish citizenship in other countries; most all have acquiesced to either working in England or America.
3. Return them to the Anglo-American Zone in Germany to continue their work under our supervision but without our assistance. We would merely control their work.

**TOP SECRET**

*RPB*

Figure D.886: William A. Consodine and A. E. Britt. August 1945. Notes to Aid in the Discussion with Dr. Vannevar Bush Concerning the Captured German Scientists [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder 202.2 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Disc.].



Henry Maitland Wilson to John Anderson. 26 October 1945 [TNA FO 800/565].

ANCAM 453

26th October 1945

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

Your CANAM 453.

Following for Sir John Anderson from Field Marshal Wilson.

I saw Groves yesterday morning and found him very difficult to move on this question. He seems completely convinced

- (a) that all but one or two of the Group would certainly try to go to Russia
- (b) that if they did they would be of the greatest value to the Soviet Government and
- (c) that even if they did not go to Russia voluntarily some would almost certainly be kidnapped. (Groves alleged that there have been one or two cases of kidnapping of scientists already by the Russians in the American zone).

On the second point (b) he expressed the view that as a Group they were superior in all-round ability to the Group which had started the New Mexico laboratory.

2. Groves asked me whether it was not possible to treat some or all of these men as war criminals. I replied in the negative but he pressed for confirmation of this. Secondly, he asked whether it was not possible for some or all of them to be offered jobs in the United Kingdom. He asked to be assured on this point and said that in the meantime he would explore the possibility of employing them in the United States, though he did not seem to be very optimistic.

3. Groves is being very unreasonable on this question, but I do not quite follow what is to be gained by taking the matter up with the State Department; who will merely consult the War Department. My inclination would be to give Groves a week to reply about the opportunities in the United States. If there is no result we should then tell him that there are no grounds on which we can legally justify their continued detention (if this is indeed the case) and that we have no alternative to sending them back to the zones in Germany from which they came, in order to join their families. But I do not think that it would be right that we should do this unless, at the same time, special instruction were given to our security forces to pay special attention to these men with the object of preventing them escaping either to the Russian occupied zone or to Berlin. I see no reason why such instructions should not be issued.

[See photos on pp. 4850–4851. Field Marshal Henry Maitland Wilson was chief of the British Joint Staff Mission to Washington, DC (JSM Washington) from 1945 to 1947. In this lofty official capacity, he met with Leslie Groves on 25 October 1945 and reported it in this Top Secret encrypted cable the next day. His cable was addressed to Sir John Anderson, who was the chair of the U.K. Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy, as well as to several other top advisors in the British government.

Leslie Groves said the German scientists held at Farm Hall “were superior in all-round ability to the Group which had started the New Mexico laboratory” and were “of the greatest value,” and he wanted to either employ them or prosecute them as war criminals. See also the 20 February 1946 memorandum from Groves below. These private admissions by Groves demonstrate that his public statements denigrating the German nuclear scientists and their work were knowingly false. If German nuclear scientists had not done anything of consequence during the war, Groves would not have had any reason to believe they were superior to the Manhattan Project scientists. Likewise, if German nuclear scientists had not done anything of consequence during the war, Groves would not have had any possible grounds on which to consider prosecuting them as war criminals.]



TNA FO 800/565

TOP SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAMRECEIVED BY C.T.P.

IZ 10052  
 TOO 261657Z  
 TOR 261935Z

FROM:- J.S.M. WASHINGTON  
 TO:- CABINET OFFICES

ANAM 453

26th October 1945

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL.

Your CANAM 453.

Following for Sir John Anderson from Field  
 Marshal Wilson.

I saw Groves yesterday morning and found  
 him very difficult to move on this question. He  
 seems completely convinced

- (a) that all but one or two of the Group  
 would certainly try to go to Russia
- (b) that if they did they would be of  
 the greatest value to the Soviet  
 Government and
- (c) that even if they did not go to  
 Russia voluntarily some would almost  
 certainly be kidnapped. (Groves  
 alleged that there have been one  
 or two cases of kidnapping of scient-  
 ists already by the Russians in the  
 American zone).

On the second point (b) he expressed the  
 view that as a Group they were superior in all-  
 round ability to the Group which had started the new  
 Mexico laboratory.

2. Groves asked me whether it was not possible to  
 treat some or all of these men as war criminals. I replied  
 in the negative but he pressed for confirmation of this.  
 Secondly, he asked whether it was not possible for some or  
 all of them to be offered jobs in the United Kingdom. He  
 asked to be assured on this point and said that in the

Figure D.887: Leslie Groves said the German scientists held at Farm Hall "were superior in all-round ability to the Group which had started the New Mexico laboratory" and were "of the greatest value," and he wanted to either employ them or prosecute them as war criminals [TNA FO 800/565, Henry Maitland Wilson to John Anderson, 26 October 1945].



-2-

{ meantime he would explore the possibility of employing them in the United States, though he did not seem to be very optimistic.

3. Groves is being very unreasonable on this question, but I do not quite follow what is to be gained by taking the matter up with the State Department; who will merely consult the War Department. My inclination would be to give Groves a week to reply about the opportunities in the United States. If there is no result we should then tell him that there are no grounds on which we can legally justify their continued detention (if this is indeed the case) and that we have no alternative to sending them back to the zones in Germany from which they came, in order to join their families. But I do not think that it would be right that we should do this unless, at the same time, special instructions were given to our security forces to pay special attention to these men with the object of preventing them escaping either to the Russian occupied zone or to Berlin. I see no reason why such instructions should not be issued.

T.O.O. 261657z

CIRCULATION.

Defence Office  
Sir John Anderson  
Mr. Neville Butler  
Sir E. Appleton  
Mr. Frank  
Mr. Akers  
Mr. Rickett  
Mr. Gorell Barnes

TNA FO 800/565

Figure D.888: Leslie Groves said the German scientists held at Farm Hall "were superior in all-round ability to the Group which had started the New Mexico laboratory" and were "of the greatest value," and he wanted to either employ them or prosecute them as war criminals [TNA FO 800/565, Henry Maitland Wilson to John Anderson, 26 October 1945].



**John Weckerling. 6 February 1946 secret memorandum. [NARA RG 319, Entry NM3-47B, Box 991, Folder Implementation, General Policy & History]**

MIL 920

6 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY SERVICE FORCES:

SUBJECT: Plans for Extended Exploitation of OVERCAST Personnel

1. In the event that governmental policies are promulgated that will permit long-term exploitation of German scientists with inducements such as legal status in the United States, possible transfer of families, patent protection, etc., it is desirable that the War Department be prepared to take immediate advantage of such a policy. It is requested that you submit lists of scientists, in the following categories, whose indefinite stay in this country appears to be in the national interest[...]

**Leslie Groves. 20 February 1946 secret memorandum. [NARA RG 319, Entry NM3-47B, Box 991, Folder Implementation, General Policy & History]**

20 February 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY SERVICE FORCES:

THRU: Chief, Personnel Division, Office Chief of Engineers.

SUBJECT: Plans for Extended Exploitation of OVERCAST Personnel.

1. Reference is made to memorandum for the Commanding General, ASF, subject as above, dated 6 February 1946, from Brigadier General John Weckerling, WDGS, MID G-2, reference MIL 920.

2. Government measures to encourage the long term exploitation of German scientists by the United States are desirable, particularly with reference to nuclear physicists and chemists who might be of some service to scientists in this country in the field of atomic energy.



3. There are a number of German scientists who might well be included for the policies and procedures set forth in reference memorandum. However, they do not fall within any of the categories listed in paragraph 1 of that memorandum. The atomic bomb was created without the direct exploitation of any German scientists. I suggest, therefore, a fifth category, defined as, those **German scientists of outstanding ability in the field of nuclear physics and chemistry who, by their past reputation and present knowledge, would be of more value to the national interest of this country if they could be employed here rather than in any other country.** A list of the men falling within such category is given below. In order for you to place them in the proper priority group, I have included a brief critical analysis of their relative merit. It should be borne in mind that strong opposition will be encountered in placing these men in American institutions best fitted to exploit their efforts. The Manhattan District does not want them because of obvious security reasons. However, **it is extremely important that these persons be prevented from giving their services to a potential enemy of the United States.**

#### PROFESSOR OTTO HAHN

He is one of the greatest living chemists in the field of radioactivity, and winner of the 1944 Nobel prize in Chemistry for the discovery of the fission of uranium. Hahn is not known to have been a Nazi and is apparently well disposed to both England and America.

#### PROFESSOR MAX VON LAUE

He never actively worked on the German nuclear physics project. However, he is or has been well disposed toward America. His son is presently in the United States Army and was formerly at Princeton. Von Laue is noted in the field of physical chemistry and X-ray diffraction as a top flight man. He is over seventy years of age.

#### PROFESSOR WALTHER GERLACH

Gerlach is an experimental atomic physicist of considerable ability but is a thorough Nazi and served as Goering's deputy in charge of the German atomic energy effort in its later stages. He is reported to feel like a defeated general because of the failure of the German nuclear project and has discussed suicide. He is not believed sympathetic to other countries but is essentially a German nationalist.

#### PROFESSOR W. HEISENBERG

He is a theoretical nuclear physicist, a Nobel prize winner and probably the present German leader in physics. He is particularly known for his work in quantum mechanics and nuclear theory. Although Heisenberg may not have been an active Nazi he is a patriotic German. It is conceivable that some persuasion might be necessary as he may desire to take his chances in Germany or England.

#### PROFESSOR P. HARTECK

**He is a famous physical chemist who seems to have what has been characterized as an "American approach" to atomic energy problems, i.e.—he demonstrated a competence in the engineering phases of the work.** He is not believed to have any profound political sympathies but has confined himself to his research work.



PROFESSOR C. P. VON WEIZSACKER

He is a first-class physicist and astro-physicist quite interested in philosophy and certain philosophical implications of his work. He is an opportunist and son of a diplomat. He is not believed to be a Nazi.

DR. K. WIRTZ

He is an experimental physicist, comparatively unknown prior to the German atomic energy project but the author, while on the project, of a number of worthwhile reports, particularly on pile theory. Wirtz is the sort who will go to another country if offered what he considers good terms.

DR. E. BAGGE

He is a fairly young, reasonably competent, experimental physicist who has done considerable work on isotope separation. Bagge is of humble origin, a serious, hard-working, completely German nationalist. He might work for another country.

H. KORSCHING

He is a rather obscure physicist who has done good work on isotope separation on the German energy project. He was probably a Nazi.

K. DIEBNER

He was Gerlach's administrative assistant on the German atomic energy project. He is not a particularly well known physicist although he has a pretty good grasp of the German project.

FREDERICK WEYGAND

He is a chemist and biologist and not a physicist. He is believed to be anti-Nazi and has been cooperative with American authorities. He has until recently been located in an American P/W camp. He has recently written the Rockefeller Foundation and requested a position with them.

DR. WERNER MAURER

He has been, until recently, in an American P/W camp but is presently on his way back to Germany. Maurer is a relatively young physicist who did considerable experimental work in Joliot's laboratory in Paris after the German occupation. He is unquestionably a reliable Nazi in addition to being an able young physicist.

DR. RUDOLPH FLEISCHMANN

He was, until recently, in an American P/W camp. He is a first-rate physicist formerly head of the Physical Research Division of the Medical Institute of the University of Strassburg and is generally considered to be an extreme Nazi. His particular field has centered around the application of induced radioactivity in the field of biological research.



PROFESSOR FRITZ G. HOUTERMANS

Houtermans is of Dutch extraction, grew up in Austria, lived in Germany until 1933 when he left because of the Nazi Party and worked at Cambridge University in England. He subsequently went to Kharkov, Russia, where he worked at the Kharkov Physico-Technical Institute. In 1937, as he was preparing to leave Russia, Houtermans, according to his own statement, was arrested by the NKVD on vague charges of counter-revolutionary activity for Germany. As a result of the intervention of Dr. R. A. Millikan of Cal. Tech., he was released in 1940 after preparing what he claims was a false confession of technical espionage which he framed in such a manner as to be obviously scientifically fallacious, but which satisfied the NKVD, who exiled him to Germany in spite of his requests not to be sent there. In Germany, Houtermans says he was immediately imprisoned by the Gestapo but was released after questioning as to why he had left Russia.

Houtermans' connection with the German nuclear physics project was not great, although he was in close contact with von Weizsacker and von Ardenne and worked with the latter on a cyclotron. Houtermans' official position was with the PTR (German Bureau of Standards) at Ronneburg, Thuringen, where he worked with counter-tubes. **He was the first man in Germany to propose the fissionability of plutonium and wrote several memoranda on the subject**, but little attention was paid to him in Germany.

L. R. GROVES,  
Major General, U.S.A.

[Publicly, Leslie Groves agreed with Samuel Goudsmit's statements that the wartime German nuclear program was very small and very primitive, had never considered plutonium, and had never even tried to produce a fission bomb. Privately, Groves wrote this secret memorandum admitting that the German program had recognized the potential of plutonium very early on, had done "considerable work" on uranium isotope separation, and had a number of "nuclear physicists and chemists who might be of some service to scientists in this country in the field of atomic energy." Groves also warned that because of those scientists' "present knowledge," "it is extremely important that these persons be prevented from giving their services to a potential enemy of the United States."

This document also shows that in addition to the ten nuclear scientists who were held at Farm Hall, a significant number of German nuclear scientists were taken to the United States for extended interrogations in "American P/W camps." How many scientists were interrogated? Where are the reports on their interrogations? What did Groves learn from those interrogations or other intelligence sources that convinced him to write this secret memo, which contradicts what Groves and Goudsmit publicly asserted?]



**Walter Trinks. Undated but probably summer 1945. [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box ??, Folder XE098301 Trinks, Walter]**

Dr. Walter Trinks  
Int. No. 8-3448-M-AA  
7<sup>th</sup> Coy.

TO THE AMERICAN COMMAND OF THE INTERNMENT CAMP? CIC-STAFF.

When I was imprisoned at Bad Aibling an American officer in an address asked German scientists and specialists to present themselves. Having presented myself I was told to give further written information on my education [education] and my career. Having been transferred to this camp I could not do so. **I am a Physicist and have been employed with the OKH [Oberkommando des Heeres] until the end of the war in the research dept. of the office for arms [Heereswaffenamt] as referee for the physics of explosions and blasting.** The tasks of that dept. included:

- 1<sup>st</sup> Research of physical phenomena at the explosion
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Augmentation of and defense against the effect of blasting materials through physical methods
- 3<sup>rd</sup> Research of difficulties and troubles.
- 4<sup>th</sup> The replacement of valuable raw materials.

During the war the principal labor was dedicated to the principle of hollow charges and its use in armour breaking ammunition as F-I-7,5 cm grenade, HL(ABC), 10 cm G.Hl, rifle grenade, Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck, Panzerhandgrenade, Redcap, Magnetic H 3 and H 15.

**At the end of the war I was occupied with experiments for producing extreme high pressures and temperatures, extreme velocities (up to 15 km/sec) and heavy swingings of the air [shock waves]. The practical use of these researches comprises:**

- 1<sup>st</sup> **for the war:** the defense against V-weapons super- and atomic bombs by destroying them before they reach their target and **the initiation of atomic bombs.**
- 2<sup>nd</sup> for peacetime: the producing of artificial diamonds and the enriching of minerals and materials.
- 3<sup>rd</sup> for purely scientific research of special molecules and atoms under extreme pressures and temperatures.

I esteem these researches to be important and promising and therefore ask to be allowed to prosecute them at the service of the U.S.A.

[See document photos on pp. 4296–4297. Due to the number of English spelling and capitalization mistakes, this document appears to have been written in English by Trinks himself, not translated by a native English speaker. For ease of understanding, I have corrected most of the document's English mistakes in the above transcription.

Trinks was imprisoned by the U.S. Army from June 1945 to June 1946, and he informed them that “At the end of the war I was occupied with experiments for... the initiation of atomic bombs.” Where are the detailed reports on his interrogations and everything he told U.S. officials about his wartime work? What exactly did he work on after the war, and for whom?]

**CONFIDENTIAL**

THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Manhattan Engineer District  
Office of the Military Attache  
American Embassy, London  
23 March 1946

EPD/rb

SUBJECT: USFET Request for Liaison Officer.

TO: Colonel W. R. Shuler, Room 4181, New War Department Building,  
Washington, D. C.

1. During a recent visit to USFET, various officers in the G-2 Division raised again the need of a MED liaison officer with that Headquarters. In fact things had progressed rather far. Lt. Colonel Greene had prepared a letter for General Sibert's signature addressed to General Vandenberg. The letter was to intercede on USFET's behalf with General Groves and ask if he, Groves, would reconsider his decision of a few weeks ago not to have a liaison officer permanently on duty in Frankfurt.

2. Frankly, the letter was filled with errors. It was even wrong in describing how G-2 USFET handles MED business; and point by point I explained to Greene how his own Division was handling our business. Greene finally tore up the letter.

3. Then it was decided to send a cable to General Vandenberg, briefly inquiring if he would ask General Groves to reconsider. That would mean a dozen copies or so being circulated around the War Department apart from General Groves' own copy. It seemed to me preferable to keep this an MED family affair. Greene agreed to drop the matter of a cable on the condition that I would ask my own Headquarters to reconsider the matter.

4. Officially, then, I transmit to your Headquarters the USFET request: that the Manhattan Engineer District have a permanent liaison officer on duty in the G-2 Division of USFET Main.

5. As a staff officer, it is my responsibility to assist you and the General by giving recommendations. My recommendation is that there is no need to assign a permanent liaison officer to USFET.

6. As an intelligence officer, I report the following:

a. The letter referred to in Paragraphs 1 and 2 was Greene's own brain child. Although prepared for General Sibert's signature, I know that Sibert had not seen it even in draft form.

b. Greene feels the need of a liaison officer. Yet Lt. Colonel Collins, the pick-and-shovel officer who actually handles our business, has a clear grasp of our interests. Although he would like to see a liaison officer, he admitted privately things were going along all right on the present basis.

14. Such a man need only be here on a limited tour of duty -- three months in the ETO should do the job. He would be attached to USFET as liaison, but on the understanding he would often be in the field.

15. I believe that the above would go far in satisfying General Sibert. Once the mission was completed, we could tell General Sibert that all odds-and-ends were tidied up, that the only continuing mission was one of observation.

*Edgar P. Dean*  
EDGAR P. DEAN,  
Lt. Colonel, AUS.

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NND 917017

**CONFIDENTIAL**

7. I feel that a permanent liaison officer is not necessary because of two reasons: present techniques in operation and the nature of our mission in Germany. To expand these points.

8. Techniques. This office and G-2 have, over the weeks, worked out an effective system of mutual assistance. Once every 10 - 14 days, an officer from this office is in Frankfurt to assist and advise Collins. Urgent matters are handled by telephone; Collins and I talk with one another several times a week. Last, we have prepared for G-2's benefit a statement of the MED missions in Germany and methods of accomplishing the mission. (See letter this office to General Sibert, "Present Mission in Germany re Atomic Energy", dated 19 March.)

9. Nature of Mission. Germany is not the country in Europe we are the most worried about. From an intelligence point of view, the great job in Germany has already been done. There are certain remaining jobs but they can't be done sitting in Frankfurt. Moreover, during the last four months we have received precious little intelligence from G-2 USFET. The best of the intelligence has always been SSU reports, with USFET acting merely as a forwarding agency. We often get these reports directly from the SSU.

10. Duty enjoins that I pass on to you the request emanating from General Sibert's office. Honesty compels me to disagree with the need of a permanent liaison officer. Merely another officer, chained to a desk in Frankfurt, wouldn't have more than a couple of hours work per day.

11. There is however a temporary need of a special type of MED liaison who would be based on, but not confined to, Frankfurt. We are accumulating a number of cases of supposedly world famous experts in atomic energy who write to G-2 USFET in one connection or another. Most of these names do not appear on ours or Welch's list of first and second-rate German scientists. Routine intelligence often shows they are crackpots. But they can only be satisfactorily interrogated by someone who himself is a nuclear physicist. Neither Johnson, Warner, nor I can qualify in this regard. We need someone to take a number of these cases and decide then one way or another: forget them or add them to the list of scientists whose whereabouts should be definitely known.

12. Then there is another job. The British in their Zone are making an inventory of all cyclotrons, betatrons, Van de Graff machines, etc. I should like to do the same for the US Zone. This is not merely in imitation of our British cousins. Welsh and I are entirely agreed that re Germany we want to tidy up a lot of loose ends: get our definitive list of personnel (mostly accomplished), get an inventory of vital equipment, remove the small remaining lots of uranium. These accomplished, the basic intelligence job in Germany is one of observation.

13. Thus on the US side we have temporary need of a special type of man. Obviously he must be a nuclear physicist. Charles Campbell, who used to be at Oak Ridge, illustrates the type of man we need. I'm not sure whether Major John King, also of the Ridge, has enough technical background. Such a man must know after he interrogates a German scientist whether the latter is a scientist or a phony. He must know a betatron when he sees one, etc.

3 April 1946

MEMORANDUM TO MAJOR GENERAL L. R. GROVES

Subject: USFET Request for Liaison Officer

1. Gattiker and Clarke fully agree with this letter, and so do I.

2. If you agree to sending a man to Germany as suggested in para. 11 - 14, he would have to come from the field. Major King will not be available, and we can't afford to send Campbell from here now.

3. The name of Major Ralph Carlisle Smith, Patent Advisor, Site Y, has been suggested by Campbell and Clarke. He is understood to have a good technical mastery of the project, is otherwise a good officer, and is desirous of an overseas mission.

*Ask Notes:*

① Gen. Nichols agrees to need of temp liaison in Germany. Major Smith is qualified but not available. Shows only solution: an O to propose the way for a civilian scientist to act as his scientific advisor, inspector and interpreter for required time; then scientist to come home & O to draw down ends together.

② There is a group of Austrian scientists in Vienna who know all about the Austrian Atomic Energy effort & the previous data; also at least seven good scientists who have recently returned from Russia. These should be contacted immediately and arrangements made for a U.S. scientist to interview them.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A,  
Box 168, Folder 202.2 LONDON  
OFFICE: Combined Intell Disc.**

Figure D.889: If the wartime German nuclear program was so small and primitive, why did the U.S. keep investigating and discovering more and more information about scientists, sites, and equipment from that program a year after the war? Edgar P. Dean to W. R. Shuler, 23 March 1946. R. H. Free to Leslie Groves, 3 April 1946. Subject: USFET Request for Liaison Officer. [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder 202.2 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Disc.]



RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 160

(19)  
1/2/T

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Apr 45 - Dec. 45  
MSG. 65971

Date 10-11-45

From —

To War Dept.

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 4-4-91  
Authority Date AR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 160

(18)  
1/1/T

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Apr. 45 - Dec. 45  
MSG. 66080

Date 11-8-45

From —

To War Dept.

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 4-4-91  
Authority Date AR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

## NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 160

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 160

(9A)  
1/1/T

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 205.2 Cables Incoming Top Secret  
MSG. 70232

Date 1-31-46

From —

To —

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 4-4-91  
Authority Date AR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 160

(9)  
1/2/T

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 205.2 Cables Incoming Top Secret  
MSG. 7561

Date 2-25-46

From USMA

To WAR Dept.

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 4-4-91  
Authority Date AR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Figure D.890: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 160	6D 1/1/T RG 77 Entry 22 Box 160	6C 1/1/T
ACCESS RESTRICTED	ACCESS RESTRICTED	ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:	The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:	The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
File Designation <u>205.2 Cables Incoming Top Secret</u>	File Designation <u>205.2 Cables Incoming Top Secret</u>	File Designation <u>205.2 Cables Incoming Top Secret</u>
MSG. 70376	MSG. 70456	MSG. 70456
Date <u>3-18-46</u>	Date <u>4-22-46</u>	Date <u>4-22-46</u>
From <u>USMA, London</u>	From <u>London</u>	From <u>London</u>
To <u>War Dept.</u>	To <u>War Dept.</u>	To <u>War Dept.</u>
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:	In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:	In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information
<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information
NND 917017 Authority	NND 917017 Authority	NND 917017 Authority
4-4-91 Date	4-4-91 Date	4-4-91 Date
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)	NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)	NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

## NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 160

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 160	6A 1/3/T RG 77 Entry 22 Box 160	4 1/1/T
ACCESS RESTRICTED	ACCESS RESTRICTED	ACCESS RESTRICTED
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:	The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:	The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:
File Designation <u>205.2 Cables Incoming TS</u>	File Designation <u>205.2 Cables Incoming Top Secret</u>	File Designation <u>205.2 Cables Incoming Top Secret</u>
MSG. 70475	MSG. 1865	MSG. 1865
Date <u>4-28-46</u>	Date <u>9-5-46</u>	Date <u>9-5-46</u>
From <u>MA, London</u>	From <u>USMA, Praha</u>	From <u>USMA, Praha</u>
To <u>War Dept.</u>	To <u>War Dept.</u>	To <u>War Dept.</u>
In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:	In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:	In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information
<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information	<input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information
NND 917017 Authority	NND 917017 Authority	NND 917017 Authority
4-4-91 Date	4-4-91 Date	4-4-91 Date
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)	NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)	NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

Figure D.891: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]



RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 160

(2A)  
1/1/7

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

(24)  
1/12/8

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

(25)  
1/8/7

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

(32)  
1/15/8

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 205.2 Cables Incoming Top Secret

Date MSG 7/1/54

From USMA London

To War Dept.

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 4-4-91  
Authority Date AR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-80)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Australia

Date Memo w/ att.

From Castle 5

To Bussell

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 4-4-91 cc  
Authority Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-80)

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

## NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Boxes 160 & 164

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

(25)  
1/8/7

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

(32)  
1/15/8

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

(25)  
1/8/7

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

(32)  
1/15/8

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Australia

Date Memo w/ att.

From Johnson

To Shuler

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 4-4-91 cc  
Authority Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-80)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Australia

Date Ltr w/ Encl.

From Peterson

To Powley

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 4-4-91 cc  
Authority Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-80)

Figure D.892: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? (Despite its name, the “Australia” folder is filled with German nuclear files. Either “Australia” was simply a code name or an otherwise empty folder was used to stored excess German files. [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A])

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

(SB)  
1/10/17

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

(6A)  
1/11/17

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Czechoslovakia

Date 5-15-45

From -

To -

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017      4-4-91 cc

Authority      Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Czechoslovakia

Date 2-4-46

From Shuler

To Groves

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017      4-4-91 cc

Authority      Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NND 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 164

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

(2)  
1/3/17

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

(2)  
1/3/15

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Czechoslovakia

Date 2-11-46

From Dean

To Shuler

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017      4-4-91 cc

Authority      Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Czechoslovakia

Date 2-12-46

From Dean

To Shuler

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017      4-4-91 cc

Authority      Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION      NA FORM 14000 (11-88)      NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION      NA FORM 14000 (11-88)

Figure D.893: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]



<p>RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164</p> <p>(98) 1/2/17</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Czechoslovakia</u></p> <p><u>Memo</u></p> <p>Date <u>2-28-46</u></p> <p>From <u>Guthrie</u></p> <p>To <u>Shuler</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority</p> <p>4-4-91 cc Date</p> <p>NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (11-86)</p>	<p>RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164</p> <p>(9) 1/11/17</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Czechoslovakia</u></p> <p><u>Partial Folder</u></p> <p>Date <u>Feb. 1946</u></p> <p>From</p> <p>To</p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority</p> <p>4-4-91 cc Date</p> <p>NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (11-86)</p>
<p>DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 917017</p> <p><b>NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 164</b></p>	
<p>RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164</p> <p>(15) 1/11/17</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Czechoslovakia</u></p> <p><u>Memo</u></p> <p>Date <u>Sept. 1946</u></p> <p>From <u>Longworth</u></p> <p>To <u>Free</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority</p> <p>4-4-91 cc Date</p> <p>NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (11-86)</p>	<p>RG 77 Entry 22 Box 164</p> <p>(16) 1/11/17</p> <p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>Czechoslovakia</u></p> <p><u>Partial Folder</u></p> <p>Date <u>Sept. 46</u></p> <p>From</p> <p>To</p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p>NND 917017 Authority</p> <p>4-4-91 cc Date</p> <p>NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (11-86)</p>

Figure D.894: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

(17) RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

(18) RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Czechoslovakia

Date 10-8-46

From Longuth

To Free

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4- Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Czechoslovakia

Date 11-4-46

From Mattin

To Guthrie

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-4-91 cc Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

## NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 164

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

(19) RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

(20) RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Czechoslovakia

Date 11-12-46

From Campbell

To Seeman

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-4-91 cc Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Czechoslovakia

Date 11-13-46

From Seeman

To Guthrie

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-4-91 cc Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Figure D.895: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]



RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

②  
11/3/7

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 164

①  
11/2/7

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation France

Date 3-3-46

From Dean

To Shuler

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017      4-4-91

Authority      Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION      NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation France

Date 4-15-46

From Sources

To Groves

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017      4-4-91 cc

Authority      Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION      NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

## NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Boxes 164 & 165

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 165

⑪  
1/3/5

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 165

⑬  
1/2/5

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Partial Folder

Date 1944

From -

To -

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017      4-2-91

Authority      Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION      NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Memo w/att.

Date 4-24-44

From Tarver

To -

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017      4-2-91

Authority      Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION      NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Figure D.896: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 165

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Memo W/att.

Date 1-8-45

From Calvert

To Furman

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-2-91 Date mk

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-88)

9

1/3/5

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 165

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Also Material

Date 11-5-46

From USMA, London

To War Dept. For MILID

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-2-91 Date mk

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-88)

3

1/3/5

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

## NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 165

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 165

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Rpt. A-44316

Date 11-7-46

From Subj: Enemy Secret Weapons

To

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-2-91 Date mk

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-88)

10

1/1/c

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 165

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Also Material

Date 12-19-46

From MA, London

To

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-2-91 Date mk

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-88)

4

1/9/5

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Figure D.897: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]



<p>RG 77 Entry 22 Box 166</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(2) RG 77 1/2/5 Entry 22 Box 166</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">(8) 1/10/7</p>
--	--

<p style="text-align: center;">ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>MEMO WATT.</u></p> <p>Date <u>8-23-44</u></p> <p>From <u>FURMAN</u></p> <p>To <u>SMITH</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p style="text-align: center;">NND 917017      4-2-91 Authority      Date <i>AK</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32.22-1 Germany</u></p> <p>Date <u>12-1-44</u></p> <p>From <u>DONOVAN</u></p> <p>To <u>GROVES</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p style="text-align: center;">NND 917017      4-2-91 Authority      Date <i>AK</i></p>
--	---

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION      NA FORM 14000 (11-86)

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

## NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 166

<p>RG 77 Entry 22 Box 166</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(6A) 1/3/5</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">(6) 1/1/5</p>
--	---

<p style="text-align: center;">ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32.22-1 Germany</u></p> <p>Date <u>3-12-45</u></p> <p>From <u>CALVERT</u></p> <p>To <u>SPEER</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p style="text-align: center;">NND 917017      4-2-91 Authority      Date <i>AK</i></p>	<p style="text-align: center;">ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>32.22-1 Germany</u></p> <p>Date <u>9-19-45</u></p> <p>From <u>DIX</u></p> <p>To <u>SMITH</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information <input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p style="text-align: center;">NND 917017      4-2-91 Authority      Date <i>AK</i></p>
--	--

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION      NA FORM 14000 (11-86)

Figure D.898: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 167

1915

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 32-12-2 Germany: Personnel (Jan 45-Dec 45)  
Rpt. STR 1280

Date 12-6-44  
From CSDFC  
To \_\_\_\_\_

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-3-91 cc Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 167

1/2/15

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 32-12-2 Germany: Personnel (Jan 45-Dec 45)  
Memo w/ encl

Date 7-6-45  
From Perrin  
To \_\_\_\_\_

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-3-91 cc Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

## NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 167

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 167

1/2/15

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 32-12-2 London Office: Combined Oper. Ger. Group  
Ltr

Date 9-24-45  
From Chadwick  
To Groves

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-3-91 cc Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 167

1/2/15

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 32-12-2 Germany: Personnel (Jan 45-Dec 45)  
Rpt. 172

Date 11-5-45  
From Holt  
To \_\_\_\_\_

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-3-91 cc Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Figure D.899: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]



RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 167

③ 1/3/T RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 167

② 1/3/T

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group  
Ltr. w/ Encl

Date 1-3-46

From Makins

To Groves

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-3-91 cc Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (11-88)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group  
Partial Folder

Date 1-46

From -

To -

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-3-91 cc Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (11-88)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

## NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 167

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 167

① 1/1/T RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 167

①A 1/3/T

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group  
Ltr.

Date 2-2-46

From Makins

To Groves

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-3-91 cc Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (11-88)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group  
Ltr.

Date 10-22-47

From Langguth

To Gattiker

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-3-91 cc Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (11-88)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Figure D.900: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 168	(26) 1/3/T	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 168	(25) 1/10/T
<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>202.3-1 London Office: Combined Intel Rpts.</u></p> <p>Memo w/att.</p> <p>Date <u>11-6-45</u></p> <p>From <u>Calvert</u></p> <p>To <u>Britt</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-4-91</u> Date <u>rk</u></p> <p>NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (11-80)</p>		<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>202.3-1 London Office: Combined Intel <del>Office</del> Rpts.</u></p> <p>Memo w/att.</p> <p>Date <u>11-8-45</u></p> <p>From <u>Calvert</u></p> <p>To <u>Britt</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-4-91</u> Date <u>rk</u></p> <p>NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (11-80)</p>	

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

## NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168

RG 77 Entry 22 Box 168	(24) 1/3/T	RG 77 Entry 22 Box 168	(23) 1/2/T
<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>202.3-1 London Office: Combined Intel Rpts.</u></p> <p>Ltr. w/att.</p> <p>Date <u>2-14-46</u></p> <p>From <u>Welsh</u></p> <p>To <u>Gathiker</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-4-91</u> Date <u>rk</u></p> <p>NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (11-80)</p>		<p>ACCESS RESTRICTED</p> <p>The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:</p> <p>File Designation <u>202.3-1 London Office: Combined Intel Rpts.</u></p> <p>Ltr.</p> <p>Date <u>2-14-46</u></p> <p>From <u>Welsh</u></p> <p>To <u>Gathiker</u></p> <p>In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Security-Classified Information</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Otherwise Restricted Information</p> <p><u>NND 917017</u> Authority <u>4-4-91</u> Date <u>rk</u></p> <p>NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (11-80)</p>	

Figure D.901: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]



RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 168

(22)  
1/4/7

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 168

(21)  
1/1/7

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 202.3-1 London Office: Combined Intel Rpts.

Memo

Date 3-13-46

From Gatiker

To Shuler

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 9/7017      4-4-91  
Authority      Date AR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION      NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 202.3-1 London Office: Combined Intel Rpts.

Memo

Date 3-22-46

From London Office of Joint TA Intel Sec.

To Wash. Office

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 9/7017      4-4-91  
Authority      Date AR

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION      NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 9/7017

## NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Boxes 168 & 169

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 168

(5)  
1/3/7

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 169

(7)  
1/10/7

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Report

Oct 20/45

Date Oct 20/45

From —

To —

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 9/7017      4/5/91  
Authority      Date ES

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION      NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Partial Folder

1945

Date 1945

From —

To —

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 9/7017      4/5/91  
Authority      Date ES

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION      NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Figure D.902: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 171

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 32.7003-1 Germ-US wartime July 42-June 44  
Partial Folder

Date June 1944

From \_\_\_\_\_

To \_\_\_\_\_

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-8-81cc Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 171

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 32.60-2 Germany: Summary 1945-46  
Summary

Date 7-31-44

From \_\_\_\_\_

To \_\_\_\_\_

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-8-81cc Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

**NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171**

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 171

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 32.7003-2 Germ-US wartime July-Oct 44  
Ltr. AA-118

Date 9-11-44

From Dir

To Furman

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-8-81cc Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 171

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 32.7003-2 Germ-US wartime July-Oct 44  
Rpt. FF-83

Date 10-21-44

From Paris

To \_\_\_\_\_

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-8-81cc Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-86)

Figure D.903: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]



RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 171

(14)  
1/6/15

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 171

(33)  
1/3/17

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 32.7003-3-Germ-US wartime Nov 41-June 45  
Rpt

Date 11-20-44

From OSS Bern

To \_\_\_\_\_

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-8-81cc Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-80)

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 32.60-2-Germany: Summary 1945-46  
Tab A

Date 1944

From 1

To 1

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-8-81cc Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-80)

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

## NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 171

(2)  
1/6/15

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 32.7003-3-Germ-US wartime Nov 41-June 45  
Partial Folder

Date April 1945

From \_\_\_\_\_

To \_\_\_\_\_

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority 4-8-81cc Date

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION NA FORM 14000 (1-80)

Figure D.904: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 174

(52A)  
11/17

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 174

(45)  
11/3/7

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 10.70 Austria Misc

Date 29 October 1945

From Britt

To Groves

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority

4/9/91 Date

(52A)

NA FORM 1400E (11-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 10.10 Austria Personnel

Date 13 June 1946

From Shupler

To Free

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority

4/9/91 Date

(45)

NA FORM 1400E (11-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

**NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Boxes 174 & 175**

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 174

(44)  
11/15

RG 77  
Entry 22  
Box 175

(23)  
11/4/91

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 10.10 Austria Personnel

Date 27 June 1946

From Pipt

To

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority

4/9/91 Date

(44)

NA FORM 1400E (11-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation

Date letter

From 08/08/46

To Hoover

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NND 917017 Authority

4/5/91 Date

(45)

NA FORM 1400E (11-86)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Figure D.905: Why do so many documents from the files of Leslie Groves related to the wartime German nuclear program remain classified and unavailable to the public, even after 75+ years? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]



<b>TOP SECRET</b>	
<p>           CABLES            CODES            WASHINGTON GROUP MEETINGS            EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION            INFORMATION SERVICES            TRUST REPORT LIST            MONTHLY GEOLOGICAL REPORTS            TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS            WEEKLY SUMMARIES            ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REPORTS                Weekly Foreign Intelligence Reports                Economic and Political Reports - MIS                Foreign Broadcast Intell. Service                Radio Report of Far East                MIS Reports on Latin America                Radio Digest                Newspaper Clippings            AFRICA                Personnel                Research            AUSTRALIA                Personnel                Research            AUSTRIA                Personnel                Research            BELGIUM                Personnel                Research                Cable Censorship Excerpts            BRAZIL                Personnel                Research            BULGARIA                Personnel                Research            BOLIVIA                Personnel                Research            CANADA                Personnel                Research            CEYLON                Personnel                Research            CHINA                Personnel                Research            CHILE                Personnel                Research            COLOMBIA                Personnel                Research         </p>	<p>           CUBA                Personnel                Research            CZECHOSLOVAKIA                Personnel                Research            DENMARK                Personnel                Research            DOMINICAN REPUBLIC                Personnel                Research            DUTCH EAST INDIES                Personnel                Research            FINLAND                Personnel                Research            FRANCE                Personnel                Research            FRENCH INDO CHINA                Personnel                Research            ENGLAND                Personnel                Research            GERMANY                Personnel                Who's Who in Sci., Res. &amp; Econ.                Lane's Reports.                Research                Manufacturing Plants (Gen.)                Auergesellschaft                Bleilochsperre Dam                Bohnenland                Bornholm                Degussa                Derben                Dresden                Friedrichshafen                Gottow &amp; Kammersdorf                Heraeus Vacuum-Schmelze                Hohenzollern Castle                I G Farbenindustrie                Mettallwerk &amp; Titanit &amp; Austrian                Hydroelectric Plant                Ober Rodersbach                Oberndorf am Neckar                Piesteritz and Auschwitz                Schrobenhausen                Siemens and Halske                Sigmaringen                Stadtilm         </p>
<b>TOP SECRET</b>	

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority AND 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder  
 202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.

B

Figure D.906: Where are the rest of the documents that were in the folders with these titles? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder 202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.]



TOP SECRET	
GERMANY (Cont.)	SWEDEN
Hechingen-Bisingen Area	Personnel
Strasbourg	Research
Taifingen	SWITZERLAND
Bacteriological/Chemical Warfare	Personnel
MID Report	Research
Targets	THAILAND
P/W Reports	Personnel
Newspaper Clippings	Research
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute	TURKEY
INDIA	Personnel
Personnel	Research
Research	UNITED STATES
ITALY	Personnel - Military
Personnel	Personnel - Civilian
Research	YUGOSLAVIA
JAPAN	Personnel
Personnel	Research
Research	MISSIONS
MADAGASCAR	TA Organization
Personnel	TA Personnel
Research	TA Reports
MALAYA	Tech. & Scien. Intel. Misn. for
Personnel	Pacific Theater
Research	Alsos Mission
NETHERLANDS	Navy Technical Mission - Alsos
Personnel	MISCELLANEOUS
Research	Cartels
NEW ZEALAND	Cyclotrons
Personnel	Enemy Production of Devices
Research	Explosives
NORWAY	Patents
Personnel	Thorium
Research	Miscel. 1945
POLAND	Miscel. 1943 and 1944
Personnel	Receipts
Research	Maps
PORTUGAL	UNION MINES
Personnel	Personnel
Research	
PERU	
Personnel	
Research	
RUSSIA	
Personnel	
Research	
Geological	
Literature	
Newspaper Clippings	
General	
SPAIN	
Personnel	
Research	
TOP SECRET	

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder  
202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority AND 917017

Figure D.907: Where are the rest of the documents that were in the folders with these titles? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 168, Folder 202.3-1 LONDON OFFICE: Combined Intell Rpts.]



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 917017

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 160,  
Folder Foreign Intelligence Unit Index

- REGION 3

FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER  
MILITARY RECORDS BRANCH  
Alexandria, Virginia

February 12, 1958

In Reply Refer To: BMC

Honorable Alan Dulles  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

In the fall of 1946 I transferred the Foreign Intelligence Unit from the Manhattan Engineer District to your predecessor organization the Central Intelligence Group.

With the prospective dissolution of the MED I felt, as did General Vandenberg, that this was in the best interests of the United States. This unit took with it certain files which were then necessary for its operation. This was done despite my belief, which was concurred in by the Secretary of War that these papers would ultimately belong in the special file which was being set up for retention in the War Department.

This file was established to preserve the papers which were likely to be of historical value. Many of these were and must remain highly secret. The file though abbreviated is quite complete. I feel that it would be most advantageous if the papers, which are of historical value, taken by CIA in 1946 could now be returned to this file. They would be kept together and would be available to your agency for official use if you should ever desire such access. I imagine that they are no longer of any current value in your operations.

Prior to the establishment of this file as a permanent collection the provisions for its safeguarding and for restricting its use were approved personally by the then Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower. The file is now in the custody of the Military Records Branch, Federal Records Center, in Alexandria, Virginia. This Center is under the jurisdiction of the Archivist of the United States and access is governed by an agreement between the Archivist and The Adjutant General of the Army. The MED file however is not open to use by anyone except with my prior approval or that of The Adjutant General acting for the Chief of Staff of the Army.

As I am leaving Washington this week on a vacation trip out of the country I would request that your reply be sent to me in care of Mr. Sherrod East who is Chief of the Military Records Branch in Alexandria. If you

agree to my proposal he, or one of his designees, would be the one to whom any papers would be physically delivered. He has seen this letter.

With very best personal wishes,

Sincerely

LESLIE R. GROVES  
Lieut. Gen. USA, Ret.

P.S.

My permanent address to which I will return about March 12th is  
c/o Remington Rand, One Atlantic Street, Stamford, Conn.

Figure D.908: To what degree were the wartime and early postwar files of the Foreign Intelligence Unit sanitized before they were ultimately transferred to NARA? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 160, Folder Foreign Intelligence Unit Index]

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 160,  
Folder Foreign Intelligence Unit Index

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

27 Feb 1958

Lt. General Leslie R. Groves  
c/o Mr. Sherrod East, Chief  
Military Records Branch  
Federal Records Center  
Alexandria, Virginia

Dear General Groves:

Your letter of 12 February 1958 (3NC) to Mr. Dulles has been passed to this office for direct reply since the records requested are presently in our custody.

Most of the records transferred from the Manhattan Engineer District to this Agency have been retired to our permanent record center located outside the Washington area. However, action has been commenced to recover these records and they will be transferred to the Military Records Branch of the Federal Records Center as you requested.

I anticipate that identification, recovery, preparing receipts and the actual transfer will require about three weeks to accomplish.

If we can be of further assistance, please feel free to call upon us at any time.

Very truly yours,

*Herbert Scoville, Jr.*  
Herbert Scoville, Jr.  
Assistant Director

March 25, 1958


160-176

Boxed

Manhattan Project Files in CIA

Reference is made to General Groves' letter to Mr. Dulles relative to return to the MED collection of certain files now in custody of CIA. Mr. Horal, code 143, extension 3487, called me today to say that these files amounting to 5 or 6 cubic feet were being prepared for return in records center cardboard boxes at the rate of one box per week. The first such shipment will arrive by courier March 26, addressed to Chief, Military Records Branch, attention: Mr. Nigh. During the next week Mr. Horal will be available should any question arise concerning this matter between 12 and 1 P.M. and on Friday. I have concurred in his suggested arrangement for transmitting the files. The contents of each box will be arranged according to a list of contents contained therein, which list should be checked, receipted and a copy returned to the sender as promptly as possible.--SE

cc: Mr. Nigh



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 917017

Figure D.909: To what degree were the wartime and early postwar files of the Foreign Intelligence Unit sanitized before they were ultimately transferred to NARA? [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 160, Folder Foreign Intelligence Unit Index]



### D.14.3 Dutch Intelligence

[Dutch intelligence appears to have provided information about the German nuclear weapons program to the United States both during and after the war.

During the war, Dutch citizens interacted with German programs in several ways:

- Many scientists and institutions in the Netherlands worked directly on German programs; Philips Laboratory in Eindhoven was a good example [CIOS III-1; CIOS VI-26, 27; CIOS X-13; CIOS XI-10; CIOS XII-22]. For more information see pp. 4352–4356.
- Many Dutch citizens worked in Germany or in other German-controlled territories as anything from paid research staff to slave laborers (pp. 4892, 4899).
- Some Dutch scientists were recruited by Germany to spy on its behalf; the Cellastic spy ring was one example [[Goudsmit 1947, pp. 37–46; Klinkenberg 1971; Van Calmthout 2018, pp. 129–148].

In all of those Dutch-German interactions, there would have been the opportunity for Dutch citizens who were secretly opposed to Germany's war effort to gather information on German secret weapons programs and to forward that information through a network of like-minded individuals to Dutch resistance leaders in the Netherlands or in exile.

Among other connections between the United States and the Netherlands, Alsos members Samuel Goudsmit and Gerard Kuiper were Dutch and had excellent contacts in the Dutch scientific community.]

**Nazis' Secret Weapon Declared One of Horror; Wipe Out Civilization.** *Indiana Evening Gazette* (Indiana, Pennsylvania). 30 March 1945 p. 1.

<https://newspaperarchive.com/indiana-evening-gazette-mar-30-1945-p-1/>

PORTLAND, Ore., March 30—(AP)—A member of the Dutch underground declared today the Nazis do have a secret—and deadly effective—weapon.

Jacob van Berkel, here under auspices of the Netherlands Information Bureau, told an interviewer the European front is now a race between victory for the Allies and Germany's resort to the ultimate weapon—"so powerfully destructive it is almost inconceivable."

"The new weapon, a tiny gadget which could be placed in a rocket bomb, may be launched with complete effectiveness against the continental United States," Van Berkel said.

He declared the Germans are saving it for a last stand, probably in the Bavarian Alps. "They are confident that their secret weapon will wipe out civilization and save them at the very end."

Van Berkel—fictitious name to hide his identity from the enemy—gave no details, except to say that the weapon does not involve poison gas. He said that while Allied officials know of the weapon, they do not know in what form it might be launched.

The 27-year-old economist, who has made 60 secret trips through Germany in the last four years, said the weapon was discovered by espionage agents.

[This story was also reported in many other newspapers such as:

*The Evening Independent* (St. Petersburg, Florida) 30 March 1945 p. 8. <https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=cwNQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=DIUDAAAAIBAJ&pg=2700,2575615>

*Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* 30 March 1945 p. 2. <https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=ULhRAAAAIBA&sjid=wWkDAAAIBA&pg=4865,6710842>

*The Palm Beach Post* (West Palm Beach, Florida) 30 March 1945 p. 1. <https://palmbeachpost.newspapers.com/image/134142783/>

*The Deseret News* 29 March 1945 p. 27. <https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=0r0KAAAIBA&sjid=nE0DAAAIBA&pg=4566,2984860>

*Daytona Beach Morning Journal* (Florida) 30 March 1945 p. 3. <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1873&dat=19450330&id=vvonAAAAIBA&sjid=6sYEAAAIBA&pg=3599,5349888>

*Daily Journal-World* (Lawrence, Kansas) 30 March 1945 p. 9. <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2199&dat=19450330&id=YBhGAAAIBA&sjid=uugMAAAAIBA&pg=5384,4064567>

*Daily Mirror* (Sydney, Australia) 31 March 1945 p. 10. <https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/272476029>

*The Sun* (Sydney, Australia) 1 April 1945 p. 5. <https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/231704491>

“Jacob van Berkel” was a pseudonym used by Anthony van der Steenhoven (unless that was a pseudonym too). According to files in the Dutch National Archive (pp. 4880–4895), van der Steenhoven was born in 1917 and worked for the Philips Laboratory in Eindhoven 1937–1944 as a secretary for the management.

During the war, van der Steenhoven also began secretly working for the Dutch resistance. He used his official position to travel to laboratories and industrial sites throughout the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, gathering information on German activities, including work on nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for them. His intelligence collection was aided by the facts that the Philips Laboratory was producing nuclear technology and collaborating with other organizations throughout German-controlled Europe, and that huge numbers of conscripted Dutch laborers worked at industrial sites throughout German-controlled Europe. Van der Steenhoven then reported what he had learned to his contacts in the Dutch resistance, the Dutch government in exile in London, British intelligence, OSS, and France.

In late 1944, the Dutch government in exile sent van der Steenhoven to the United States on a lecture tour to raise awareness and support. Although van der Steenhoven was supposed to talk about generalities of living in German-controlled Europe, and he largely did so, in some of his public presentations he briefly alluded to the German work on nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. After such a lecture in Boston, van der Steenhoven ended up having a lengthy private discussion with Gerard Kuiper, a member of Alsos. Van der Steenhoven’s allusions to German nuclear weapons attracted the attention of a number of journalists, and through the resulting newspaper articles the disapproving attention of the U.S. government (probably censors from Leslie Groves’s office). During his months in the United States, van der Steenhoven even wrote a book giving more details about the German nuclear weapons program, but due to pressure from Philips Laboratory (likely concerned about their public image) and perhaps also from Leslie Groves’s office, the book was never published, and van der Steenhoven was sent back to Europe in summer 1945.

This warning from a highly knowledgeable member of the Dutch resistance that Germany was on the verge of launching an intercontinental nuclear attack that would be strong enough to win the war was highly consistent with information from a number of independent sources. See for example pp. 4684, 5068, 5077, and 5119.]



**Anthony van der Steenhoven. 2 April 1945. Report regarding secret weapon [Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1945–1954, Blok Z36, Toegang 2.05.117, Inv. nr. 25010.]**

[See document photo on p. 4882.]

#### RAPPORT BETREFFENDE GEHEIM WAPEN

In Duitschland kreeg ik in 1943 berichten van Duitse bronnen betreffende het in vergevorderd stadium zijnde onderzoek naar het gebruik van de zoogenaamde atoom splitsing van Uraan in een wapen.

Verschillende Duitschers, z.g. ingewijden, gaven hier hoog over op. Het kwam ongeveer hier op neer dat als dit wapen eenmaal in een bruikbaren vorm gebracht kon worden Duitschland in enkele klappen al haar vijanden zou kunnen vernietigen. Ik begon hier aan te werken en kreeg inderdaad de bevestiging dat verschillende Duitse laboratoria hiermede druk bezig waren. Einde 1943 vloog een geheel laboratorium in de buurt van Berlijn in de lucht en later hoorde ik van een secretaresse uit de Privatkanzlei des Führers dat dit iets met het geheime wapen te maken had. Een officier die bereid was mij meerdere inlichtingen te verschaffen sneuvelde helaas ontijdig. Het een en ander meldde ik later aan O.S.S. maar over de eigenaardige houding van OSS hoef ik nu niet meer te spreken, ik kreeg sterk de indruk dat men of, hierover reeds voldoende wist, of mij niet serieus nam. In de Ambassade sprak ik hierover zoowel met Dr. van Houten als met den Schout-bij-nacht. Gezien echter de houding van OSS, was ik wat huiverig geworden om dingen als belangrijk voor te stellen dus zal ik het waarschijnlijk wel terloops genoemd hebben.

#### REPORT REGARDING SECRET WEAPON

In Germany in 1943 I received messages from German sources regarding the advanced stage of research into the use of the so-called atomic fission of uranium in a weapon.

Several Germans, so-called insiders, spoke highly of this. It basically came down to the following: if this weapon could once be brought into a usable form, Germany could destroy all her enemies in a few blows. I started working on this and indeed received confirmation that several German laboratories were busy working on this. At the end of 1943, an entire laboratory flew into the air near Berlin and later I heard from a secretary at the “Privatkanzlei des Führers” that it had something to do with the secret weapon. Unfortunately, an officer who was prepared to provide me with more information was suddenly killed. I later reported some things to the OSS, but I no longer need to talk about OSS’s peculiar attitude; I got the strong impression that they either already knew enough about this or did not take me seriously. In the Embassy I spoke about it with Dr. van Houten and also with the Rear Admiral. However, given OSS’s attitude, I had become a little hesitant to present things as important, so I probably mentioned it in passing.

In Boston ontmoette ik Prof. Kuiper, die mij hiernaar vroeg en nadat hij zich als G 2 geïdentificeerd had vertelde ik hem wat ik wist, hetgeen hij zeer belangrijk vond aangezien het zijn gegevens volkomen bevestigde. Helaas was ik niet in staat hem te vertellen of het reeds in bruikbaren vorm bestond hetgeen hen verontrustte aangezien volgens hem G. 2 dit ook niet wist. Hij was van meening dat het zeer wel mogelijk was dat als zij het konden gebruiken het zeer zeker ook tegen de United States aangewend zou kunnen worden. Sinds Boston heb ik er toen af en toe melding van gemaakt in den vorm zooals getelegrafeerd. Niemand had hier blijkbaar bezwaar tegen, en het merkwaardige is dat verschillende malen interviewers mij man en paard reeds noemden waardoor ik den indruk kreeg dat het een publiek geheim was. Verdere inlichtingen gaf ik nooit. Nu en dan gebruikte ik het als gedeelte van een interview om den indruk van mijn andere indrukken te versterken namelijk: denk er aan, niet te optimistisch, de oorlog is morgen nog niet over!

Hierbij de "clipping" van het geheele bewuste interview hetgeen dus op de gebruikelijke wijze door den interviewer geïnterpreteerd en aangedikt, en een andere "clipping" van het "secret-weapon" gedeelte wat aldus afgedrukt natuurlijk een verkeerde indruk geeft.

Salt Lake City 2 April 1945

In Boston I met Prof. Kuiper, who asked me about this matter and after he identified himself as G-2, I told him what I knew, which he considered very important given that it completely confirmed his own information. Unfortunately I was unable to tell him whether it already existed in a usable form, which worried them given that G-2 (according to him) did not know this either. He believed that it was entirely possible that if they could use it, it could certainly be used against the United States. Since Boston, I have occasionally reported about the subject in the form as telegraphed. Apparently no one objected to this, and the strange thing is that several times interviewers already called me man and horse, which gave me the impression that it was an open secret. I never provided any further information. Occasionally I used it as part of an interview to reinforce my other impressions, namely: remember, don't be too optimistic, the war won't be over tomorrow!

Here is the "clipping" of the entire interview in question, which is interpreted and enhanced by the interviewer in the usual way, and another "clipping" about the "secret-weapon" part, which of course gives a wrong impression when printed in this way.

Salt Lake City 2 April 1945



**Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Ministerie van Buitenlandse  
Zaken 1945-1954, Blok Z36, Toegang 2.05.117, Inv. nr. 25010**

RAPPORT BETREFFENDE GEHEIM WAPEN,  
-----00000-----

In Duitschland kreeg ik in 1943 berichten van Duitse bronnen betreffende het in vergevorderd stadium zijnde onderzoek naar het gebruik van de zoogenaamde atoom splitsing van Uraan in een wapen.

Verschillende Duitschers, z.g. ingewijden, gaven hier hoog over op. Het kwam ongeveer hier op neer dat als dit wapen eenmaal in een bruikbaren vorm gebracht kon worden Duitschland in enkele klappen al haar vijanden zou kunnen vernietigen. Ik begon hier aan te werken en kreeg inderdaad de bevestiging dat verschillende Duitse laboratoria hiermede druk bezig waren. Einde 1943 vloog een geheel laboratorium in de buurt van Berlijn in de lucht en later hoorde ik van een secretaresse uit de Privatkanzlei des Führers dat dit iets met het geheime wapen te maken had. Een officier die bereid was mij meerdere inlichtingen te verschaffen sneuvelde helaas ontijdig. Het een en ander meldde ik later aan O.S.S. maar over de eigenaardige houding van O.S.S. hoef ik nu niet meer te spreken, ik kreeg sterk de indruk dat ~~mijn~~ men of, hierover reeds ~~vrij~~ voldoende wist, of mij niet serieus nam. In de Ambassade sprak ik hierover zoowel met Dr. van Houten als met den Schout-bij-nacht. Gezien echter de houding van O.S.S. was ik wat huiverig geworden om dingen als belangrijk voor te stellen dus zal ik het waarschijnlijk wel terloops genoemd hebben. In Boston ontmoette ik Prof. Kuiper, die mij hiernaar vroeg en nadat hij zich als G 2 geïdentificeerd had vertelde ik hem wat ik wist, hetgeen hij zeer belangrijk vond aangezien het zijn gegevens volkomen bevestigde. Helaas was ik niet in staat hem te vertellen of het reeds in bruikbaren vorm bestond hetgeen hem verontrustte aangezien volgens hem ~~ook~~ G. 2 dit ook niet wist. Hij was van meening dat het zeer wel mogelijk was dat als zij het konden gebruiken het zeer zeker ook tegen de United States aangewend zou kunnen worden. Sinds Boston heb ik er toen af en toe melding van gemaakt in den vorm zooals getelegrafeerd. Niemand had hier blijkbaar bezwaar tegen, en het merkwaardige is dat verschillende malen interviewers mij man en paard reeds noemden waardoor ik den indruk kreeg dat het een publiek geheim was. Verdere inlichtingen gaf ik nooit. Nu en dan gebruikte ik het als gedeelte van een interview om den indruk van mijn andere indrukken te versterken namelijk: denk er aan, niet te optimistisch, de oorlog is morgen nog niet over!

Hierbij de "clipping" van het geheele bewuste interview hetgeen dus op de gebruikelijke wijze door den interviewer geïnterpreteerd en aangedikt, en een andere "clipping" van het "secret-weapon" gedeelte wat aldus afgedrukt natuurlijk een verkeerde indruk geeft.

Salt Lake City 2 April 1945.

*Jacob van Berkel*  
Jacob van Berkel.

Figure D.910: Anthony van der Steenhoven. 2 April 1945. Report regarding secret weapon [Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1945-1954, Blok Z36, Toegang 2.05.117, Inv. nr. 25010].

**H. van den Berg. 16 January 1945. Hearing of: van der STEENHOVEN Anthony** [Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Ministerie van Justitie Bureaus Kabinet en Juridische Zaken van de Afdeling Politie (1932-) 1945–1952 (-1968), Blok J36, Toegang 2.09.107, Inv. nr. 931].

[See document photos on pp. 4888–4890.]

Politie-Buitendienst

Police External Service

Departement van Justitie

Department of Justice

Verhoor van: van der STEENHOVEN Anthony, geboren 28 October 1917 te DORDRECHT, van beroep secretaris directie N. V. Gloeilamp-fabrieken PHILIPS te Eindhoven, laatstelijk gewoond hebbende Hertogstraat 30 te EINDHOVEN, die Nederland heeft verlaten op 24 September 1944, in Engeland ia aangekomen op 29 September 1944, die op 17 October 1944 uit de R.V.P.S. werd ontslagen en zich alhier meldde op 31 October 1944. [...]

Hearing of: van der STEENHOVEN Anthony, born 28 October 1917 in DORDRECHT, by profession secretary management N. V. Gloeilampenfabrieken PHILIPS in Eindhoven, last living Hertogstraat 30 in EINDHOVEN, who left the Netherlands on 24 September 1944, arrived in England on 29 September 1944, was discharged from the R.V.P.S. on 17 October 1944 and reported here on 31 October 1944. [...]

Op 16 Februari 1944 te Hilligersberg gehuwd met Cornelia BERGER, geboren 23 November 1922 te Hilligersberg, wonende Hertogstraat 30 EINDHOVEN. [...]

On 16 February 1944 in Hilligersberg married Cornelia BERGER, born 23 November 1922 in Hilligersberg, living Hertogstraat 30 EINDHOVEN. [...]

Ik genoot Lager Onderwijs te Dordrecht. Juni 1935 behaalde ik einddiploma A. op de H.B.S. te Dordrecht. Vervolgens heb ik nog tot 1937 Mei gestudeerd op de Economische Hoogeschool te Rotterdam.

I received my primary education in Dordrecht. In June 1935 I obtained my final diploma A at the H.B.S. in Dordrecht. Then I studied at the Economic School in Rotterdam until May 1937.

Door tussenkomst van mijn vader, die een kennis was van den directeur van de Holland Amerika Lijn, heb ik 4 maanden gevaren als stuurmansleerling op de MAASDAM. Vervolgens heb ik thuis gestudeerd en ben tevens werkzaam geweest in de zaak van mijn vader. In November 1937 kreeg ik een betrekking bij de N. V. PHILIPS te Eindhoven als assistent-correspondent met een tweejarige opleiding voor het buitenland. Toen in 1940 deze cursus was afgelopen werd ik eind 1940 aangezocht om naar Duitschland te gaan om in Berlijn de versterkersafdeeling te organiseeren.

Through the intervention of my father, who was an acquaintance of the director of the Holland America Line, I sailed for 4 months as an apprentice mate on the MAASDAM. After that I studied at home and also worked in my father's business. In November 1937 I got a job at the N. V. PHILIPS in Eindhoven as an assistant correspondent with a two-year course abroad. When this course was finished in 1940, I was asked to go to Germany to organize the amplifier division in Berlin.



Ik kreeg deze opdracht van den heer KETEL, personeelschef en ook van den heer KAMSTRA, die destijds personeelschef was. In werkelijkheid was echter mijn opdracht om oogen en ooren open te zetten. Ik vertrok dus naar Berlijn, alwaar ik op 23 Januari 1941 arriveerde. Ik werd geplaatst op de Philipsfabrieken als chef van de afdeling versterkers. Ik begon met het organiseren van de civiele verkoopafdeling, doch na 2 maanden werd de verkoop verboden en mocht alleen onder zeer speciale omstandigheden daarvan worden afgeweken. Intusschen was ik lid geworden van de plaatselijke Amerikaansche kerk en -club. Ik werd bevriend met den Amerikaanschen dominee Stewart HERMAN, doordat wij gemeenschappelijk kennissen hadden in de Vereenigde Staten van Amerika. Bovendien werd ik lid van den inmiddels door de Gestapo opgeheven Nederlandsche club "Nederland en Oranje", alwaar iederen Donderdagavond bijeenkomsten plaatsvonden. Op die bijeenkomsten ontmoette ik den Heer MILLENAAR van het Zweedsche Gezantschap, die daar zat ter behartiging van de Nederlandsche belangen in Duitschland. Hij was vroeger werkzaam op het Nederlandsche Gezantschap, doch was bij het uitbreken van den oorlog door den Gezant aangewezen om in Berlijn te blijven. MILLENAAR en ik werden spoedig bevriend en er ontstond samenwerking op groote schaal, hetgeen beteekende het onderhouden van zijn contacten in Nederland, (Dit had hoofdzakelijk plaats met den heer MEES van de N. V. Philips, wonende te Rotterdam) en het verstrekken van alle mogelijke hulp in Duitschland zelf, zooals het bezoeken van studenten en arbeiders in ziekenhuizen en werkkampen enz, hetgeen ik op mij nam en deed. Hierbij was veel handigheid vereischt. Ik bleef ca. 3 jaar in Berlijn en had veel moeilijkheden. Ik reisde geregeld op en neer naar Nederland. Ik ben 2 keer aan de grens en 2 keer in Duitschland aangehouden, doch telkens vrijgelaten, zonder resultaat voor de Duitschers. Intusschen werkte ik ook voor de K.L.M. als tussenpersoon tussen Berlijn en PLESMAN en hield mij bezig met brievensmokkelarij enz. Op 24 December 1943 keerde ik definitief naar Nederland terug. Nadien heb ik in Januari en Februari 1944 nog eenige reizen heen en terug naar Berlijn. Ik was den laatsten tijd nog wel bij N. V. Philips in dienst, doch deed niets.

I received this assignment from Mr. KETEL, chief of staff, and also from Mr. KAMSTRA, who was chief of staff at the time. In reality, however, my assignment was to open eyes and ears. So I left for Berlin, where I arrived on 23 January 1941. I was placed at the Philips factories as head of the amplifier division. I began to organize the civil sales department, but after two months sales were prohibited and could only be deviated from under very special circumstances. Meanwhile, I had joined the local American church and club. I became friends with the American pastor Stewart HERMAN, because we had mutual acquaintances in the United States of America. In addition, I became a member of the Dutch club "Netherlands and Orange," which had been disbanded by the Gestapo, where meetings were held every Thursday evening. At these meetings I met Mr. MILLENAAR of the Swedish Legation, who was there to represent Dutch interests in Germany. He used to work at the Dutch legation, but at the outbreak of war had been assigned by the envoy to stay in Berlin. MILLENAAR and I soon became friends and there was cooperation on a large scale, which meant maintaining his contacts in the Netherlands, (This mainly took place with Mr. MEES of N. V. Philips, living in Rotterdam) and providing all possible help in Germany itself, such as visiting students and workers in hospitals and work camps etc., which I took on and did. This required a lot of skill. I stayed in Berlin for about 3 years and had many difficulties. I regularly traveled back and forth to Holland. I was stopped twice at the border and twice in Germany, but each time I was released without any result for the Germans. In the meantime I also worked for the K.L.M. as an intermediary between Berlin and PLESMAN and was engaged in letter smuggling etc. On 24 December 1943 I returned to Holland for good. In January and February 1944 I made several trips to Berlin and back. I was employed by N. V. Philips lately, but did nothing.

Op 21 September 1944 kwam ik te EINDHOVEN in contact met Majoor WATERSCHOOT VAN DER GRACHT van de Amerikaansche dienst O.S.S. Hoe die mij kende weet ik niet. Hij vroeg mij of ik hem over Duitschland in wilde lichten, hetgeen ik voor zoover dit in mijn vermogen lag deed. Hij stelde mij voor terug te gaan naar Duitschland, zoogenaamd als een soort gevluchte N.S.B.er, hetgeen echter niet door kon gaan, omdat ik op de zwarte lijst van de N.S.B. stond. Dat ik in Duitschland geen moeilijkheden heb ondervonden was min of meer het gevolg van het feit, dat ik het hoofd van de Gestapo van het Philipsconcern, genaamd Majoor LIESE, goed kende. LIESE had een vreeselijken hekel aan de N.S.B. LIESE was volgens mij goed en is na de laatste beruchte aanslag op HITLER (Goerdelaire) door de Duitschers doodgeschoten. LIESE wist niet wat ik deed, doch was de meening toegedaan, dat ik een harde werker van N. V. Philips was.

WATERSCHOOT stelde mij toen voor mij per parachute in Berlijn neer te laten hetgeen ik als zelfmoord beschouwde, aangezien ik te goed in Berlijn bekend ben en daarvan de moeilijkheden kende.

In December 1943 had ik te BERLIJN van den Gestapoagent, Inspecteur LANGE, die goed was en in contact stond met MILLENAAR, de tip gekregen Duitschland te verlaten, aangezien mijn activiteiten te verdacht werden.

On 21 September 1944 in EINDHOVEN I came into contact with Major WATERSCHOOT VAN DER GRACHT of the American service O.S.S. How he knew me I do not know. He asked me to inform him about Germany, which I did as far as I could. He suggested that I return to Germany, supposedly as a kind of N.S.B. [Dutch National Socialists] refugee, but this could not be done, because I was on the black list of the N.S.B. I could not go. That I encountered no difficulties in Germany was more or less due to the fact that I knew the head of the Gestapo of the Philips concern, named Major LIESE, well. LIESE had a dreadful dislike for the N.S.B. LIESE was good, in my opinion, and was shot dead by the Germans after the last infamous attack on HITLER (Goerdel affair). LIESE did not know what I did, but was of the opinion that I was a hard worker for N. V. Philips.

WATERSCHOOT then proposed to me to drop me by parachute in Berlin, which I considered suicide, since I am too well known in Berlin and knew its difficulties.

In December 1943 I had been tipped off in BERLIN by the Gestapo agent, Inspector LANGE, who was well and in contact with MILLENAAR, to leave Germany, since my activities were becoming too suspicious.



WATERSCHOOT stelde mij vervolgens voor naar STOCKHOLM te gaan om door tusschenkomst van mijn contacten weer contact op te nemen met MILLENAAR, hetgeen ook weer niet door kon gaan vanwege het gevaar voor MILLENAAR. Tenslotte werd mij voorgesteld, dat ik met de bezettende Amerikaansche troepen BERLIN zal binnenrukken om door mijn contacten de zaak zoo vlug mogelijk voor elkaar te brengen. Intusschen zou ik dan in LONDEN moeten afwachten tot het zoover zou zijn en inmiddels rapport uitbrengen over mijn bevindingen van het laatste jaar. Dit laatste voorstel is door mij aangenomen. Ik ben thans echter door het Nederlandsche Ministerie van Buitenlandsche Zaken aangezocht om onder de naam van Jacob van BERKEL een propagandatour door de Vereenigde Staten van Amerika te maken.

Op 24 September 1944 vertrok ik per jeep naar BRUSSEL. Op 26 September 1944 met een Amerikaansch vliegtuig van BRUSSEL naar PARIJS en vandaar op 29 September 1944 met een Amerikaansch vliegtuig naar LONDEN, op laatstgenoemde reizen vergezeld van WATERSCHOOT. Na mijn aankomst in LONDEN bezocht ik gedurende die week op 30 September den Minister BURGER (een overbuurman van mij in Nederland), die onmiddellijk den heer F. van 't SANT opbelde. Die week heb ik zonder medeweten van de Engelsche autoriteiten in LONDEN rondgezworven. Op 2 October 1944 had ik weer een onderhoud met den Minister BURGER en op 3 October 1944 met den Minister President GERBRANDY. Van 5 tot 17 October 1944 ben ik verhoord geworden in de R.V.P.S. Op laatstgenoemden datum werd ik afgehaald door een Amerikaansch officier. Op 18 October 1944 had ik een onderhoud met den heer HAARSMA DE WIT, secretaris van den Minister-President GERBRANDY, de laatste Gezant in BERLIJN, die mij mededeelde, dat ik mij bij Minister KLEFFENS moest vervoegen en dien ik op 23 October 1944 bezocht. Ik werd toen aangenomen voor de propagandatour in Amerika. Op 28 October 1944 ben ik ontvangen bij Prinses JULIANA en op 31 October 1944 bij H. M. de KONINGIN.

WATERSCHOOT then proposed to me to go to STOCKHOLM to get back in touch with MILLENAAR through my contacts, which again could not take place because of the danger to MILLENAAR. In the end it was suggested to me that I go into BERLIN with the occupying American troops in order to get things done as quickly as possible through my contacts. In the meantime I would have to wait in LONDON until the time would come and in the meantime report on my findings of the last year. This last proposal was accepted by me. However, I have now been asked by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make a propaganda tour through the United States of America under the name of Jacob van BERKEL.

On 24 September 1944, I left by jeep for BRUSSELS. On 26 September 1944 with an American airplane from BRUSSELS to PARIS and from there on 29 September 1944 with an American airplane to LONDON, accompanied by WATERSCHOOT on the latter trips. After my arrival in LONDON on 30 September, I visited Minister BURGER (a neighbor of mine in Holland), who immediately called Mr. F. van 't SANT. That week I wandered around LONDEN without the knowledge of the English authorities. On 2 October 1944 I had another meeting with Minister BURGER and on 3 October 1944 with Minister President GERBRANDY. From 5 to 17 October 1944 I was interrogated in the R.V.P.S. [[Royal Victoria Patriotic School](#)] On the latter date I was picked up by an American officer. On 18 October 1944 I had a meeting with Mr. HAARSMA DE WIT, Secretary to Prime Minister GERBRANDY, the last Envoy to BERLIN, who informed me that I had to report to Minister KLEFFENS, whom I visited on 23 October 1944. I was then accepted for the propaganda tour in America. On 28 October 1944 I was received by Princess JULIANA and on 31 October 1944 by Her Majesty the Queen.

Daar ik verwachtte in moeilijkheden te zullen komen in verband met het feit, dat ik niet door een officieele instantie van Nederlandsche zijde was gehoord geworden, heb ik U op aanraden van Hugo KLEIN van den Voorlichtingsdienst, dien ik in Netherlands House ontmoette, opgebeld en om een onderhoud verzocht. Mijns inziens was het ook veel beter geweest, dat de Amerikaansche autoriteiten mijn geval niet geheimzinnig behandeld hadden en mij den officieelen weg hadden laten volgen.

Ik ben officieel door Minister KLEFFEN aangenomen met ingang van 3 November 1944.

De N.S.B.ers die ik kende in EINDHOVEN zijn inmiddels opgeruimd.

Verdere bijzonderheden kan ik U niet mededeelen.

CONCLUSIE: v. d. STEENHOVEN maakt een gunstigen indruk, doch doet erg gewichtig. Mijns inziens is na dit verhoor moeilijk na te gaan of deze man politiek betrouwbaar is. Daarvoor zouden nadere informaties moeten worden ingewonnen.

Londen, 16 Januari 1945.

De wachtmeester tit. der Kon. Marechaussee,

(H. van den BERG).

OPMERKING: Weer een van de gevallen de Nederlandsche instanties volkomen onkundig waren van de aankomst van een Nederlander. Na opname in de R.V.P.S. werd van andere Engelandvaarders vernomen, dat v.d.S. zich daar bevond en later was hij weer op mysterieuze wijze verdwenen.

H. van den BERG.

Since I expected to get into trouble because I had not been heard by an official Dutch authority, I called you on the advice of Hugo KLEIN of the Information Service, whom I met in Netherlands House, and asked for an interview. In my opinion it would have been better if the American authorities had not treated my case secretly and had let me follow the official route.

I was officially hired by Minister KLEFFEN effective 3 November 1944.

The N.S.B.ers [Dutch national socialists] I knew in EINDHOVEN have in the meantime been cleared out.

I cannot give you any further details.

CONCLUSION: v. d. STEENHOVEN makes a favorable impression, but acts very pompous. I think that after this interrogation it is difficult to ascertain whether this man is politically reliable. Further information should be obtained.

London, 16 January 1945.

The appointed sentry of the Royal Military Police,

(H. van den BERG).

NOTE: Another of the cases the Dutch authorities were completely unaware of the arrival of a Dutchman. After being admitted to the R.V.P.S., it was learned from others knowledgeable about England that v.d.S. was there and later he had mysteriously disappeared again.

H. van den BERG.



**Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Ministerie  
van Justitie Bureaus Kabinet en Juridische Zaken  
van de Afdeling Politie (1932-) 1945-1952 (-1968),  
Blok J36, Toegang 2.09.107, Inv. nr. 931**

Politie-Buitendienst  
Departement van Justitie

7028

3260/15

STAAT VAN INLICHTINGEN ONTREKT UIT  
NEDERLAND OVERGECOMEN PERSONEN.

1e. Naam en voornamen: *van der Steenhoven, Anthony*

2e. Geboorteplaats en datum: *Dordrecht, 20 October 1917.*

3e. Woonplaats in Nederland gedurende de laatste drie jaren: *Hertogstraat 30 Eindhoven*

4e. Uit Nederland vertrokken: *24 September 1944.*

5e. In Engeland aangekomen: *29 September 1944.*

6e. Schoolopleiding en verdere studie: *Lezerschool, 5 p. H.B.S. (A),  
2 p. Auditor Economische  
Hooftschool A. d. a. m.*

7e. Beroep gedurende de laatste drie jaren: *Secretaris-directie N.V. Gloeilamp-  
penfabriek Philips Eindhoven*

8e. Van welk deel van Nederland weet betrouwen in het bijzonder iets mede te deelen: *Dordrecht en Eindhoven*

9e. Van welke kringen, diensten of bedrijfstakken, draagt betrouwen inzonderheid kennis: *Philips fabrieken.*

Verhoor van: van der STEENHOVEN  
Anthony, geboren 28 October 1917 te DORDRECHT,  
van beroep secretaris directie N.V. Gloeilampen-  
fabrieken PHILIPS te Eindhoven, laatstelijk ge-  
woond hebbende Hertogstraat 30 te EINDHOVEN, die  
Nederland heeft verlaten op 24 September 1944,  
in Engeland ia aangekomen op 29 September 1944,  
die op 17 October 1944 uit de R.V.P.S. werd ont-  
slagen en zich alhier meldde op 31 October 1944.

Vader: Johannes van der STEENHOVEN, oud ca. 64-  
jaar, beroep koekfabrikant, wonende Prin-  
senstraat 19 te DORDRECHT;

Moeder: Anna Adriana van ALKEMADE, oud 56 jaar  
wonende ten huize van haar echtgenoot;

Broer: Johannes Jacob van der STEENHOVEN, oud  
ca. 36 jaar, gehuwd met Adriana VERSTEEG;  
hij is van beroep Chef Rijksbureau Groen-  
ten- en Tuinbouwveilingen Den Haag, wo-  
nende Van Lansbergenstraat 74 Den Haag;

Broer: Gerardus Pieter Jacobus van der STEENHOVEN  
oud ca. 34 jaar, opvolger in de zaak van  
zijn vader, gehuwd met Cornelia FRENSDORP  
(Zweedsche), wonende Cornelis van Beveren-  
straat DORDRECHT;

Broer: Jacobus Gerardus van der STEENHOVEN, oud  
ca. 25 jaar, ongehuwd, advocaat en procu-  
reur, wonende te DORDRECHT, Prinsenstr. 19;

Broer: Jacobus van der STEENHOVEN, oud ca. 22  
jaar, ongehuwd, scholier Kweekschool, wo-  
nende ten huize van zijn ouders;

Zuster: Cornelia van der STEENHOVEN, oud ca. 35  
jaar, gehuwd met Roeland GROENEVELD, op-  
ticien, wonende Bagijnhof 50 DORDRECHT;

Zuster: Catharina Jacoba van der STEENHOVEN, oud  
ca. 29 jaar, gehuwd met Pieter van DALEN,  
banketbakker, wonende Vriezestr. DORDRECHT;

Zuster: Jeanne van der STEENHOVEN, oud ca. 22 jaar  
ongehuwd, wonende ten huize van haar  
ouders;

Zuster: Mathilde Francine van der STEENHOVEN, oud  
ca. 20 jaar, onderwijzeres, ongehuwd,  
wonende ten huize van haar ouders;

Zuster: Anna Adriana van der STEENHOVEN, oud ca.  
16 jaar, scholier Gymnasium, ongehuwd,  
wonende ten huize van haar ouders;

Zuster: Elisabeth van der STEENHOVEN, oud ca. 15  
jaar, scholier, wonende ten huize van  
haar ouders.

Op 16 Februari 1944 te Hilligersberg gehuwd met  
Cornelia BERGER, geboren 23 November 1922 te  
Hilligersberg, wonende Hertogstraat 30 EINDHOVEN.

Figure D.911: H. van den Berg. 16 January 1945. Hearing of: van der STEENHOVEN Anthony [Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Ministerie van Justitie Bureaus Kabinet en Juridische Zaken van de Afdeling Politie (1932-) 1945-1952 (-1968), Blok J36, Toegang 2.09.107, Inv. nr. 931].



Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Ministerie van Justitie Bureaus Kabinet en Juridische Zaken  
van de Afdeling Politie (1932-) 1945-1952 (-1968), Blok J36, Toegang 2.09.107, Inv. nr. 931

- 2 -

Godsdienst: Gereformeerd.

Onderwijs: Lagere School; 5 jr. H.B.S.(A); 2 jr Auditor Economische Hoogeschool te Rotterdam;

Talenkennis: Fransch, Duitsch, Engelsch, eenig Spaansch.

Mil. dienst: Geene.

Pol. richting: Anti-Revolutionaire Partij.

Ik genoot Lager Onderwijs te Dordrecht. Juni 1935 behaalde ik eind-diploma A. op de H.B.S. te Dordrecht. Vervolgens heb ik nog tot 1937 Mei gestudeerd op de Economische Hoogeschool te Rotterdam.

Door tusschenkomst van mijn vader, die een kennis was van den directeur van de Holland Amerika Lijn, heb ik 4 maanden gevaren als stuurmans-leerling op de MAASDAM. Vervolgens heb ik thuis gestudeerd en ben tevens werkzaam geweest in de zaak van mijn vader. In November 1937 kreeg ik een betrekking bij de N.V. PHILIPS te Eindhoven als assistent-correspondent met een tweejarige opleiding voor het buitenland. Toen in 1940 deze cursus was afgelopen werd ik eind 1940 aangezocht om naar Duitschland te gaan om in Berlijn de versterkersafdeeling te organiseren. Ik kreeg deze opdracht van den heer KETEL, personeelschef en ook van den heer KAMSTRA, die destijds personeelschef was. In werkelijkheid was echter mijn opdracht om oogen en ooren open te zetten. Ik vertrok dus naar Berlijn, alwaar ik op 23 Januari 1941 arriveerde. Ik werd geplaatst op de Philipsfabrieken als chef van de afdeeling versterkers. Ik begon met het organiseren van de civiele verkoopafdeeling, doch na 2 maanden werd de verkoop verboden en mocht alleen onder zeer speciale omstandigheden daarvan worden afgeweken. Intusschen was ik lid geworden van de plaatselijke Amerikaansche kerk en -club. Ik werd bevriend met den Amerikaanschen dominee Stewart HERMAN, doordat wij gemeenschappelijk kennissen hadden in de Vereenigde Staten van Amerika. Bovendien werd ik lid van den inmiddels door de Gestapo opgeheven Nederlandsche club "Nederland en Oranje", alwaar iederen Donderdagavond bijeenkomsten plaatsvonden. Op die bijeenkomsten ontmoette ik den Heer MILLENAAR van het Zweedsche Gezantschap, die daar zat ter behartiging van de Nederlandsche belangen in Duitschland. Hij was vroeger werkzaam op het Nederlandsche Gezantschap, doch was bij het uitbreken van den oorlog door den Gezant aangewezen om in Berlijn te blijven. MILLENAAR en ik werden spoedig bevriend en er ontstond samenwerking op groote schaal, hetgeen beteekende het onderhouden van zijn contacten in Nederland, (Dit had hoofdzakelijk plaats met den heer MEES van de N.V. Philips, wonende te Rotterdam) en het verstrekken van alle mogelijke hulp in Duitschland zelf, zooals het bezoeken van studenten en arbeiders in ziekenhuizen en werkkampen enz, hetgeen ik op mij nam en deed. Hierbij was veel handigheid vereischt. Ik bleef ca. 3 jaar in Berlijn en had veel moeilijkheden. Ik reisde geregeld op en neer naar Nederland. Ik ben 2 keer aan de geren grens en 2 keer in Duitschland aangehouden, doch telkens vrijgelaten, zonder resultaat voor de Duitschers. Intusschen werkte ik ook voor de K.L.M. als tusschenpersoon tusschen Berlijn en FLESMAN en hield mij bezig met briefwisseling enz. Op 24 December 1943 keerde ik definitief naar Nederland terug. Nadien heb ik in Januari en Februari 1944 nog eenige reizen heen en terug naar Berlijn. Ik was den laatsten tijd nog wel bij N.V. Philips in dienst, doch deed niets.

Op 21 September 1944 kwam ik te EINDHOVEN in contact met Majoor WATERSCHOOT VAN DER GRACHT van de Amerikaansche dienst O.S.S. Hoe die mij kende weet ik niet. Hij vroeg mij of ik hem over Duitschland in wilde lichten, hetgeen ik voor zoover dit in mijn vermogen lag deed. Hij stelde mij voor terug te gaan naar Duitschland, zoogenaamd als een soort gevluchte N.S.B'er, hetgeen echter niet door kon gaan, omdat ik op de zwarte lijst van de N.S.B. stond. Dat ik in Duitschland geen moeilijkheden heb ondervonden was min of meer het gevolg van het feit, dat ik het hoofd van de Gestapo van het Philipsconcern, genaamd Majoor LIESE, goed kende. LIESE had een vreeselijken hekel aan de N.S.B. LIESE was volgens mij goed en is na de laatste beruchte aanslag op HITLER (Goerdelaaffaire) door de Duitschers doodgeschoten. LIESE wist niet wat ik deed, doch was de meening toegedaan, dat ik een harde werker van N.V. Philips was.

WATERSCHOOT stelde mij toen voor mij per parachute in Berlijn neer te laten, hetgeen ik als zelfmoord beschouwde, aangezien ik te goed in Berlijn bekend ben en daarvan de moeilijkheden kende.

In December 1943

Figure D.912: H. van den Berg. 16 January 1945. Hearing of: van der STEENHOVEN Anthony [Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Ministerie van Justitie Bureaus Kabinet en Juridische Zaken van de Afdeling Politie (1932-) 1945-1952 (-1968), Blok J36, Toegang 2.09.107, Inv. nr. 931].



- 3 -

In December 1943 had ik te BERLIJN van den Gestapoagent, Inspecteur LANGE, die goed was en in contact stond met MILLENAAR, de tip gekregen Duitschland te verlaten, aangezien mijn activiteiten te verdacht werden.

WATERSCHOOT stelde mij vervolgens voor naar STOCKHOLM te gaan om door tusschenkomst van mijn contacten weer contact op te nemen met MILLENAAR, hetgeen ook weer niet door kon gaan vanwege het gevaar voor MILLENAAR. Tenslotte werd mij voorgesteld, dat ik met de bezettende Amerikaansche troepen BERLIJN zal binnenrukken om door mijn contacten de zaak zoo vlug mogelijk voor elkaar te brengen. Intusschen zou ik dan in LONDEN moeten afwachten tot het zoover zou zijn en inmiddels rapport uitbrengen over mijn bevindingen van het laatste jaar. Dit laatste voorstel is door mij aangenomen. Ik ben thans echter door het Nederlandsche Ministerie van Buitenlandsche Zaken aangezocht om onder de naam van Jacob van BERKEL een propagandatour door de Vereenigde Staten van Amerika te maken.

Op 24 September 1944 vertrok ik per jeep naar BRUSSEL. Op 26 September 1944 met een Amerikaansch vliegtuig van BRUSSEL naar PARIJS en vandaar op 29 September 1944 met een Amerikaansch vliegtuig naar LONDEN, op laatstgenoemde reizen vergezeld van WATERSCHOOT. Na mijn aankomst in LONDEN bezocht ik gedurende die week op 30 September den Minister BURGER (een overbuurman van mij in Nederland), die onmiddellijk den heer F. van 't SANT opbelde. Die week heb ik zonder medeweten van de Engelsche autoriteiten in LONDEN rondgezworven. Op 2 October 1944 had ik weer een onderhoud met den Minister BURGER en op 3 October 1944 met den Minister President GERBRANDY. Van 5 tot 17 October 1944 ben ik verhoord geworden in de R.V.P.S. Op laatstgenoemden datum werd ik afgehaald door een Amerikaansch officier. Op 18 October 1944 had ik een onderhoud met den heer HAARSMA DE WIT, secretaris van den Minister-President GERBRANDY, de laatste Gezant in BERLIJN, die mij mededeelde, dat ik mij bij Minister KLEFFENS moest vervoegen en dien ik op 23 October 1944 bezocht. Ik werd toen aangenomen voor de propagandatour in Amerika. Op 28 October 1944 ben ik ontvangen bij Prinses JULIANA en op 31 October 1944 bij H.M. de KONINGIN.

Daar ik verwachtte in moeilijkheden te zullen komen in verband met het feit, dat ik niet door een officieele instantie van Nederlandsche zijde was gehoord geworden, heb ik U op aanraden van Hugo KLEIN van den Voorlichtingsdienst, dien ik in Netherlands House ontmoette, opgebeld en om een onderhoud verzocht. Mijns inziens was het ook veel beter geweest, dat de Amerikaansche autoriteiten mijn geval niet geheimzinnig behandeld hadden en mij den officieelen weg hadden laten volgen.

Ik ben officieel door Minister KLEFFENS aangenomen met ingang van 3 November 1944.

De N.S.B.ers die ik kende in EINDHOVEN zijn inmiddels opgeruimd. Verdere bijzonderheden kan ik U niet mededeelen.

CONCLUSIE: v.d. STEENHOVEN maakt een gunstigen indruk, doch doet erg gewichtig. Mijns inziens is na dit verhoor moeilijk na te gaan of deze man politiek betrouwbaar is. Daarvoor zouden nadere informaties moeten worden ingewonnen.

Londen, 16 Januari 1945.

De wachtheester tit. der Kon. Marechaussee,

*H. van den Berg*

(H. van den BERG).

OPMERKING: Weer een van de gevallen de Nederlandsche instanties volkomen onkundig waren van de aankomst van een Nederlander. Na opname in de R.V.P.S. werd van andere Engelandvaarders vernomen, dat v.d.S. zich daar bevond en later was hij weer op mysterieuze wijze verdwenen.

*H. van den Berg*

H. van den BERG.

Figure D.913: H. van den Berg. 16 January 1945. Hearing of: van der STEENHOVEN Anthony [Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Ministerie van Justitie Bureaus Kabinet en Juridische Zaken van de Afdeling Politie (1932-) 1945-1952 (-1968), Blok J36, Toegang 2.09.107, Inv. nr. 931].






Figure D.914: Script for Richard Harkness interview with Jacob van Berkel, NBC, 19 January 1945 [Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1945-1954, Blok Z36, Toegang 2.05.117, Inv. nr. 25010].



PAGE 3

J. van B: they actually do almost nothing.

HH: You don't think there are many "Good Germans" left, then?

J. van B: No, if there have ever been really good Germans, as we understand it, really democratic I mean, there are very very few left.

HH: How did the "foreign underground" work in Germany? I realize you can't tell the details, since it is still operating; but tell us what you can.

J. van B: Well, this is indeed very hard to answer, but here is a rough outline: We tried to make contacts with other foreign underground people and Germany was a very good place to do that. In some ways it was easier to work in Germany than in the occupied countries, because in Germany they didn't expect an underground to develop among foreign workers, at first.

HH: Now did you utilize the contacts you made?

J. van B: For one thing, there was an organization to get slave-workers home again, and this worked fine. And, of course, we did real intelligence work, the results of which were transmitted via France for instance, to our allied countries.

HH: You visited some of the other occupied countries, did you not?

J. van B: Yes I did. At different times I visited Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Belgium, as well as Holland.

HH: Were the people of those countries/bitter against the Nazis as the Dutch are?

J. van B: This was not easy to judge, but I think I can say that I found nowhere such stubborn resistance as in Poland and Holland. We should not forget

PAGE 4

J. van B: that Poland's suffering began in 1939, and the amount of butchery and suffering there was perhaps greater than in any other country.

HH: How did you get to travel to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and such places?

J. van B: Well, I provided myself with the necessary papers, and please don't ask me how; I stepped on the train and got there and back again, as you see.

HH: You make it sound so simple!

J. van B: It wasn't always that simple! It's just that I can't tell you all the details. I speak German with hardly any accent, and that was a big help.

HH: What about conditions in Occupied Holland?

J. van B: Conditions there are disastrous. I heard not long ago a German officer say: "What ~~do~~ do we care whether 2 millions, or 5 millions of Dutchmen are going to die, we shall win this war!" And they really act as if this is their guiding principle. I saw them looting the very last bits of food out of private houses. Mind you not only the SS or Gestapo did this, but all the Germans. Since the allied armies came to a stop, a great part of Holland has been flooded. The Germans have looted all means of transportation, so the big cities have been cut off from most of their supplies. Also the anti-German railroad strike is still on, in spite of German threats and persecution. If you try to get food from the farmers on the outskirts of the towns, the Germans take your bicycle. There is very little water, no heating and no electricity because there is no coal. Disease epidemics and starvation are setting in. In Amsterdam there is a typhus epidemic. Potato peels are sold there as food but even they are hard to get--and if this were not enough, they take all/they can trace for slave work in Germany. If you stick

PAGE 5

J. van B: your nose out of the door, even, you are a lost man. The next thing you know you are in Germany.

HH: Tell me, how does it feel to be liberated? You just had that experience in September, when Southern Holland was freed, didn't you?

J. van B: Yes, after what I told you about Holland, you can imagine that I still can hardly believe my good fortune at being a free man again. It is marvelous especially for me to be in your fine country, to meet such friendly people and at last to be able to tell everybody the truth about Germany.

HH: I have read a lot about the food shortages in liberated Holland. Are conditions getting better now?

J. van B: The main thing to the Dutch is to be liberated. Of course, this feeling doesn't give you the necessary amount of calories, but it is marvelous to see how everybody tries to help, and slowly conditions are improving now.

-000-

Nationaal Archief (Den Haag),  
Ministerie van Buitenlandse  
Zaken 1945-1954, Blok Z36,  
Toegang 2.05.117, Inv. nr. 25010

Figure D.915: Script for Richard Harkness interview with Jacob van Berkel, NBC, 19 January 1945 [Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1945-1954, Blok Z36, Toegang 2.05.117, Inv. nr. 25010].






Figure D.916: Anthony van der Steenhoven, 2 April 1945: "Made same statement in Boston. Do not know whether press always quoted me alright but doubt it. Source old, but renewed in Boston; spoke about it with Embassy, but did not stress it specially it being a public secret. My former employers did seem very interested. I told you about my peculiar experiences in London and did not want to make myself important. This is my statement literally: 'They have a secret weapon on their sleeve; the Allies know exactly what it is but not exactly if they can bring it in a practical form; it is not gas'. On question whether it can be used against U.S.A. reporter in Portland seemed convinced himself. I started 'I do not know but scientists here seem to be convinced'. Source new and I will give you complete details." [Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1945-1954, Blok Z36, Toegang 2.05.117, Inv. nr. 25010].



No. 1843 May 23, 1945

Ed Lt. D.B. Thomson, CAP,  
D.F. Leader,  
Orange City, Iowa.

My dear Lt. Thomson:

I was very glad to receive your letter of the 17th inst. from which I see with pleasure that you share the high opinion that is generally held of the talks that were recently given in this country by Jacob van Berkel, whose real name, by the way, is Anton van den Steenhoven.

He told me a short time ago that he hopes to go on European leave in the near future, and that he may return to the United States. If these plans materialize, arrangements for his future lectures will not be made by me but I am forwarding a copy of your letter to the proper authorities with the request to communicate with you in the event Mr. Van den Steenhoven can resume his lecturing activities in this country.

Thanking you for communicating with me, I am

Yours sincerely,

J. A. Schuurman  
Consul General

JAS B

**Nationaal Archief (Den Haag),  
Ministerie van Buitenlandse  
Zaken 1945-1954, Blok Z36,  
Toegang 2.05.117, Inv. nr. 25010**

**THE NETHERLANDS INFORMATION BUREAU**  
(A Government Agency of the Kingdom of the Netherlands)

THE NETHERLANDS  
POPULATION 16,000,000  
AREA 16,000 MILES

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES  
POPULATION 75,000,000  
AREA 10,000 MILES

NETH. WEST INDIES & SURINAM  
POPULATION 1,000,000  
AREA 10,000 MILES

CABLE ADDRESS: NETHINFORM  
IN ANSWERING PLEASE REFER TO  
NO. 502804SB/CHS

10 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA  
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.  
TELEPHONE: COLUMBUS 5-4214

-2-

Company to decide whether they wished to enter such a contract with Mr. van Berkel on a purely personal basis.

Since Mr. van Berkel has worked very hard while in this country and all the reports on his lectures have been, without exception, most favorable, I intend to pay him for a period of one month after his return to London to enable him to take a vacation and finish his book. However, I do not think this payment should be the equivalent of what his salary has been in dollars, but the amount should be redetermined based on what Mr. Pelt feels is reasonable. After this payment, the Government would not be responsible for any future payment.

Please let me have your reactions to this proposed arrangement.

N.A.C. Slotemaker de Bruine  
Director

May 25th, 1945

In connection with the teletype message I received in San Francisco on May fifteenth from Dr. de Beus, I can report on my conversation with Mr. Pelt concerning Mr. van Berkel's position in London after he returns from this country as follows:

Mr. Pelt takes the position that since Mr. van Berkel will not be working for the Netherlands in England, he cannot include his salary in the London budget,-- moreover, he has never been on Mr. Pelt's payroll. In view of these facts, Mr. Pelt sees no reason why he should ask the Netherlands Government to increase his budget to cover Mr. van Berkel's salary.

I discussed the matter also with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who informed me that Mr. van Berkel was sent to this country on a special assignment for a limited period, and as soon as the assignment has been completed, there is no reason for keeping him on the Government's payroll. It was mentioned that Mr. van Berkel might go back to Philips.

It is my understanding that Mr. van Berkel is to leave this country in the beginning of June. As he informed me, he has a contract with the Crowell Publishing Company to write a book on his experiences, in which he will bring out the fact that at that time the Germans were preparing already for World War III. One of the editors of the Crowell Publishing Company came to see me and mentioned that it was this feature which made a contract with Mr. van Berkel attractive. I pointed out during this conversation that I could not assume any responsibility for the contents of Mr. van Berkel's book, and that it was entirely up to the Crowell Publishing Company.

Netherlands Embassy  
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Dr. J. G. de Beus

Figure D.917: N. A. C. Slotemaker de Bruine, 25 May 1945: "Mr. van Berkel... has a contract with the Crowell Publishing Company to write a book on his experiences, in which he will bring out the fact that at that time the Germans were preparing already for World War III." [Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1945-1954, Blok Z36, Toegang 2.05.117, Inv. nr. 25010].



**Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Archief van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (Londens Archief) (1936) 1940-1945 (1958), Blok Z27018, Toegang 2.05.80, Inv. nr. 5666**

**THE NETHERLANDS INFORMATION BUREAU**  
(A Government Agency of the Kingdom of the Netherlands)

RECEIVED JUN 6 1945  
P 1859  
REC'D JUN 6  
FILE 486

THE NETHERLANDS  
POPULATION 13,000,000  
AREA SQ. MILES 13,000

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES  
POPULATION 72,000,000  
AREA SQ. MILES 728,000

NETH. WEST INDIES & SURINAM  
POPULATION 303,000  
AREA SQ. MILES 55,000

CABLE ADDRESS: NETHINFORM  
IN ANSWERING PLEASE REFER TO NO. 605058B/CRS

10 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA  
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.  
TELEPHONE: COLUMBUS 5-4214

June 5th, 1945

In answer to your letter of June first, #P-1762, I confirm that I am indeed in favor of Mr. van Berkel returning to this country later on for further lecturing. So far he has accomplished much and, after a stay in Holland where he would obtain new impressions and additional information, he would be able to still do much for our cause here.

However, it is an open question as to whether the American authorities will allow him to return, but this need not be gone into at the moment. If it is decided that he is to return, I suggest he not return under the auspices of the Netherlands Government if it can be arranged otherwise. Were this necessary for formal reasons, it should be made clear that the Netherlands Government will not pay his salary or expenses—for instance, American Relief for Holland might take this on.

I have informed the Acting Director of the Netherlands Government Information Bureau in London of the arrangements whereby I intend to pay Mr. van Berkel's salary for one month after his return to England.

N.A.C. Slotemaker de Bruine  
Director

Netherlands Embassy  
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Dr. J. G. de Beus

**Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1945-1954, Blok Z36, Toegang 2.05.117, Inv. nr. 25010**

**THE NETHERLANDS INFORMATION BUREAU**  
(A Government Agency of the Kingdom of the Netherlands)

RECEIVED JULY 30 1945  
P 2244  
REC'D JULY 30  
FILE 486

THE NETHERLANDS  
POPULATION 13,000,000  
AREA SQ. MILES 13,000

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES  
POPULATION 72,000,000  
AREA SQ. MILES 728,000

NETH. WEST INDIES & SURINAM  
POPULATION 303,000  
AREA SQ. MILES 55,000

CABLE ADDRESS: NETHINFORM  
IN ANSWERING PLEASE REFER TO NO. 702707CRS

10 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA  
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.  
TELEPHONE: COLUMBUS 5-4214

July 27th, 1945

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

It would be appreciated if you would have the following message transmitted to Dr. Slotemaker in a coded cablegram--

PLEASE INFORM ME ABOUT PRESENT STATUS VAN BERKEL STOP WAS HE SUPPOSED TO SUBMIT HIS MANUSCRIPT TO US STOP PHILIPS COMPANY OBJECTS TO CERTAIN PASSAGES IN BOOK STOP NOT CLEAR ABOUT OUR POWER TO ADJUST THIS MATTER

For obvious reasons it seems desirable not to send this message through ordinary channels.

For the Director  
B. Landheer, Head  
Library & Research Dept.

Netherlands Embassy  
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Dr. J. G. de Beus

**Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Archief van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (Londens Archief) (1936) 1940-1945 (1958), Blok Z27018, Toegang 2.05.80, Inv. nr. 5666**

**THE NETHERLANDS INFORMATION BUREAU**  
(A Government Agency of the Kingdom of the Netherlands)

RECEIVED JUN 6 1945  
P 1859  
REC'D JUN 6  
FILE 486

THE NETHERLANDS  
POPULATION 13,000,000  
AREA SQ. MILES 13,000

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES  
POPULATION 72,000,000  
AREA SQ. MILES 728,000

NETH. WEST INDIES & SURINAM  
POPULATION 303,000  
AREA SQ. MILES 55,000

CABLE ADDRESS: NETHINFORM  
IN ANSWERING PLEASE REFER TO NO. 605068B/CRS

10 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA  
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.  
TELEPHONE: COLUMBUS 5-4214

June 5th, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

Amice:

Enclosed herewith I am sending you a copy of my letter of May twenty-fifth to the Embassy, #50280ASB/CRS, together with a copy of the Embassy's reply, #P-1762, of June first.

Mr. van Berkel is scheduled to leave the United States around the middle of June, and I hereby authorize you to pay him one month's salary after his arrival in England. The amount should be the equivalent of salary paid in England to a First Lieutenant (married), and our account is to be charged with this.

As you will see from the enclosed correspondence he has done an excellent job lecturing here. I need not go into all the details here, which at times caused us quite a headache, especially the attitude taken by the American authorities, but will discuss all this when I see you.

Sincerely yours,  
N.A.C. Slotemaker de Bruine  
Director

Mr. Dirk deMan  
Netherlands Government Information Bureau  
London, England

enclosures 2

Note: Please let me know what the amount of Mr. van Berkel's salary will be on the above-mentioned basis.

**THE NETHERLANDS INFORMATION BUREAU**  
(A Government Agency of the Kingdom of the Netherlands)

RECEIVED AUGUST 3 1945  
P 2284  
REC'D AUGUST 3  
FILE 486

THE NETHERLANDS  
POPULATION 13,000,000  
AREA SQ. MILES 13,000

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES  
POPULATION 72,000,000  
AREA SQ. MILES 728,000

NETH. WEST INDIES & SURINAM  
POPULATION 303,000  
AREA SQ. MILES 55,000

CABLE ADDRESS: NETHINFORM  
IN ANSWERING PLEASE REFER TO NO. 80206CRS

10 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA  
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.  
TELEPHONE: COLUMBUS 5-4214

August 2nd, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

I should appreciate it if you would arrange to have the following message transmitted to Dr. Slotemaker via a coded cablegram--

"AFTER DISCUSSION PHILIPS OFFICIALS CONSIDER PUBLICATION VANBERKEL BOOK UNDESIRABLE STOP PLEASE SEE WHETHER POSSIBLE TO HAVE VANBERKEL WITHDRAW MANUSCRIPT"


For the Director  
B. Landheer, Head  
Research & Library Dept.

Netherlands Embassy  
Washington, D.C.

Attention: Dr. J. G. de Beus

Figure D.918: Both Philips Eindhoven and unnamed U.S. government officials (likely censors from Leslie Groves's office) blocked van der Steenhoven from publicly revealing what he knew about the German nuclear program [Nationaal Archief (Den Haag), Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1945-1954, Blok Z36, Toegang 2.05.117, Inv. nr. 25010; Archief van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (Londens Archief) (1936) 1940-1945 (1958), Blok Z27018, Toegang 2.05.80, Inv. nr. 5666].





## NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 169, Folder British Liason

<u>Personnel</u>		<u>Places</u>	
British:		Countries:	
Portal	Margaret	England	New York
Perrin	Lizzy	France	Maine
Welsh	Peggy	Germany	Delaware
Mann	Alice	Italy	Ohio
Todd	Jane	Switzerland	Maryland
Cowman	Mary	Sweden	Iowa
Davis	Nancy	USSR	Texas
Ford	Anne	Czechoslovakia	Nevada
Penny	Pearl	Bulgaria	Kentucky
Rowley	Rose	Poland	Dakota
Cockcroft	Katy		
Blount	Pansy	Cities and Installations:	
Davidson, C. S.	Isabel	Britain:	
American: <i>Chase</i>		Harwell	Newton
Kessinger	<i>Joie</i> Jack	London	<del>High</del> Erie
Penfield	Joe	Aldermaston	Cleveland
Weber	Jim	Risley	Chicago
Brasted	Jake	Springfields	Dover
Baroody	Jones	Windscale	Wyoming
Benson	Willie	Capenhurst	Lancaster
Lowenhaupt	Walter	France:	
Quigley	Bill	Paris	Portland
DuBois	Percy	Saclay	Cleveland
Ingraham	Oswalt	Fort Chatillon	Savannah
Rogers	Oscar	Germany:	
Hubbard	Mabel	Bitterfeld	Boise
Nichols	Sandy	Heidleberg	Felton
Kirkpatrick	Jackson	Berlin	Avon
Betts	Cecil	Karlsruhe	Berkeley
Langguth	John	Munich	Bethlehem
Colby	James	Frankfurt	Seattle
Kramish	James, Jr.	Others:	
<i>Goudsmi</i>	<i>Writer of the "book"</i>	Salzberg	Easton
Others:		Amsterdam	Richmond
Scherrer	Jeanne	Zurich	Burlington
Kowarski	Marie	Moscow	St. Louis
Joliot	Linda	Vienna	Biloxi
Goldschmidt	Susan		
Randers	Helen		
Bohr	Hazel		
Seigbahn	Sue		
<i>Baker</i>	<i>Professor</i>		
<i>J. Kistemaker</i>	<i>Oliver</i>		

Figure D.919: Jacob Kistemaker was one of the developers of uranium gas centrifuges; his code name "Oliver" (bottom left) appeared on a postwar list of other U.S./U.K. intelligence sources [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 169, Folder British Liason]. Kistemaker's wartime work and allegiances are rather murky [Goudsmi 1947, pp. 37–46; Klinkenberg 1971; Van Calmthout 2018, pp. 129–148]. How much did he know and reveal about the wartime German nuclear program?

Samuel Goudsmit to Jan Hendrik de Boer. 1 March 1946. [American Institute of Physics Niels Bohr Library & Archives. Samuel A. Goudsmit papers. Series 04: Alsos Mission. Subseries A. Alsos Mission material. Box 25, Folder 08, Dutch intelligence, 1944–1948. <https://repository.aip.org/islandora/object/nbla:252943#page/1/mode/2up>]

March 1, 1946

Col. J. H. De Boer  
Netherlands Government  
Arlington House  
London W 1, England

Dear De Boer:

I have had some dealings with the Netherlands Attaché in Paris and recently received a cable from them asking some important information. I now received a letter from Rosbaud in which he mentions that the colonel in question has been dismissed. I would appreciate getting some more information about this and would like to know who is taking his place.

I hear that you are staying [\[in\]](#) England. I had a very interesting trip on the continent. I returned straight from there to the States in October [\[1945\]](#) and had to give up my plan to spend a couple of weeks in England. [...]

[\[Jan Hendrik de Boer \(Dutch, 1899–1971\) was a physical chemist who was closely connected with the Dutch and German scientific communities. He was apparently one of the leaders of a Dutch spy network that obtained information on the wartime German nuclear program. The Manhattan Project contacted him in 1944 via Samuel Goudsmit \(p. 4437\).](#)

[Paul Rosbaud \(Austrian, 1896–1963\) worked as a metallurgist in Germany but secretly provided information on the German nuclear program to U.K. and U.S. intelligence.](#)

[Samuel Goudsmit's entire folder of Dutch intelligence on the German nuclear program \[NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420, Box 3\] remains classified and unavailable 75+ years after the war ended \(Fig. D.920\). Why is that the case, if the German nuclear program said to be so small and ineffective?\]](#)



RG: <u>200</u> ENTRY: <u>GOUDSMIT PAPERS</u> BOX: <u>3</u>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; border-radius: 50%; width: 40px; height: 40px; margin: 0 auto; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;">112</div> TAB #: <u>1</u> / <u>27</u> / <u>C</u> COPIES / PPS. / CLASS.
--	---

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation NETHERLANDS INTELLIGENCE (Hist. Off. Inquiry Ch. 4)  
— ENTIRE FOLDER —

Date 00/00/1945

From \_\_\_\_\_

To \_\_\_\_\_

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information  
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

<u>NND 933079</u> Authority	<u>06 October 1993</u> Date
--------------------------------	--------------------------------

Withdrawn by [Signature]

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NA FORM 14000 (5-92)

Figure D.920: Samuel Goudsmit's entire folder of Dutch intelligence on the German nuclear program remains classified and unavailable [NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420, Box 3].

**Dutch Aide Seized as Spy in Prague. *New York Times* 29 August 1948.**

## Police Say He Confessed and Named Foreign Superiors—Czech Group Also Accused

[...] The police disclosed that Leonardus Bartolomeous van Dam, described as investigation officer at the Netherlands Embassy, had been taken into custody together with a group of Czechoslovaks.

Mr. van Dam confessed to police, according to an official announcement, and gave the names of Netherlands officials who instructed him to carry on military and political espionage in Czechoslovakia. The same official announcement said several important documents were found on him and that these seriously implicated other subjects of Netherlands in espionage in Czechoslovakia. The documents, according to the statement, reveal the methods of the foreign intelligence service in question and the tasks laid down of its agents to execute.

Dutch officials told the United Press that Mr. van Dam was attached to the Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs and did not have diplomatic immunity. He had been collecting death certificates and other data on Dutch slave laborers under the German occupation in Czechoslovakia. [...]

[Leonardus Bartholomeus van Dam (1917–1983; <https://www.tracesofwar.com/persons/65909/Dam-van-Leonardus-Bartholomeus.htm>) was a very important Dutch spy working for the resistance and reporting to the Allies during the war, and from this report he apparently continued to spy on German technologies and sites after the war.

Even for at least three years after the war ended, Dutch intelligence continued to collect information on wartime German secret weapons programs that had been conducted in Czech territory (and elsewhere), and on how the advanced technology left over from those programs was being exploited by Russian and Czech military forces. That seems to be another indicator of how advanced and how strategically important the wartime German programs were.

Can files detailing the wartime German secret weapons programs, as well as their postwar investigation and exploitation, be located in Dutch archives and released to the public now?]



#### D.14.4 French Intelligence

[In a fashion highly analogous with Dutch intelligence, there is evidence that French intelligence may have provided information about the German nuclear weapons program to the United States during and after the war.]

Rodney P. Carlisle, ed. 2005. *Encyclopedia of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*. New York: M.E. Sharpe. p. xxi.

c. 1940

Jacques Bergier of the Red Orchestra network helps establish French MARCO POLO group which gains information about German atomic program under Werner Heisenberg and the development of the V-1 and V-2 rockets.

Présidence du Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française. 30 April 1945. No. 205/2. English translation. [Document courtesy of Andreas Sulzer]

Source: Commandant CHIGOT

Origins: Interrogation of repatriates of the Reprisal Camp of MAUTHAUSEN, particularly the following:

MARCO POLO whose correct name is not known, but is probably known to the D.G.E.R.

RABATE, member of the Communist Party, whose wife is Communist Municipal Councilor in Paris.

---

Information received indicates that the Germans started on 22 April the massacre of the 80,000 men and women interned in this camp.

These massacres would be completed before the arrival of Russian troops.

Mr. BURCKARDT sent a message, by a convoy leaving for MAUTHAUSEN, to the German commander of the camp, warning him that he would be held responsible if these massacres continued.

It would seem necessary to intervene by force, or if that is impossible to parachute arms and ammunition in order to at least permit these men to defend themselves before being killed.

---

The Germans have removed from MAUTHAUSEN the Spanish Communists and the Austrian anti-Nazis, dressed them in SS uniforms, and placed them on the bridge of LINZ to be massacred by the Russian troops.

In Block VI of the camp at MAUTHAUSEN is M. Jacques BERGIER, a great specialist on the splitting of the atom.

The Germans have given him a false identification as a Polish Jew; it is requested that everything humanly possible be done to find M. J. BERGIER and to save him regardless of cost.

**Jacques Bergier. 1977. *Je Ne Suis Pas Une Legend*. Paris: Retz. pp. 131–132.**

Le convoi qui m'emmenait de Sarrebruck arriva à Mauthausen dans la soirée du 2 avril 1944. [...]

Personnellement, je n'ai quitté le camp que le 19 mai 1945, car avant d'être rapatrié par avion, il me fallait régler un certain nombre de problèmes d'importance vitale pour l'avenir. J'avais en effet reçu des confidences, *in articulo mortis*, donnant la solution d'importantes affaires de trahison et il convenait d'en avertir immédiatement le gouvernement français afin qu'il procède à l'arrestation des coupables, ce qui fut fait. Je possédais aussi des renseignements sur de nouvelles armes allemandes et sur les endroits où l'on pouvait soit les trouver à l'état de prototype, soit se procurer la documentation les concernant. Près de huit cents kilomètres de microfilms sur les armes secrètes ont été ainsi découverts.

The convoy that took me from Saarbrücken arrived in Mauthausen on the evening of 2 April 1944. [...]

Personally, I did not leave the camp until 19 May 1945, because before being repatriated by plane, I had to solve a number of problems of vital importance for the future. I had indeed received confidences, at the moment of death, giving the solution of important treason cases and it was necessary to immediately inform the French government so that it could arrest the guilty parties, which was done. I also had information on new German weapons and where they could be found in prototype form or where to obtain documentation about them. Thus nearly eight hundred kilometers of microfilm on secret weapons have been discovered.

[Jacques Bergier had a scientific background, like many others who were sent to the underground Gusen facilities that were part of the St. Georgen-Gusen-Mauthausen camp system [[https://www.jewishgen.org/databases/Holocaust/0117\\_Mauthausen-Gusen-Death-Book.html](https://www.jewishgen.org/databases/Holocaust/0117_Mauthausen-Gusen-Death-Book.html)]. From the available documentation and Bergier's own writings, it is very unclear what work he did at Gusen, but it may have been related to his knowledge of nuclear physics. The fact that even the scientific prisoners at Gusen were issued false identification papers suggests an extreme level of security about the work that was conducted there.

From the available documentation, Bergier and his associates appear to have provided valuable information about German technologies to Allied intelligence, both during and after the war. That suggests that at least parts of those technologies were being developed at Gusen. However, it is quite unclear just what the technologies or the information were.

Can additional relevant documents be located and released from French, U.S., or other archives? Where is the “nearly eight hundred kilometers of microfilm on secret weapons”?



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NDG/H-17*

NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 165, Folder ALSOS MATERIAL

**SECRET**

*German Red.*

**AMERICAN EMBASSY**  
**OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ**  
1, GROSVENOR SQUARE, W. 1  
LONDON, ENGLAND

17 April 1945

Subject: Secret Weapon Experiments In "German Redoubt".

To : Major F. J. Smith, Room 5119, New War Dept.  
Bldg., Washington, D. C.

On 14 April 1945, at 1034 hours, the French Telegraph Service broadcasted the following which is thought to be of interest to your office:

"German border: Somewhere in the "German redoubt", there are reported to exist great underground laboratories where scientists and technicians have been ordered by Hitler personally to go on with experiments with new secret weapons. The Fuehrer feverishly follows their work. The weapons are said to include 'V6', the famous atomic bomb. They had already vainly tried to work on this in the thick-walled, windowless casemates discovered in Strasbourg. They contained a special apparatus for producing an electric arc of enormous power, which was used for researches in the disintegration of matter. In addition to reserves already accumulated, the laboratories in the 'redoubt' are still producing gas. One of these gases is harmless in the open air, but becomes toxic by contact and chemical combination with the substances in the intake tube (cartouches) of gas-masks, meant to neutralise the action of other gases."

For the Military Attache:

*H. K. Calvert*  
H. K. CALVERT  
Major, F.A.  
Assistant to the Military Attache.

*dup of document  
12 Jan 47  
H.*

**SECRET**

*Briged  
not 1/4  
R*

Figure D.921: Example of a wartime French report on high-priority work toward a German atomic bomb involving high-voltage machines for what sounds like electromagnetic isotope separation or electronuclear breeding. Horace K. Calvert to Francis J. Smith. 17 April 1945. Subject: Secret Weapon Experiments in "German Redoubt". [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 165, Folder ALSOS MATERIAL]

378.780000 3.47. EXEMPLAIRE N° 20 - 2 - 21.3 - C/O.430/SD

**CONFIDENTIEL**

RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE  
LIBERTÉ - ÉGALITÉ - FRATERNITÉ  
PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL  
S. D. E. C. E.

BULLETIN DE RENSEIGNEMENTS SCIENTIFIQUE - 21.3 - C/O.430/SD  
Sorti le : 18 OCT 1947  
Objet : A L L I E D B E L I E F ( 12.374 à 12.376 )

ACTIVITÉ DE L'INGÉNIEUR SAUER

1933 - 1935  
Ingénieur de la firme allemande "ARNDT" ayant son siège à Berlin, a fait de nombreux voyages à l'étranger dans le but de diriger sur place la pose de machines spéciales pour la fabrication de fils téléphoniques, radio, et de machines destinées à la fabrication de fibre et autres matières "novotox".

1936 -  
Chez ROEBACH -  
Recherches sur les modèles suivants :  
Appareil de liaison  
No 164  
analogue au Pi-Sterch (en métal)  
Appareil de reconnaissance -

(sans nom)  
avec deux fuselages et moteurs à grande action, équipe d'appareils spéciaux de reconnaissance (basés sur ondes courtes et "Infrarouge").  
Appareil stratosphérique -  
Avions à ailes repliables :  
Utilise la technique de l'hélicoptère

1937-1940  
Chez ARADO  
Recherches sur les modèles suivants :  
Ar 79  
Changement de construction pour la fabrication en grandes séries à l'aide de machines et presse hydraulique d'un rendement plus économique.  
Ar 233  
quadrimoteurs de transport de munitions, équipé de moteurs à réaction.  
Ar 234  
Avion de chasse bimoteurs à réaction - doté d'armes automatiques.

1940-1943  
Ministère de l'Air :  
Ingénieur en chef de la firme "JETZE" BERLIN  
Service secret de projets sur "V", avec les firmes TELEFUNKEN, HALLSKE, SIEMENS et ASKANIA.  
Construction de bombes atomiques sans connaissance de la nature de l'explosif.

26 - 3 - 21.3 - C/O.430/SD 28 - 4 - 21.3 - C/O.430/SD

Organisation du travail chez Flugzeugbau Halle (Siebel) -  
Fabrication à la chaîne d'avions.  
Organisation du travail chez JUNKERS, HALLE, ROSTADT, ASCHERHEIM  
Fabrication du JU 88 et suivants à la chaîne.

1943-1945  
Ministère de l'Armement  
Contrôle de firmes françaises à TROYES, AUTUN et PARIS.  
Contrôle de firmes tchèques à PRAGUE.  
Actuellement à HAMBURG, Ingénieur en chef chez W. ZIEHL, fabrication de briques de tourbe.

NOTES :  
SAUER, qui fait une excellente impression, semble prêt à donner tous renseignements en sa connaissance sur ses travaux, tant chez ARADO que dans les centres d'armes V où il est passé. Parle correctement le Français.

DESTINATAIRES

Centre d'Etudes des Projectiles Autopropulsés 91, Avenue Henri Martin - PARIS.	1
Service de documentation et d'information technique 49, Rue de la Porte d'Issy - PARIS.	1
M. le Chef de la section Liaison Recherches 2ème Bureau M.L.G. de la Marine - 2, Rue Royale - PARIS.	1
SERVICE 22.3.1	3
SERVICE 21.3	1
SERVICE 22.4.3	1
SERVICE 25.2	1
SERVICE 28	1
400	1
410	1

Figure D.922: After the war, France hired many Germans who had worked on the nuclear weapons program (e.g., pp. 2081, 4967, 5796), such as engineer Saur, who had expertise in mechanical and electrical engineering and had constructed non-nuclear components of "atomic bombs" for "V projects" (missiles) from 1940 to 1943 [Archives of the French Army Ministry of Defense, courtesy of Norberto Lahuerta].



### D.14.5 German and Japanese Submarines

[In May 1945, the German submarine U-234 surrendered to the United States and was found to be carrying a large and diverse cargo of high-tech materials (including uranium), prototypes, plans, and scientific experts originally intended for Japan. Details of that cargo and how it was ultimately used by the United States remain very mysterious, despite the efforts of a number of investigators [e.g., Brooks 1992, 2002; Grunden 2005; Gutzeit 2001; Hirschfeld 1991; Hirschfeld and Brooks 1996; Hydrick 1998, 2016; Naujoks and Nelson 2002; Scalia 2000; Sellwood 1956; Robert K. Sutton. 2021; Trevethan 1999; Wilcox 2019; *Boston Globe* 1993-07-27; NYT 1995-12-31].

Note that a number of other German and Japanese submarines evacuating materials, documents, and personnel from Germany were also captured or sunk by Allies, or made it through to countries such as Japan and Argentina; details of what those submarines carried are even less clear than for U-234.]

**Wolfgang Hirschfeld, Chief Radio Operator of U-234. Wolfgang Hirschfeld and Geoffrey Brooks. 1996. *Hirschfeld: The Story of a U-Boat NCO 1940-1946*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. pp. 198–200, 216–217. [Hirschfeld’s spelling, Falk, has been corrected to Falck in the passage below.]**

The most important and secret item of cargo, the uranium oxide, which I believe was highly radioactive, was loaded into one of the vertical steel tubes one morning in February, 1945. Two Japanese officers were to travel aboard *U-234* on the voyage to Tokyo: Air Force Colonel Genzo Shosi, an aeronautical engineer, and Navy Captain Hideo Tomonaga, a submarine architect who, it will be recalled, had arrived in France aboard *U-180* about eighteen months previously with a fortune in gold for the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. I saw these two officers seated on a crate on the forecasing engaged in painting a description in black characters on the brown paper wrapping gummed around each of a number of containers of uniform size. At the time I didn’t see how many containers there were, but the Loading Manifest showed ten. Each case was a cube, possibly steel and lead, nine inches along each side and enormously heavy.

Once the inscription *U235* had been painted on the wrapping of a package, it would then be carried over to the knot of crewmen under the supervision of Sub-Lt Pfaff and the Boatswain, Peter Schölch, and stowed in one of the six vertical mineshafts.

I asked Tomonaga what the lead cubes contained, and he said, ‘It is the cargo from *U-235*. That boat is no longer going to Japan.’ When I enquired at the 5th Flotilla Office, they told me that *U-235* was a small Type VII training U-boat which had never been earmarked for operations outside the Baltic. So I knew that Tomonaga had lied to me. I mentioned all this to Lt Cdr Fehler that evening, but he told me not to bring up the subject again with the Japanese. Recently I was informed by the naval historian Professor Jürgen Rohwer that the nuclear material had been requested, probably in the military attaché code, at the end of December, 1944, or very early in 1945. The Japanese Military Attaché in Berlin, Kigoishi, organized the transport of the material with the German authorities and from the quayside at Kiel had watched the loading of the ten cases of uranium oxide into *U-234*. This seemed to me to confirm that the uranium oxide was of a nature which rendered it of especial value to the Japanese.

When the loading of *U-234* was finished it was estimated that the total weight of the cargo was 260 tons.

[...] The eleven passengers boarding in Germany were the two Japanese, Lt Cdr Richard Bulla, a specialist in air-sea cooperation, who was also the First Lieutenant, and the following eight;

Colonel Fritz Sandrath (Luftwaffe); former head of Bremen AA defences.

Colonel Erich Menzel (Luftwaffe): technical aide to the Air Attaché, communications

Lt Cdr Heinrich Hellendorn (Navy); specialist in naval AA gunnery.

Captain (Eng.) (S) Heinz Schlicke (Navy, honorary rank); radar, infra-red and direction finding scientist.

Lt Colonel Kai Nieschling (Luftwaffe): Nazi military judge.

Captain Gerhard Falck (Navy): specialist in shipbuilding and design.

August Bringewald: Senior Messerschmitt engineer, Me 262, Me 163 and rocketry.

Franz Ruf: procurement specialist for Messerschmitt.

[\[Did U-234 carry additional technical experts not listed here? See p. 4937.\]](#)

The final passenger was to board in Norway. Nieschling, the judge, was going to investigate allegations against Embassy staff implicated in the Sorge spy scandal and to keep an eye on other passengers during the voyage. The two Japanese, Nieschling and Falck slept in the deck below the NCO's quarters while all remaining passengers slept where they could.

The US National Archive has now declassified a document under reference *373/3679/Box 22/FOLDER OP-16-Z Day File 1/1/45*. This is a memorandum concerning the interrogation of Judge Nieschling. No Memorandum regarding the interrogation of Captain Gerhard Falck has ever been released.

Personally I saw very little of Falck who never socialized except with the Judge.

In the Memorandum [...] Nieschling said that 'the meaning behind the ore' was known to Gerhard Falck, who had taken some secret courses before he boarded *U-234* and was to be chief technician on all naval matters in Tokyo under Admiral Wenneker.

On the afternoon of 25 March, 1945, squatting low in the water from all the fuel, ammunition, provisions, and cargo she had aboard, *U-234* diesel out of the U-boat basin into the Förde.

[\[... After surrendering to the USS \*Sutton\*:\]](#) The *Sutton* dropped anchor outside the harbour of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on the glorious morning of 19 May, 1945. [...]

The ten specialists were driven off to a secret destination. We located them all after the war with the exception of Captain Gerhard Falck. Possibly, like Peter Schölch, our Boatswain, and Lt Pfaff, who loaded and unloaded the uranium cases, he accepted US citizenship in exchange for his silence. But as Judge Nieschling said, Falck knew everything about the uranium oxide, and he probably knew too much for his own good. His eventual fate after he disappeared into the abyss on 19 May, 1945, remains a mystery.



[Gerhard Falck was apparently the resident expert on the uranium and how to use it. Note that he was closely guarded during the voyage and mysteriously vanished after it. In the publicly available transcripts of his May–July 1945 interrogations by U.S. authorities, the uranium is never mentioned [NARA RG 38, Entry UD-38, Box 13]. Can transcripts of his interrogations about the uranium be located, declassified, and released? Could his prior history and connections in Germany be traced?

Heinz Schlicke may have been in charge of detonators for fission implosion bombs, as shown in the documents on p. 4928.

Captain Johann Fehler recounted the general details of U-234's voyage to the British naval journalist Arthur V. Sellwood. Fehler said the submarine carried over 260 tons of important cargo, but otherwise he was remarkably close-lipped about the details of that cargo, even over a decade after the war [Sellwood 1956, p. 137].

The U.S. National Archives appears to have only seven small boxes of information from or about the U-234's cargo [NARA RG 38, Entry UD-16, Boxes 3–8 and RG 38, Entry UD-38, Box 13]. Where are the over 260 tons of documents, prototypes, and other cargo from the U-234, as well as all of the information the United States compiled in the process of analyzing them?

Where is all the cargo and documentation for at least five other German submarines filled with high-tech cargo that were captured at the end of the war (p. 4938)?]



Figure D.923: German submarine U-234 surrendering to the USS Sutton on 14 May 1945.



Figure D.924: U-234 Captain Johann Fehler, Lt. Karl Pfaff, radio operator Wolfgang Hirschfeld, and Dr. Heinz Schlicke [NARA RG 38, Entry UD-38, Box 13, Folder U-234 and RG 330, Entry A1-1B, Box 145, Folder Schlicke, Heinz].



**U.S. Navy Confidential Dispatch 131509. Subject: Interviewing of Prisoners. 13 May 1945. [NARA Boston RG 181]**

CONFIDENTIAL

13 May 1945

131509

FROM: CESF  
TO: CTG 02.1  
CTG 02.4  
INFO: CTG 02.3  
02.5  
02.6  
SUBJECT: Interviewing of Prisoners

1. Press representatives may be permitted to interview officers and men of German submarines that surrender. This message applies only to submarines that surrender. It does not apply to other prisoners of war. It does not apply to prisoners of the U-234. **Prisoners of the U-234 must not be interviewed by press representatives.**

[See document photo on p. 4909 top.]

**U.S. Navy Secret Dispatch 151942. Subject: Disposition of U-234 Prisoners. 15 May 1945. [NARA Boston RG 181]**

SECRET

15 May 1945

151942

FROM: COMINCH  
ACTION: CESF  
INFO: CINCLANT  
NYD Portsmouth  
COM 1  
SUBJECT: Disposition of U-234 Prisoners

**Maintain prisoners U-234 incommunicado and send them under Navy department representative to Washington for interrogation.**

[See document photo on p. 4909 bottom.]

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
131509

13 MAY 1945

FROM: CESF

TO: CTG 02.1  
CTG 02.4

INFO: CTG 02.3  
02.5  
02.6

SUBJECT: INTERVIEWING OF PRISONERS

1. PRESS REPRESENTATIVES MAY BE PERMITTED TO INTERVIEW OFFICERS AND MEN OF GERMAN SUBMARINES THAT SURRENDER. THIS MESSAGE APPLIES ONLY TO SUBMARINES THAT SURRENDER. IT DOES NOT APPLY TO OTHER PRISONERS OF WAR. IT DOES NOT APPLY TO PRISONERS OF THE U-234. PRISONERS OF THE U-234 MUST NOT BE INTERVIEWED BY PRESS REPRESENTATIVES.

DISTRIBUTION  
COMDT  
C/S  
DUTOFF  
ACO & DIO (A)  
DSERVO  
PD  
PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE

FAO  
NYBOS

**S-E-C-R-E-T**

151942

15 MAY 1945

FROM: COMINCH

ACTION: CESF

INFO: CINCLANT  
NYD PORTSMOUTH  
COM 1

SUBJECT: DISPOSITION OF U-234 PRISONERS

MAINTAIN PRISONERS U-234 INCOMMUNICADO AND SEND THEM UNDER NAVY DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVE TO WASHINGTON FOR INTERROGATION.

DISTRIBUTION  
COMDT  
C/S  
DUTY OFF  
ACO (A)  
DIO  
D SERV O  
PD  
FAO  
DPRO

MPR

RMV

152129

**NARA Boston RG 181.  
1st Naval District. Office  
of the Assistant Chief of  
Staff for Operations.  
Formerly Security  
Classified General  
Correspondence 1944--  
1945. Box 26. Folders:  
U-Boats, Surrender of.  
Surrender of German  
Submarines (1 of 2).**

Figure D.925: U.S. Navy Secret Dispatches [NARA Boston RG 181]



**NARA Boston RG 181. 1st Naval District. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. Formerly Security Classified General Correspondence 1944--1945.  
Box 26. Folder Surrender of German Submarines (1 of 2).**

USS SUTTON (DE-771)  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
New York, N.Y.

15 May 1945

PASSENGERS AND CREW OF U-234

PASSENGERS

✓ 1. KESSLER, Ulrich	General der Flieger
✓ 2. VON SANDRART, Fritz	Oberst
✓ 3. MENZEL, Erich	Oberleutnant der waffe
✓ 4. FALCK, Gerhard	Fregattenkapitan
✓ 5. NIESCHLING, Kay	Geschwaderführer
✓ 6. SCHLICKE, Heinz	Dr. Ing. Sonderführer Korvetten Kapt(MN).
✓ 7. HELLENDORF, Heinrich	Oberleutnant Zur See
✓ 8. RUF, Franz	Civilian.

OFFICERS ON BOARD SUTTON

✓ 1. FEHLER, Johann Heinrich	Kapitanleutnant
✓ 2. PAGENSTERN, Gunter	Oberleutnant Zur See
✓ 3. HIRSCHFELD, Wolfgang	Oberfunkmeister
✓ 4. WINKELMANN, Wilhelm	Obermaschinist

OFFICERS ON BOARD U-234

✓ 1. BULLA	Kapitanleutnant
✓ 2. ERNST	Kapitanleutnant (Ing).
✓ 3. WALTER	Mar. Stabsarzt
✓ 4. PFAFF	Leutnant Zur See

CREW OF U-234 ON BOARD SUTTON

✓ 1. ZIETZ, Wieland	UO 1193/38T	Masch Maat.
✓ 2. GEBAUER, Rudi	UN 29043/475	FK Ob Gefr.
✓ 3. RAUHE, Herbert	UO 13263/43	Funk Gefr.
✓ 4. MAHIA, Adolf	UO 49239/42	Matr Ob Gefr.
✓ 5. DISTLER, Otto	UO 105/39T	Masch Ob Maat.
✓ 6. SCHREIBER, Herbert	UN 9838/43	Matr Ob Gefr.
✓ 7. RITGE, Herbert	UN 73838/43	Mech Gefr.
✓ 8. STORKENMAYER, Fulins <i>Fulins Tillius</i>	UN 6161/41	Masch Ob Gep.
✓ 9. SCHMIDT, Helmut	15058/41	Matr Ob Gefr.
✓ 10. ERNST, Steffen	UO 306/43	Masch Ob Gefr.
✓ 11. HOHN, Martin	UO 69805/42T	Masch Ob Gefr.
✓ 12. PAGEL, Kurt	UN 20981/41T	Masch Ob Gefr.
✓ 13. OBST, Hans	UN 58872/42T	Masch Ob Gefr.
✓ 14. HAASE, Wilhelm	UO 11266/40KT	Masch Hpt Gefr.
✓ 15. VACHMANN, Werner	UN 3170/40T	Oberfunkmaat.
✓ 16. RUDOLPH, Karl	UO 3881/39T	Maschinen Maat.
✓ 17. SCHNEIDER, Alfred	UO 9049/42S	Mat Ob Gefr.
✓ 18. WIESMAYR, Peter	UN 3651/41KS	San Hpt Gefr.
✓ 19. WINTER, Lothar	UO 75589/42	Masch Ob Gefr.
✓ 20. LÜHMANN, Georg	UN 440/40S	Ob Btsmt.
✓ 21. PUTZAS, Waldemar	UN 1093/40S	Matr Hpt Gefr.
✓ 22. MIEHLING, Alfons	UO 7311/42	Masch Ob Gefr.
✓ 23. LEHRMANN, Hubert	UO 42047/42T	Masch Ob Gefr.
✓ 24. MEINERT, Karl	UNO 5535/41T	Masch Hpt. Gefr.
✓ 25. HUBER, Herbert	UN 12782/42	FK Ob Gefr.

CREW REMAINING ON BOARD U-234

✓ 1. JÄSPER	Ob Strm.	✓ 13. RISCHE	Ob Strm.
✓ 2. SANDMULLER	Ob Masch.	✓ 14. SCHOLCH	Btsmt.
✓ 3. THIES	Btsmt.	✓ 15. HUGGEE	Mech Mt.
✓ 4. KLATT	Masch Mt.	✓ 16. RICHTER	Masch Mt.
✓ 5. QUOSDORF	Masch Mt.	✓ 17. SIMON	Masch Mt.
✓ 6. SPURK	Matr Ob Gefr.	✓ 18. MOSTL	Matr Ob Gefr.
✓ 7. SCHILLI	Matr Ob Gefr.	✓ 19. GRÜTHALER	Mat Ob Gefr.
✓ 8. MEYER	Mech Ob Gefr.	✓ 20. ROLL	Mech Ob Gefr.
✓ 9. SCHRAMM	Masch Ob Gefr.	✓ 21. WILLIAN	Masch Ob Gefr.
✓ 10. WINTERMEYER	Masch Ob Gefr.	✓ 22. ENGELGARDT	Masch Ob Gefr.
✓ 11. KOPP	Masch Hpt Gefr.	✓ 23. WALTER	Masch Gefr.
✓ 12. WIEDENHOFT	Masch Gefr.	✓ 24. FUCHS	Matr Ob Gefr.

PASSENGERS ON BOARD U-234

✓ BRINGENWALD	Civilian
---------------	----------

USS ARGO  
19 May, 1945

Received the above named prisoners, this date.

VICTOR D. HERBSTER  
Captain, U.S.N.

Figure D.926: U.S. Navy Secret Dispatches [NARA Boston RG 181]



**NARA Boston RG 181. 1st Naval District. Office of the  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. Formerly Security  
Classified General Correspondence 1944--1945. Box 26.  
Folder Surrender of German Submarines (1 of 2).**

Address reply to  
Commandant,  
First Naval District  
and refer to:  
PRO-1/arc(0590)

**HEADQUARTERS  
FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT  
NORTH STATION OFFICE BUILDING  
150 CAUSEWAY STREET, BOSTON 14, MASS.**

18 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Captain Herbster  
Deputy Commander Northern Group

Subj: Publicity on surrender of U-234.

At 1745 yesterday (Thursday, 17 May) I received from Captain George W. Campbell, Deputy Director of Public Relations, Navy Department, a telephone message stating that ComInch now authorizes me to permit press, radio and photographic coverage of the arrival of the U-234 at Portsmouth tomorrow morning with these two exceptions:

1. No press interviews with the prisoners will be permitted.
2. No press representatives will be permitted to go aboard the U-boat.

In response to questions, Captain Campbell stated that press and radio representatives and photographers may be taken in small craft to view and record the arrival of the U-boat at the buoy in Portsmouth Harbor, that photographs of this event may be taken but that it probably will be impracticable to arrange for photographs of the prisoners ashore. (Captain Campbell did not say such photographs were not to be permitted, providing circumstances made them feasible.)

In short, Captain Campbell said we would handle the U-234 just as we have been handling press coverage of the preceding 3 U-boats, except that there will be no press interviews with the prisoners.

Lieut. Comdr. Allan Keller, PRO, CESF, informed me he had received similar instructions last night from Captain Campbell, who informed him that Admiral McCann would call Admiral Leary last night and confirm the instructions.

*N. R. Collier*  
N. R. Collier,  
Commander, USNR  
District Public Relations Officer

Figure D.927: Commander N. R. Collier to Captain Herbster. Subj: Publicity on surrender of U-234. 18 May 1945. [NARA Boston RG 181]



**U.S. Navy Secret Dispatch 151716. 15 May 1945. [NARA Boston RG 181]**

Documents and personnel of U-234 are most important and any and all doubtful personnel should be sent here.

[See document photo on p. 4913.]

**Jack H. Alberti to John L. Riheldaffer. 22 May 1945. Subject: U-234. [NARA RG 38, Entry UD-38, Box 13, unlabelled folder]**

1. The cargo of this U-boat consisting of some eight tons of documents, one ton of diplomatic mail and approximately 210 tons of miscellaneous cargo including numerous explosives, fuses, prototypes of radar, etc., is stowed in steel tubes fitted into the mine shafts of the boat. It is believed that the documents are not stowed in separate shafts but together with other cargo. The Portsmouth Navy Yard intends to unload these tubes and forward them “as is” to their destination. It is believed possible that some of these tubes contain hydrostatic scuttling charges designed to blow up the tubes in case of jettisoning. The tubes are sealed shut and will have to be opened with an oxyacetylene torch. Instructions are requested as to whether or not these tubes are to be opened at Portsmouth for segregation of their contents or if they are to be shipped to Washington unopened.

**U-234, U-805, U-873. Undated but apparently late May 1945. [NARA RG 38, Entry UD-38, Box 13, unlabelled folder]**

#### U-234

U-234, a type XB boat under Fehler, left Kristiansand on 14 April 1945[...] She carried 240 tons of cargo for Japan including one ton of diplomatic mail. While in transit she made or received no attacks. The ship’s ciphers and papers were jettisoned, Fehler saying this was done by orders of Bdu. [...]

#### U-805

Interrogation of crew of U-805 reveals she left Kiel 10 February and Trondheim on 17 March. [...] After receipt of surrender orders, the commanding officer destroyed the envelope containing the special CO code, Kartenschlüssel and Kurzsignal left. Commanding Officer and second watch officer will be sent Washington for further investigation. [...]

#### U-873

U-873, commanded by Steinhoff, left Kristiansand about 1 April[...] All ship’s papers and code machines were destroyed. In her ballast tanks was stowed a cargo of mercury and optical glass, and she was originally scheduled for Japan voyage instead of U-234. [...]

**NARA Boston RG 181. 1st Naval District. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. Formerly Security Classified General Correspondence 1944--1945. Box 26. Folder U-Boats, Surrender of.**

S-E-C-R-E-T  
151716 (P)

15 MAY 1945

FROM: CNO

TO: COMONE FOR LT. COMMANDER HATTON

INFORM LT COMMANDER HATTON INTERROGATOR FROM ONI THAT COMINCH PARTICULARLY DESIRES ALL OPERATIONAL INFORMATION ON LAST CRUISE X ATTACKS MADE AND RECEIVED X WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO U-805 X MAKE SPECIFIC INQUIRY WHY U-873 WAS IN POSITION REPORTED X DOCUMENTS AND PERSONNEL OF U-234 ARE MOST IMPORTANT AND ANY AT ALL DOUBTFUL PERSONNEL SHOULD BE SENT HERE

R-4-6 }  
UC-3 }

DISTRIBUTION

COMDT  
C/S  
DIO (A) \_\_\_\_\_

EH

DOUBLEHEADED NYPORTS FOR LT COMDR HATTON

am

Lt. Comdr Ives phoned  
and given Time/Date/Group  
@ 157615

Figure D.928: U.S. Navy Secret Dispatch 151716. 15 May 1945 [NARA Boston RG 181]



**Captain Johann Fehler [Sellwood 1956]**

[p. 137] The fitting-out of our U-boat proved interesting enough, and more complicated than we had thought. The packing side of it was extremely tricky, for some of the cargo was extremely sensitive to condensation, and every drum had to be thoroughly sealed before being cased in a protective skin of chemicals. Command now wanted us to carry an increased quota: this time we used reserve torpedo cylinders as containers . . . cutting deep into our diving tanks in order to stow them.

Finally our submarine was almost bursting at the seams. We had managed to take on board **over two hundred and sixty tons of cargo!**

[p. 195] The Yanks had left a strong guard on the *U-234* to supervise Bulla and his men. Now the buzz went round the *Sutton* that one of the Americans had been shot in the stomach. The Captain sent for me and I arrived at his cabin a very worried man, wondering what the hell had gone wrong, and which of my boys had fired the blasted bullet. It turned out, however, that there had been no quarrel. The guard had been accidentally shot by his own pal. They had been fooling around with a pistol in the W/T locker. He was badly wounded, but our [German] doctor was looking after him until a U.S. warship, equipped with an operating theatre, arrived. [...]

At first I bewildered. Then I got annoyed. I had handed over a U-boat not a kindergarten.

**Jack H. Alberti to John L. Riheldaffer. 22 May 1945. Subject: Report on Events at Portsmouth Navy Yard in Connection with the Surrender of German Submarines U-234, U-805, U-873 and U-1228. [NARA RG 38, Entry UD-38, Box 13, unlabelled folder]**

**I. LOOTING**

The usual extensive looting by boarding parties from the DE's had taken place. In the case of the USS SUTTON, which captured the U-234, interrogators were able to board the destroyer and examine the "souvenirs". Items of possible intelligence interest were removed, but the great majority of souvenirs were left in the hands of the ships' crews. There was no looting of prisoners about the USCG ARGO or aboard the tugs ENSEMORE and YAKIMA.

Because of the need of the presence of one of the interrogators, Lt. Cdr. Hatton, aboard U-234 until her docking, the passengers aboard this U-boat were accompanied to the Portsmouth Naval Prison on arrival by interrogators Lt. Maxwell and Mr. J. H. Alberti. These passengers were personally searched by these two interrogators.

The crew of the U-boat and their baggage were searched in the cell block by Marine guards in the presence of five or six Marine officers and at least two U.S.N. Medical Officers attached to the prison. Practically all items of value, such as watches, rings, decorations, wallets, even those containing personal photographs, etc. were looted from the prisoners. In some instances where enlisted men had taken watches from prisoners, these watches were taken from the enlisted men by Marine officers who retained them as souvenirs. This action has had a most detrimental effect on interrogation of the crew and jeopardizes the willingness to cooperate on the part of those members of the crew retained aboard the U-boats.

After the departure for Washington of the passengers, accompanied by Lt. Maxwell, the presence of Mr. Alberti was required aboard the U-boat. [...]

Looting aboard the U-boats at the dock has been carried on in a very large scale, both by members of the naval working party aboard and the Marine guard establishment. [...]

## II. SAFETY OF THE CAPTURED GERMAN U-BOATS

All four U-boats carried large quantities of liquor. [...]

On the morning of 20 May, Lt. Ewald of Op-20-G boarded U-234 and found U.S. Naval ratings drunk aboard. At various times on 20 and 21 May, U.S. Naval ratings were found asleep in the bunks while on duty in U-234. [...]

The captain of the U-234, while complaining to interrogating officers about the looting of the personal effects of his crew and himself, mentioned that he was all the more indignant at this treatment considering that all he had to do was to pull a lever and everyone of his mine shafts would have been emptied of their contents. [...]

[Jack Alberti, though an American himself, gave extremely unflattering descriptions of the behavior of the Americans who received this submarine, which had made such a remarkable journey to deliver over 260 tons of the world's most advanced technologies.

Johann Fehler also described in detail widespread conduct among the receiving American forces that was highly unprofessional, unethical, and uneducated [Sellwood 1956].

The “extensive looting” that was “carried on in a very large scale” (in Alberti's words) makes it even more difficult to reconstruct exactly what information and items were carried by the submarine and its personnel.]



**U.S. Navy Secret Dispatch 222115. U-234, Disposition of. 23 May 1945. [NARA Boston RG 181]**

Desire following accomplished cargo U-234... All material after rendering safe by mine disposal personnel placed safe stowage and inventory list sent CNO who will give shipping instructions and **will control access to and disposition of all cargo due to vital importance to Pacific War.**

[\[See document photo on p. 4917.\]](#)

**Lt. Best. 24 May 1945. Report of Interrogation: PW: NIESCHLING, Kay. [NARA RG 38, Entry UD-38, Box 13, Folder U-234]**

Veracity:

The following is believed reliable.

Report: Regarding "URANIUM OXIDE" and other CARGO aboard U-234:

P/W does not know anything in particular about this ore, but only heard that it was valuable and that it was to be exchanged for some other valuable ore that the Germans needed.

Lt. PFAFF was the man responsible for loading the U-Boat.

The meaning behind the ore would, according to P/W be known by the technician Fregattenkapitan FALCK (Commander). The latter also knows magnetic problems, Naval mine problems, Naval building problems. He also took some secret courses before he boarded the U-Boat. Was to be chief technician on all naval matters under Admiral WENNECKER.

Captain FEHLER as commander of the U-Boat should also know something about the ore.

It may be important to contact a man named Korvettenkapitan BECKER (Lt. Commander), living in KIEL-WIG, who was a member of the Marine Sonderstabzweigstelleheimat. (Special Naval Home Sub-station Branch).

This man traveled to the various factories in NUERNBERG and others in South Germany. He was responsible for contacting the various agencies regarding what and how much was to be included in the cargo.

The Marine Attache Abt. in Berlin Oberkommando, Referat Japan under Captain zur see "SOU-CHON" decided together with the Japanese just what the most important things were that should be included in the cargo. The latter's assistant a Korvettenkapitan von KROSIGK (Lt. Commander) also should know the details.

CNS  
25 MAY 1945

SECRET  
251446 (P)

FROM: CNO  
TO: NY PORTS  
INFO: BUORD  
COMONE  
SUBJECT: POW AND FUSES FROM U-234  
LT (JG) H E MORGAN, LT (JG) F M ABBOTT, ENS F L GRANGER WITH DR SCHLICKE POW IN CUSTODY LEAVING ANACOSTIA NOON FRIDAY VIA PLANE. THIS PARTY EXPERT IN BOMB DISPOSAL AND PROXIMITY FUSES AND BEING SENT TO ASSIST IN SECURING CERTAIN INFRA RED PROXIMITY FUSES IMPORTANT BUORD AND IN CARGO U-234. FUSES WHEN SECURED TO BE RETURNED WASHINGTON CUSTODY ABOVE PARTY.

**NARA Boston RG 181.  
1st Naval District. Office  
of the Assistant Chief of  
Staff for Operations.  
Formerly Security  
Classified General  
Correspondence 1944--  
1945. Box 26. Folders:  
U-Boats, Surrender of.  
Surrender of German  
Submarines (1 of 2).**

SECRET  
222115

23 MAY 45

DISTRIBUTION:  
COMDT  
C/S  
ACO  
DIO (A)  
DSERVO  
D. ORDOFF  
DPR O

FROM: COMINCH AND CNO  
TO: COMONE  
INFO: NYPORTS  
SUBJECT: U-234 CARGO, DISPOSITION OF

1. DESIRE FOLLOWING ACCOMPLISHED CARGO U-234.  
ALL DOCUMENTS TO BE SENT COMMUNICATION ANNEX NAVY DEPARTMENT EXPEDITIOUSLY. ALL MATERIAL AFTER RENDERING SAFE BY MINE DISPOSAL PERSONNEL PLACED SAFE STOWAGE AND INVENTORY LIST SENT CNO WHO WILL GIVE SHIPPING INSTRUCTIONS AND WILL CONTROL ACCESS TO AND DISPOSITION OF ALL CARGO DUE TO VITAL IMPORTANCE TO PACIFIC WAR.

*alb-3*  
*Surrender*

DISTRIBUTION  
COMDT  
C/S  
OUTY OFF  
ACO(A)  
DIO  
DSERVO

EA

*Curry*  
*for*  
*Amund P.*  
*Res*  
*OP*  
*Dio*  
*Jo*  
*MBM*

Figure D.929: U.S. Navy Secret Dispatches [NARA Boston RG 181]



**U.S. Navy Secret Dispatch 262151. Subject: Mine Tubes, Unloading of. 27 May 1945. [NARA Boston RG 181]**

Interrogation Lt Pfaff second watch officer U-234 discloses he was in charge of cargo and personally supervised loading all mine tubes.

Pfaff prepared manifest list and knows kind documents and cargo in each tube.

Pfaff states long containers should be unpacked in horizontal position and short containers in vertical position.

Uranium oxide loaded in gold lined cylinders and as long as cylinders not opened can be handled like crude TNT.

These containers should not be opened as substance will become sensitive and dangerous.

Pfaff is available and willing to aid unloading if RNEDT desires.

Advise.

[See photo on p. 4919. Lt. Pfaff, the German naval officer in charge of loading the U-234's cargo, specifically informed the U.S. Navy that the uranium oxide was stored in many separate, sealed, gold-lined cylinders. Moreover, he told the U.S. Navy that the uranium oxide could be dangerous if the cylinders were opened and it were mishandled, just as TNT would. Pfaff's warning suggests that the uranium might have been capable of starting a neutron chain reaction if the cylinders were opened and gold shielding no longer separated the individual pieces of uranium from each other.

Gold is very resistant to chemical corrosion, and it is extremely dense, which makes it good at shielding neutrons or other radiation. Unenriched uranium oxide is not dangerously radioactive and would require no special shielding or packaging. Furthermore, unenriched uranium oxide could not form a critical mass and initiate a neutron chain reaction no matter how much was brought together and how it was mishandled, so there would be no need to package it into many separate, sealed, gold-lined cylinders and issue warnings about it being dangerous and explosive if mishandled.

On the other hand, storing small quantities of uranium in many separate, sealed, gold-lined cylinders would be exactly the right approach for handling weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium. When the United States produced and shipped weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium from Oak Ridge to Los Alamos, it did in fact divide the uranium into many separate, sealed, gold-lined containers, as documented on pp. 4920–4921.

Of course, there are many possibilities. Maybe all of the uranium oxide cargo of U-234 had been highly enriched, in which case 560 kg would provide enough for a shockingly large arsenal of ~10–100 fission bombs, depending on their size and design. Perhaps the uranium oxide had been somewhat enriched, but not yet to weapons-grade levels. Maybe different batches of the uranium oxide had been enriched by different amounts. Perhaps the uranium oxide was unenriched or only somewhat enriched but had been neutron-irradiated inside a functioning fission reactor somewhere in the Third Reich, which would have made it highly radioactive and also a good source for extracting plutonium-239 that had been produced in the process. One might imagine other possibilities as well. Thus it is very important for future archival researchers to find historical documents that will answer these questions.]

**NARA Boston RG 181. 1st Naval District. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations. Formerly Security Classified General Correspondence 1944--1945. Box 26. Folder U-Boats, Surrender of.**

SECRET

262151 (P)

27 MAY

FROM: CNO  
TO: NYPORT  
INFO: COMONE  
SUBJECT: MINE TUBES, UNLOADING OF

INTERROGATION LT PFAFF SECOND WATCH OFFICER U-234 DISCLOSES HE WAS IN CHARGE OF CARGO AND PERSONALLY SUPERVISED LOADING ALL MINE TUBES.

PFAFF PREPARED MANIFEST LIST AND KNOWS KIND DOCUMENTS AND CARGO IN EACH TUBE.

PFAFF STATES LONG CONTAINERS SHOULD BE UNPACKED IN HORIZONTAL POSITION AND SHORT CONTAINERS IN VERTICAL POSITION.

URANIUM OXIDE LOADED IN GOLD LINED CYLINDERS AND AS LONG AS CYLINDERS NOT OPENED CAN BE HANDLED LIKE CRUDE TNT.

THESE CONTAINERS SHOULD NOT BE OPENED AS SUBSTANCE WILL BECOME SENSITIVE AND DANGEROUS.

PFAFF IS AVAILABLE AND WILLING TO AID UNLOADING IF RNEDT DESIRES. ADVISE.

DISTRIBUTION

COMDT  
C/S  
DUTY OFF  
ACO (A)  
DIO  
D ORD OFF




Figure D.930: U.S. Navy Secret Dispatch 262151. Subject: Mine Tubes, Unloading of. 27 May 1945. [NARA Boston RG 181]



**Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Operations start and shipments begin.**

[<http://www.y12.doe.gov/sites/default/files/assets/document/07-12-06.pdf>]

[The uranium transported on the U-234 was stored in many separate, gold-lined cylinders. As described below, highly enriched uranium was transported from Oak Ridge to Los Alamos in many separate, gold-lined cylinders. There was no need to transport unenriched uranium in such an elaborate fashion.]

The first successful shipment from Y-12 served also to demonstrate that the concept of a production factory was basically in place. The process included the full sequence of events required to take uranium ore and process the material to the final special end product of uranium 235 suitable for shipment by courier.

A most unusual method was used to transport this extremely valuable material. It was carefully packaged in a small room in the center of Building 9733-1. Then the material was placed in gold-lined nickel containers about the size of coffee cups. Two of these containers were placed in a briefcase size container and the container strapped to an Army Lieutenant's arm. He was dressed in a suit to look like a salesman and along with a couple of other Army personnel also dressed as salesmen, was driven to Knoxville where he boarded a passenger train to Chicago.

At Chicago, the courier transferred his case to yet another Army Lieutenant also dressed as a salesman who took the material on to Los Alamos. A new set of escorts were assigned to this new courier and the original group returned to Oak Ridge by way of Knoxville.

In *The New World*, by Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr., the following description is provided regarding the transportation of uranium-235 from Y-12 to Los Alamos.

“Transporting the precious material to Los Alamos involved all the melodrama of an undercover operation.

“Since air travel seemed too risky, the Army shipped the product by rail. The containers of uranium tetrafluoride were placed in special luggage. At 10:30 a.m. on specified days, armed couriers wearing civilian clothes took the shipments to Knoxville in an unmarked Chevrolet sedan with Tennessee license plates. At 12:50 p.m., the couriers left for Chicago in a private compartment aboard the ‘Southland.’

“Arriving in Chicago the next morning, the Oak Ridge couriers were met by Chicago couriers who boarded the Santa Fe ‘Chief’ for the long ride west. The next day at 2:10 p.m., a car from Los Alamos met the train at Lamy, a way station in the New Mexico desert. There was some danger that conductors, porters, and station attendants might come to recognize the couriers no matter how hard they tried to make themselves inconspicuous, but train transportation was cheap and relatively safe.”

That “special luggage” mentioned in the book was a briefcase-type container with two coffee-cup-

sized gold-lined nickel containers. The “briefcase” was strapped to the arm of an Army lieutenant who was dressed to look like a salesman.

This method of shipment kept folks in Knoxville asking, “What’s going on over there at Y-12?” They saw trainload after trainload of building materials going to Oak Ridge, but they never saw anything being shipped out because they did not expect the product to be shipped in something as small as a briefcase.

Here’s another story that shows the value placed on the uranium 235. **The entire Y-12 production of U-235 prior to the dropping of the bomb Little Boy passed through room 22 of Building 9733-1.** At one time, there were bars on the windows and a guard was posted outside the door to protect the output of Y-12’s calutrons. **The material was processed in one kilogram batches.**

**Twenty-four karat gold trays weighing about four pounds were used to process the material.** The first batches were ground by hand using a mortar and pestle made of nickel. After the grinding operations, the workers had to check under their fingernails to be sure the material had not accumulated there.

**The coffee-cup-size nickel cylinders used to transport the U-235 were made by a group in the Y-12 shops headed by Jack Case, Y-12 plant manager from 1967 to 1982 and namesake of the Jack Case Center. They were gold plated in Slack’s Plating Shop in Knoxville.** Johnsson was driven to Knoxville to deliver and pick up the cylinders by one of Y-12’s Motor Pool drivers (a Mrs. Justice).

The filled cylinders were delivered to Captain Lloyd Zumwalt, who was located in an office two blocks from Building 9733-1. When the captain found out they were walking with cylinders containing U-235, he instructed those delivering it to, “Call for a car. If you got run over it would be a mess to dig up the ground to recover the uranium but in a car it would be all in one place.”



**U.S. Navy Secret Dispatch 292045. Subject: U-234, Cargo Information. 30 May 1945. [NARA Boston RG 181]**

Lieut Comdr Karl B Reese USNR, Lieut (JG) Edward P McDermott USNR and Major John E Vance CE USA [Corps of Engineers, United States Army] will report to commandant May 30th Wednesday in connection with cargo U-234.

It is contemplated that shipment will be made by ship to ordnance investigation laboratory NAVPOW-FAC Indian Head Maryland if this is feasible.

[See document photo on p. 4923.

John Vance worked for the Manhattan Project and would have been an ideal person to facilitate the transport of the uranium from the U-234 to the Manhattan Project. The uranium was temporarily stored at Indian Head, Maryland, along the way.]

**Joseph Mark Scalia. 2000. *Germany's Last Mission to Japan: The Failed Voyage of U-234*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. p. 233.**

35. Interview, Pfaff with Wilcox, 24 February 1995. Pfaff recalled that once the welders opened the cylinders, he noticed “a tall civilian... with a large hat” examining the boxes. Because the stranger was rather conspicuous, Pfaff inquired as to his identity and was told that he was “Oppenheimer”. Only later, as a prisoner of war in Louisiana, did he realize that the man with the large hat might have been J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Manhattan Project. While it cannot be confirmed that the man Pfaff saw was Oppenheimer, the physicist was in the vicinity during late May and early June 1945. He was in Washington to attend a meeting with Henry Stimson, James F. Byrnes, and Gen. Leslie Groves and the Interim Committee; that he would travel to southern Maryland to examine a captured German stock of uranium oxide is not out of the realm of possibility.

[Karl Pfaff also described the same incident with Oppenheimer when interviewed in: Andreas Gutzeit. 2001. *U-234: Hitler's Last U-Boat*. Film. Washington, D.C.: Story House Productions.]

~~SECRET~~  
29245 (P) 30 MAY 1945

FROM: CNO  
TO: NYPORTS  
INFO: NAV POW FAC INDIAN HEAD MD, INFORM GIL COMONE  
SUBJECT: U-234, CARGO INFORMATION  
REFERENCE: NYPORTS 281540  
LIEUT COMDR KARL B REESE USNR, LIEUT (JG) EDWARD P McDERMOTT USNR AND MAJOR JOHN E VANCE GE USA WILL REPORT TO COMMANDANT MAY 30TH WEDNESDAY IN CONNECTION WITH CARGO U-234.

IT IS CONTEMPLATED THAT SHIPMENT WILL BE MADE BY SHIP TO ORDNANCE INVESTIGATION LABORATORY NAVPOW FAC INDIAN HEAD MARYLAND IF THIS IS FEASIBLE.

LIEUT COMDR REESE AUTHORIZED TO TAKE CUSTODY OF CARGO IN FULL. COGNIZANCE BUORD FOR SHIPMENT.

REF: CONCERNS CARGO CONTAINERS ON U-234

DISTRIBUTION  
COMDT  
C/S  
DUTOFF  
AGO (A)  
DIO  
D ORD O

~~SECRET~~  
281540 (P)

28 MAY '45

FROM: NYPORTS  
TO: CNO  
INFO: COMONE

SUBJECT: CARGO U-234, INFORMATION ON.  
REFERENCE: (A) CNO'S 262151.

RE REF. (A) AND MY LETTER 25 MAY RE CARGO U-234.

REQUEST DECISION WHETHER CARGO CONTAINERS OPENED HERE OR SHIPPED TO WASHINGTON.

PAFF SHOULD BE AVAILABLE WHERE CONTAINERS ARE OPENED.

CONTAINERS ARE OFF SHIP AND READY FOR SHIPPING. ERNST HAS NO OBJECTION TO PAFF.

DW

NOTE: REF. (A) CONCERNS CARGO ON U-234.

DISTRIBUTION  
COMDT  
C/S  
AGO (A)  
DIO  
D ORD O

MPK

2 copies to H. EDWARD  
281520

**NARA Boston RG 181.  
1st Naval District. Office  
of the Assistant Chief of  
Staff for Operations.  
Formerly Security  
Classified General  
Correspondence 1944--  
1945. Box 26. Folders:  
U-Boats, Surrender of.  
Surrender of German  
Submarines (1 of 2).**

Figure D.931: U.S. Navy Secret Dispatches [NARA Boston RG 181]



-2-

Pos. Nr.	Post. Nr.	Marke u. Nr.	unverpackt in Marke u. Nr.	Stückzahl	Art	Gesamt	Inhalt	Empfänger	Bemerk.	Wo verstaubt
21	02854	02854	a-g	17	Paq	42,3	Schwein Zeichn.	Jap. Marine		a. Tabensaufst.
15	4166	4166		4	Paq	9,5	Kondensatoren	Jap. Heer		"
31	02542B	30213/1-2	30213/1/2a-b 30213/2/2a-b	4	Paq	11,0	Empfänger	Jap. Marine		"
51	1704	1704	a-c	3	Paq	6,5	Dokumente	Jap. Heer		"
51	1569/13-21	1569/13-21	13-17, 19-21a-g 18a-g, 21a-g	103	Paq	317,0	Stahlkugeln	Jap. Marine		"
51	1701	1701	a-b	5	Paq	8,5	Dokumente	Jap. Heer		"
51	6058/385	6058/385		3	Paq	219,0	Waffenteile	Jap. Heer		"
51	2040	2040		1	Paq	6,0	Flanglas	"		"
22	02863	02863/1-20	16-8, 10-11, 13-17, 18-19 d	39	Paq	26,4	Farbstoffe	"		"
25	117206	117206		1	Paq	214,5	FUG X	Jap. Marine		"
36	6157/1-10	6157/1-10		10	Paq	43,5	KK-108	Jap. Heer		"
151	6157/1-7	6157/1-7		17	Paq	2,5	Kabel	Jap. Marine		"
39	1257	1257		1	Paq	560,0	Uranoxyd	Jap. Heer		"
51	5/1-2	5/1-2		2	Paq	600,5	Bestandteile f. Zündhütchen	"		"
51	30215/1-8	30215/1-8	1-2, 4-7a-b 3a-g, 8a-b	57	Paq	25,0	Hämoglobin	"		"
119	3114/1-25	3114/1-25	1-3, 6, 7a-b 2, 5a-g, 1a-f 8a-i	61	Paq	59,0	Farbstoffe	"		"
119	3114/1-25	3114/1-25	1-3, 6, 7a-b 2, 5a-g, 1a-f 8a-i	61	Paq	107,0	Spulenkörper	Jap. Marine		"
119	3114/1-25	3114/1-25	1-3, 6, 7a-b 2, 5a-g, 1a-f 8a-i	61	Paq	271,5	Rohglaspreßringe	"		"
57	ST 1239	ST 1239/1-21	JE A-Y	260	Paq	4275,9	Rohglas	"		"
						8984,5				

POS. NR.	DESTINATION NR.	LABEL & NR.	REPACKED IN LABEL & NR.	NUMBER OF BALES	HOW PACKED	WEIGHT TOTAL IN KG.	CONTENTS	RECIPIENT	REMARKS	WHERE STORED
31	02542B	30213/1-2	30213/1/2A-B 30213/2/2A-B	4	PACKAGES	11,0	RECEIVERS	JAP NAVY		SEE DECK CONTAINER PLAN
51	12386	ST 1704	A-C	3	PACKAGES	6,5	DOCUMENTS	JAP ARMY		"
51		1569/13-21	13-17, 19-21A-M 18A-E, 21A-G	103	PACKAGES	317,0	STEEL BALLS	JAP NAVY		"
51		ST 1701	A-C	5	PACKAGES	8,5	DOCUMENTS	JAP ARMY		"
51		ST 6058/385		3	CASES	219,0	ARMAMENT PARTS	"		"
51		ST 2040		1	PACKAGE	6,0	PLANOSPHERICAL LENS	"		"
49		ST 1255/7	7A-B	4	PACKAGES	26,4	DYES	"		"
22	02863	02863/1-20	16-8, 10-11, 13-17, 18-19A-D	39	PACKAGES	214,5	FUG X	JAP NAVY		"
25		117206	K 168	1	PACKAGE	2,5	CABLE	"		"
36		ST 1270/1-10		10	CASES	560,0	URANIUM OXIDE	JAP ARMY		"
151		ST 6157/1-17		17	PACKAGES	620,5	STOCK PARTS FOR PERCUSSION CAPS	"		"
39		ST 1257		1	CASE	25,0	HEMOGLOBIN	"		"
51		ST 1255/1-2		2	PACKAGES	59,0	DYES	"		"
61	02851	30215/1-8	1-2, 4-7A-B-H 3A-C, 8A-B	57	PACKAGES	107,0	COILS	JAP NAVY		"
119		3114/1-25	1-3, 6-7A-H 2, 5A-C/4A-F 8A-I	61	PACKAGES	271,5	RAW GLASS SHAPING RINGS	"		"
119		3114/1-25	1-3, 6-7A-H 2, 5A-C/4A-F 8A-I	61	PACKAGES	271,5	RAW GLASS SHAPING RINGS	"		"
57	ST 1239	ST 1239/1-21	JE A-Y	260	PACKAGES	1275,9	RAW GLASS	"		"
				525	PACKAGES	1312,5	PLASMA CHIN	JAP ARMY		"

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 903015

Figure D.932: U-234 German cargo manifest and English translation, both listing 10 cases totaling 560 kg of uranium oxide [NARA RG 38, Entry UD-16, Box 4, Folder Manifest of U-234].

**William J. Broad, Captured Cargo, Captivating Mystery. *New York Times* 1995-12-31 p. A22.**

Historians have quietly puzzled over that uranium shipment for years, wondering, among other things, what the American military did with it. Little headway was made because of Federal secrecy. Now, however, **a former official of the Manhattan Project, John Lansdale Jr., says that the uranium went into the mix of raw materials used for making the world's first atom bombs. At the time he was an Army lieutenant colonel for intelligence and security for the atom bomb project. One of his main jobs was tracking uranium.**

Mr. Lansdale's assertion in an interview raises the possibility that the American weapons that leveled the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki contained at least some nuclear material originally destined for Japan's own atomic program and, perhaps, for attacks on the United States.

[...] But Mr. Lansdale, the former official of the Manhattan Project, displayed no doubts in the interview about the fate of the U-234's shipment. "It went to the Manhattan District," he said without hesitation. "It certainly went into the Manhattan District supply of uranium."

[John Lansdale wrote or received many of the memos on the German nuclear program in the Manhattan Project's files [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A]. He stated unequivocally to the *New York Times* that the U-234's uranium cargo went to Oak Ridge ("the Manhattan District supply of uranium"), and he presumably would have been in a good position to know that. It makes perfect sense that the U-234's uranium would go to Oak Ridge, regardless of its state of enrichment. Its precise composition could be tested much more thoroughly and easily at the Oak Ridge laboratory than in the field at the Portsmouth Navy Yard. If the U-234's uranium was unenriched, it would have gone into the general stockpile of uranium awaiting enrichment by Oak Ridge's K-25 gaseous diffusion plant and Y-12 calutrons. If the uranium was somewhat enriched, it would have been sent to the calutrons for further enrichment. Even if it were highly enriched, it would be inspected and repackaged, and likely would have had its chemical form altered (at that time, the United States preferred to ship highly enriched uranium as uranium tetrafluoride, not uranium oxide) before it was sent on to Los Alamos.

I spent several days searching Oak Ridge's 1945 files at the NARA Atlanta archive, including detailed files of uranium shipments received at Oak Ridge, weekly enrichment reports from the gaseous diffusion plant and the calutrons, and records of enriched uranium shipped out of Oak Ridge. As Carter Hydrick first pointed out [Hydrick 1998, 2016], there was a significant increase in the output of highly enriched uranium from the calutrons beginning in mid-June 1945, but that appears to have been due to the first moderately enriched uranium from the gaseous diffusion plant being forwarded to the calutrons at that time, not the arrival of the U-234's uranium. In fact, I could find no records whatsoever of the U-234's uranium entering Oak Ridge or being processed there. Perhaps I overlooked those records among the vast collection of files, or maybe they are stored elsewhere, or perhaps they are still classified. Alternatively, maybe the U-234's uranium was officially entered into the record books as something else, for example by falsely labelling it as a shipment of uranium oxide from the Belgian Congo, a batch of uranium that had already been partially enriched by Oak Ridge's gaseous diffusion plant, or some other such subterfuge.

Again, hopefully future archival researchers can dig even more deeply into these mysteries and finally find some answers.]



[In addition to the uranium, the following documents suggest that detonators from the U-234 submarine, as well as passenger Heinz Schlicke's knowledge of those detonators, may have been useful for the U.S. plutonium implosion bombs.]

**Dr. Delmar Bergen, former director of the nuclear weapons program at Los Alamos National Laboratory [Hydrick 2016, pp. ix–xi].**

I began my career at Los Alamos in the summer of 1957, directly involved in nuclear weapons work, which remained the case until my retirement. I started as a staff member working on nuclear weapon design, and eventually was promoted to Director of the LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory) Nuclear Weapons Program. Other assignments included serving as a consultant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, and as a consultant to the US delegation developing the protocols for the Short and Intermediate Range Missile Treaty between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

[...] I would like to stress two points that I believe materially change the important history of the birth of the Nuclear Age as we know it:

First, it is my view as a physicist, based on documentation provided here in *Critical Mass* that the effort the Germans put into preparing and shipping the 560 kilograms of uranium oxide surrendered on board the German submarine U-234, was enriched in the isotope U235. In other words, it was enriched to create a nuclear weapon. [. . .]

The second material information you should take note of, I believe, is that the contributions to the Manhattan Project of the surrendered U-234 did not stop there. I believe the surrender of U-234 had impact on the development of the implosion device—the plutonium bomb dropped on Nagasaki—as well.

I was well acquainted with the development of the implosion device and the difficulties our scientists experienced in developing a detonation system that would give a proper spherical implosion. This concern kept the entire group on edge until the famous Trinity Test in New Mexico proved it to be successful... Surprisingly, as the date of the test approached, last-minute improvements in the firing system reduced their concern enough about the reliability of the detonation system...

I was never told how the details of the improvements came about, but it was during this period that the passengers on board U-234 were debriefed and it was learned that one in particular, the scientist Heinz Schlicke, had knowledge of fast operating energy transfer systems. The rapid and consistent release of electrical energy was a key part of the problem the LANL scientists were experiencing triggering the detonators with the simultaneity necessary to achieve a clean spherical implosion. There apparently is no written unclassified record available to provide us with what may have come from the debriefing of Heinz Schlicke but this we do know, over the summer months after his capture and the surrender of U-234 the confidence in the detonation system greatly improved, and the production of uranium for the gun weapon increased significantly.

**Jack H. Alberti to John L. Riheldaffer. 24 May 1945. Subject: U-234. [NARA RG 38, Entry UD-16, Box 4, Folder Manifest of U-234]**

The following information has been obtained from P/W Leutnant Menzel of the Luftwaffe, passenger on U-234.

1. The two after mine shafts of the forward line of six mine shafts amidships contain the personal baggage, documents and other property belonging to General Kessler, Col. von Sandart and Leutnant Menzel, in addition to some other cargo.
2. The Captain of U-234, Kapitänleutnant Fehler, and the II.W.O., Leutnant Pfaff (believed at Fort Meade), and the engineer of the boat (retained aboard U-234), between them, know most about cargo stowage and can be of great assistance in identifying it, as well as in proper and safe unloading.
3. In the U-Raum of U-234 there are two steel chests, marked Erich Menzel. These contain 15 rolls of secret films and all documents concerned with Menzel's mission.
4. U-843, C.O. Kapitänleutnant Herwartz, arrived in Norway from Japan about 10 April. She was sunk on her way to Kiel and two survivors were rescued by the Germans.
5. U-864, C.O. Kapitänleutnant Wolfram, was to go to Japan. She was sunk off Bergen with two Messerschmidt experts on board. Lt. Col. Stepp of the Luftwaffe and Baurat Wahlfeldt, the high-frequency expert, who were to sail on this boat were not aboard and remained in Horten.
6. The packages for Dr. Schlicke, one of the passengers, and contained in one of the tubes are marked "TONI". Dr. Schlicke knows about the infra-red proximity fuses which are in some of these packages. He warns that they must be handled with the utmost care as they may either explode or be irreparably damaged if handled improperly. Dr. Schlicke knows how to handle them and is willing to do so.
7. Fregattenkapitän Falck states that in addition to the mine shafts there are containers with cargo and documents inside the fuel tanks.
8. General Kessler, who was going to Japan to relieve General von Gronau, had originally planned to go to Japan via Northern Norway in a Junkers 290. Although this plan was abandoned in his case, it is possible that others went to Japan in this manner.
9. An empty envelope, found in the passport of Col. von Sandrat, is inscribed on the outside to the effect that it originally contained 1500 Swiss Francs. Since General Kessler only claims to own 1500 Swiss Francs, and since only 1800 francs have been recovered, 1200 francs must still be scattered among the souvenir hunters at Portsmouth, and this is on the assumption that none of the other passengers had any Swiss Francs.

[From information that is currently available, U-234's cargo apparently included a wide variety of advanced detonator technologies, and Heinz Schlicke was an expert on those and many other technologies. Although only infrared detonators were mentioned as an example in the above document and the next document, the other technologies may have included exploding bridgewire detonators such as would be especially useful for implosion bombs. Erich Schumann appears to have referred to exploding bridgewire detonators in his description of German implosion bombs (p. 4279).]



**Secret dispatch from Commander of Naval Operations to Portsmouth Naval Yard. Subject: POW and fuses from U-234. 25 May 1945. [NARA Boston RG 181]**

Lt (JG) H E Morgan, Lt (JG) F M Abbott, Ens F L Granger with Dr Schlicke POW in custody leaving Anacostia noon Friday via plane. This party expert in bomb disposal and proximity fuses and being sent to assist in securing certain infra red proximity fuses important BUORD [Navy Bureau of Ordnance] and in cargo U-234. Fuses when secured to be returned Washington custody above party.

[See document photo on p. 4917.]

**First lecture given by Dr. Schlicke at the Navy Department. 19 July 1945. [NARA RG 38, Entry UD-38, Box 13, Folder U-234]**

After Dr Schlicke completes his lecture he will be available for questions that people ask. But we will kindly ask you not to ask any questions during the lecture and after the lecture Mr Alvarez will sit at the table and the person who wishes to ask a question is asked to come forward so that we can get in the microphone and keep a record of all the questions and answers. Thank you.

[For more information on some of Schlicke's U.S. lectures, see AFHRA B1975, frames 1325–1495.]

**Luis W. Alvarez. 1987. *Alvarez: Adventures of a Physicist*. New York: Basic Books. p. 137.**

The gamma-ray records proved less definitive than we had hoped but helped the implosion design. I cleaned up some loose ends in detonator design. By April 1945 that work had moved on to engineering, and I was again unemployed.

[...] Normally a new weapon is proof fired at a proving ground before it's used in combat. We had only one U-235 weapon, however, every atom of which had been run twice at enormous expense through the Oak Ridge calutrons, and as of July 1945, there would be about one plutonium bomb a month, the first of which would have to be used up in a static test to make sure the Fat Man implosion system worked as we predicted it would.

[Note from this passage that Alvarez had been directly involved in the design of the detonators for the U.S. implosion bomb, was available for additional assignments by April 1945, and recognized there was still uncertainty about whether the implosion bomb detonation system would work as intended. From the document on p. 4785, Alvarez was also directly involved in U.S. intelligence efforts to analyze the progress of the German nuclear weapons program. Thus if U-234, Heinz Schicke, or Allied discoveries of German nuclear weapons components in Europe (p. 4279) did in fact provide improved detonators for an implosion bomb, Alvarez would have been an ideally qualified person to assign to apply them to the U.S. bomb.]

**Pam Fessler. 18 August 2008. Former GIs Spill Secrets Of WWII POW Camp. National Public Radio.** <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93649575>  
[See also: <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93640350> and <https://www.npr.org/2008/08/18/93635950/breaking-the-silence-of-a-secret-pow-camp>]

Amid the shade trees, swings and picnic grounds at Fort Hunt Park just outside Washington, D.C., there are few traces of the site's top-secret military past. But for the GIs who were stationed there during World War II, the park is alive with memories of what it had been: an interrogation camp for nearly 4,000 mostly German prisoners of war.

The park, then code-named P.O. Box 1142, was where the military elicited crucial information from top enemy officers and scientists. It also was where the United States had a clandestine program to help American POWs escape.

Until recently, much of what occurred at P.O. Box 1142 was unknown. Many who participated went to their graves without revealing—even to their families—what they'd done. The buildings were razed after the war. And many documents about the camp were destroyed in an effort to conceal its existence.

The National Park Service, which now runs Fort Hunt Park, is trying desperately to capture some of this history before it disappears. It has conducted more than 40 oral interviews with vets who had been stationed there.

One GI who worked at P.O. Box 1142 was John Gunther Dean, a young American soldier singled out while in basic training because he seemed well-suited for the intelligence operation. Dean, now 82, recalls how he was summoned to the Pentagon, where an Army officer asked him if he knew how to speak German.

"And I said, 'Yeah, I speak German like a native,'" says Dean.

His family, which was Jewish, had fled Germany in the late 1930s. When everyone else at Fort Belvoir—a U.S. Army base in Virginia—was sent overseas, Dean was handed a nickel and a phone number and then mysteriously dropped off in the middle of Alexandria, Va.

"There was a drug store. I went in, called the number and they said, 'Dean, you stay outside and we'll pick you up in a staff car.' And they drove me up towards Mount Vernon and that's how I ended up at Fort Hunt. It must have been end of November, early December 1944," he says.

George Mandel, now an 84-year-old professor at George Washington University, also ended up at P.O. Box 1142 during the war.

Mandel says when he was there, things looked quite different than they do today. There were prison barracks and buildings where American soldiers would interrogate Nazi and other enemy prisoners. About 4,000 high-ranking prisoners passed through the camp.

"My job was to interrogate scientifically trained and experienced Germans who had been sent to this country by the military," says Mandel. He knew German and had a chemistry degree.

But he admits that at age 20, he was naïve in the face of some of the Third Reich's top scientists.



“One of them was a person who worked on enriching uranium, and I didn’t know why anybody would want to enrich uranium. I mean, what does this have to do with anything?” he says. “And so my job was to find out what he was doing and how it was being carried out, and then I reported this to the Pentagon.”

It was part of a U.S. effort to learn what the Germans were up to. The prisoners were asked about troop movements, scientific advances and anything else that could help the Allied cause.

For years, Mandel, Dean and others kept quiet about P.O. Box 1142 because they had been sworn to secrecy. The operation has since been declassified, but many records were lost, which is why the veterans’ stories are so important to the park service.

For Chief Ranger Vincent Santucci, it’s like trying to glue together a broken vase—with some important pieces missing.

“Many of the archives were destroyed directly after the war. And so if we didn’t have the opportunity to speak with these men and capture their stories, much of it may have been lost forever,” Santucci says. [...]

One of those Dean befriended was German engineer Heinz Schlicke, who developed infrared fuses that could be used to trigger an atomic bomb. Schlicke was brought to P.O. Box 1142 after the U-boat on which he and other scientists were fleeing Germany for Japan was surrendered in 1945.

Schlicke’s time at Fort Hunt was part of Operation Paperclip, a secret effort to bring hundreds of top German scientists—and their expertise—to the U.S. before the Russians got their hands on them. Dean says he and Schlicke played tennis and rode horses.

“It took quite some time before he was willing to cooperate. The war had ended in Europe and at that point, he said, he’s willing to help us, but his wife was at that point in what was in the Russian zone,” says Dean.

Dean was eventually sent to Europe to find Schlicke’s wife and two small children and to reunite the family. Schlicke ended up working in the U.S. for the remainder of his life.

[See also p. 2057.

At least some of the surviving records from Fort Hunt are at NARA RG 165, Entry 179. Those and any other relevant records should be searched thoroughly.

Are there detailed reports of the interrogations of German-speaking prisoners who described uranium enrichment, atomic bomb fuses, or other nuclear-related work?

What are the names of the 4,000 German-speaking prisoners who were interrogated at Fort Hunt?

What all did the United States learn from them?]

**Robert K. Sutton. 2021. *Nazis on the Potomac: The Top-Secret Intelligence Operation That Helped Win World War II*. Philadelphia: Casemate. pp. 74–75.**

[George] Mandel's special expertise was chemistry, but, in time, he became comfortable asking questions about more technical issues, such as German jets and jet engines. In short order he became one of the experts on jets at Fort Hunt. Once he learned about the technical capabilities, flight characteristics, speed, and everything else about German jets, he came to the chilling conclusion that had the Nazis developed these machines at the peak of their manufacturing capabilities, the war could well have ended very differently. These airplanes were far superior to anything the Allies had in the air. [...]

One German scientist described his responsibility of enriching uranium. Mandel would later say that he could not understand why anyone would bother to enrich uranium, but as he probed deeper, he learned that the Germans had been working on developing a nuclear bomb. This was critical information that needed to be passed along to the Pentagon—immediately! [...]

While interrogating another scientist, Mandel learned about proximity fuses. The Allies had developed proximity fuses—which could detonate an explosive shell when it was close to or in the proximity of a target for maximum effect—but the Pentagon wanted to better understand the German uses of the devices. Mandel discovered that the German development of these devices was further advanced than those in the United States.

[Johann Gunther Dienstfertig (1926–2019) was born in Breslau, moved to the United States in 1939, and became much better known as John Gunther Dean. As a native German speaker who was drafted into the U.S. Army, he was assigned to obtain information from German prisoners of war at Fort Hunt and was also sent on a mission to Europe after the war. In multiple interviews, he stated that POWs from the U-234 as well as other German personnel captured earlier provided information about the German nuclear program, and that the German nuclear program was highly advanced. He spent most of his career as a high-ranking diplomat working around the world on behalf of the U.S. government.]

**Ambassador John Gunther Dean. Interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy. 6 September 2000. p. 19. [https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/pdf\\_documents/assets/documents/oral\\_histories/project/Initial\\_Interview\\_Part\\_One.pdf](https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/pdf_documents/assets/documents/oral_histories/project/Initial_Interview_Part_One.pdf)**

DEAN: [...] For the next two years, I served at Post Office Box 1142, Alexandria, Virginia. I was sent to Europe at one point, but I always remained part of "Post Office Box 1142."

Q: Was this OSS?

DEAN: It was military intelligence. The OSS colleagues with whom I worked lived in a mansion on the road to Mount Vernon. I went to Fort Hunt, also a stop on the Mount Vernon Highway, about 5 minutes from our OSS friends. Today, at Fort Hunt, you can see nothing that existed during the war. I took my wife there, 30 years later. There is nothing there except some areas designated "Off Limits". During my military career, I could wear most anything I wanted—civilian clothes, military clothes (but I was a little young guy at 18 to pose as an officer). In 1944, I heard for the first time the word "atomzertrummerung" meaning splitting of the atom. Few people had ever heard about it until one year later.



**Fort Hunt Oral History. P.O. Box 1142. Interview with John Dean by Brandon Bies. 2 October 2007.** [https://www.nps.gov/museum/exhibits/fohu\\_oral\\_history/transcripts/Fort%20Hunt\\_NPS\\_PO%20Box%201142\\_JDean.pdf](https://www.nps.gov/museum/exhibits/fohu_oral_history/transcripts/Fort%20Hunt_NPS_PO%20Box%201142_JDean.pdf)

[There are also many other enlightening interviews of former Fort Hunt interrogators at this website [https://www.nps.gov/museum/exhibits/fohu\\_oral\\_history/index.html](https://www.nps.gov/museum/exhibits/fohu_oral_history/index.html)]

[p. 22:] BB: So, these room conversations, the listening in that you would do—does any particular room conversation stand out, do you remember any time—

JD: One of them was, and I heard it for the first time, the word [speaks German], the splitting of the atom. Now, whether this is recorded; I don't—did I push the button? But I knew, was my uncle Otto Stern [...] had worked in Germany with Hahn and people like that, and he was fleeing and he went to the States. He got the Nobel Prize in 1948 in physics, so I knew the word [speaks German]. I know nothing of how you get to that, and I'm not at all a scientist, but I knew that's the time you press the button, because that was of major interest to the United States. [...]

[pp. 23-24:] JD: I just turned the damn stuff in; I don't remember. We all turned the stuff in, and we were told not to talk much about the thing. But then they used us younger guys—I was used because Heinz Schlicke, when he came, he was young, sports-oriented, and he wanted—we wanted to be nice to him. So somebody had to go and do things with him; so I did. He was a nice guy—he was Nazi—yes, he was a good Nazi, and he was at Peenemünde; so what? My job was to see what he could do for the United States. And I was told to do this. [...]

[p. 30:] JD: [...] At 1142, there was no pressure. There was psychological power being used. We put a stoolpigeon in because this guy was knowledgeable on atomic energy. [...]

[pp. 42-44:] JD: What happened with the—in January of 1945, the war was going badly for the Germans. Hitler sent U-boat number 234 to help the Japanese allies. You have the documentary. Now, how we got involved is we got it after these people came to 235, and it was the following—that we—that a—this submarine was on its way to Japan, and it had, we were told, mercury for \$300 million, which was a number so extraordinary in 1945, but it wasn't. It was actually uranium oxide on there, and the captain was Captain Fehler. It had a German four-star general on it, and if I reached back, I'd give you the name somewhat.

BB: Was it Kessler?

JD: It—

BB: Ulrich Kessler?

JD: It was an air force general.

BB: And Luftwaffe. Yeah, that's Ulrich Kessler.

JD: And it was—and it was two colonels—Japanese colonels who committed hari-kari because—and then there was our friend Heinz Schlicke on there. Now, that U-boat was on its way and got as far—as I remember it—as far as Uruguay and was then supposed to go—you have to remember at that point, in May of 1945, Japan was very much still in the war. The atomic weapons—we had—we weren't using it and may not have had it, and the Germans had been very far advanced on atomic energy. Hahn—Professor—was it Hahn or whatever—was the head of it, and that's where my uncle came in—Otto Stern was—he had been down—but these guys—the Jewish people left and fled, you

know, okay. So, when this boat surrendered, 234, the two Japanese committed hari-kari because Fehler said, “I will only surrender to the Americans.” All I know that—at that point, these guys came—some of these guys came to P.O. Box 1142, and it took quite some time, to be very frank, for Heinz Schlicke to come around to working with us and the willingness to work with us, and it was only later that I was sent with prisoners who were being sent back to Europe, and I was put on a ship, and I went back, and I delivered these guys, and everything was so well planned, I was in luck. In Normandy, it was pretty normal, and at that point I was asked to go to Kiel, British zone, and there I was told that—that since I’d known Schlicke that I should go and get his wife and two kids. Everything was worked out. [... I]t was in South Hampton, I believe, somewhere on Long Island that they first put him, and he worked with us, and he gave us the secrets of infrared we didn’t have, and he then stayed with his wife and children in the United States, and he died last year—

BB: Right.

JD: —and Schlicke was a good Nazi. He had worked in Peenemünde[....]

[pp. 54–57:] BB: Okay. Do you—again, realizing completely that your views were that of an 18 and a half year old, do you have a feeling or any sense that anything at all that went on at 1142 somehow assisted the American nuclear program, the atomic program?

JD: It definitely did. Definitely we had people who knew something about it. Now, I am not at that level, but they probably told them who the names were, and what level they were at and something like that. You see, that is what they could find out. But they didn’t have the bomb yet. But they were close, because they sent that stuff over to the Japanese. [...]

BB: Okay. Were you aware of any operations going on outside of 1142 up in Boston? Now we’re at a place called Fort Strong in Long Island in Boston.

JD: No, sir. [...]

BB: Getting a little bit—well actually, while we’re on that subject of other locations, how about a place called Pine Grove Furnace up in Pennsylvania? [...] This would’ve been a location where it was kind of used as a holding facility for prisoners prior to them coming to 1142.

JD: No, sir. [...]

BB: Are you familiar with another camp similar to 1142 on the West Coast? [...] It was called Camp Tracy. It was in Byron Hot Springs, California. It also had a P.O. Box number. It was P.O. Box 751.

[Fort Hunt was just one of several interrogation facilities. Are the complete lists of POWs and the interrogation transcripts from all of these facilities at NARA RG 165, Entry 179 or elsewhere?

What details of the German nuclear program were learned from the occupants of the U-234 submarine?

What details of the German nuclear program were learned from other POWs who mentioned “the splitting of the atom”?

How did all of that information aid the U.S. nuclear program?





NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.7003-3  
GERMANY: US Wartime Positive Int. (Nov. 44-June 45)

EVALUATION SECTION  
POST OFFICE BOX 1142  
Alexandria, Virginia

**SECRET**

25 January 1945

MEMORANDUM TO LT. COL. STUART D. BROWN.

Subject: Books in possession of PsW Weygand, Maurer and Neuert.

Mettauch & Fluegge: Kernphysikalische Tabellen. Berlin, 1942. Syringer.

Kopfermann: Kernmomente. Leipzig, 1940. Akademischeverlagsgesellschaft.

Heisenberg: Die Physikalischen Prinzipien der Quantentheorie. Leipzig, 1930.

Heisenberg: Wandlungen in den Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaften. Leipzig, 1944. Hirzel.

P. Jordan: Statistische Mechanik. Braunschweig, 1944.

L. de Broglie: De La Mecanique Ondulatoire a la Theorie du Noyau. Tome 1. Paris, 1943. Herman & Cie.

Berthelot: Theses. Paris, 1944. Manon & Cie.

Neuberg: Das Naturwissenschaftliche Wellebild der Gegenwart. Goettingen 1944.

Hickinbottom: Reactions of Organic Compounds. London, 1936. Longmans, Green and Co.

Robert Robinson: Two Lectures On Electronic Theory. London, 1932.

Hugo Sirk: Mathematik fuer Naturwissenschaftler und Chemiker. Dresden, 1944. Steinkopf.

Matossi: Raman-Effekt. Braunschweig, 1944.

Walden: Drei Jahrtausende Chemie. Berlin, 1944.

J.D'Ans & Ellen Lax: Taschenbuch fuer Chemiker und Physiker. Berlin, 1943. Springer Verlag.

Hinsberg und Lang: Medizinische Chemie. Berlin & Wien, 1938. Urban und Schwarzenberg.

P.E. Verkade & F. J. Janetzky: Untersuchungen Ueber Indolverivate (photo-static copy from Recueil Trav. Chim. Pay Bas, 1943).

Eucken: Lehrbuch der Chemischen Physik. II Band. 2 Teilband. Leipzig, 1944. Akademischeverlagsgesellschaft.

Hodgman: Handbook of Chemistry & Physics. Cleveland, Ohio, 1936. Chemical Rubber Publishing Co.

Berichte der Deutschen Chemischen Gesellschaft. Dated 14 October 1944 and 31 August 1944.

Weygand, F.: Ueber N-Glykoside, Isozuckermine und Deren Reduktionsprodukte. Heidelberg, 1940.

K. Henkel & F. Weygand: Synthese von Pyrozol und Triazoldialdehyden. 1943.

OWEN C. CAMPBELL,  
 Captain, M. A. C.

Figure D.933: Owen C. Campbell to Stuart D. Brown. 25 January 1945. Subject: Books in possession of PsW Weygand, Maurer and Neuert [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.7003-3 GERMANY: US Wartime Positive Int. (Nov. 44-June 45)].

To Dr. S. A. Goudsmit  
head of the military intelligence mission for Germany.

December 18, 1945.

Dear Dr. Goudsmit,

Nearly one year ago you have interrogated me several times and have inspected my Department of Physics and our whole Institut. At your suggestion I was treated gentlemanlike, and I intended to behave myself gentlemanlike. I was very grateful to you for your care and likewise to your deputy for his especial care during my stay in the hospitals in Paris. My distinguished esteem for U.S. has not <sup>been</sup> influenced by the war. Arrived in American custody I was trustful and in the following time I believed to have gained trust too. I think that my sincere and cooperative attitude was made evident in the interrogation camp near Washington D.C. especially to Capt. Berger.

I have to conceal nothing about my scientific work and nothing about my personal affairs. I guess you could verify in the mean-time the correctness of my statements and suppose you know now from Mr. Gerlach that he as „Bevollmächtigter für Kernphysik“ has declared basic research as „kriegswichtig“ and that I was occupied by such basic research, though more in preparatory than in accomplishing state.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED  
AUTHORITY: DOD-DPO  
BY LEO SULLIVAN, DATE:  
9/20/2017

**NARA RG GOUDS,  
Entry UD-7420,  
Box 3, Folder  
“Historian’s Office  
Inventory Control  
Job Goudsmit  
Box 4 Folder 6”**

Moreover I assume you have now an idea of the conditions prevailing since 1933 in Heidelberg where I was working and further suppose you know from my private notices or from Mr. Botke and from Mr. Freudenberg too that the „party“ has prevented my admission to the „Dozentur“ by reason of political unreliability till the beginning of 1937. My fundamental attitude is today the same as one year ago and as at much earlier time, and quite similar as my father's during all his life.

Now I should like to express what I wrote in a letter of August 22, 1945 to the commanding officer of this PW-camp (Ft. Geo. G. Meade): I am scientist and all my interest is belonging to the science (physics). The far-reaching tasks of science exceed limits of nations and extend to the future. I am in the age of best efficiency and there are lying before myself important scientific tasks.

Since June 2, 1945 applying repeatedly in vain to see any officer (or scientist) informed about my affairs I suppose these affairs can be handled only on a higher level and it seems me that something is to be cleared.

From a newspaper I came to know your military position. Therefore I write <sup>now</sup> to you as scientist applying to grant me an occasion to see you or a commissioner of you

Yours respectfully  
R. Fleischmann  
R. Fleischmann, 3 WG-1244

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NW87071

Figure D.934: Rudolf Fleischmann to Samuel Goudsmit. 18 December 1945 [NARA RG GOUDS, Entry UD-7420, Box 3, Folder “Historian’s Office Inventory Control Job Goudsmit Box 4 Folder 6”]. “I think that my sincere and cooperative attitude was made evident in the interrogation camp near Washington D.C. especially to Capt. Berger.... this PW-camp (Ft. Geo. G. Meade).”



**Robert A. Carr. October 1949. How German Experts Aid Our Research. *Army Information Digest* 4:10:15–19.**

[...] By 1 September 1949—ten years after Hitler’s attack on Poland—many changes had been wrought in the life of Dr. [\[Wolfgang\]](#) Finkelburg. Now 44, he lives with his wife and two-year-old son at Fort Belvoir, where he is employed by the United States Government as a research expert in light and radiation sources. He also is a research consultant on atomic physics; and his textbook on the subject is currently on the press of the leading American publisher.

Dr. Finkelburg’s activities in the field of pure science are not confined to the seclusion of the laboratories at Fort Belvoir. During the past two years he has lectured at Ohio State, New York and Northwestern Universities; Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Bell Telephone and Brookhaven National Laboratories; and before the Society of Motion Picture Engineers. For many months, he has carried a heavy schedule of classes, teaching atomic physics in extension classes conducted by Catholic University at Fort Belvoir.

Dr. Finkelburg is only one of about 500 [\[the actual total was far larger\]](#) outstanding German scientists and technical experts whose talents are being utilized by the United States, to help maintain our position of world leadership in scientific research and development. Under this far-reaching program, known as Project Paperclip, German experts are brought to the United States. Here they are provided with facilities for research in electronics, supersonics, guided missiles and jet propulsion. They pioneer in the vast realms of chemistry, physics, metallurgy, engineering, synthetic fuels, environmental protection, and the like. Some are doing advanced work in medicine, including the design of artificial limbs and prosthetic appliances. Nearly all of the technical services of the Armed Forces are now employing these scientists; and a few have been made available to civilian industry.

Among Dr. Finkelburg’s associates at the Engineer Research and Development Laboratories are Dr. Alexander Smakula, a specialist on optics, formerly with the Zeiss Company [\[p. 1291\]](#); Dr. Werner K. Weihe, electronics researcher who was formerly chief of the Zeiss electrotechnical laboratories [\[p. 1161\]](#); and Dr. George Hass, formerly on the faculty of the Technical University of Danzig, who is now doing research in optics and in other aspects of physics [\[p. 2769\]](#).

Although [the idea of capitalizing on the knowledge and skills of German scientists had been conceived early in World War II](#), it was not until the summer of 1945 that a firm plan could be put into operation. However, immediately after VE day, we acquired our first German experts by chance, as part of a drama that had the earmarks of a movie thriller.

[In obedience to Allied orders, Nazi submarines in every sector of the world were to surface, report their positions, and display a black flag in token of surrender. Among the submarines docking at the Portsmouth \(New Hampshire\) Navy Yard was the U-234, one of Germany’s largest U-boats, a minelayer of the latest type. Here was a haul! This sub was not on an ordinary errand. She carried Hitler’s last, most valuable gift to his Japanese ally. Her compartments were filled with treasure—platinum and mercury, blueprints by the thousands, samples of the newest electronic tubes and other inventions, uranium oxide of a high degree of purity, and a rich human cargo—ten of Germany’s leading scientific and technical experts. \[\\[Does this mean that U-234 had additional\]\(#\)](#)

technical experts not listed on p. 4905?]

It was intended that these men should carry on in Japan the newest research projects which the increasing fury of the war had prevented Germany from realizing. The group included Lieutenant General Ulric Kessler, the former head of the *Luftwaffe Flieger Korps*; Dr. Gerhardt Falck, one of the top designers in the German Bureau of Ships; and August Bringewald, the star production engineer of the Messerschmitt Works, carrying with him blueprints which would enable him to set up a complete plant for construction of the latest Messerschmitt jet aircraft in Japan.

Some of these men were placed on special military projects, and later were returned to Germany. Several are still employed at Army, Navy, and Air Force research centers, where they continue their work under Government supervision. Today, Bringewald is employed at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, and Dr. Falck has returned to Germany.

Among the cream of German scientists now working for the Armed Forces are the former director of Germany's air-to-ground and ground-to-air missiles projects; eminent V-2 and remote control specialists; the former research directors for Junkers and Zeiss; and some of Germany's leading parachute experts and aeronautical engineers.

From the beginning, the process of screening German scientists for admission to this country has been thorough. Even before the European phase of World War II ended, technical teams of the military services were surveying major plants and research organizations in Germany. They catalogued the names of thousands of Germans engaged in research; and they forwarded many thousands of scientific documents and reports to Washington for study by our technical experts. Commercial teams followed the military, analyzing the progress of German commercial research, locating the leading experts. Finally, a panel of top-notch German specialists was assembled and was directed by the Theater Commander to compile a list of all German scientists and technical specialists. This roster contained the names of 24,000 Germans, ranging from world-acknowledged experts to lesser technical specialists.

From all these sources, the military services, in cooperation with other interested Government agencies, made the final selection. The dominant factor in each case was the ability of the scientist to make an "otherwise unobtainable" contribution to American military research and development. Every using agency was required to certify that the skills and experience offered by the German could not be obtained from an available American scientist. [...]

Hundreds of millions of dollars and from two to ten years of research time, it is estimated, have been saved by the program. Out of the experience of the German scientists has come a knowledge of the many blind alleys to be avoided, thus narrowing the fields to be explored.

*MAJOR ROBERT A. CARR, Inf., is on the staff of the Security Review Branch, Office of Public Information, Department of Defense. He was formerly Public Information Officer for the Department of the Army on Project Paperclip.*



[One of the U-234 passengers that the above article named, Gerhard[t] Falck, had some sort of nuclear expertise, which this article did not mention [p. 4916]. This article also carefully avoided mentioning another U-234 passenger, Heinz Schlicke, who may have had knowledge related to nuclear components [pp. 4927–4926]. Even the main scientist featured in this article, Wolfgang Finkelburg (who was not a passenger on U-234), focused on fission reactors for much of his postwar career, so he likely had some nuclear-related wartime experience that was never explicitly named.

More broadly, the above article—written directly by the U.S. Army—openly admitted that German scientists were up to a decade ahead of the U.S. during the war and that in postwar U.S. programs, the German scientists were making enormous contributions in a wide variety of fields that were beyond the capabilities of U.S. scientists.

Where in current archival files is this list of 24,000 German names? That would be even more extensive than the Osenberg list of 15,000 names.]

**Operation LUSTY. January 1946. [AFHRA C5098 electronic version p. 586.]**

**<http://www.indianamilitary.org/FreemanAAF/OperationLusty/OperationLusty-s.pdf>**

A casual remark made by a technical engineer, who stated that he had recently been offered a position in Japan, led to his being thoroughly interrogated for significant technical information. As an aside, and what he probably considered a relatively unimportant incident, he stated that less than a month ago, **about the middle of April, ten submarines heavily loaded with the latest German equipment relative to aerial warfare, were dispatched from Kiel to Japan.** When Lt Col. O'Brien was thus informed he immediately advised the Directorate of Intelligence, USAFE, who in turn notified the Japanese Intelligence Section of SHAFE. A cable was then dispatched to all commands.

In every theater of war, all vessels in ports and at sea were notified, and one of the biggest searches ever undertaken during the war for submarines was initiated. What route they had taken, whether they had gone alone or together, no one knew. But so extensive was the search and so carefully was it executed by warships of all Allied nations, that **by the end of June, six of these ten submarines had been captured intact**, some a relatively short distance away from their bases, others perilously close to Japan.

[What technologies were on the U-234 submarine, in terms of its cargo, documents, and the knowledge of its passengers and crew?

What technologies were on other submarines (both German and Japanese) that evacuated materials and personnel from Germany?

What technologies were evacuated from Germany by other means—aircraft, smuggling across borders, etc.?)



NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder  
32.60-2 GERMANY: Summary Reports (1945-1946),  
Summary of Information June and July [1944]




Figure D.935: "The Japanese have announced that they too have discovered the effects of fission and have also said that Germany was working on the project. The interchange of technical information between Japan and Germany is being accomplished by means of submarine, surface ships, the Siberian railway and by air." [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 171, Folder 32.60-2 GERMANY: Summary Reports (1945-1946), Summary of Information June and July [1944]]



### D.14.6 High-Level Interrogations

[Many high-level German military and political officials who would have known a great amount about the German nuclear program were captured and interrogated at length by the United States and/or United Kingdom. Available documents show that those officials did indeed discuss the German nuclear program, although currently available declassified documents do not reveal most of the details that those German officials provided.]

**Nazis' A-Bomb 90 Days Late, Says Goering.** *Chicago Daily Tribune*. 26 January 1946 p. 10.

Germany was within 90 days of producing its first atom bomb when the war ended, Hermann Goering, former Luftwaffe chief, told his jailers at an American army prison in Mondorf, Luxemburg.

Authority for this statement is former Tech. Sgt. Robert Bock, 1203 S. 57th St., Milwaukee, who was warden of "Ashcan" prison, where Goering and other top flight Nazis were questioned for 100 days prior to the trials at Nuernberg, Germany.

"Goering told me Germany had made extensive progress in the use of the element uranium as a source of destructive atomic power, and that he had plans for an atomic anti-aircraft grenade which would have crumpled the wings of every plane within one kilometer (5/8 of a mile) of its bursting point," Bock asserted.

But Goering believed America would have defeated Germany even if the Nazis had developed the atom bomb, Sgt. Bock said.

[Nuclear weapons could have been employed in a variety of ways during the war. One possible tactical application would have been as an anti-aircraft weapon, such that one nuclear weapon exploded in the air might conceivably destroy an entire formation of Allied bombers. Since Hermann Goering was the head of the Luftwaffe, that application would have been most significant to him.

As the single most talented, most utilized, and most secretive native German-speaking interrogator in the investigation of German scientific programs by the United Kingdom (and by collaboration, the United States), Edmund Tilley (1892–1966) gained a deep knowledge of German programs to develop nerve agents (below), fission bombs (pp. 4948–4949), manned V-1 cruise missiles armed with fission bombs (pp. 4942–4943), a 6-ton H-bomb (pp. 4388–4397), advanced rockets (pp. 5862–5863) and goodness knows what else. Can all of the files related to Tilley's interrogations, reports, and knowledge be located and declassified?]

**Dan Kaszeta. 2020. *Toxic: A History of Nerve Agents, from Nazi Germany to Putin's Russia*. London: C. Hurst. pp. 66–68, 74, 318.**

Edmund Tilley played a pivotal role in the history of nerve agents because of his skills as a German-speaking interrogator. He spoke German with native fluency, having been born in Marburg in 1892 where his father was an English lecturer and ran a series of language schools.<sup>5</sup>

Edmund Tilley was in the US by the time of World War I, but his father and brothers were interned by the Kaiser's government. After studying at Union College in Schenectady, New York, Edmund spent time as a language and dramatics teacher, at both Union College and in Istanbul at Robert College, which was and is an elite private high school. A generation of the political and economic elite of Turkey may have been taught English by Tilley. By 1937, his mother's obituary lists him

residing in England,<sup>6</sup> yet even then he was something of an enigma as he is missing from all records other than an immigration form completed when he visited relatives in the USA, listing a modest house in North London as his current address.

Due to his fluency in German, Edmund became involved in intelligence work with the British Army. The beginnings of his war service are also a bit of a mystery. The Army records show him being made a second lieutenant in the Intelligence Corps in the autumn of 1940, shortly after it was formally re-established. At forty-eight, he made for an old lieutenant. From 1940 through 1943 he either did little of note or it was very secret. One suspects the latter. Tilley could mimic most regional German accents and it is highly likely that these talents were not squandered. A book on wartime espionage in Persia makes a single tangential reference to Edmund Tilley being in Egypt in November 1943. He was part of the intelligence services and assigned to the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre, in Maadi, Egypt. Special Intelligence Middle East's director, Brigadier Maunsell, described Tilley in his memoirs:

By far the best interrogator we had in SIME: a gentle person, paranoically [sic] devoted to duty and a crashing bore! Major Tilley succeeded in breaking down our most difficult suspect, where all others had failed.<sup>7</sup>

He is described as one of the intelligence service's "most expert interrogators" who, after a full month of interrogation, broke a hardened German spy named Hans Merz and cracked another in thirty minutes.<sup>8</sup> Details of his remaining service in the Middle East and Mediterranean theatres is largely still a secret, but whatever Tilley did, it was worthy enough for him to appear in a picture shaking hands with King George VI in Italy in 1944.<sup>9</sup> Tilley was mentioned in dispatches for his work in Egypt and toward the end of the war was assigned to FIAT.

After the D-Day invasions, the liberation of Europe was no longer a planning effort but an operational one. Tarr, Tilley, and their team headed to the field, arriving in Paris shortly after it fell to Allied forces. They followed the Allied advance all the way to Germany, often only a few days behind British, American, and Free French forces. [...]

The archives are replete with both summary and detailed interrogation reports by Edmund Tilley. It is abundantly clear that he could persuade Germans of any rank or position to talk. No doubt some of this was through his native fluency. He knew every regional accent and famously once rumbled a German spy by telling him, quite correctly, that his accent was from Altona, outside of Hamburg. By the time Tilley was chasing scientists, he had years of interrogation experience with prisoners in the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean theatres. He had interrogated hundreds, if not thousands, of Germans before he even set foot in Germany towards the end of the war. [...]

5. Philip Thomson, 'William Henry (1860–1935)', *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, <https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/tilly-william-henry-8815/text15339>, published first in hardcopy 1990, accessed online 22 March 2019.

6. Bronxville Press, 7 January 1937.

7. Private papers of Raymond Maunsell, 4829, IWM, pp. 51–52.

8. O'Sullivan, Adrian. *Nazi Secret Warfare in Occupied Persia (Iran)*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 201.

9. <https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205259615>—Note that this photo wrongly describes Tilley as a Lt Col when he was, in fact, a Major at the time.



**Edmund Sorg. 17 August 1946. Betrachtungen über die bemannte V 1 im Zusammenhang mit Atomenergie. [TNA FO 1031/57]**

Betrachtungen über die bemannte V 1 im Zusammenhang mit Atomenergie.

Reflections on the manned V 1 in the context of atomic energy.

Bei der Durcharbeitung der Interrogation vom 16.8.46 habe ich folgende Gedankengänge über die Verwendung der bemannten V 1 in Zusammenhang mit Atomenergie erwogen:

In working through the interrogation of 16.8.46, I thought about the use of manned V 1 in connection with atomic energy:

Die Betrachtung der in viele Millionen Menschen gehenden Verluste und ungeheuren Materialzerstörungen, die ein moderner Angreifer im Laufe mehrerer Jahre verursacht, zwingt zu der Überlegung, welche Möglichkeiten gegeben sind, einen Angriffskrieg und damit diese Verluste und Schäden zu verhindern.

The consideration of the losses in many millions of people and immeasurable material destruction caused by a modern attacker in the course of several years compels us to consider the possible ways of preventing an attack and thus to prevent these losses and damage.

Jedes sich mit Angriffsabsichten tragende Land ist durch Vernichtung einer verhältnismässig kleinen Zahl von Punkten, die für den Angreifer lebenswichtig sind, schlagartig zu lähmen. Es sind dies, wie allgemein bekannt, z.B. Werke der Energiewirtschaft (Kohle, Elektrizität), der Öl Förderung, Aufbereitung und Lagerung, Kunstbauten des Verkehrs, Schlüsselindustrien der Rüstungswirtschaft, Schlachtschiffe u.s.w. Die Zahl dieser verwundbaren Stellen ist zwar bei den einzelnen Staaten verschieden, liegt aber zahlenmässig bei allen im Bereich der praktischen Einwirkungsmöglichkeit. Es liegt ebenfalls im Bereich der Möglichkeit, die kleine Zahl Menschen zu finden, die als internationale Polizeitruppe—als Flugzeugführer einer bemannten V 1—jederzeit bereit sind, eine Bedrohung des Weltfriedens durch sofortige Vernichtung der oben erwähnten lebenswichtigen Punkte des angreifenden Staates zu verhindern.

Every country with hostile intentions could be immediately paralyzed by the destruction of a relatively small number of places that are vital for this aggressor. As is well known such places are for instance the factories for the production of energy (coal, electricity); the oil production, processing, and storage industries; engineering infrastructures for transport; key sectors of the armament industry; battleships; etc. The number of these vulnerable places may differ in each nation, but is numerically in a range that makes a practical intervention possible. It is also within the realm of possibility, to find the small number of people necessary to establish an international police force—pilots of manned V1—ready at any time to stop a menace to world peace by the immediate destruction of the vital places of an aggressive nation of the kind mentioned above.

Eine verbesserte bemannte V 1 mit Atomenergie als Ladung, kurz eine bemannte steuerbare Atom-bombe, die mit Sicherheit von modernen schnellen Grossflugzeugen in der Nähe ihres Zieles abgesetzt wird, gewährleistet bei Lenkung von Menschenhand und bei Selbstaufopferung des Piloten eine sichere Vernichtung ihres Zieles. Die Lenkung einer solchen Bombe durch Fernsteuerung, gleich welcher Art, gewährt nicht die absolute Sicherheit, das Ziel richtig zu treffen. Denn die technische Beeinflussungsmöglichkeit der Fernsteuerung sowie des die Fernsteuerung bedienenden Menschen durch den Feind liegt zur Zeit im Bereich des möglichen. Daraus ergeben sich Fehlerquellen, die die Erfolgsaussichten einer solchen Bombe sehr in Frage stellen. Dagegen bietet eine durch Menschenhand gesteuerte Bombe die nach menschlichem Ermessen grössten Erfolgsaussichten.

An improved manned V1 with atomic energy as a charge, in short a manned controllable atomic bomb, which can certainly be released by modern, fast, large airplanes close to its target, ensures a safe destruction of this target given that it is steered by the hands of a pilot ready to sacrifice himself. Guiding such a bomb by a remote control of any kind does not ensure the absolute certainty of hitting the target correctly. This happens because at this time it is technically possible for the enemy to interfere with the remote control and also influence the people controlling the remote guidance. This results in sources of error that seriously jeopardize the success of such a bomb. On the other hand, a human-controlled bomb offers the greatest possible prospects of success.

**Edmund Tilley. October 1946. Report on the interrogation of Edmund Sorg. [TNA FO 1031/57]**

“Specially adapted models of V-1 manned by pilots prepared to sacrifice their lives were to receive a powerful charge with which to destroy key targets, such as vital war plants and large battleships... It is more likely that the charge for the warhead which had been envisaged was not available in sufficient quantities. Significantly SORG mentioned an atomic charge for these suicide V-1s as the ideal explosive in a future ‘defensive’ war.”

[See document photos pp. 4944–4945.]

For another document on the interrogation of Edmund Sorg by Edmund Tilley, see p. 4392.

It seems likely that there are many other detailed documents summarizing information that was learned from interrogating Sorg. Can those documents be located and declassified?

For photos of actual piloted and air-launched V-1s similar to what Sorg described, see p. 1853. For a news description that may be related, see p. 5058. For submarine-launched V-1s that may have been intended to carry weapons of mass destruction, see pp. 5712–5721. See also Henshall 2000, pp. 129–130, redrawn from original document 824B-Sk 895/a, 19 September 1944, in the U.S. Air and Space Museum archive. For photos of a similar air-to-ground nuclear missile system that was created (or recreated?) in the United States by Walter Dornberger beginning in 1946, see p. 1866.]



TNA (Kew) FO 1031/112 Sorg V2

Sorg , Edmund

17.8.46.

Betrachtungen über die bemannte V 1  
in Zusammenhang mit Atomenergie .

Bei der Durcharbeitung der Interrogation vom 16.8.46 habe ich folgende Gedankengänge über die Verwendung der bemannten V 1 in Zusammenhang mit Atomenergie erwogen :

Die Betrachtung der in viele Millionen Menschen gehenden Verluste und ungeheuren Materialzerstörungen, die ein moderner Angreifer im Laufe mehrerer Jahre verursacht, zwingt zu der Überlegung, welche Möglichkeiten gegeben sind , einen Angriffskrieg und damit diese Verluste und Schäden zu verhindern.

Jedes sich mit Angriffsabsichten tragende Land ist durch Vernichtung einer verhältnismässig kleinen Zahl von Punkten, die für den Angreifer lebenswichtig sind, schlagartig zu lähmen. Es sind dies, wie allgemein bekannt, z.B. Werke der Energiewirtschaft (Kohle, Elektrizität), der Öl Förderung, Aufbereitung und Lagerung, Kunstbauten des Verkehrs, Schlüsselindustrien der Rüstungswirtschaft, Schlachtschiffe u.s. Die Zahl dieser verwundbaren Stellen ist zwar bei den einzelnen Staaten verschieden, liegt aber zahlenmässig bei allen im Bereich der praktischen Einwirkungsmöglichkeit. Es liegt ebenfalls im Bereich der Möglichkeit, die kleine Zahl Menschen zu finden, die als internationale Polizeitruppe - als Flugzeugführer einer bemannten V 1 - jederzeit bereit sind, eine Bedrohung des Weltfriedens durch sofortige Vernichtung der oben erwähnten lebenswichtigen Punkte des angreifenden Staates zu verhindern.

Eine verbesserte bemannte V 1 mit Atomenergie als Ladung, kurz eine bemannte steuerbare Atombombe, die mit Sicherheit von modernen schnellen Grossflugzeugen in der Nähe ihres Zieles abgesetzt wird, gewährleistet bei Lenkung von Menschenhand und bei Selbstaufopferung des Piloten eine sichere Vernichtung ihres Zieles. Die Lenkung einer solchen Bombe durch Fernsteuerung , gleich welcher Art , gewährt nicht die absolute Sicherheit, das Ziel richtig zu treffen. Denn die technische Beeinflussungsmöglichkeit der Fernsteuerung sowie des die Fernsteuerung bedienenden Menschen durch den Feind liegt zur Zeit im Bereich des möglichen. Daraus ergeben sich Fehlerquellen , die die Erfolgsaussichten einer solchen Bombe sehr in Frage stellen. Dagegen bietet eine durch Menschenhand gesteuerte Bombe die nach menschlichem Ermessen grössten Erfolgsaussichten.

So wäre eine entsprechend ausgewählte, geschulte und ausgerüstete internationale Polizeitruppe durch Einsatz der bemannten, steuerbaren Atombombe jederzeit in der Lage, grössere Angriffsabsichten und Handlungen eines Landes sofort im Keim zu ersticken. Allein die Tatsache des Vorhandenseins einer solchen Polizeitruppe würde schon eine weitgehende Garantie gegen Angriffsabsichten sein.

Ein Einwand, dass der Angreifer mit dem gleichen oben angeführten Totaleinsatz von wenigen Menschen den Verteidiger lahmlegen könnte, trifft nicht zu. Denn jeder moderne Angreifer muss einen ungeheuren Rüstungsapparat unterhalten, dessen Nervenzentren infolge ihrer Vielzahl immer sichtbar und daher verwundbar sein werden. Dagegen kann der Verteidiger, der diese Riesenrüstung nicht benötigt und sich durch die oben erwähnte Polizeitruppe schützt, seine wenigen hierzu erforderlichen Nerven so schützen oder verteilen, dass sie nicht lahmgelegt werden können.

Aus diesen Gründen erscheint mir die bemannte Atombombe besonders geeignet, Angriffsabsichten hochgerüsteter Staaten zu verhindern und damit die Welt vor erneuten unabsehbaren Verlusten an Menschen und Material zu bewahren.




Figure D.936: Edmund Sorg. 17 August 1946. Betrachtungen über die bemannte V 1 im Zusammenhang mit Atomenergie. [TNA FO 1031/57]



TNA (Kew) FO 1031/112 Sorg V2

5. a partial list of the members of Hanna REITSCH's V-1 suicide squad and their general whereabouts, and a few other items.

Frau SORG appeared at FIAT and was allowed to see her husband on 3rd and 4th October, in the presence of the undersigned. Her statements, some of them previously made in her letters to her husband, revealed the imminence of the execution of a plot, possibly the evacuation of Luftwaffe personnel to PERU with the help of a Peruvian citizen of English extraction, who is now employed by UNRRA in MUNICH. Since immediate action seemed imperative a brief operational memorandum was written for C.I.C. on 6 Oct 46. Most of the information contained in the memorandum of 6 Oct 46 will be repeated and amplified in this report. The second report on SORG's knowledge of the latest Luftwaffe weapons, on his "vision" of a future defensive war by means of suicide V-1s with atomic charges, and on the hiding of the most secret documents of RECHLIN, will follow shortly after this report.

7. SORG claims to have told all his secrets to the American and British officers who interrogated him in late spring and early summer 1945 and to have handed over to them all the RECHLIN documents he had hidden <sup>in Bavaria and Württemberg</sup> for Colonel PETERSEN. In fact, he did reveal <sup>some</sup> many of his secrets and handed over a portion of the concealed documents. He has already admitted that he forgot to mention the latest fuse he tested, i.e. an acoustic or sonic fuse for aircraft to aircraft missiles. Apparently he had only given part of the story of Hanna REITSCH's "suicide squad" which was supervised and trained by SORG. Specially adapted models of V-1 manned by pilots prepared to sacrifice their lives were to receive a powerful charge with which to destroy key targets, such as vital war plants and large battleships. SORG stated that the training was abandoned, late in 1944, "because of German air inferiority". It is more likely that the charge for the warhead which had been envisaged was not available in sufficient quantities. Significantly SORG mentioned an atomic charge for these suicide V-1s as the ideal explosive in a future "defensive" war. SORG has not been very truthful in his account of the finding of the 25/27 boxes of hidden documents. Some of these boxes were opened by French soldiers ignorant of their value, others were "lost". The only other man who knew the whole truth, a Major GROSHOLZ, 1st to Colonel PETERSEN, was shot by the French in May 1945 and his body was disinterred by SORG in March 1946. It may safely be assumed that SORG has told some deliberate untruths about these documents and that he has not yet handed over to the allies all he had hidden in spring 1945.

Figure D.937: Edmund Tilley. October 1946. Report on the interrogation of Edmund Sorg. [TNA FO 1031/57] "Specially adapted models of V-1 manned by pilots prepared to sacrifice their lives were to receive a powerful charge with which to destroy key targets, such as vital war plants and large battleships... It is more likely that the charge for the warhead which had been envisaged was not available in sufficient quantities. Significantly SORG mentioned an atomic charge for these suicide V-1s as the ideal explosive in a future 'defensive' war."



**Hans Kammler. 23 April 1945 telegram. [BA (Bundesarchiv). Bestand NS 3/514, pp. 31–32. Microfilmed as: NARA RG 242, Records of the Reich Leader of the Schutzstaffel (SS) and Chief of the German Police, Microfilm 183, NAID 273992206 (<https://catalog.archives.gov/id/273992206>)].**

Geräte V 1 bei Berlin sofort sprengen.


Immediately blow up V 1 devices near Berlin.

[See document photo on p. 4947.

This was one of the last known communications Hans Kammler sent before he (secretly) surrendered to U.S. forces (pp. 4977–5005). “V 1” probably meant V-1 cruise missiles, although it is possible that it referred to some other type of device. V-1 cruise missiles had been mass-produced and were widely available, so there must have been something especially noteworthy about these particular V-1s. “Blow up” (sprengen) seems to have meant to destroy them before they could be captured, not to detonate them by firing them at targets, since no targets were mentioned.

The most likely explanation is that these were V-1s that had been modified to carry nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and that Kammler wanted those advanced weapons/evidence destroyed before Russian forces captured Berlin. Note that there were more than one of them (Geräte is plural). This document complements the evidence cited above that specially modified V-1s were constructed during the war and intended for strategic Allied targets before the end of the war.]


NARA RG 242, Records of the Reich Leader of the Schutzstaffel (SS) and Chief of the German Police, Microfilm 183, NAID 273992206 (<https://catalog.archives.gov/id/273992206>)




Fernspruch - Fernschreiben - Funkspruch - Blinkspruch							
Durch die Nachr.-Stelle auszufüllen	Nachr.-Stelle		Nr.		Befördert		
	<b>Sunkstelle</b> <b>SS-Oberabschnitt Süd</b>		<b>140</b>		an	Tag	Zeit
						23.4.	1658
Vermerke: <i>Geheim</i>				<b>Geheim</b>			
Angenommen oder aufgenommen							
von		Tag	Zeit	durch			
					<i>Geheim 17/45</i>		
Abgang					Absende-Stelle		
Tag:		An <i>4-Sturmabteilung</i> <i>Grosch</i>					
Zeit:		Bauinspektion der Waffen- <i>4</i> und Polizei					
Dringlichkeits-		Böhmen-Mähren					
Vermerk		Prag					
<i>KB-124</i>		Muspillstr. 19			Fernsprech-		
		zur Weiterleitung an <i>4</i> -Ostuf. Schürmann			Anschluß:		
		Berlin					

DH-43 O.U., den 23.4.1945

Geräte V 1 bei Berlin sofort sprengen.  
*4*-Ostuf. Schürmann sofort zum Meldekopf München-Oberföhring,  
 Muspillstr. 19 in Marsch setzen.

  
 (Dr. Ing. Kammler)  
*4*-Obergruppenführer und General  
 der Waffen-*4*



Einführung	Fernspruch Fernschreiben Funkspruch Blinkspruch	Nr.	Von	An	Tag	Zeit	Annehmender Offz. (Offz.)	
							Name	Dienstgrad

Bestell-Nr.: WH - 2105 a  
 H-Vordruckbuch W. F. Meyer, (18b) Mischach 20000

Figure D.938: Hans Kammler. 23 April 1945 telegram: "Immediately blow up V 1 devices near Berlin." [NARA RG 242, Records of the Reich Leader of the Schutzstaffel (SS) and Chief of the German Police, Microfilm 183, NAID 273992206 (<https://catalog.archives.gov/id/273992206>)]



**Edmund Tilley. Brief Operational Report on [censored] and Other Germans and Italians Connected with Project Abstract. 19 August 1947. [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134A, Box 29, Folder Operation Oberjoch]**

1. On 11 August 1947 [censored] on the Italian phase of PROJECT ABSTRACT, which, in a few previous reports, was called Operation Arrival or Arrivederci, [censored] Headquarters, USAFE, by Captain R.R. SNEIDER of the CIC Detachment, BAD KISSINGEN. Major A J. LEOCHA [censored]

2. [Censored]

SANITIZED COPY  
SENSITIVE INFORMATION DELETED

[...] New Facts and Re-affirmation of Statements on PROJECT ABSTRACT.

4. Thorough cross-examination has not been effective in shaking [censored] on matters directly concerned with or related to PROJECT ABSTRACT.

a. Atomic research and development at TUCHELER HEIDE was coupled with research on guided missiles, in 1943 and 1944. (Note: In March 1947 Professor W. von BRAUN admitted that in the summer of 1943 he had been interested in atomic energy for use in V-2. Von BRAUN claimed to have dropped the project for lack of available raw materials. It may be mere coincidence that [censored] also places the beginning of combined research and development in 1943.—In March and April 1945 the undersigned heard rumors in Germany of such a combination. The most persistent rumors in I.G. FARBEN circles had it that this combination would be linked with Chemical Warfare, especially with the new nerve gases, i.e., the TABUN series. These rumors were repeated by responsible members of I.G. FARBEN, who added that this vague plan or hope had been abandoned. At the time no progress was made in the investigation of the atomic side of the problem because all effort was concentrated on a solution of the new Chemical Warfare problem. [Censored] now reveals that the ampullae (phials) he saw in four boxes in Italy had originated with I.G. FARBEN. (See b below).

b. Four boxes, probably originating in the Luftwaffe Ministry in Berlin, were sent in March 1945 by SD, POTSDAM, to ITALY in the care of a FELDWEBEL (Sergeant) HEINZ (surname forgotten!), [censored] and a Private (name forgotten!). The boxes contained (i) reports and research data on V-weapons and atomic research; (ii) 40–50 small ampullae (phials) “full of a whitish liquid”, labeled U-234, U-235 and PLU, stamped “IG” (= IG Farbenindustrie); (iii) a new and not completely developed optical instrument probably intended for measuring speed and trajectory of guided missiles at the firing point; (iv) various small and delicate parts of guided missiles, fastened to cardboard by fine wires, with full description of each item attached to the cardboard.

c. The boxes were buried near VERONA by the FELDWEBEL, [censored] and a third soldier. (The site has been explored. Parts of wooden boxes or of a wooden box, fragments of paper and an ampullae (phial) marked U234 or U235 were seen by Captain SNEIDER and [censored]. The rest had vanished). [...]

BREE may be the same “person with a French name” (BOREU?) who worked spasmodically on “electric fuses for guided missiles” at TUCHELER HEIDE in 1943 and 1944. Thus he would

know valuable details on the combined “guided missiles–atomic energy” research and development and would perhaps know where the missing documents were sent, whether they went first from TUCHELER HEIDE to BERLIN, as [censored] vaguely stated, and thence to SD, POTSDAM, and to Italy.

24. Ingenieur KRUEGER should be traced and brought at once to ECIC. He may give us valuable information on the combined “guided missiles–atomic energy” program at TUCHELER HEIDE in 1943 and 1944 and may know exactly where documents and instruments have been sent. [Censored] obtained most of his information on activities at TUCHELER HEIDE from KRUEGER, in 1944.

25. Prof. Dr. NIELS [Walter Nielsch?], now said to be in the United States, was, according to [censored], concerned with chemical and atomic problems at TUCHELER HEIDE and produced a number of atomic bombs, weighing from 1 to 5 kilograms. NIELS should be traced and questioned in detail.

26. Prof. Dr. HUETTEN. Present whereabouts unknown to [censored.] He should be located and brought to ALASKA for questioning. According to [censored] he was the originator of the combined project of research and development of atomic energy and guided missiles at TUCHELER HEIDE. This project was named “Aktion HUETTEN” after him. He was transferred elsewhere, probably in 1943 (see paragraph 7).

27. Prof. Dr. HOFMANN, successor of HUETTEN as chief of the combined program at TUCHELER HEIDE, is now at “ALEXANDROWKA Kononien” near BAKU where he is continuing his former work. [...]

28. Prof W. Von BRAUN should be re-interrogated on the following: [...]

[For information on Edmund Tilley, see pp. 4940–4941. For more information on Project Abstract, see Mills and Johanson 2019.

The German military took over Tucheler Heide in September 1939 and used it as a proving ground (Truppenübungsplatz Westpreußen or Heidekraut) for rockets, nuclear work, and other experiments until January 1945. See p. 4506.

Walter Dornberger briefly mentioned rocket testing at Tucheler Heide [Dornberger 1958, pp. 227–229].

Dr. Walter Nielsch (German, 1915–20??) was an expert on chemical metallurgy [e.g., <https://www.semanticscholar.org/author/W.-Nielsch/16969230>] and a plausible candidate to have been involved in the purification of uranium-235, uranium-233, and/or plutonium-239. What exactly did Dr. Nielsch and/or Dr. Niels do during the war and also after the war?

Were the “number of atomic bombs, weighing from 1 to 5 kilograms” fission fuel pits for bombs?

Was this work on a nuclear-armed projectile at Tucheler Heide in Poland related to the alleged test of a nuclear-armed projectile in Poland (Section D.11)? See p. 2108 for a map of other known research sites in Poland.

The March 1947 interrogation of Wernher von Braun, mentioned in this document, is described in more detail in the document on p. 5862.]





NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A,  
Box 160, Folder Apr 45—Dec. '45

**WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER  
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE**

TOP SECRET TOT

URGENT

**TOP  
SECRET**

From: US Military Attache London England

To : War Department

Nr : 43739 15 May 1945

To MILID sr nr 43739 TOP SECRET LOCO personal to Groves for Smith from Calvert signed Van Voorst.

Obergruppenfuhrer Kaltenbrunner, head of RSHA which controlled entire German Secret Service for Intelligence inside and outside Germany apprehended and presently 12th Army Gp Hq.

OSS London initiated my behalf request for me to interview Kaltenbrunner immediately and before his release to Joint Special Camp. Purpose interview to determine extent of Germany's espionage against project in States however interview be along broad lines for security reasons.

Comments requested quick possible as 12th Army Gp Hq plan to release to camp very shortly.

End

ACTION: Gen Groves

OM-IN-14004

(15 May 45)

DTG 151613Z rel

TOP SECRET

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN 24-75724

Figure D.939: Horace K. Calvert to Leslie Groves and Francis J. Smith. 15 May 1945 [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 160, Folder Apr 45—Dec. '45]. After the war, Ernst Kaltenbrunner was interrogated regarding wartime nuclear research; he had been in a position to know a great deal about both the German and the U.S. programs. Where are the resulting reports?



NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 167, Folder 32.12-2 GERMANY: Personnel (Jan 45--Dec 45)

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority AND 917017

**SECRET**  
AMERICAN EMBASSY  
Office of the Military Attache  
London, England

*file*  
*Perm. Pen.*

23 May 1945

Subject: Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner and Otto Skorzeny.

To : Major Francis J. Smith, Room 5119, New War Department Building, Washington, D. C.

1. This officer, accompanied by Mr. John Gimperman, FBI Representative, U. K., went to 12th Army Group Headquarters on 20 May 1945 for the purpose of interviewing Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner and his subordinate Lieutenant General Otto Skorzeny. As you know, Kaltenbrunner was head of the RSHA in Germany. The RSHA controlled all intelligence both domestic and foreign for Germany. Skorzeny is a subordinate of Kaltenbrunner and was head of AMT VIS, which is the sabotage section of the RSHA. He also controlled the special troops which the RSHA had attached to it.
2. Both Kaltenbrunner and Skorzeny had just arrived one day previous to our visit and in that period of time very little information had been elicited. It was thought that at least a week would be needed for the initial background investigation and it was agreed that it would not be feasible to integrate our questions in the interrogation for possibly another five or six days. It is estimated it will take that long to obtain tactical information from them, such as location of RSHA personnel and files.
3. In addition to Kaltenbrunner and Skorzeny there are also their personal adjutants, some members of their staff and their mistresses.
4. Kaltenbrunner is reported to be a man of extreme ability as a lawyer and also extremely cautious in answering all questions. While he is talking, he is saying nothing that will further incriminate himself and professes ignorance on many activities under his control and tries to elude direct answers by stating "that is in the jurisdiction of so and so".
5. Skorzeny on the other hand is a willing talker and very cooperative. He claims to be a professional soldier and wants to be treated in accordance.
6. The present status is that we left with the interrogators a set of very general questions dealing with intelligence activities in the Western Hemisphere. These questions are to be integrated into the initial interrogation and if anything of interest arises I will then go back for a more detailed interrogation.

For the Military Attache:

*H. K. Calvert*  
H. K. CALVERT,  
Major, F. A.  
Assistant to the Military Attache

**SECRET**

*A.*

Figure D.940: Horace K. Calvert to Francis J. Smith. 23 May 1945. Subject: Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner and Otto Skorzeny. [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 167, Folder 32.12-2 GERMANY: Personnel (Jan 45-Dec 45)]. After the war, Ernst Kaltenbrunner was interrogated regarding wartime nuclear research; he had been in a position to know a great deal about both the German and the U.S. programs. Where are the resulting reports?



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NNP 760041

NARA RG 238, Entry NM70-160, Box 26, Folder  
Hq — FIFTEENTH USA Reports — TIC-PIR / Interr. Kaltenbrunner

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP  
INTERROGATION CENTER  
AFO 655A N N E X N O IIIComments on Amt III

PRISONER: O/Gruf KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst

DATE: 28 June 1945

K. explains that it had been his aim to change the role of the SD from a negative, and criticizing one to that of a positive, and constructive organization. In line with this policy was the interest of Amt III in technical advance, especially when it touched the war effort. OHNESORGE, the minister in charge of the Reich Postal Service had been directing the improvements of already existing equipment. He was supported by Amt III where SEIBERT and SPENGLER handled questions of technical developments. One of the inventions OHNESORGE's scientists had made was an infra-red light which enabled vehicles to move about during blackout. Another one concerned radar equipment.

The last report issued by Amt III dealt with the Luftwaffe. This report had been prepared by SEIBERT and SPENGLER. It was about 40 pages long, and was subdivided into three parts. The first dealt with the over organization of the Luftwaffe which had retained the number of different commands it had at the time of its greatest expansion, e.g. separate organizations for reinforcements, flak, supplies, etc. The report recommended that these organizations be broken down and that infantry units be formed from the surplus personnel. The second part of the report concerned technical matters. It criticized the mistaken use of the ME 262 as a bomber instead of a fighter. It pointed out that in many instances the Luftwaffe had continued to build obsolete aircraft types and it discussed in detail the Luftwaffe's armament reserves. The third part of the report contained proposals for improvements.

Before the report was shown to HITLER, K. removed the criticisms of GOERING. He felt that HITLER was already more than familiar with them. K. also took the report to GOERING who was grateful for being consulted and for the omissions.

The Luftwaffe report was based on information which had, for the larger part, come from sources outside the SD. K. explains in this connection that the attitude of the public towards the SD had undergone a decisive change in the last two years. While in the early part of the war nobody out-side of the SD would have thought of contacting Amt III to report criticisms of the government, lately a great number of people had felt that the SD was the only agency willing to listen. And since the state of the Luftwaffe was an open scandal, pilots, inventors, and production men, came to report their observations.

The report on the Luftwaffe was unique and normally Amt III did not touch matters concerning the German armed forces, so as not to encroach on Mil Amt which reported its findings directly to the Wehrmachts Fuehrungs Stabe.

c. Amt III and the Old Abwehr - 20 July 1944

K. insists that Amt III had no agents in the Abwehr, in keeping with an unwritten law according to which the SD never spied on Wehrmacht personnel. K. admits that the Abwehr always suspected the SD of having planted agents among its personnel - a suspicion that the Abwehr thought was confirmed by the many arrests of its members after 20 Jul. K. counters this argument with the assertion that the SD had known for a long time that the personnel of the Abwehr was reactionary and "rotten", but it was unable to do anything about it. If the RSHA had been in a position to take action the Abwehr officials who figured prominently in the 20 July events would have been eliminated long before.

- 13 -  
S E C R E T

Figure D.941: Headquarters 12th Army Group Interrogation Center. 28 June 1945. PRISONER: O/Gruf KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst [NARA RG 238, Entry NM70-160, Box 26, Folder: Hq—FIFTEENTH USA Reports—TIC-PIR / Interr. Kaltenbrunner]. Ernst Kaltenbrunner had been deeply involved in technological collaborations between the SS and the Reichspost, which had been important for the German nuclear program. Where are the detailed reports on what he knew?

Declassified NWCD A318/20119:54:29 AM  
NW#: 66830 DocId: 33034459

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 196,  
Folder XE061504 Fiebinger, Karl

Interrogation Report No. 517.  
Ref. No. AIU/PIR/135.  
11th June, 1947.

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES SUB-COMMITTEE

Interrogation of Karl FIEBINGER

on 7th May, 1947

Target No. C22/6925

Main Interest: Building Construction.

1. PERSONAL HISTORY

- a. Citizenship: Austrian.
- b. Address: Salzburg, Kapellenweg, 16, (presently under Salzburg town arrest).
- c. Date and Place of Birth: 20 January 1913 at Vienna, Austria.
- d. Description: Height 6'1"; weight 187 lbs; brown hair; blue eyes; married, no children.
- e. Education: Attended Technische Hochschule, Vienna from 1931 to 1937, studying civil engineering.
- f. Political Affiliations: NSDAP applicant since June 1938, member of NSV since 1941 and of NSBDT (Nazi Engineering Association) since 1939.
- g. Military Service: None.

2. OCCUPATIONS: Upon completing his studies at the Technische Hochschule, Fiebinger accepted a position as assistant professor in the "Eisenbetonbau und Static" (Reinforced Concrete Construction and Statics) section of the civil engineering department of the Hochschule in September of 1937. His reputation grew so rapidly that Professor Dr. Ernst Melan, then chief of the Hochschule's civil engineering department, asked his co-operation on a huge construction project of a cement factory to be built at Kirchbichl Tyrol. This project was initiated in October of 1938 and was later known as "Perlmoser Cement Werke". It occupied Fiebinger so fully that he was unable to carry on with his duties as assistant professor at the Hochschule. On 15 April 1939, he established his own office in Vienna, which was known as "Buero fuer Bauwesen Dipl. Ing. Karl Fiebinger". He claims to have employed a staff of 40 engineers and to have gained national recognition for the many projects he handled between 1939 and the end of the war, a fact which was borne out by statements made to interrogators by his former associates. Fiebinger moved his office to Strobl on the Wolfgangsee, in February 1945. Upon cessation of hostilities, he claims to have presented detailed plans for underground installations constructed by him at Ebensee, (V-2); Melk (Ball Bearings); Redl Zif. (V-2), Messerschmitts (V-2) at St. Georgen, to a team of American investigators that was allegedly dispatched from Paris in June or July 1945 specifically for this purpose. During the fall of 1945 Fiebinger organized a new concern in Salzburg, called "Spezial Baugesellschaft, Salzburg" (Firm for specialized construction), which was contemplating the production of small wooden houses. His work was interrupted in February 1946 by his arrest by American authorities as a security threat. The reason for his arrest, as stated on his arrest report, is the supervision of important SS building matters, including a V-2 factory and a crematory for a concentration camp at Ebensee, for which slave labor was used and for which he allegedly received 1,000,000 marks. Fiebinger denies the above charges. On the 29th April, 1947, he was removed from the full arrest category and placed under town arrest in Salzburg, per letter order from G-2, United States Forces in Austria.

- 1 -

Figure D.942: Karl Fiebinger was the chief engineer of many massive underground facilities for advanced weapons production in the Third Reich. After the war he was interrogated by the U.K. and U.S. and worked for the United States. [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 196, Folder XE061504 Fiebinger, Karl]



Declassified NWCD A318/20119:54:29 AM  
NW#: 66830 DocId: 33034459

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 196,  
Folder XE061504 Fiebinger, Karl

per letter order from G-2, United States Forces in Austria.

3. GENERAL INFORMATION: Fiebinger is claimed to be one of Germany's foremost experts on the construction of modern industrial plants, particularly underground installations. His ability was soon recognized by various German authorities charged with the construction, enlargement and improvement of underground factories for the Nazi war effort. Among the orders filled by Fiebinger's office upon the request of such agencies as the German Air Ministry were:

a. Architectural design and supervision of construction.

- (1) Ebensee underground installations originally intended as a testing station for V-2 rockets. This testing establishment was built for General Dornberger of the High Command of the German Army, who was charged with the development of the V-2 and covered a space of approximately 300,000 cubic meters (November 1943 to the end of the war).
- (2) A Messerschmitt factory for the Me-262 (code name: Bergkristall), an underground installation of approximately 15,000 cubic meters, located at St. Georgen an der Gusen, Upper Austria (Russian occupied zone of Austria). This order was originally given by General Wilder of the Luftwaffe but was executed under the supervision of the SS Building and Construction Corps, (February 1944 to the end of the war).
- (3) The underground V-2 testing station at Redl-Zipf, Upper Austria developed for the Rax Werke, Wiener Neustadt, covering a cubic space of approximately 35,000 cubic meters. This organization was later reorganized to become known under the code name "Steinbruch Verwertungs G.m.b.H." under the supervision of the High Command of the German Army (September 1943 to the end of the war).
- (4) An underground installation at Kirchbichl, Tyrol (French occupied zone of Austria) intended for production of aircraft engines by Flugmotorenwerke Ostmark, Vienna. Actual production in this 160,000 cubic meter underground installation never got underway (February 1945 to the end of the war).
- (5) A factory for the Rax Werke, Vienna for the production of coal tenders (December 1942 to the end of the war).
- (6) An aircraft assembly plant at Vienna - Schwchat designed and constructed for Heinkel werke. This plant, covering an area of 30,000 square meters, was destroyed by Allied bombing on the very day of its completion. (1943).
- (7) Design and construction of an air raid shelter intended as the last stand headquarters for Adolf Hitler and his staff. The location of the installation is claimed to be 10 kilometers south of the city of Gotha, Germany and 2 kilometers from the village of Kracwinkel in the direction towards the village of Arnstadt. The "top secret" order for this project was given to Fiebinger by SS-Obergruppenfuhrer (General) Kammler, on Christmas day 1944, with instructions to complete the project prior to 15 April 1945. The job called for the construction of three horizontal tunnels into the face of a hill with connecting passages. It was abandoned during March 1945 when the tunnels were almost complete.

b. Architectural Design:

- (1) Flugmotorenwerke Ostmark, an aircraft engine construction firm for which Fiebinger designed plants at Wiener Neudorf, Austria; Bruenn, Czechoslovakia; and Marburg, Yugoslavia. The designing job covered 40 specialized plant constructions and an area of 400,000 square meters (1941 to 1944).
- (2) The underground installation at Melk, Lower Austria (Russian occupied zone

Figure D.943: Karl Fiebinger was the chief engineer of many massive underground facilities for advanced weapons production in the Third Reich. After the war he was interrogated by the U.K. and U.S. and worked for the United States. [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 196, Folder XE061504 Fiebinger, Karl]

Declassified NWCD A3/8/2011 9:54:29 AM  
NW#: 66830 DocId: 33034459

**NARA RG 319,  
Entry A1-134B, Box 196, Folder  
XE061504 Fiebinger, Karl**

of Austria), known under the code name "Quarz". This installation was constructed as a combination evacuation plant for the above mentioned firm "Flugmotorenwerke Ostmark" and the firm of "Steyr-Daimler-Puch", Steyr, Upper Austria. The scheduled production of ball bearings was never realized due to the course of the war. The Melk installation covered a cubic area of 120,000 cubic meters. The end of the war interrupted its completion. (February 1944 to the end of the war).

- (3) A plant covering 40,000 square meters designed for Steyr-Daimler-Puch, producers of aircraft engines, at Steyr, Upper Austria (November 1941 to April 1943).
- (4) Various designs for Junkers Werke, Dessau, i.e., a new aircraft engine factory at Prague (1942) and two construction plants at Bernburg and Aschersleben, both near Dessau, Germany (1942).
- (5) Design of a factory intended for the production of 1000 bombers per month, scheduled to be built at Oels, near Breslau for the German Air Ministry. This project was later abandoned (1942 to 1943).
- (6) Porlmoser Cement, a huge cement factory at Kirchbichl, Tyrol (French occupied zone of Austria), scheduled for a production of 100,000 tons of cement per year. Project was never completed. (1938 to 1940).
- (7) Design of air raid shelters, bridges and river control systems for the city of Vienna. (1941 to 1943).

4. DISPOSITION: Fiebinger is being further interrogated on German construction methods of underground installations. Any headquarters requiring further information should forward a brief outlining specific information desired to Chief, Air Section, Headquarters, United States Forces in Austria.

(Signed) ROBERT E. WORK.

ROBERT E. WORK.  
Major, Air Corps,  
Chief Interrogator.

AIR SECTION  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES IN AUSTRIA  
Air Interrogation Unit (Int. Center-Austria)  
APO 777, U.S. ARMY.

Figure D.944: Karl Fiebinger was the chief engineer of many massive underground facilities for advanced weapons production in the Third Reich. After the war he was interrogated by the U.K. and U.S. and worked for the United States. [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 196, Folder XE061504 Fiebinger, Karl]



**Günter Nagel. 2012a. *Wissenschaft für den Krieg: Die geheimen Arbeiten der Abteilung Forschung des Heereswaffenamtes*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. pp. 489–490.** [Where are the postwar British reports on information that Erich Schumann gave to the U.K. or work that he did for the U.K.? Schumann must have provided something of great value for the U.K. not to turn him over to the ongoing war crimes trials or to the United States. See pp. 3312–3314.]

In der Erklärung Schumanns von Januar 1957 heißt es weiter:

“Ich hielt mich zwischen Mai 1945 und Mai 1947 bei Bekannten auf, meist in Berlin. So entging ich zunächst einer Fest- bzw. Gefangennahme. Erst in Frühjahr 1947 habe ich mit Herrn Geh. Rat. Prof. Dr. Planck (damals in Göttingen) wegen meiner Einfädelung im Westen Verbindung aufgenommen. Dieser empfahl mir, nachdem er bei englischen Dienststellen hatte anfragen lassen, eine persönliche Meldung bei den Engländern in Göttingen. Daraufhin meldete ich mich im Juli 1947 bei der englischen Besatzungsbehörde in Göttingen (unter Übergabe eines Abmeldescheines damaligen Datums aus Dolgelin, wo ich mich nicht persönlich abmeldete, aber abmelden ließ. Ein guter Bekannter überbrachte mir den Abmeldeschein.)

Die englische Besatzungsbehörde veranlaßte dann

a) Befragung (aber noch auf freiem Fuß),

b) Gefangennahme,

c) Registrierung meines Einganges in die britische Zone (festgesetzt auf den 14. 08. 1947—aber bereits in Lübeck—s. anliegende Abschrift des englischen Registrierscheines Nr. 001013 vom 1. 09. 1947, Intelligence Team Friedland Camp),

d) Entlassung aus der Gefangenschaft und

e) Zuzugsgenehmigung durch den Regierungspräsidenten Hildesheim (Bezirksflüchtlingsamt) von 9. 9. 1947 (s. Anlage zu 25 c).“

Als Wohnorte gab Schumann an: Göttingen 1947, Hamburg 1948, Düsseldorf 1953 und Detmold 1956.<sup>1313</sup>

Schumann’s statement from January 1957 goes on to say:

“I stayed with friends between May 1945 and May 1947, mostly in Berlin. That’s how I initially escaped capture or imprisonment. It was only in the spring of 1947 that I spoke to Mr. Geh. Rat. Prof. Dr. Planck (in Göttingen at the time) about my placement in the West. After making inquiries with the British authorities, he recommended that I report personally to the British in Göttingen. As a result, I registered with the British occupation authorities in Göttingen in July 1947 (handing over a deregistration form of that date from Dolgelin, where I did not personally deregister, but had myself deregistered. A good acquaintance gave me the deregistration certificate).

The British occupation authorities then arranged for

a) Interrogation (but still at large),

b) capture,

c) registration of my arrival in the British zone (for 14 August 1947—but already in Lübeck—see attached copy of British registration certificate No. 001013 dated 1 September 1947, Intelligence Team Friedland Camp),

d) release from captivity and

e) Relocation permit from the Hildesheim District President (District Refugee Office) dated 9 Sept. 1947 (see attachment to 25 c).“

Schumann gave his places of residence as: Göttingen 1947, Hamburg 1948, Düsseldorf 1953, and Detmold 1956.<sup>1313</sup>

Für die von Planck empfohlene Verbindungsaufnahme mit englischen Stellen in Göttingen nutzte Schumann seine frühere Bekanntschaft mit Telschow, der sich in Göttingen aufhielt—damals Sitz der aus Berlin ausgewichenen KWG. Am 4. August 1947 stellte Telschow den Kontakt Schumanns mit den Engländern her. **Zwei Monate später übergab Schumann in Göttingen an “Herrn Porhase (AVA)” einen kurzen Bericht über das Reichweitengeschoss, der für einen Mister Groves bestimmt war.** Dieser Vorgang belegt ein weiteres Mal die bekannte “Situations-Geschicklichkeit” (Cobarg) Schumanns. Vergleicht man nämlich den dürftigen Bericht (eine Schreibmaschinenseite!) mit den tatsächlichen Forschungsergebnissen zum Trommsdorff-Geschoss (vgl. Kapitel 12), dann weiß man sofort: Schumann hielt den Engländern einen kleinen Happen hin, den eigentlichen Braten behielt er für sich.<sup>1314</sup>

**Was Schumann damals alles seinen “neuen englischen Freunden” von den Geheimnissen der deutschen Rüstungsforschung preisgab, lässt sich nur erahnen. Aber es muss—wie noch an anderer Stelle belegt wird—so ergiebig und wertvoll gewesen sein, dass die Engländer hin und wieder ihre schützende Hand über den Professor hielten. Solche Art Fürsorge hatte Schumann in den ersten Jahren nach dem Krieg mitunter auch bitter nötig, vor allem wegen einiger Prozesse, in denen seine Person eine Rolle spielte.**

1313 Schriftliche Erklärung Schumanns vom 5. January 1957 “Anlage zu 24c und 25a”, NL Schumann. Die Gründe, die zu dieser Erklärung führten, sind nicht bekannt.

1314 Briefwechsel Schumann/Telschow 1947/48, AMPG, III. Abt., Rep. 83, Nr. 286. Interessant ist, dass in dem kurzem Vermerk auf den Bericht “Reichweitengeschoss” hingewiesen wird, dieses Dokument jedoch im Nachlass Telschow nicht vorhanden ist. **Eine Kopie befand sich im Nachlass Schumann, mit handschriftlichem Vermerk zum Termin der der Abgabe an “Porhase”, bestimmt für den Empfänger Groves.**

Schumann used his previous acquaintance with Telschow, who was in Göttingen—at that time the headquarters of the KWG, which had been evacuated from Berlin—to establish contact with the British authorities in Göttingen, as recommended by Planck. On August 4, 1947, Telschow established Schumann’s contact with the British. **Two months later, Schumann handed over a short report on the long-range projectile to “Mr. Porhase (AVA)” in Göttingen, which was intended for Mr. Groves.** This process once again demonstrates Schumann’s well-known “situational dexterity” (Cobarg). If one compares the meagre report (one typewritten page!) with the actual research results on the Trommsdorff projectile (cf. Chapter 12), then one knows immediately: Schumann held out a small morsel to the English, he kept the actual roast for himself.<sup>1314</sup>

**We can only guess what Schumann revealed to his “new English friends” about the secrets of German armaments research. But it must have been—as is documented elsewhere—so productive and valuable that the English occasionally held their protective hand over the professor. Schumann was in dire need of this kind of care in the early years after the war, especially because of a number of [war-related] trials in which he played a role.**

1313 Written declaration by Schumann dated January 5, 1957 “Annex to 24c and 25a,” Schumann estate. The reasons that led to this declaration are not known.

1314 Correspondence between Schumann and Telschow 1947/48, AMPG, III. Abt., Rep. 83, No. 286. It is interesting that the short note refers to the report “Reichweitengeschoss,” but this document does not exist in the Telschow estate. **A copy was found in the Schumann estate, with a handwritten note on the date of delivery to “Porhase,” intended for the recipient Groves.**

[How much information from Schumann was forwarded to Leslie Groves and the United States?]



**Heinrich Klein. 1977. *Vom Geschöß zum Feuerpfeil: Der große Umbruch der Waffentechnik in Deutschland 1900–1970: Eine Dokumentation*. Stuttgart: Motorbuch. pp. 96–97.**

[Heinrich Klein (German, 19??–19??) led the Rheinmetall-Borsig team that created the Rheintochter two-stage, radio-guided, surface-to-air missile, which was first demonstrated in 1943 (p. 1924). Klein’s team also created the larger Rheinbote four-stage missile, first launched in 1943 (p. 1925) [Klein 1977; Margry 2001; Mills 2020, 2022]. In fact, according to a 1947 French military document, during the war Klein was even personally involved in “the construction of flying rockets... capable of crossing the Atlantic in 40 minutes” (p. 5534).]

Mitte Mai 1945, nach der Kapitulation Deutschlands, wurde der Verfasser durch eine gemischte amerik.-engl.-austral. technische Kommission auf dem Schießplatz Unterlüss über die neuen Waffenentwicklungen in Deutschland befragt. Zuvor hatte die Kommission die gesamten Einrichtungen des Meßhauses, die Laborieranstalt und der Füllanlage Neulüss besichtigt und natürlich Meßgeräte und Munition durch ein englisches Truppenkommando sicherstellen lassen. Bei der Besichtigung der Laborieranstalt war die Kommission auch auf einige Brennkammern der Flugstufe des “Rheinboten” gestoßen, die mit dem letzten Troß von Leba nach Unterlüss gebracht worden waren. Im Zuge der Befragungen wandte sich der Leiter der Kommission an den Verfasser und fragte nach dem Sinn und Zweck der gesichteten Brennkammern. Die Kommission habe ähnliche Kammern auf der Strecke über Holland in Richtung Antwerpen gefunden.

In mid-May 1945, after the capitulation of Germany, the author was questioned by a mixed American-English-Australian technical commission at the Unterlüss firing range about the new weapons developments in Germany. The commission had previously inspected the entire facilities of the measuring station, the laboratory, and the Neulüss filling plant, and of course had measuring instruments and ammunition that had been secured by an English troop detachment. During the inspection of the laboratory, the commission also came across some combustion chambers from a stage of the “Rheinbote,” which had been brought to Unterlüss with the last convoy from Leba. In the course of the questioning, the head of the commission approached the author and asked about the purpose of the combustion chambers he had seen. The commission had found similar chambers along the trajectory towards Antwerp in Holland.

Irgendwelche Einzelheiten waren dem Verfasser über den Einsatz des “Rheinboten” im Westen nicht bekannt geworden, aber es lag nahe, daß es sich um Stufenteile jener Geräte handeln mußte, die für den Einsatz vorbereitet worden waren. Aus der Fragestellung der Kommission war eindeutig zu entnehmen, daß ihnen das Gerät vollkommen unbekannt war. Sie wollten es zunächst auch nicht glauben, daß das Stufenprinzip für Raketen in Deutschland bereits gelöst wäre, ließen sich dann aber später an Hand einigen Erklärungen davon überzeugen. Mehrere Male während dieser Befragung sprach die Kommission davon, ob der “Rheinbote” die Rakete gewesen wäre, die mit einem atomaren Sprengkopf versehen werden sollte. Auf diese Frage konnte der Verfasser keine Antwort geben, da ihm nicht bekannt war, daß man den Nutzlastkopf dieser Rakete für einen besonderen Zweck verwenden wollte. Wie aus einem später mit dem Leiter der Einsatzabteilung, Oberstleutnant Tröller, geführten Gespräch erkennbar wurde, hat tatsächlich die Überlegung bestanden, den “Rheinboten” mit einer atomaren Nutzlast auszustatten. Wieweit dies nach dem Stand der atomaren Technik in Deutschland möglich gewesen wäre, vermag der Verfasser nicht zu beurteilen. Die Mitteilung von Tröller beruhte darauf, daß ihm SS-Obergruppenführer Dr. Kammler ganz real von einer solchen Einsatzmöglichkeit gesprochen hatte.

The author did not know any details about the use of the “Rheinbote” on the western front, but it was obvious that its stages must have been prepared for [combat] use. It was clear from the commission’s questions that the device was completely unknown to them. At first they did not want to believe that the stage principle for rockets had already been solved in Germany, but they were later convinced by some explanations. Several times during this questioning, the commission asked whether the “Rheinbote” would have been the missile to be fitted with a nuclear warhead. The author could not give an answer to this question, as he was not aware that the payload compartment of this missile was to be used for a special purpose. As became clear from a later conversation with the head of the Operations Department, Lieutenant Colonel Tröller, the idea of equipping the “Rheinbote” with a nuclear payload had indeed been considered. The author is not in a position to judge to what extent this would have been possible given the state of nuclear technology in Germany. Tröller’s report was based on the fact that SS-Obergruppenführer Dr. Kammler had actually spoken to him about such a possible use.

[Based on evidence they had seen, this postwar Allied commission was convinced that Germany possessed or would have soon possessed operational nuclear weapons. What exactly was this commission? Where are their reports? What was their evidence?

German officials who would have been in a position to know, including Hans Kammler and Oberstleutnant Tröller, were convinced that Germany possessed or would have soon possessed operational nuclear weapons. Where are the wartime and postwar documents regarding what they knew?

The Rheinbote version deployed during the war only carried 40 kg of payload. Were the Allied and German officials referring to using Rheinbote missiles with each carrying 40 kg of radioisotopes as a radiological weapon? If so, that would imply that Allied and German officials had knowledge of at least one operational German fission reactor, since a fission reactor would be required to produce sufficiently large quantities of sufficiently radioactive isotopes to support such a weapon system.

The known Rheinbote was rushed to deployment and was likely just a technological stepping stone toward a larger solid propellant Rheinbote-series rocket with a larger payload capacity [Georg 2009, pp. 502–504; <https://archive.org/stream/WaffenArsenal189/Waffen%20Revue%2084.djvu.txt>]. A larger Rheinbote version might have been able to carry the ~300 kg of the small nonspherical fission implosion bomb that was described by other sources (p. 5218).]



**HQ CIC, USFET, Region Munich IV, Munich Sub-Regional Office, 25 April 1946.**  
**Subject: Wilhelm Voss. Declassified 2006 [NARA RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 133, File Voss, Friedrich Wilhelm].**

1. Dr. Wilhelm VOSS reported to this office 24 April 1946. Subject was the director of the Skoda Works and Bruenner Waffenwerke in Prague, Czechoslovakia from 1939–1945. **Subject claims that he has valuable information on atom bomb research in Germany.** He also states that he has information on a new type torpedo which is radar controlled and leave no trace in water.

2. Dr. Wilhelm VOSS was born 1 July 1896 in Rostock, Mecklenburg. [...] He was one of the founders of Reichswerke Hermann Goering and in 1938 became its commercial director. In 1939 VOSS was appointed director of Skoda and Bruenner Waffenwerke by Goering.

3. **Subject states that the two men that were responsible for research on the most secret weapons at Skoda were SS Gruppenfuehrer Prof. KAMMLER and his deputy SS Oberfuehrer PURUCKER. On the 10 May 1945 VOSS and PURUCKER were in Schimelitz, fleeing in the direction of the American troops. PURUCKER was driving a large civilian car which contained many of the plans on the atom bomb. This car plus material fell into the hands of the Russians, and VOSS was separated from PURUCKER. VOSS at present does not know where PURUCKER is located.**

4. Subject was held prisoner by the Czechs in the concentration camp Modran. He was released two weeks ago and at present resides in Odelzhausen near Munich. Subject is moving on 25 April 46 to Egern/a, Tegernsee, Seestrasse 68, c/o REINHOLD. CIC in Tegernsee was notified by phone on the 24 April 1946, and VOSS was told to report to CIC Tegernsee immediately on arrival there.

5. **VOSS states that the following men know more detailed plans on the atom bomb and other secret weapons.**

a. **Director Alfred BAUBIN of the staff of KAMMLER. Middle of March BAUBIN was supposed to have still been in Internment Camp Schtehowitz near Prague. He was slated to be returned to his native Austria.**

b. **Director ENGEL, manager of research laboratory in Pibrams and closely connected with KAMMLER. VOSS believes that ENGEL escaped from Czechoslovakia and might subsequently have become PW in American hands.**

c. **Members of the Research Group could be found in the secret “Mitteilungsblatt des Ruestungsministeriums.”**

[See pp. 4961– 4965 for excerpts from the original German-language interrogation transcript of Voss that is referenced in this document.]

**Wilhelm Voss. April 1946 statement [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831, Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm]. [See photos on pp. 4962– 4965.]**

Die zentrale Leitung der Entwicklung und Fertigung der geheimsten Waffen und Geräte lag in den letzten Jahren in Händen des SS-Gruppenführers Prof. Kammler und seiner Arbeitsgruppe. Dabei handelt es sich um die geheimsten Waffen, Geräte und Verfahren, die z.T. tatsächlich eingesetzt wurden, z.T. aber auch nicht mehr zur Anwendung kamen, und zwar auf dem Gebiet der Atomzertrümmerung, der Umwandlung der Elemente, der Atombombe und der Atomenergie, weiter der Raketenwaffen, neuester Antriebskräfte für Flugzeuge, der Fernsteuerung usw. Während auf manchen Gebieten noch bis in die letzte Zeit des Krieges die verschiedenen Wehrmachtsteile unabhängig voneinander arbeiteten, gelang es Kammler, auf seinem Gebiet vor allem die Entwicklungsarbeiten zentral bei sich zu vereinigen. Er war der Vertreter zugleich des Rüstungsministeriums, des Heereswaffenamtes, des Luftfahrtministeriums und der SS. [...]

In the last years [of the war], the central management of the development and production of the most secret weapons and devices was in the hands of SS General Professor Kammler and his working group. These were the most secret weapons, devices, and processes, some of which were actually used, but some of which were not used [in the war], namely in the field of atom smashing, the [nuclear] transformation of elements, the atomic bomb and atomic energy, and also rocket weapons, the latest propulsion systems for aircraft, remote control, etc. While in some areas the various parts of the Wehrmacht worked independently of each other until the last days of the war, Kammler succeeded in centralizing the development work in his field. He was the representative of the Ministry of Armaments, the Army Ordnance Office, the Air Force, and the SS at the same time. [...]

Mir unterstanden ausser den Konzernen der Skoda-Werke und der Brünnner Waffen-Werke u.a. auch die Avia-Flugzeug- und Motorenwerke, die elektrotechnischen Werke Krizik, die optischen Werke in Prerau, die Sprengstoffwerke der Explosia in Semtin, die Radio-Slavia in Prag usw. Ich hatte also Spezial-Sachverständige und Spezialwerkstätten aller in Betracht kommenden Gebiete zur Verfügung. Ausserdem habe ich für längerfristige Forschungen und Entwicklungen die Spezialisten in unseren zentralen Forschungs- und Entwicklungswerkstätten in Pibrans konzentriert.

In addition to the Skoda-Werke and Brünnner Waffen-Werke groups, I was also in charge of the Avia Aircraft and Engine Works, the Krizik electrotechnical works, the optical works in Prerau, the Explosia explosives works in Semtin, Radio-Slavia in Prague, and so on. I therefore had access to specialized experts and workshops in all relevant fields. I also concentrated specialists in our central research and development workshops in Pibrans for longer-term research and development.

[In this document, Kammler's name is misspelled as "Kammerer." Voss certainly would have known how to spell Kammler's name, so the document appears to have been transcribed by an Allied interrogator from Voss's oral explanation. Kammler's name is spelled correctly in the other documents related to Voss's interrogations, and I have corrected the spelling here to avoid any confusion.

The first paragraph is a very clear statement of the projects under Kammler's control. Voss, who made that statement, was an extremely senior and experienced official in a position to know, as shown by the other paragraph from later in the same document. Note that many of the sites named by Voss were involved in nuclear work, as reported by documents elsewhere in this appendix.

Surely Allied interrogators would ask Voss for much more information about these very hot topics. Where are those more detailed interrogation reports?]



- 1 -

Declassified Case: NW# 67560 Date: 09-20-2022

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831,  
Folder XE065651 Voss, WilhelmI.) Arbeitsgruppe K a m m e r e r .

Die zentrale Leitung der Entwicklung und Fertigung der geheimsten Waffen und Geräte lag in den letzten Jahren in Händen des SS-Gruppenführers Prof. K a m m e r e r und seiner Arbeitsgruppe. Dabei handelt es sich um die geheimsten Waffen, Geräte und Verfahren, die z.T. tatsächlich eingesetzt wurden, z.T. aber auch nicht mehr zur Anwendung kamen, und zwar auf dem Gebiet der Atomzertrümmerung, der Umwandlung der Elemente, der Atombombe und der Atomenergie, weiter der Raketenwaffen, neuester Antriebskräfte für Flugzeuge, der Fernsteuerung usw. Während auf manchen Gebieten noch bis in die letzte Zeit des Krieges die verschiedenen Wehrmachtsteile unabhängig voneinander arbeiteten, gelang es Kammerer, auf seinem Gebiet vor allem die Entwicklungsarbeiten zentral bei sich zu vereinigen. Er war der Vertreter zugleich des Rüstungsministeriums, des Heereswaffenamtes, des Luftfahrtministeriums und der SS. Prof. Kammerer hielt sich zuletzt hauptsächlich in Prag auf. Er ist in der Nähe von Prag am 9. Mai 1945 durch Selbstmord verschieden.

Sein Vertreter in der Leitung der Arbeitsgruppe war der SS-Oberführer P u r u c k e r . Er war Generaldirektor der Industriewerke Spandau (?), eines Unternehmens, das zum Rüstungsministerium gehörte, und gleichzeitig seit Jahren der Verbindungsmann des Rüstungsministeriums beim Heereswaffenamt. Als sich in den Tagen des 9., 10. und 11. Mai 1945 ein Teil der deutschen Truppen und der Zivilisten-Trecks aus dem Raume um Prag herum nach Westen in Richtung auf die USA-Truppen zurückzog, fand sich am 10. Mai 1945 auch Purucker in Schmelitz bei der

-2-

Figure D.945: Wilhelm Voss. Excerpts from April 1946 statement [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831, Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm].

Declassified Case: NW# 67560 Date:  
09-20-2022

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831,  
Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm

- 2 -

amerikanischen Sperre auf der Strasse Pibrams-Strakonitz ein und versuchte, mit seinem grossen Wagen, der nach seinen Erklärungen mit Material Kammerers voll beladen war, die Sperre zu passieren, um sich und sein Material im Hauptquartier in Hinterberg den Amerikanern zu übergeben. Das gelang ihm nicht, da das Passieren der Sperre strikte verweigert wurde.

Am 12. Mai 1945 wurde die Masse der im dortigen Raume befindlichen Truppen und Zivilisten in Anwesenheit einiger weniger USA-Einheiten von russischen Truppen übernommen. Purucker und ich haben versucht, trotzdem noch in letzter Stunde das Material Kammerers den USA-Streitkräften zu übergeben. Wir haben zu diesem Zweck einen amerikanischen Offizier herbeigeholt, ihm die Sachlage kurz erklärt und ihn gebeten, seinen Kommandeur zu unterrichten. Der Leutnant versprach, spätestens innerhalb einer Stunde zurückzukommen. Das geschah aber nicht. Als nach zwei Stunden russische Truppen in das Grundstück, in dem wir uns befanden, eindringen, wandte sich Purucker an einen russischen Hauptmann und machte diesem von seinem Material Meldung. Der russische Offizier hat sofort das Hauptquartier in Stary-Sedlece orientiert und kam sehr bald mit der Nachricht zurück, dass Purucker mit seinem Material binnen kurzer Zeit zum russischen General geführt würde. Wir sind dann mit mehreren deutschen Offizieren und Zivilisten nach Zlabings (Zlavonice) überführt worden. Dort wurde Purucker unverzüglich verhört, der Wagen mit dem Material wurde ihm abgenommen und Purucker selbst wegtransportiert, - wohin, ist mir nicht bekannt, da ich mich, als Purucker mit den russischen Offizieren verhandelte, schon von ihm trennte und von Zlabings aus dann in ein russisches Lager überführt wurde. Welches Material Purucker im einzelnen bei sich hatte, kann ich nicht sagen. Nach seinen Erklärungen waren es die wichtigsten Akten, Zeichnungen und

-3-



- 5 -

Declassified Case: NW# 67560 Date:  
09-20-2022

sonstigen Unterlagen der Arbeitsgruppe Kammerer. Ich kann auch über die Arbeiten Kammerers im einzelnen nichts sagen, weil ich der Arbeitsgruppe nicht angehörte. Ich weiss aber aus den Mitteilungen einiger meiner Herren, die in den von mir geleiteten Betrieben arbeiteten und die auch bei Kammerer tätig waren, dass von der Arbeitsgruppe Kammerer konzentriert die Gebiete bearbeitet wurden, die ich oben angegeben habe. Nähere Mitteilungen darüber könnten folgende Personen machen:

- 1.) die Mitglieder der Arbeitsgruppe (zu erfahren aus dem geheimen Mitteilungsblatt des Rüstungsministeriums),
- 2.) Direktor Alfred Z a u b i n (Prag, Skoda-Werke, Jungmannstr.), der in den letzten Monaten den Arbeitstab Kammerers in Prag leitete. Zaubin ist nach meinen Informationen im vorigen Sommer und Herbst in Prag sehr oft von Russen und auch von tschechischen KNO vernört worden. Er befand sich, als ich aus der CSR entlassen wurde, Mitte März dieses Jahres noch in einem Lager Schtehowitz bei Prag und sollte, wie ich hörte, in seine Heimat nach Österreich entlassen werden.
- 3.) Direktor Z n g e l, der meine zentrale Forschungs- und Entwicklungswerkstätten in Pilsen leitete und der in dauerndem Kontakt mit Kammerer stand. Engel ist, wie ich annehme, rechtzeitig aus der CSR geflüchtet und dürfte von den USA-Streitkräften gefangenengenommen sein.

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831,  
Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm

Figure D.947: Wilhelm Voss. Excerpts from April 1946 statement [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831, Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm].

Declassified Case: NW# 67560 Date: 09-20-2022

Mir unterstanden ausser den Konzernen der Skoda-Werke und der Brünnner Waffen-Werke u.a. auch die Avia-Flugzeug- und Motorenwerke, die elektrotechnischen Werke Krizik, die optischen Werke in Píra, die Sprengstoffwerke der Vyplosia in Semtin, die Radio-Slavia in Prag usw. Ich hatte also Spezial-Sachverständige und Spezialwerkstätten aller in Betracht kommenden Gebiete zur Verfügung. Ausserdem habe ich für längerfristige Forschungen und Entwicklungen die Spezialisten in unseren zentralen Forschungs- und Entwicklungswerkstätten in Píbram konzentriert.

Für die Entwicklung wesentlicher neuer Waffen und Geräte habe ich demzufolge von Anfang an gemeinsam angesetzt:

den Materialfachmann,  
den Ballistiker,

-7-

- 3 -

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831,  
Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm

- 8.) Eine Vorrichtung, die den Panzern ein treffsicheres Schiessen aus der Bewegung gewährleistet.
- 9.) Höchstwirksame Sprengstoffe.
- 10.) Schalldämpfende und lichtfreie Sprengstoffe.
- 11.) Rückstossfreie Raketenbeschütze für Flugzeuge.
- 12.) Automatische Kanonen für 4, 5 und 7,5 cm.
- 13.) 3 cm Flak, als Zwilling und Vierling, erheblich besser als die 3,7 cm deutsche Flak.
- 14.) Elektrische Zünder für Hohlladung und Keilgeschoss, und anderes mehr.

Ein grosser Teil der unter mir tätigen deutschen und tschechischen Forscher und Konstrukteure dürfte sich entweder in amerikanischer Gefangenschaft befinden (so weit es sich um Deutsche handelt), oder ist (das gilt für die Tschechen) aus ihren Positionen entfernt worden. Die Letzteren werden aber zweifelsohne von der tschechischen oder russischen Armee eingesetzt werden, da sie erstklassige Fachleute sind.

Figure D.948: Wilhelm Voss. Excerpts from April 1946 statement [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831, Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm]. Note the manufactured items 9 ("highest energy explosives") and 14 ("electric detonators for shaped charge and wedge projectiles").



**Wilhelm Voss. Statement. 18 September 1946.** The first two pages are present in the U.K. copy of this document [TNA FO 1031/64] but appear to have been redacted in the U.S. copy [NARA RG 263, Entry ZZ-18, Box 133, File Voss, Friedrich Wilhelm].

1. Professor Kammler (G).

He was the Head of a staff of specialists who developed highly secret weapons and war-equipment. Whereas up to a recent date each Branch of the Wehrmacht and its competent authorities had their developments carried out separately, Kammler succeeded in creating in his field a centralized command for all Branches of the Wehrmacht. His field consisted mainly of V-weapons, rocket apparatus, remote control, atomic energy, jet-propulsion and other similar subjects.

According to my information, Kammler, who shifted his office to Prague during the last month of the war—committed suicide on May 9th near Prague. His first assistant and second in command was

2. Generaldirektor (General Manager) [Erich] Purucker (G).

He was General Manager of the Vereinigte Industrierwerke, Spandau, and of the Berliner Spreewerk (production of guns and ammunition). He was in the first place the liaison between SS, Heereswaffenamt (Army Ordnance Branch) and Ruestungsministerium (Ministry of Armaments and War Production) and in the end he became the assistant of Kammler. On May 10th I met him at the American demarcation line outside Schimmelitz on the road Pibrams–Strakonitz, where a large convoy of civilian lorries and military formations stopped, in order to be taken over and directed into the Reich by American troops. We stayed there until May 12th. On that day an order was given all of a sudden to the effect that not the Americans, but approaching Russian Formations would take us over. Therefore Purucker and I tried to hand over to the Americans the very bulky material of the staff of scientists under Kammler, which Purucker had packed and carried with him in a large lorry and in order to hand the material over to the Americans, Purucker called an American officer. This officer promised to inform his Commanding Officer according to our wish and to fetch us and the material within an hour latest. Apparently, however, he did not realize the importance of this matter, because he did not come back. Therefore Purucker handed all his material over to Russian officers. I was still with him on May 15th in the Russian camp in Zlavonice at the southern border of Bohemia. Purucker was interrogated there several times by night by the Russians and one day he was moved together with his material. Where—I don't know—but recently I heard by chance that he is working in Moscow and that his family has joined him there.

3. Ing. Karel Staller (C)

This man is the most versatile and intelligent designer and scientist I ever met. Towards the end he became second General Manager of the Bruenner Waffen-Werke under me—worked, however, as before, mainly in the field of research and development. He himself was the designer of the famous British machine-gun (Bren ZB 26 and 37) and he carried out more or less himself all developments within the Bruenner Waffen-Konzern in the fields of optics, machine-construction, construction of arms, fuzes, ammunition, rocket-projectors, etc. [...]

4. Fritz (?) [actually Rolf] Engel (G)

This man was, if I am not mistaken—until 1942/43 Head of the experimental workshops at Helamuende, which he founded himself. Then I took him over (with the experimental workshops) and made him Chief of our research institute at Pibrams. Engel was a specialist for many years in the field of rockets and he was a member of the Central Commission for rocket-research, Berlin. For a long time he worked together with Kammler, and he knew almost everything of the secret research and development work, especially because he was the President of a special Commission which had to carry out the entire calculations in the chemical and physical fields with regard to ballistics of special weapons and apparatus. Engel and his wife lived in Pibrams. I suppose that he escaped in time across the American demarcation line into Germany and that he lives probably somewhere in the American Zone.

5. Ing Odstracil (C)

After Staller he is, according to my opinion, the best scientist and designer of the Bruenner-Waffen-Konzern, of which he was the official Chief designer. He worked mainly in the fields of rocket projectors, automatic weapons, fuzes and ammunition. [...]

6. Ing. Adolf Vambersky (C).

This man was General Manager of the Skoda Konzern (Combine) and in that capacity he was more or less the Chief of research and development in all fields with regard to the combine. [...]

7. Ing. Alesch (C).

Until May 1945 he was Chief of Explosia AG and Synthesia AG He is a former Austrian Officer of the Engineers in Blumen. Alesch is an excellent expert in the field of high explosives, therefore he directed our latest developments in high explosives. [...]

8. Dr. Kappel (G).

He, as a chemist was in charge of the laboratories of our plants for high-explosives in Semtin. He himself was a scientist and the inventor of the latest patents. [...]

11. Ing. Novy (C)

He was the Chief of our foundries, including the attached plants and the casting houses. He was a specialist in the field of light metal. He is an excellent expert as well as technician. [...]



12. Professor Dr. Maurer (G).

Before he worked with Krupp's, then he was advisor with the Skoda Konzern in all questions of metallurgy and foundries. He was in the first place a University professor (ordentlicher Professor) at the Academy for Mining in Freiberg/Saxony [see pp. 3451–3455, 3474–3434, 3742]. As far as I know he had to resign at the instigation of the Russians. He is an excellent scientific capacity on iron and steel including the working-up process and he is also very practical-minded. [...]

14. Dr. Pavlicek (G).

He was the Chief of the Optiko-Techna.—the optical plants of the Bruenner Waffen Konzern in Prerov. His field was mainly research and development. He was also informed with regard to many particulars concerning his field, inside Germany, as he had to function at general conferences and discussions in these questions, created by various firms under the leadership of Zeiss. [...]

[For the German-language original of this document, see pp. 4969–4975.]

This document supports the story of Purucker fleeing with (atomic bomb) plans in his car and being forced to surrender to Russians instead of Americans.

It also provides more information on Rolf Engel and other experts working in wartime Czechoslovakia, and demonstrates that their expertise covered many of the areas necessary to build an atomic bomb. See also pp. 3785–3788.]

Declassified Case: NW# 67560 Date:  
09-20-2022

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831,  
Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm

### Forscher und Konstrukteure

#### 1. Professor Kamaler (G)

Er war der Leiter eines besonderen Arbeitsstabes, dem die Entwicklung geheimster Waffen und Kriegsgewehre oblag. Während bis in die letzte Zeit hinein die einzelnen Wehrmachtsteile und die dafür zuständigen Behörden ihre Entwicklung getrennt voneinander durchführen ließen, war es Kamaler gelungen, auf seinem Arbeitsgebiet eine zentrale Führung für alle Wehrmachtsteile zu erreichen. Sein Arbeitsgebiet war in der Hauptsache V-Waffen, Raketenwerke, Fernsteuerung, Atomenergie, Strahltrieb und dergleichen mehr.

Nach meinen Informationen hat sich Kamaler, welcher in den letzten Monaten des Krieges seinen Dienstsitz nach Prag verlagert hatte, am 9. Mai 1945 in der Nähe Prags das Leben genommen. Sein erster Mitarbeiter und Stellvertreter war

#### 2. Generaldirektor Purucker (G)

Dieser war Generaldirektor der Vereinigten Industriewerke in Spandau und des Berliner Sprengwerkes (Herstellung von Geschützen und Munition). Er war in der Hauptsache der Verbindungsmann zwischen SS, Heereswaffenamt und Rüstungsministerium und nicht zuletzt Mitarbeiter von Kamaler. Am 10. Mai 1945 kam ich mit ihm an der amerikanischen Demarkationslinie vor Schmilwitz auf der Straße Pribram - Strakonitz zusammen, wo eine Menge Ziviltrucks und militärischer Verbände hielten, um von den Amerikanischen Truppen übernommen und in das Reich durchgeschleust zu werden. Wir verblieben dort bis zum 12. Mai. An diesem Tage kam plötzlich die Anordnung durch, daß wir nicht von den Amerikanern, sondern von den russischen Verbänden, die im Anrücken waren, übernommen würden. Purucker und ich haben dann noch versucht, das sehr umfangreiche Material des Arbeitsstabes Kamaler, das P. in einem großen Wagen mit sich führte, den Amerikanern zu übergeben und zu diesem Zweck einen amerikanischen Offizier heranzurufen. Dieser versprach, unserem Wunsch gemäß, seinen Kommandeur zu verständigen und dann uns mit dem Material spätestens innerhalb einer Stunde zu holen. Offenbar ist ihm aber die Bedeutung der Sache nicht klar geworden, jedenfalls ist er nicht wiedergekommen. P. hat dann sein gesamtes Material russischen Offizieren übergeben. Ich war zuletzt mit ihm am 15. noch im russischen Lager in Klavonice an der böhmischen Südgrenze zusammen. Dort wurde Purucker mehrfach nachts von den

Figure D.949: Wilhelm Voss. Excerpts from September 1946 statement [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831, Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm].



- 2 -

Declassified Case: NW# 67560 Date: 09-20-2022

Russen vorhört und eines Tages mit seinem Material abtransportiert. -Wohin, weiß ich nicht-, ich habe aber zufällig vor kurzem gehört, daß er in Moskau tätig ist und auch seine Familie nach dorthin hat nachkommen lassen.

### 3. Ing. Karel Staller (C)

Dieser ist der vielseitigste und begabteste Konstrukteur und Forscher, den ich überhaupt kenne. Er war zuletzt Stellvertretender Generaldirektor der Brünnner-Waffen-Werke unter mir, hat aber nach wie vor hauptsächlich auf dem Gebiet der Forschung und der Entwicklung gearbeitet. Er selbst war Konstrukteur des bekannten englischen Maschinengewehrs (Bren ZB 26 und 37) und hat außerdem eigentlich sämtliche Entwicklungen, die im Rahmen des Brünnner-Waffen-Konzerns vor sich gingen, mehr oder weniger selbst durchgeführt, und zwar sowohl auf dem Gebiet der Optik, wie des Maschinenbaues, der Waffenkonstruktion, des Zünders, der Munition, der Raketengeräte etc.

Staller habe ich zuletzt Ende des Jahres 1945 in Prag, als ich in Untersuchungshaft war, gesprochen. Er ist Mitte des Jahres 1945 bei den Brünnner-Waffen-Werken ausgeschieden (ich nehme an, weil er nicht kommunistisch eingestellt ist) und hatte nur eine beratende Tätigkeit bei der Organisation der Metallverarbeitenden Industrie in Prag. Er sagte mir damals, daß er ins Ausland gehen möchte.

### 4. Fritz (?) Engel (G)

Dieser war, wenn ich nicht irre bis 1942/43 Leiter der Versuchswerkstätten in Helmingde, die er auch selbst gegründet hatte.

Dann habe ich ihn übernommen (mit den Versuchswerkstätten) und ihn zum Leiter unseres Forschungsinstitutes Pribrams gemacht. Engel war Spezialist seit vielen Jahren auf dem Gebiet des Raketenwesens und war Mitglied der zentralen Kommission in Berlin für dieses Gebiet. Er hat auch lange mit Kammer zusammengearbeitet und war über wesentliche Teile der geheimsten Forschung und Entwicklung unterrichtet, insbesondere auch deshalb, weil er Vorsitz einer Sonderkommission war, die die gesamten Berechnungen auf chemischem und physikalischem Gebiet für die Ballistik der Sonderwaffen und Sondergeräte durchzuführen hatte.

Engel wohnte mit seiner Frau in Pribrams, ich nehme an, daß er rechtzeitig über die amerikanische Demarkationslinie nach Deutschland geflohen ist und wahrscheinlich sich in der amerikanischen Zone aufhält.

- 3 -

Figure D.950: Wilhelm Voss. Excerpts from September 1946 statement [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831, Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm].

- 3 -

Declassified Case: NW# 67560 Date:  
09-20-2022NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831,  
Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm5. Ing. Ostrauil (E)

Diesem halte ich nach Staller für den besten Forscher und Konstrukteur des Brünner-Waffen-Konzerns, dessen offizieller Chefkonstrukteur er war. Er hat vor allem auf dem Gebiet der Raketen-geräte, der automatischen Waffen, der Zünder und der Munition gearbeitet.

Nach meinen Informationen war er der neuen Richtung der SJA nicht genehm, mußte deshalb bei dem Brünner-Waffen-Konzern ausscheiden und hatte keine neue Beschäftigung. Seine Wohnung befand sich in Prag.

6. Ing. Adolf Vamborsky (C)

Dieser war Generaldirektor des Skoda-Konzerns und leitete auch in dieser Eigenschaft hauptsächlich die Forschung und Entwicklung auf allen Arbeitsgebieten des Konzerns. Er war früher selber Konstrukteur gewesen und hatte die neuesten Skoda-Lokomotiven und die bekannten schweren 42 cm Kanonen des ersten Weltkrieges konstruiert. Er ist nach der Revolution vom Mai 1945 in Prag noch einige Monate Generaldirektor des Skoda-Konzerns geblieben, dann aber verhaftet worden. Im März 1946 wurde er vom tschechischen Nationalgericht zu einem Jahre Gefängnis und teilweisen Einziehung seines Vermögens verurteilt, mit der Begründung, daß er mit einigen anderen führenden Tschechen im April 1945 versucht hat, im amerikanischen Hauptquartier die Besetzung Prags durch die Amerikaner statt durch die Russen zu erreichen. Als ich von Prag freigelassen wurde, befand sich Vamborsky noch im Krankenhaus. Wo er jetzt ist, weiß ich nicht. Er wohnte auf einem Gut in der Nähe von Tabor (CSR).

7. Ing. Alesch (C)

Er war bis zum Mai 1945 Zentraldirektor der Explosia AG. und der Synthesia AG., früher Österreichischer Genie-Offizier in Blumau. Alesch ist ein ausgezeichnete Fachmann auf dem gesamten Gebiet der Explosivstoffe, der auch unsere neuesten Entwicklungen dieser Art leitete. Auch er wurde aus seiner Stellung von der neuen tschechischen Richtung entfernt und hat meines Wissens keine neue Tätigkeit übernommen. Er wohnte in Semtin bei Pardubitz.

8v

Figure D.951: Wilhelm Voss. Excerpts from September 1946 statement [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831, Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm].



- 4 -

Declassified Case: NW# 67560 Date: 09-20-2022

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831,  
Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm**8. Dr. Kappel (G)**

Dieser leitete als Chemiker die Laboratorien unserer Sprengstoffwerke in Semtin und war selber Forscher und Entwickler, auch Erfinder neuer Patente. Er hat als Deutscher sicher nicht in der Tschechei bleiben können. Wie ich annehme, ist er über die amerikanische Demarkationslinie nach Deutschland geflohen und dürfte sich ebenfalls in der amerikanischen Zone aufhalten. Er wohnte vorher in Semtin.

**9. Ing. Zubaty (C)**

Dieser leitete unsere Panzerwerke in Pilsen beim Skoda-Konzern und führte selber die neuen Entwicklungen auf dem Gebiet des Panzerwesens durch. Ein ausgezeichnetster Konstrukteur auf dem Gebiet wie in allen Einzelheiten eines modernen Panzers, einschließlich Motoren. Auch er hat seinen Posten verloren und keine neue Tätigkeit. Er wohnte in Pilsen.

**10. Dr. Jurczyk (G)**

Er war stellvertretender Leiter unserer Geschützfabriken in Pilsen beim Skoda-Konzern, einschließlich der Versuchswerkstätten, und war selber Forscher und Konstrukteur. Er hat z.B. die neuesten schweren Minen (30,5 und 42 cm mit einer Distanz bis zu 30 Km) konstruiert.

**11. Ing. Novy (C)**

Dieser leitete unsere Hütte mit den zugehörigen Werken einschließlich der Gießereien und war ein Spezialist auf dem Gebiete des Leichtmetalls. Er ist ein hervorragender Fachmann, sowohl Techniker wie Praktiker. Er wohnte in Pilsen, ob er dort noch tätig ist, weiß ich nicht.

**→ 12. Professor Dr. Maurer (G)**

Dieser war früher bei Krupp tätig und dann Adviser beim Skoda-Konzern für alle Metall- und Hüttenfragen. Er war in der Hauptsache ordentlicher Professor an der Bergakademie in Freiberg in Sachsen und wie ich hörte ist er auf Veranlassung der Russen dort ausgeschieden. Er ist ein ausgezeichnetster Forscher gerade auf dem Gebiet von Eisen und Stahl und ihrer Verarbeitung und hat auch einen sehr guten praktischen Blick. Wo Maurer sich zur Zeit aufhält, ist mir nicht bekannt.

- 5 -

Figure D.952: Wilhelm Voss. Excerpts from September 1946 statement [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831, Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm].

- 5 -

Declassified Case: NW# 67560 Date: 09-20-2022

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831,  
Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm13. Ing. Kautsky (C)

Er war der Spezialist des Brünner-Waffen-Konzerns für automatische Waffen und war als solcher bei der Entwicklung dieser Geräte maßgebend beteiligt. Seine Wohnung befand sich in Brünn. Was aus ihm seit Mitte 1945 geworden ist, weiß ich nicht.

14. Dr. Pavlísek (C)

Er leitete die Optiko-Techna, die Optischen Fabriken des Brünner-Waffen-Konzerns in Frerov und befaßte sich in der Hauptsache mit der Forschung und Entwicklung. Er war auch über sehr viele reichsdeutsche Dinge auf diesem Gebiet im Bilde, weil er bei gemeinsamen Aufgaben, die für mehrere optische Firmen unter Führung von Zeiss gestellt wurden, mitzuwirken hatte. Er wohnte in Frerov, ob er sich dort noch aufhält oder tätig ist, habe ich bisher nicht feststellen können.

15. Ing. Löhr (G)

Dieser war der Spezialist für Munition, sowohl in der Entwicklung wie in der Fertigung in Pilsen bei den Skodawerken seit mehreren Jahrzehnten. Als Deutscher hat er Pilsen verlassen wissen, wahrscheinlich befindet er sich in der amerikanischen Zone.

16. Ing. Stancevilo (Serbe)

Er war der Generaldirektor des Vistad-Konzerns (Sitz Belgrad, Hauptwerk in Valjevo). Als solcher leitete er den gesamten Konzern, war aber selber speziell Forscher, Entwickler und Konstrukteur auf dem Gebiet des Maschinenbaues, sowie von Bomben und Munition.

17. Ing. Noak (C)

Er war der Leiter der Flugzeugwerke Avia des Skoda-Konzerns in Prag-Letnán. In der Hauptsache war er Konstrukteur, u.a. der früheren tschechoslowakischen Flugzeugtypen insbesondere auch des sehr erfolgreichen bekannten tschechischen Kampfflugzeuges. Er wohnte in Prag. Wo er sich jetzt aufhält, ist mir unbekannt.

18. Ing. Ledvinka (Österreicher)

Dieser war der Chefkonstrukteur der Ringhoffer-Tatra Werke. Er hat selber eine Reihe modernster Auto-konstruiert, u.a. die bekannten Tatravagen, und auch modernste Wagen und Motoren überhaupt entwickelt. Ende des Jahres 1945 befand er sich in Untersuchungshaft in Gmünd (Tschechoslowakei).

Figure D.953: Wilhelm Voss. Excerpts from September 1946 statement [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831, Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm].



Declassified Case: NW# 67560 Date: 09-20-2022

 NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831,  
Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm

19. Fliegerstabingenieur L e y s e

Er war der zentrale Bearbeiter der Konstruktionsarbeiten für die Luftwaffe und für das Heereswaffenamt, arbeitete in engster Zusammenarbeit mit den von mir geleiteten Kommissaren und vor allem auch mit Direktor Angel, dessen Kommission er angehörte.

Wo Leyse sich jetzt aufhält, ist mir nicht bekannt.

20. Direktor Ing. J e s t r a b e k

Er war leitender Konstrukteur bei meinen Brünnener Waffen-Werkzeugen und leitete in Brünn auch eine besondere Versuchswerkstätte. Er war selber Konstrukteur. Spezialgebiet: Automatische Waffen, Sondermunition und vor allem 3 cm Flak.

Jestrabek wohnte in Brünn, hielt sich im April noch in Prag auf und dürfte jetzt auch in Deutschland sein.

21. Walter S e e s t

Er war Konstrukteur vor allem auf dem Gebiet der Optik, der Schallmessungen u.a. bei unserer Optiko-Techna (Brünnener Waffen-Konzern in Brerov.)

Seest ist meines Wissens noch in der Tschechoslowakei gefangen, und zwar in einem Lager bei Kollin.

22. Baron Hans K i n n h o f f e r

Er war einer der ersten Fachleute auf dem Gebiete der Personen- und Lastwagen und auch des Waggonbaus, von internationalen Ruf.

Im Frühjahr 1946 befand er sich noch in Haft in dem Lager Prag-Hagibor.

23. Dipl.-Ing. G e l d

Er war Generaldirektor der Ferdinand-Nord-Bahn (Kohlenbergbau). Einer der ersten Fachleute auf dem Gebiet des Kohlenbergbaus, der Kohlenverwertung, Verkehlung etc.

Er wohnte bis zum Frühjahr 1945 in Mährisch-Osterau, ist aber rechtzeitig nach Deutschland geflohen.

24. Dipl.-Ing. K l i m a

Dieser war Leiter der zentralen Betriebsdirektion des Skoda-Konzerns in Prag. Spezialist der Fertigung von Waffen und Maschinen aller Art. Auch guter Organisator für die Betriebsfertigung.

Er ist nach meinen Informationen nach Deutschland geflohen.

25. Direktor Ing. S e e m e r e d

Er

Figure D.954: Wilhelm Voss. Excerpts from September 1946 statement [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831, Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm].

- 7 -

Declassified Case: NW# 67560 Date: 09-20-2022

**25. Direktor Ing. S E N N O W E R D**

Er war Direktor der Skoda-Werke in Dubaica (Slowaakei). Als Spezialist auf dem Gebiete der Fertigung.

Sennowend wohnte mit seiner Familie in Durnica, ist aber im Frühjahr 1945 nach Österreich geflohen und soll sich dort in Linz aufhalten.

**26. Direktor Dr. M I T T**

Er war Leiter der Bräuner-Kaffen-Werke in Povaska/Bistrica (Slowaakei), Betriebspezialist.

Mitt wohnte mit seiner Familie in Povaska/Bistrica, dürfte aber rechtzeitig nach Deutschland geflohen sein.

**27. Direktor Ing. C O R W E S L I H R**

Er war früher bei den Rheinmetall-Werken tätig, seit den letzten Jahren bei den Skoda-Werken als Spezialist für die Fertigung von Panzern und Geschützen.

Corwesslühr war bis zum Sommer in Prag. Wo er sich jetzt aufhält, ist mir nicht bekannt.

**28. Direktor Ing. M A S K E**

Er leitete die Skoda-Werke in Prag/Bukow. Spezialist auf dem Gebiet der Werkzeugmaschinen- und der Geschosfertigung.

Wo er sich jetzt aufhält, ist mir unbekannt.

**29. Direktor Ing. D O S T A L**

Er leitete die zentrale Betriebsdirektion der "Mährisch-Böhmerischen" in Prag. Spezialist auf dem Gebiet der Fertigung.

Aufenthaltsort mir unbekannt.

**30. Direktor Dipl.-Ing. L I N D E N B E R G**

Dieser leitete unsere Flugzeugmotorenwerke in Prag-Letnana. Spezialist für die Fertigung von Flugzeugmotoren.

Lindenberg war bis Ende März in Haft in der Tschechoslowakei, ist dann nach Deutschland gekommen und hält sich in Tagersee auf. Er ist meines Wissens im Motor-Pool der US-Armee in Bad Wiessee/Tagersee tätig.

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831, Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm

Figure D.955: Wilhelm Voss. Excerpts from September 1946 statement [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831, Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm].



Declassified Case: NW# 67560 Date: 09-20-2022

NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831,  
Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm

Dr. Wilhelm Voss

den 19. Oktober 1946

An  
B.P.B.S. - F.i.A.F.

H.B.C.H.S.t

via Commandant Dustain

Ich bitte hiermit um meine Entlassung aus der Haft. Zur Begründung weise ich in der Hauptsache auf Folgendes hin:

1. Ich war bereits 11 Monate, vom Mai 1945 bis Ende März 1946 in Haft in der Tschecho-Slowakei. Während dieser Zeit sind meine persönlichen Verhältnisse und insbesondere auch meine Tätigkeit als Chef des Skoda- und des Brünner-Waffen-Konzerns (1939 - 1945) eingehend untersucht, und ich bin immer wieder verhört worden (von der Gendarmerie, der Polizei und auch vom Innenministerium).

Ende März 1946 wurde ich nach Deutschland entlassen.

Diese Tatsache ist wohl der beste Beweis dafür, daß man mir nicht das Geringste vorzuwerfen hat, denn sonst wäre ich sicher nicht entlassen worden. Wie mir amtlich mitgeteilt wurde, lag trotz aller Rundfragen keinerlei Anzeige oder Beschwerde gegen mich vor. Im Gegenteil, die befragten Nationalausschüsse und Betriebsräte hatten ausdrücklich zu meinen Gunsten Stellung genommen.

2. In den von mir geleiteten Werken wurden keine ausländischen Arbeiter beschäftigt, auch keine angefordert. Ich habe mich darüber hinaus mit Erfolg dafür eingesetzt, daß keine Tschechen aus unserem Bereich nach Deutschland dienstverpflichtet wurden, was besonders schwierig war, als es sich um tschechische Konstrukteure und Spezialisten handelte. Außerdem habe ich zu Weihnachten 1944 dafür gesorgt, daß ins Reich dienstverpflichtete tschechische Studenten mit Wagen der Skoda-Werke nach Hause transportiert wurden, wo sie dann natürlich auch blieben.

3. Soweit es in meinen Kräften stand, habe ich der tschechischen Bevölkerung Hilfe geleistet, wann und wo immer es nur möglich war. Große Teile meines Sekretariats in Prag waren mit nichts anderem beschäftigt, als für Tschechen bei deutschen Dienststellen zu intervenieren, und zwar naturgemäß in erster Linie für Arbeitnehmer unserer Werke und ihre Angehörigen, darüber hinaus aber auch für Tschechen, die außerhalb meines Tätigkeitsbereiches standen und die sich an mich gewandt hatten, weil ich im Protektorat dafür bekannt war, daß ich mich der Tschechen annahm, soweit es in meinen Kräften

stand.

Ich habe grundsätzlich verboten, Vorkausgehrige bei der Polizei auszubringen.

Es steht nachweislich fest, daß mir viele arbeitslose Tschechen, Männer, Frauen und Kinder Freiheit und Leben zu verdanken haben. Ich habe eine große Anzahl von Tschechen aus den Gefängnissen und Konzentrationslagern befreit, sie bei der Disposition Franks vor dem Erschießen bewahrt.

Um nur ein Beispiel von vielen zu nennen:

Im Jahre 1944 sollte ein führender Tscheche, Ingenieur Karel Staller, mit seiner Familie erschossen werden, weil ein Agent glaubhaft gemeldet hatte, daß der tschechische Ingenieur eine wichtige Verheimlichung an die Alliierten verraten hatte. Trotzdem habe ich mich aus gründlicher Menschlichkeit für den Betroffenen und seine Familie eingesetzt. K.H. Frank gegenüber die persönliche Bürgschaft für Staller übernommen und ihn sowie seine Familie gerettet. Davon habe ich Staller außerdem Mitteilung gemacht und ihn gewarnt.

Figure D.956: Wilhelm Voss. Excerpts from October 1946 statement [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134B, Box 831, Folder XE065651 Voss, Wilhelm].

[According to official histories, Hans Kammler died in early May 1945. However, documents in U.S. government archives prove that he surrendered to U.S. forces in May 1945 and was alive and being interrogated by the United States long after the war.]

**Albert Speer. 1981. *Infiltration: How Heinrich Himmler Schemed to Build an SS Industrial Empire*. p. 243**

[...] Kammler [...] came to me in early April in order to say goodbye. For the first time in our four-year association, Kammler did not display his usual dash. On the contrary, he seemed insecure and slippery with his vague, obscure hints about why I should transfer to Munich with him. He said efforts were being made in the SS to get rid of the Führer. **He himself, however, was planning to contact the Americans. In exchange for their guaranty of his freedom, he would offer them the entire technology of our jet planes, as well as the A-4 rocket and other important developments, including the transcontinental rocket.** For this purpose, he was assembling all development experts in Upper Bavaria in order to hand them over to the Americans.

**Hans Kammler's Adjutant Heinz Schürmann. 6 November 2003 filmed interview with Heiko Petermann [courtesy of Heiko Petermann].**

[Kammler's last words to Schürmann before leaving him on 4 May 1945:]

Wenn es heisst, Hänschen ist tot, ist Hans noch  
lange nicht tot.

If it is said that little Hans is dead, Hans is far  
from dead.



7 May 1945 memorandum discovered by or provided to Gerald Fleming (Surrey University). What is the original archival source for this document? [It was published in Reuter et al. 2019, p. 168].

[Redaction 1]

T O P   S E C R E T

[Redaction 2]

7 May 1945

BY DIPLOMATIC POUCH

SUBJECT:        Interrogation Report [Redaction 3] HANS KAMMLER

General der S.S. KAMMLER (chief of all V-weapons production) office at 7, Taunusstrasse, Berlin - Grunewald.

Age: 43 and party member since 1932. Dr. Ing. KAMMLER is a trained architect by profession and was head of all secret weapons projects including the V-1 and V-2. He further claims to have been head of [Redaction 4] project based at the [Redaction 5]. CIC Officer is in possession of documents from KAMMLER which may prove to be of considerable value.

Dr. KAMMLER surrendered 6 May with other named persons attached. Dressed in Heer uniform he later identified himself to an officer of [Redaction 6]. By way of special order KAMMLER is to be transferred immediately to KOHNSTEIN, Germany for purposes of detailed interrogation and evaluation of underground weapons research and production facilities.

DETAILED REPORT:        At the suggestion of the investigating officers KAMMLER is preparing a detailed report (in German). This is to include the following:

Secret weapons development

[Redaction 7]

Underground research and production facilities

Security measures concerning the above

[Redaction 8]

[See document photo on p. 4980 (courtesy of Rainer Karlsch).

This document was typed in a monospace font, with an equal amount of space for every character. It used a single space after each period. The number of characters in each redacted phrase gives some clue as to what that phrase could have been.

**Redaction 1** seems to have been added sometime after the document was typed and was probably an identification number for the document within an archive. That information was apparently removed to prevent investigators from locating the source of the document, verifying its authenticity, and finding other related documents.

**Redaction 2** was the name of the organization that created this memorandum. Again, it was probably removed to prevent investigators from locating the source of the document, verifying its authenticity, and finding other related documents. Based on the style of the document, it was

created by the U.S. military. From information later in the document, the creating organization was either the U.S. Army Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) itself or some other organization that collaborated with or oversaw CIC.

**Redaction 3** contained 6 characters between “Report” and “HANS”, including any spaces (which I will show as “\_”) before, after, and in between. Presumably it named the organization that interrogated Kammler and was redacted for that reason. The most likely answer was “s\_CIC\_” or “:\_CIC\_”. CIC is named later in the document as being involved in possessing information from Kammler. It appears very sloppy or hasty that one mention of CIC was redacted while the other was not.

**Redaction 4** contained 16 characters between “of” and “project”, including any spaces before, after, and in between. It named some secret weapons project that was much more sensitive than the V-1 and V-2, and that still required redaction even many decades later. Based on the sorts of projects that Germany appears to have been conducting, and the sorts of projects that would provoke such secrecy from U.S. officers and censors, it seems almost certain that Redaction 4 concerned the German nuclear weapons program. There are several plausible wordings that match the 16-character space, including “\_the\_Tube\_Alloy\_”, “\_the\_German\_T\_A\_”, “\_an\_atomic\_bomb\_”, “\_SS\_atomic\_bomb\_”, or “\_atomic\_weapons\_”.

**Redaction 5** contained 18 characters between the beginning of the line and the apparent location of the period, including any spaces. It seems to have named the headquarters and/or the most important production location for the German nuclear weapons program. As such, this information would be of great interest to modern investigators. The 18-character location name is preceded by “the”, which also helps to narrow down the possible answers. “BERGKRISTALL\_plant” (St. Georgen/Gusen) and “Truppenübungsplatz” (Ohrdruf) are plausible answers. Other possible locations might have included Linz, Pilsen, Prague, Tuchola Forest/Tucheler Heide, etc., although it is challenging to think of names that the U.S. military would have used for those locations and that would have been preceded by “the” and had 18 characters.

**Redaction 6** contained 21 characters between “of” and the apparent location of the period, including any spaces. It named the military unit to which Kammler surrendered, and it was probably redacted to prevent investigators from verifying this document and finding related documents. Based on U.S. troop movements and locations in early May 1945, a plausible answer is “\_4th\_Armored\_Division”.

**Redaction 7** contained 17–19 characters, and most likely 18 characters based on how far the other black marks protrude beyond the edge of a redacted word. Redaction 7 was the second in a list of four items. The first and third items were almost exactly as named earlier in the memorandum, so the redacted phrase was probably the same or nearly the same as named in Redaction 4. Some possibilities include “\_Tube\_Alloy\_project” (18 characters), “\_German\_T\_A\_project” (18 characters), “\_German\_TA\_project” (17 characters), “\_Atomic\_development” (18 characters), “\_SS\_atomic\_research” (18 characters), “\_SS\_atomic\_weapons” (17 characters), “\_Atomic\_bomb\_project” (19 characters), etc.

**Redaction 8** was the person who wrote this memorandum. Once again, it was apparently redacted to prevent investigators from locating the source of the document, verifying its authenticity, and finding other related documents.

Can the archival source of this document be identified, and can unredacted versions of this document, the documents it mentions, and other related documents be released?]






Figure D.957: 7 May 1945 memorandum, proving that Hans Kammler was alive and being interrogated by the United States as of 7 May 1945 [courtesy of Rainer Karlsch; published in Reuter et al. 2019, p. 168].

**Frederick I. Ordway III and Mitchell Sharpe. 1979. *The Rocket Team*. pp. 282–283.**

On the same day that the first ship left [22 May 1945], Staver learned the exact location of the documents hidden by Huzel and Tessmann on April 3. He did so by a clever ruse. A couple of days earlier, talking with Fleischer in Bleicherode, he casually pulled a notebook from his pocket and read an imaginary entry:

Von Braun, Steinhoff, and all the others who fled south have been interned at Garmisch. Our intelligence officers have talked to von Ploetz [Kammler's intelligence officer], General Dornberger, General Rossmann, and General Kammler. They told us that many of your important drawings and documents were buried underground in a mine somewhere around here, and that you, Fleischer, could help us find them.

As he finished, he watched the German closely. Fleischer was upset by what he had heard and reacted visibly. Staver, not wanting to appear overly eager to find the cache of documents, merely told him to think things over and that he would see him the next day. [...]

Fleischer and Rees finally located the mine[...] Then they returned to Nordhausen to inform Staver, arriving there at 1:30 AM on May 22.

[Wernher von Braun and other key German rocket experts provided direct input for this book, which covered the work by those experts in Germany during the war and in the United States after the war. The book was published in 1979, a couple of years after von Braun's death.

According to this book, U.S. Army Major Robert B. Staver told a false story to a German, Karl Otto Fleischer, in order to persuade him to reveal where some rocket documents had been buried. The allegedly false story was that under interrogation by U.S. intelligence officers, Hans Kammler had said that Fleischer knew where the documents were. Even if it was false that Fleischer had been implicated during the interrogation of Kammler, it was in fact true that Kammler was in the custody of U.S. intelligence officers and was being interrogated at that time.

According to official accounts, which presumably would have been widely reported both in these German circles and in U.S. military circles since Kammler was such a high-ranking figure, Kammler had been killed or committed suicide in early May. Staver's bluff suggests that both Staver and Fleischer knew that Kammler was in fact alive and in U.S. custody; otherwise the bluff would not have been credible.

Perhaps it was not even a bluff at all. Maybe Kammler really did discuss the buried documents during his interrogation, and Staver was simply using an actual fact as leverage to persuade Fleischer to reveal where the documents were hidden. In order to maintain the official story that Kammler died in early May 1945, Staver's claim to Fleischer may have later been explained away as fictional.]



**James McGovern. 1964. *Crossbow and Overcast*. pp. 167–169.**

On the afternoon of May 18, a plane arrived from Brunswick with Drs. [Victor H.] Fraenckel and [Howard P.] Robertson, two civilian technical investigators attached to General Eisenhower's headquarters. [...]

Dr. Robertson agreed with Staver's view, then glanced through his pocket notebook and read a notation: "Von Ploetz said that General Dornberger told General Rossmann that documents of V-weapon production were hidden in *Kaliwerke* (salt mine) at Bleicherode, walled into one of the mine shafts. Von Ploetz was G-2 [intelligence] to Kammler." Dr. Robertson suggested that Rees or Fleischer might be able to direct Major Staver to the salt mine in question, but other than that Dr. Robertson had no further information to offer.

Major Staver spent the rest of the afternoon interrogating Walther Riedel with the thought constantly in the back of his mind of how to turn Dr. Robertson's sketchy lead to the best advantage. The V-2 documents, of course, were not in the salt mine at Bleicherode, which contained only some minor material relating to production. At 6 P.M., Staver left the U.S. Military Government building with Riedel and found that Fleischer had been waiting for them in his two-seater roadster. As casually as he could, after a few words of greeting with Fleischer, Staver took out his own pocket notebook and read from it: "Von Braun, Steinhoff, and all of the others who fled to the south have been interned at Garmisch. Our intelligence officers have talked to von Ploetz, General Dornberger, General Rossmann, and General Kammler. They told us that many of your drawings and important documents were buried underground in a mine somewhere around here, and that Riedel, or *you*, Fleischer, could help us find them."

This was, of course, a fabrication designed to make Fleischer and Riedel think they had been put on the spot by their superiors. Staver reasoned that if they did have any knowledge of a cache of documents they would believe either that they had to tell him where it was or risk being imprisoned for withholding information their superiors wanted the Americans to have.

[James McGovern gave an independent account of the same incident and added a few details. In particular, he mentioned the involvement of Dr. Howard P. Robertson and Dr. Victor H. Fraenckel. Robertson was the head and Fraenckel was a member of the Scientific Intelligence Advisory Section (SIAS) at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEP). Thus they were scientific advisors of the highest level for Dwight Eisenhower. Their direct personal involvement out in the field suggests that this was a matter of the greatest impossible importance. Robertson and Frankel seem to have been involved in interrogating Hans Kammler's intelligence chief, von Ploetz. Could they also have been involved in interrogating Kammler?

What information and archival documents can be located regarding the wartime work and postwar interrogations of von Ploetz? As Kammler's intelligence chief, he would have known a great deal about the most secret German weapons programs.

See also: Jacobsen 2014, p. 97; Neufeld 2007, pp. 206–207, 505; Reuter et al. 2019, pp. 154–155, 273, 367–370.]





## CONFIDENTIAL

- Sp. It was difficult to procure the necessary amount of Oxygen, because I already had difficulties to get oxygen for industrial purposes. I found reasons against the expansion of this program. The bottleneck here was the electro-industry on one side, and oxygen on the other.
- Q. We know that one of the most typical features of all V-programs is the fact that they required high temperature, high pressure etc. That means that they required high-grade steel. How would the load on steel have been in the case of a planned expansion of the program?
- Sp. I had refused to produce more than 600 a month. Originally 900 were planned. I had also refused to carry out an initial expansion of the anti-aircraft rocket. I said that when the anti-aircraft rocket comes, V-2 will have to step back and its capacity used for the anti-aircraft rocket, because it was too great a luxury for me. I could have made about 5 to 6 Fighters with the same man power as the V-2 took, which would have been better from my point of view. It is a technical experience to see such a rocket, piloted by a ray from below, going into the air, electrically directed. That is technically the most advanced thing one can imagine.
- Q. Didn't about half of the projectiles explode before they got away?
- Sp. There was the danger that the projectile would not take off straight. Then one could observe the steering, how the projectile was always brought back into the right direction again.
- Q. Do you have figures about how high the losses were at the launching?
- Sp. Kammler must be able to tell you exactly about this. As far as I know, a projectile came back 10 or 12 times. But then there is none left in the neighborhood, except the command tank with the two people who guide the projectile. It happened that the fusing of the explosive charge did not immediately take effect, but only a few minutes later, so that this last service crew also could get away. The worst thing was when the projectile could not be brought into the right direction, coming down approximately 30 kilometers from the launching site.
- Q. Do you assume in your estimate that the production of the V-weapon injured English production more than German?
- Sp. More than German. I have often said that. For one thing because the dispersal was so great that no real effect could be obtained. I considered the nerves of the Englishmen to be so good that they would stick it out anyway. And your victories came first. A victorious nation could not be impressed by that. I believe however, that the development of the V-2 will definitely be the most important factor for war in later times. At the present time it did not come to full effectiveness. It can be launched from a ship, from every street. They do not need a previously prepared launching site and in the course of time their striking accuracy will be just as great as with bombing.

## CONFIDENTIAL

Figure D.959: In this 21 May 1945 interrogation, Albert Speer knew or at least had correctly concluded that Hans Kammler was also alive, in U.S. custody, and cooperating with interrogations: "Kammler must be able to tell you exactly about this." [<https://digital.library.cornell.edu/catalog/nur01453>]

Colonel Loyd K. Pepple. 30 May 1945 Memorandum to Colonel Sheldon. [AFHRA folder 570.605 1944–46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data. Microfilmed as AFHRA C5089, electronic version pp. 792–806]

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE  
Office of Asst. Chief of Staff A-2  
Exploitation Division, Operations Section

30 May, 1945

MEMORANDUM: Summary of Activities, Operations Section, Exploitation Division.

TO: Colonel Sheldon

[...]

47. The following is a list of key German Air Force non-technical **personnel presently being held for interrogation.**

Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering	Commander in Chief of Luftwaffe.
Generalfeldmarschall Ehrhard Milch	Secretary of State for Air and Inspector General of the GAF—Director General of Equipment.
General der Flieger Koller	Chief of General Staff of Luftwaffe.
Dr. Albert Speer	Minister for Armament and War Production.

[...]

<b>SS-Obergruppenführer Kammler</b>	<b>Inspector of all units of the Luftwaffe working with rocket-propelled arms.</b>
-------------------------------------	--

[...]



AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data




Figure D.960: 30 May 1945 memorandum from Colonel Loyd K. Pepple to Colonel Sheldon, proving that Hans Kammler was alive and being interrogated by the United States as of 30 May 1945 [AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data].






Figure D.961: 30 May 1945 memorandum from Colonel Loyd K. Pepple to Colonel Sheldon, proving that Hans Kammler was alive and being interrogated by the United States as of 30 May 1945 [AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data].



SECRET

17. FLYING BOMBS, Single Pilot, type V-1. Eight on hand and one being prepared for priority 1 air shipment to ATSC, Wright Field.

18. FLYING BOMBS, dual piloted type. Two are available and being prepared for carrier shipment to ATSC, Wright Field.

✓ 19. LIPPISCH P-13 JAGER, tailless twin rocket propelled wing for supersonic speeds indicate that this flying wing together with the unique aircraft controls indicate possible operation at high mach numbers in the vicinity of .85. One aircraft is being assembled in the vicinity of KOECHTEL, AUSTRIA and will be available for shipment to ATSC, Wright Field. The air foil section of the sweep back wing is a symmetrical laminar-flow design with a minimum of parasite resistance. The cockpit is located about midway up the dorsal fin, thus allowing the twin rocket tubes of the Lorin type engine to be installed outboard of the center section and completely contained within the wing contour. Evidence indicates that this aircraft design may be capable of supersonic speeds and that high speeds would initially be reached by the employment of assisted takeoff accelerating rocket units to gain a speed of approximately 80 meters per second.

#### AIRCRAFT JET ENGINES

20. Athodyd (Lorin Engines) units developing thrusts in excess of 1500 kilograms have been uncovered and sufficient design data is in our possession to permit immediate application in the field of high speed aircraft production at ATSC, Wright Field.

21. Arrangements have been made to run a series of performance tests in the high-altitude engine test beds of the BMW outfit at Munich. It is contemplated that several HIRTH 011, BMW 003 and JUNKERS 004 jets of various series, some supposedly running well over 3000 pounds in thrust will be tested during these trials. This test bed equipment appears to be the most elaborate in the world being capable of supplying refrigerated low-pressure air both for engine cooling and combustion, thus completely simulating atmospheric conditions at approximately 40,000 feet.

22. Plans and specifications have been recovered for a number of experimental jet and turbine engines developing extremely high thrusts, and in some cases making use of conventional propeller drive as a means of reducing excessive fuel consumption rates at low altitudes. Included in this series is the BMW 028 delivering an input of 9,000 H.P. through its propeller unit while operating under thrust of an equivalent of 3,000 H.P. of direct Jet discharge. The JUNKERS 022 is another propeller and turbine combination, however complete drawings and plans are not yet available.

23. Convection Steam Cooling. The use of substitute metal for engine turbine blades in lieu of high tensile strength alloy metals that had been available to allied nations, but which were not available to Germany, presented a problem to German research which was met in a novel experimental development. The individual blade was provided with a circulating liquid system within each blade. By the incorporation of a drilled duct through the center of the blade, and filling this cylinder with water, centrifugal

SECRET

Figure D.962: 30 May 1945 memorandum from Colonel Loyd K. Pepple to Colonel Sheldon, proving that Hans Kammler was alive and being interrogated by the United States as of 30 May 1945 [AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data].



SECRET

forces upon the spinning rotor allowed the liquid at the tip of this drilled duct to reach exceedingly high pressures. The system thus incorporated permitted the water immediately adjacent to the duct walls to reach a temperature of approximately 500° centigrade, and equal to the surrounding metal. This outer shell of water moving longitudinally toward the center of the individual turbine blade and bypassed the center column of water in the duct moving outward by the thrust of extremely high centrifugal forces. This method of coolant principle permitted the employment of substitute metals to operate within an actual ambient temperature of 1200° centigrade. It is believed that the novel principle incorporated in this process may be incorporated within turbine blades constructed of improved metals currently in U.S. manufacture, and that this principle will allow a far greater degree of operating temperatures with a consequent increased efficiency of axial turbines of American jet engines.

24. Sample aircraft, drawings, and specifications of several extremely small rocket propelled piloted aircraft specifically designed for anti-bomber interception work have been obtained. The total wing area of these units varies from 50 to 100 square feet. One of these aircraft, the NATTER, is designed to take-off vertically under the control of anti-aircraft ground personnel. For the first 15,000 feet of climb the course of the craft is determined by the setting of the launching device and gyro equipment mounted in the airplane. At this point the pilot takes over and directs his course into the bomb formation. The airplane is capable of reaching 30,000 feet in less than one minute. Upon overtaking the formation the pilot attacks by means of 45 rocket tubes located in the nose of the unit. He then pulls a release causing the craft to split just forward of the pilot's compartment, the nose section falls to the ground and the tail section including the propulsion unit parachutes down with the pilot parachuting down separately. Four rocket assist take-off units are used initially along with a rocket engine similar to that mounted in the ME-163, installed in the airplane itself.

#### AIRCRAFT RECIPROCATING ENGINES

25. Forty-eight Cylinder Experimental Development Aircraft Engine of estimated 2,500 to 3,000 H.P. now at Stuttgart, ATI Center, being crated and shipped to HANAU.

26. HEINKEL-HIRTH Turbul Superchargers designed for use with engines of up to 3,000 H.P. rating permitting sea-level performance at altitudes in excess of 40,000 feet. HIRTH has also developed two stage closely coupled superchargers which are used without inter coolers or after coolers in the path of the inducted air, but depend on direct vaporization of Methanol-water mixtures injected directly into the difuser sections for cooling. Samples of these superchargers are now on the way to ATSC, Wright Field.

#### AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT AND INSTRUMENTS

27. Aircraft equipment and instruments of all models have been obtained of the latest design of Aero-medical, emergency rescue, ground handling and personnel equipment in numbers and types too brief. Priority items are being evacuated to the ATSC, Wright Field for evaluation and study together with the documents that accompanied them.

SECRET -4-

Figure D.963: 30 May 1945 memorandum from Colonel Loyd K. Pepple to Colonel Sheldon, proving that Hans Kammler was alive and being interrogated by the United States as of 30 May 1945 [AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data].



AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data

SECRET

ELECTRONICS

28. Extensive investigation of the German Air Ministry Files located at KOETHEN disclose very complete information on the operation and the installation of the German Radar equipment, JOGDSCHLOSS. The JOGDSCHLOSS is a long range early warning radar equipment used by the Germans for the detection of enemy aircraft. Complete reports on this equipment are being prepared by the Electronics Intelligence Section and will be forwarded to the interested agencies.

29. Complete information on the FREYA and RIESE "G" Wurtzburg radar equipment has been uncovered at the research laboratory located at KOETHEN. This equipment was used by the Germans for ground control interception of enemy aircraft and at present is being classified and crated for shipment to ATSC, Wright Field.

30. A complete establishment of allied radar equipment was discovered at the KOETHEN laboratory. This allied equipment was used for research by the Germans, to determine the various characteristics of equipment of the Allied Nations. It also aided in determining the effectiveness of German counter measures against Allied equipment and in instructing German students in operation technique.

31. Three complete assemblies of the FX-1400 Radio controlled bomb are being sent to the ATSC, Wright Field. In addition, three tail assemblies which contain the radio control are also being shipped to the Aircraft Radio Laboratory, Wright Field, Ohio. This equipment is similar to the AAF Azon.

32. The Telefunken Corporation in Germany, under Dr. Brandt, Chief of Development Research, have trained 2,200 Japanese in radar and infrared technique.

DIRECTED MISSILES

33. X-4 ROCKET. A specimen of the German secret weapon X-4 rocket propelled, winged, controlled anti-aircraft missile, has been found and returned to the Air Ministry AI-2(g), for complete examination.

34. This missile is intended for launching from German fighter aircraft against U.S. heavy bombardment daylight formations and is controlled from the fighter aircraft by means of a pair of thin wires. Experimental development had not been completed, and no known flight testing of the X-4 missile has ever been recorded.

35. HS-117. An anti-aircraft missile launched from the ground has been found and sent to Air Ministry AI-2 (g) for examination. The item was incomplete but examination indicates that it was capable of being launched from fighter aircraft and by means of a development proximity fuse, to be detonated in the midst of a heavy bombardment formation.

SE-5-DET

Figure D.964: 30 May 1945 memorandum from Colonel Loyd K. Pepple to Colonel Sheldon, proving that Hans Kammler was alive and being interrogated by the United States as of 30 May 1945 [AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data].



SECRET

36. GREAT ENZIAN. Data on several interesting types of rocket propelled guided missiles have been uncovered. One of these, upon which the Germans apparently pinned a great deal of faith was the "GREAT ENZIAN". This unit carried a 500 kilogram explosive head and could operate to 53,000 feet altitude at speeds approaching mach numbers of .9. Sixty had been produced for test purposes, 40 flown, and a very high production schedule projected when the organization fell into allied hands and the remaining 20 were destroyed. Dr. Wurster, the designer, is now in our hands and he has given us the following information on this unit: Take-off is assisted by 4 powder type Assist Take-off units which operate for the first 5 seconds only producing a thrust of 3,200 lbs apiece which when added to the 4,400 lb thrust of the main rocket gives a total thrust of 17,600 lbs, over 4 times the total weight of the missile. The assist take-off units drop off when the powder has been consumed and the main rocket motor runs on for 45 seconds gradually decreasing its thrust as the missile becomes lighter to roughly 1/2 its initial value. When the missile is guided within 500 feet of the airplane target it is automatically exploded by a radar device destroying the bomber. The unit when traveling at a mach number of .9 is not very maneuverable, minimum turning radius being about 1650 feet, thus permitting evasive tactics to be successful. Speeds 30 to 40% greater than those of the target aircraft are best. The range of this unit is 15 miles when the trajectory is arranged to achieve the maximum. It can be fired safely at any angle down to 30° above horizontal. Launching is accomplished from modified 88 mm gun mounts with 23 feet guide rails attached.

37. An acoustic controlled guided missile research development program together with operating personnel has been located at BAD KISSENGER. This experimental control system contains four electrical circuits which are actuated by sound, with the intended purpose of launching a rocket-propelled missile into the space occupied by a heavy bombardment formation, and the missile constantly correcting its course by means of incoming sound waves from the Aircraft engines. With control of vertical and horizontal flight, a course of collision with a bombardment aircraft was sought. The group of scientists working upon this development are being retained in custody at the laboratory to develop the program.

38. Controlled Missiles A-4 Rockets (V-2). Seven complete A-4 rockets have been shipped to the United States for study and possible development.

#### AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT

39. PROXIMITY SHELL FUSES. Proximity fuse development for artillery shells has been located. The ALSOS Mission has ascertained that the fuse operates upon electro-static principles and will be a very difficult fuse against which to employ counter-measures. But one experimental manufacturing establishment has been located at BRESLAU, and a field team is searching for some materiel that had been evacuated to the American area in Austria. Interrogation of German scientists disclosed that research has not made the fuse effective for a distance greater than 1000 yards, and that under ideal conditions, 90% efficiency could be obtained. Adverse conditions, such as rain or the presence of high electro-static energy in the atmosphere, would render the fuses inoperative more than 50% of the time.

-6- SECRET

Figure D.965: 30 May 1945 memorandum from Colonel Loyd K. Pepple to Colonel Sheldon, proving that Hans Kammler was alive and being interrogated by the United States as of 30 May 1945 [AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data].



AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data

**SECRET**

40. 5 CM. CANNON. Four types of 5 cm. aircraft cannon have been in development by the Luftwaffe for installation in the jet Messerschmitt 262 aircraft, and it is interesting to note that each of these automatic cannon developed from single shot tank cannons. The weapons do not possess a high cyclic rate of fire, but are limited to between 30 to 50 rounds per minute. One complete installation has been flight tested and the ME-262 is in AAF possession at LECHFELD/AUGSBURG. The cannon mount is an integral part of the fuselage, and a jet trained pilot will fly this aircraft to the vicinity of a seaport for direct loading for shipment to the United States.

41. 5.5 CM. CANNON. Four 5.5 cm. aircraft cannon have been in limited experimental development state and no specimen has been recovered to indicate that the Germans had any hope of success before mid-1945 for limited production of this caliber cannon. Documents located have shown that the ammunition would not be available at that time. Two of the 5.5 cm. cannon employ rocket burning projectiles and it was hoped that in the experimental development items a cyclic rate of 300 rounds per minute would be obtained. Ordnance exploitation teams are directing extensive searches through RHEINMETALL-BORSIG, MAUSER, KRUPP arsenals and laboratories to get all possible information upon present whereabouts of sample items.

42. TSA-2 BOMB SIGHTS. Four German acceleration integrator bomb release mechanism, or toss bomb sights, together with complete experimental development plans for employment have been located at the Carl Zeiss plant at JENA and have been evacuated to ATSC, Wright Field, for further evaluation and study.

#### MATERIALS

43. Plastic welding has been employed by German aircraft industry, and a document covering the complete course of instruction and the handling of this equipment was located at HALLE. This novel method of fabrication provides for the joining of plastics by flame gas welding which allows the sections thus joined to possess the strength at juncture of the original material. The information is being reported to Army Air Forces for joint study by ATSC and the Office of Scientific Research and Development.

#### AIR TECHNICAL FIELD PERSONNEL

44. Approximately three hundred officers and enlisted men, together with eighty industrial specialists from the United States, are employed at high priority targets of opportunity and combined intelligence objectives within Germany to exploit the areas to the maximum. The German aeronautical research facilities at the Herman Goring Aerodynamic Research Laboratory, VOLKENRODE/BRUNSWICK, as the center of German research, has yielded the greatest return in the field of pure research. The establishment containing more than seventy buildings, including a number of large wind tunnels through the range of supersonic installations, covers an area of approximately 4,000 acres. This installation has been exploited as a combined intelligence objective. Dr. Von Karman and his group of eminent scientists have been engaged there in basic scientific research, and large quantities of documents have been selected by them for microfilming prior to evacuation of the selected material.

-7-

**SECRET**

Figure D.966: 30 May 1945 memorandum from Colonel Loyd K. Pepple to Colonel Sheldon, proving that Hans Kammler was alive and being interrogated by the United States as of 30 May 1945 [AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data].



**SECRET**

45. Kockel Research Center. Approximately 700 German research specialists evacuated from the Peenemunde area are engaged in research under their original director, Dr. Herman. Included in the equipment are 3 supersonic tunnels, in good working order, with experiments being conducted in the field of aerodynamic research.

GERMAN SCIENTIFIC PERSONNEL

46. Eminent scientific personnel are available for interrogation concerning German Air Force activities in all the fields of scientific and industrial research. The following are a list of the key personnel together with their principal related activity.

Dr. Ing. Johann W.T. Cassens	Chief Static & Vibration Test Section. FOUR-STAR, 1945-1946
Dr. Helmut Wittmeyer	Asst. to Dr. Cassens-Vibration " Specialist.
Wittwer	Chief, Photo Reproduction & Process Section.
Heintzeiman	Chief Stress Analysis Rigidity Section.
Walter Horten)	Brothers in firm "Horten Flugzeugbau G.m.b.H. BONN/Rh. and have Werkstaette at GOETTINGEN & HEPSFELD. Specialize in "nur Fluegel Flugzeuge" "
Reimar Horten)	
Oberst Ing. Lorenz	Administrative link between development committee and GAF research establishments. A-1 ADI (K). "
Oberst Hoeffner	Chief of Hwy transport in France before and after invasion. Has left ADI (K). See Rept 301/45.
Oberst Trubenbach	JAFU Mittelrhein. With ADI (K).
Prof. Oberth	Peenemunde Research Center.
Professor Buchhold	From Darmstadt Technische Hochschule. Specialty Research work for Peenemunde and other institutions.
" Rau	
" Viewig	
" Wagner	
" Walter	
Dr. Alexander Lippisch	Aerodynamic designs, rocket ME-163 aircraft and supersonic speed flying wing.
Dr. Gollnau	From J. Gollnau & Sohn, Stettin. Specialize in Stahlbau Konstruktion (especially bridges & buildings) and MAGIC EYE.
Dr. Feige	

**SECRET**  
-8-

Figure D.967: 30 May 1945 memorandum from Colonel Loyd K. Pepple to Colonel Sheldon, proving that Hans Kammler was alive and being interrogated by the United States as of 30 May 1945 [AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data].



AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data

**SECRET**

Dr. Martin Dr. Hagenann	From the firm of Ruhr Chemie, Oberhausen. Specialize in Herstellung von Stickstoff and Kuhlwasserstoff.
Dr. Kramer	Ruhr Stahl A.G. Brackwede. Hr. Bielefeld specializes in controlled missiles, X- Geräte.
Dr. Lamblich	Engineer with Rhein Metall, Borsig. Specializes in launched projectiles, rockets. OBHON Verfahren.
Dr. Junck	Retired General/Lieutenant of the Luftwaffe. Has lately been with FOCKE-WULFE, BAD Eilsen.
Prof. Willy Messerschmitt.	Messerschmitt Aircraft Industry.
Dr. Kurt Tank	President and Chief Designer FOCKE-WULFE, BAD EILSEN.
Engineer Hans Multhopp	Chief Aerodynamic Section.
Dr. Ing. Otto Ernst Fabst	Chief Wind Tunnel, Jet Propulsion Section.
Chefingenieur Gotthold Mathias	Chief Flight Mechanics Section. (Project & Flight Test).
Engineer Willy E. J. Kaether	Chief Technical Director & Development Section.
Dipl. Ing. Herbert A.H. Wolff	Chief Flight Mechanics & Eng. Section.
Chefingenieur Ludwig J. Mittel- huber	Co-Chief Aerodynamics & Projects Section.
Lidner, Gerhard	From, A.G. Messerschmitt. Specialty, Versuchs-Einflieger (Test Pilot).
Dr. Schmeierle, Ing. Paul Adolf.	Director of Klueckner Humboldt Wrk Qerursel formerly Motoren Fabrik, Deutz. Specialty, Aero Engines.
Prof., Dr Esau, Phil Abraham	From, Physikalische Technische Reichs Anstalt. Specialty, Hochfrequenz (High Frequency).
Dr. Karl Werninger	Director and Chief Designer of Rheinmetall Borsig. Specialty, gun designing and re- search.
From Research Establishment at PEENEMÜNDE.	
Gen. Dr. Dornberger	Head of establishment, chief engineer on all rocket projects, conceived and developed A & throughout in its military application. Said A & development cost 600,000,000 RM.

**SECRET**

Figure D.968: 30 May 1945 memorandum from Colonel Loyd K. Pepple to Colonel Sheldon, proving that Hans Kammler was alive and being interrogated by the United States as of 30 May 1945 [AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data].



AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data

SECRET

Prof. Von Braun	Chief engineer on A 4. Worked on this project as a civil weapon in peacetime.
Dr. Steinhoff	Theory, design, and development of control system throughout.
Dr. Schilling	Static and projection firing trials.
Dr. Dabus	Ground installations.
Dipl. Ing. Dhenenburg	Engineering design.
Dir. Ruter	Transport vehicle design.
Dr. Tschinkel	Chemistry-fuels.
Dr. Heller	Internal ballistics.
Dr. Wierer	Electrical engineer for round and aricellous.
Dipl. Ing. Hoelzer	Accuracy and effects of alterations in production of rounds.
Dr. Strobel	External ballistics.
Dr. Fricke	Chief designer of rockets using solid fuels, to Rhiurmetall Borsig.

SECRET

GERMAN NON-TECHNICAL PERSONNEL

47. The following is a list of key German Air Force non-technical personnel presently being held for interrogation.

Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering	Commander in Chief of Luftwaffe.
Generalfeldmarschall Erhard Milch	Secretary of State for Air and Inspector General of the GAF-Director General of Equipment.
General der Flieger Koller	Chief of General Staff of Luftwaffe.
Dr. Albert Speer	Minister for Armament and War Production.
General Martini	Director General of GAF Signals.
General von Criegern	General Quartermaster of Luftwaffe.
Obstl. Kienitz	lc of GAF General Staff.
Dr. Benckendorff	Chief of GAF Weather Service.
Obst. Ruhser	Being groomed for job as Chief of GAF General Staff.

-10-

SECRET

Figure D.969: 30 May 1945 memorandum from Colonel Loyd K. Pepple to Colonel Sheldon, proving that Hans Kammler was alive and being interrogated by the United States as of 30 May 1945 [AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data].



AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data

SECRET

Generaloberst Plagman	Chief of Commissariat Officers.
Generalmajor Morzik	Chief of Air Transport.
General Meister	Chief of Luftwaffe Personnel.
General Pickert	Chief of GAF Flak Artillery.
Generaloberst Richter, Freiherr von Hammerstein	Judge Advocate of the Luftwaffe
Generalleutnant Olbrich	Special tasks and troop estimate Staff.
General Kammhuber	Specially detailed officer for defense against 4-engined bombers.
Generaloberst Weise	Specially detailed officer for defense against enemy long-range arms.
SS-Obergruppenführer Kammaler	Inspector of all units of the Luftwaffe working with rocket-propelled arms.
General der Flieger Bodenschatz	In the office of the Air Minister (also political representative for party affairs.)
General Kreipe	(Academy for Air Warfare) Chief of all Tactical and Technical Training.
Generaloberstabsarzt Dr. Schröter	Chief of GAF Medical Services.
Generalmajor Helmuth von Rhoden	Chief of GAF Historical Section.
Generalleutnant Laube	High Commander for Gas protection of troops.
General der Flieger Förster	Chief of Aeronautics.
Generalmajor Lindner	Chief of Civil Defense RLM.
Präsident Habermehl	Chief GAF Weather Research Service (Reichsamt für Wetterdienst).
Generalfeldmarschall Sperrle	Director of GAF Plans.
Generalmajor Hirschold	Commanding General, Ground Attack.
Obstlt. Bar	Well-known Kommodore of J.G3 lately flying jets.
Gen. Von Massow	Commanding General, Training.
Obstlt. Killinger	Interrogation of Allied Air Crew.
Generalmajor Ibel	Commanding General, Jagddivision 2.
Generalmajor Galland	Formerly Commanding General, Fighters.

SECRET

-11-

Figure D.970: 30 May 1945 memorandum from Colonel Loyd K. Pepple to Colonel Sheldon, proving that Hans Kammler was alive and being interrogated by the United States as of 30 May 1945 [AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data].



**AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data**

SECRET

Generalmajor Boner

Chief Signal Officer, Luftwaffe Air Defense.

Engineer Homberg

With the GAF-Hochfrequenz und Nachdienst,  
Weisbaden. (Radio Intercept Service).

# NON-TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE EXPLOITATION

48. GAF RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. Heinz Weber, official German Government interpreter on all German-Japanese negotiations relating to the Japanese air effort, evacuated to United States 15 May, 1945. Documents evacuated with Weber consisted of a basic document of thirty pages and six annexes, setting forth:

- a. Japanese aircraft production, 1939-1945.
- b. Japanese flak guns.
- c. Japanese Navy aircraft as of 1 June, 1944.
- d. Aircraft equipment manufacturing industry in Japan and Manchukuo.
- e. Aircraft production data for Japan as of 1 June, 1944.
- f. Japanese Air armament industry and equipment as of 1 June, 1943.

49. GERMAN AIR EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED JAPAN. Documents concerning the supply of German war material to Japan have been recovered near Berchtesgaden. This file contains correspondence from 1 Gruppe/6 Abteilung, German Air Ministry Intelligence, dated from January, 1943 to March, 1945, concerning the supply of all types of equipment for aerial warfare, including models of the ME 262 and 163 (transported in a specially modified U-Boat), quantities of V-1 equipment, high explosive and incendiary bombs, bombsights, radar apparatus of all descriptions including models of the Wurzburg and Freya, radio and signals installations, telephones, teleprinters, etc., and all types of aircraft parts. In addition the following photographic equipment destined for Japan has been seized:

- a. 25 Automatic aerial cameras Rb 20/30, complete.
- b. 60 Film magazines FK 30/60.
- c. 6 Electric drives 24 V (Amot) with control box.
- d. 6 view finders 18/1.

50. GAF MISSION TO JAPAN. Adjutant to head of GAF mission to Japan, Oberleutnant Schumann, seized with two other officers of mission, prior to their departure for Japan by submarine. Schumann's evacuation to United States was recommended. Other two officers not sufficiently knowledgeable to warrant evacuation. Technical drawings of German aircraft and engines for shipment to the Japanese Air Force with mission have been seized.

51. GAF INTELLIGENCE. The records of GAF Intelligence on the

SECRET  
-12-

Figure D.971: 30 May 1945 memorandum from Colonel Loyd K. Pepple to Colonel Sheldon, proving that Hans Kammler was alive and being interrogated by the United States as of 30 May 1945 [AFHRA folder 570.605 1944–46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data].



AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data




Figure D.972: 30 May 1945 memorandum from Colonel Loyd K. Pepple to Colonel Sheldon, proving that Hans Kammler was alive and being interrogated by the United States as of 30 May 1945 [AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data].



AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data




Figure D.973: 30 May 1945 memorandum from Colonel Loyd K. Pepple to Colonel Sheldon, proving that Hans Kammler was alive and being interrogated by the United States as of 30 May 1945 [AFHRA folder 570.605 1944-46, Misc. Documents G-2 Miscellaneous Data].





NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 174,  
Folder 10.10. Austria Personnel

**SECRET**

U. S. GROUP CONTROL COUNCIL  
(Germany)  
Office of the Director of Intelligence  
Field Information Agency Technical

Mail Address:  
FIAT  
c/o USFET Main  
APO 757, U.S. Army

IN FIAT K 141.8 29 October 1945

**SUBJECT:** Reports on Scientific Research  
in Austria and Czechoslovakia.

**TO :** Headquarters, U. S. Forces  
European Theater;  
Attention AC of S, G-2

*Transmitted by  
hand to Mr.  
M. Berg. 31 Oct.*

1. Attached hereto are reports and other papers dealing with scientists in Austria and Czechoslovakia, which include matter of interest in connection with the Manhattan Engineer District project.

2. Two of these reports were written by Mr. T. M. ODORENKO an American investigator sponsored by FIAT, upon his return from a recent mission to Austria and Czechoslovakia. No distribution of these reports is being made by FIAT, other than the than the present action.

3. The remaining papers, a description of which is given in the covering letter to Col. PEPPLE, A.T.I., USAFE, deal with the group of scientists now in the Western Austria. Since this material and the ODORENKO reports are closely related, they are being transmitted together at Col PEPPLES suggestion. (Enclosure (2 of these papers has not been received by USAFE)).

For the Director of Intelligence

*R.M. Osborne*  
R.M. OSBORNE  
Colonel, GSC  
Chief, FIAT(US)

**SECRET**

**Incls.**

Report "Atomic Bomb Research in Russian  
Zone of Cszechoslovakia" (2)

Report "Problem of Displaced Scientists now Residing in the  
American Zone of Austria" (2)

Covering letter, addressed to A.I.I., USAFE, and Enclosures (with  
exception of Enclosure No. 3.)

Figure D.974: R. M. Osborne. 29 October 1945. Subject: Reports on Scientific Research in Austria and Czechoslovakia. This memo demonstrates the intersection of Loyd K. Pepple, Todos M. Odarenko, Moe Berg, and others involved in deep investigations of the German nuclear program after the war [NARA RG 77, Entry UD-22A, Box 174, Folder 10.10. Austria Personnel].